Editorial

vWhile the chairmanship of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (G8GP) passed from the USA to the UK at the end of 2012, it is worth noting the steady increase in the initiative’s membership, as agreed in 2011 (from the Group of Eight industrialized countries in 2002 to twenty-five countries and the EU to date), along with a gradual rapprochement between the G8GP scope and methodology, and the overarching European approach to international security.

As stated in the report presented at the Deauville Summit in May 2011, the G8GP has become “a large-scale collaborative international initiative” gradually “focusing on nuclear and radiological security, bio-security, scientist engagement and facilitation of implementation of UNSCR 1540”.

More particularly, the year 2012 was marked by an emphasis placed on the issues of information sharing and coordination. This field represents a real opportunity for the EU as a global actor. As the last Six-monthly Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD (2012/II) put it, “the EU Centres of Excellence gained momentum within (…) the G8GP, in particular as a tool to facilitate exchange of information regionally and, possibly, avoid duplication among donors.”

As an operationally-oriented framework, the G8GP has never been put under the spotlight. The same applies for the European Strategy against the proliferation of WMD, which was adopted one year after the G8GP was launched. Even if the visibility of these two frameworks and associated tools can be perceived as being quite low, which is often the case, they were designed to achieve practical long-term benefits. This is their essence and their value.

Benjamin Hautecouverture
EU Non-Proliferation Consortium / Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

February/March 2013, Issue No. 8

The EU Strategy fitted well into Hungary’s commitments

Hungary has been a party of all multilateral treaties on the non-proliferation of WMD. Even if a small number of Hungarian experts are following these issues, we believe that the EU Strategy is a welcome development.
Erzsébet N. RÓZSA, Arabist and Iranist by training, joined HIIA in 1990 and was appointed Executive Director in 2009. She was a Rockefeller Brothers Foundation scholarship holder at the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, studying nuclear non-proliferation in 1993-1994. She defended her PhD in International Relations (nuclear non-proliferation) in 1996. She has been lecturing on nuclear non-proliferation and the Middle East at the National University of Public Service.
Hungary signed the Treaty of accession to the EU at the time of adoption of the EU Strategy against the spread of WMD. How is the Strategy perceived in Budapest?

Hungary has been a party of all multilateral treaties and agreements on the non-proliferation of WMD, and has not had any activity (of its own) falling under their prohibition since the Second World War. Within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization developing any WMD program or capacity without the approval of the Soviet Union was out of question, and the Eastern bloc policy was the proactive participation in the WMD non-proliferation regimes. Following the regime change in 1989, Hungarian foreign policy priority of joining the Euro-Atlantic community further strengthened this commitment. Therefore, the adoption of the EU Strategy against the spread of WMD fitted well into Hungary’s commitments and policies. Consequently, the Strategy is not part of the public discourse in Hungary and being a small country, only a small number of experts are following the issue. That being said, those experts believe that the Strategy is a welcome development, one that harmonizes well with 2003 ESS and the findings of the 2008 ESS review. This is well reflected in the new National Security Strategy of Hungary published in 2012, which has been drawn up based on the ESS and using the relevant ESS and NATO New Strategic Concept terminology.

aaaTextNotToBeShownaaa

What are the HIIA’s main areas of focus and current projects as far as non-proliferation is concerned?

Nonproliferation and disarmament per se is not among the main fields of research of the HIIA, however, due to HIIA’s philosophy (each researcher should have a theoretic and a regional expertise) and staff capacities non-proliferation and disarmament case studies are frequent. HIIA's focus regarding nonproliferation issues mostly, but not exclusively, concentrates on the Central European context, in cooperation with other think tanks in Central Europe, Russia and the US. Recently, non-proliferation in the Middle East, including the Iranian nuclear debate and the planned WMDFZ negotiations, have also been in the forefront of activities. HIIA researchers are participating in international projects, conferences and seminars organized on these subjects by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the Pugwash Movement, PRIF (Frankfurt), ACSIS (Amman) and CSR (Tehran). In a joint project with the MFA, HIIA is currently working on a "Nonproliferation and Disarmament Handbook" in Hungarian aiming at providing the experts, the students and the public with a complete guide to non-proliferation and disarmament, covering both conventional and WMD weapons.

Interview conducted by Benjamin Hautecouverture
Research Fellow
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), Paris

Ten years after the adoption of the Strategy, how would you define the future challenges in Europe on this front?

Although Hungary perceives no direct military threats, global concerns, such as the proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles are mentioned in the National Security Strategy. To counter such threats Hungary joined and has actively participated in all WMD-relevant verification organizations and export control regimes. In the short to medium term the most imminent challenges Europe should be concerned with are the transportation of dual use items suitable for use in proliferation-sensitive technologies as some precedents have shown that this is a real possibility on the territory of the EU. In this context the appearance of private companies in the R&D and production – of especially the dual use materials, equipment and technologies - is a further, yet unsolved challenge. The failure of the international effort to find a solution to the lack of a verification system within the BTWC should also be mentioned. Hungary was deeply involved in the relevant negotiations headed by Ambassador Tibor Tóth, and has supported all further initiatives and confidence-building measures to this end. Finally, the decision on the US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will have to be made.

aaaTextNotToBeShownaaa