

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE

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I. INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence (COE) Initiative was launched in May 2010 in response to the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries outside Europe to mitigate CBRN risks, including criminal activities (e.g. CBRN proliferation or terrorism), natural disasters (e.g. swine flu) and accidental disasters (e.g. Bhopal or Fukushima).¹ The objective of the COE Initiative is to develop a structural, all-hazards CBRN policy at the national, regional and international levels to anticipate and respond to these risks, and to reduce the vulnerability of countries to CBRN events. In this respect, the initiative is in the reciprocal interests of regional and EU security.²

Given the dynamic nature of the CBRN COE Initiative, this paper offers a snapshot of its development and current status. Section II describes the legal framework underpinning the EU CBRN risk-mitigation actions—the 2006 Instrument for Stability (IFS)—and also explains the EU's innovative holistic approach and the structure of the CBRN network, including the establishment of the Regional Secretariats. Section III describes the scope of the 32 COE projects to be carried out in 2013 according to the CBRN materials and agents concerned.

¹ On the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative see the CBRN COE website, <<http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/>>.

² European Council, Notices from European Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to the Council, Six-monthly Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', C37, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 9 Feb. 2013.

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent the official position of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

SUMMARY

This paper outlines the development and current state of the European Union (EU) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centres of Excellence (COE) Initiative. It describes the legal framework underpinning the EU CBRN risk-mitigation actions—the Instrument for Stability (IFS)—and also illustrates the EU's innovative holistic approach and the structure of the CBRN network, as well as the establishment of the Regional Secretariats.

The paper analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the COE Initiative and identifies several issues that need to be addressed if the initiative is to be successful. It argues that the proposed new IFS for the period 2014–20, EU member states' support for the initiative and the appreciation demonstrated by international organizations and other interested stakeholders should help ensure the continuity of the actions currently being undertaken by the EU to control the proliferation of CBRN materials.

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Section IV analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the COE Initiative. Section V identifies several issues that need to be addressed if the initiative is to be successful. Section VI outlines the scope of the proposed IFS for 2014–20. Section VII presents conclusions.

II. BACKGROUND TO THE CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE CONCEPT

The Instrument for Stability

The legal basis of the CBRN COE is the November 2006 regulation of the European Parliament and of the European Council establishing the IFS, and more specifically the first priority of this regulation, namely ‘Risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents’.³ The IFS, created as part of the 2006 reform of the European Community’s external financing instruments, has been designed to provide the EU with a strategic and innovative tool to address global security challenges that constitute sources of insecurity and impediments to development for states and their citizens. The rationale is based on the concept that sustainable economic growth and social development are unthinkable without a safe environment in which they can flourish—in other words, that lasting security is a precondition for development.

The IFS programme for 2009–11 provides the context and justification for the creation of the CBRN COE Initiative in terms of support for the objectives of the 2003 EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁴ Economic development and high growth rates in emerging economies increase the availability of CBRN materials, agents and processing equipment.⁵ This may lead to an increase in the number of laboratories handling highly sensitive biological

and chemical substances, as well as a risk of increased clandestine production, nuclear smuggling and the exploitation of CBRN materials by terrorists. To address these related risks and threats, the European Commission and other donors are already supporting a number of assistance programmes on export controls, illicit transfers, the security and safety of facilities in specific sectors, and the employment of former weapons scientists.⁶ Building capacities and conducting training in these areas are necessary preconditions for a more effective response to CBRN proliferation, and also help ensure the sustainability of COE programmes.

So far, much of the CBRN training provided by the European Commission has been in the former Soviet Union, focusing on nuclear safeguards and security. However, growing demand for nuclear energy, biotechnology and chemical substances in parts of Africa, in the Middle East, and in South and South East Asia requires the extension of a culture of safety and security to these regions. This shift reflects the requirement under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to assist countries in need on a global scale and the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized states has agreed to facilitate implementation of this assistance.⁷

Innovative approach

A recent assessment of the Nuclear Security COE categorizes centres of excellence on the basis of their core activities, distinguishing between those that are technical and scientific in nature with a focus on training on the use, calibration and maintenance of equipment (Group A); educational (Group B); encompassing a wider range of topics (Group C); focused on nuclear research and development (Group D); or raising awareness of nuclear security (Group E). The EU CBRN COE Initiative falls under Group C.⁸ The assessment pointed to the problem of

³ Council Regulation (EC) no. 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Nov. 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L327, 24 Nov. 2006; and European Commission, ‘Instrument for Stability’, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ifs_en.htm>.

⁴ Council of the European Union, ‘Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 15708/03, 10 Dec. 2003, <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33234_en.htm>.

⁵ European Commission, ‘The Instrument for Stability—Multi-annual indicative programme 2009–2011’, C(200)2641, 8 Apr. 2009.

⁶ Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ‘Kananaskis principles and guidelines’, 27 June 2002, <<http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html>>; and Canadian Government, ‘Report on the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction’, 27 May 2011, <<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2011/Annex6-Report-G8GlobalPartnershipAgainsttheSpreadofWeaponsandMaterialsofMassDestruction.aspx>>.

⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 15 Apr. 2004; and Canadian Government (note 6), para. 4.

⁸ Heyes, A., ‘An assessment of the Nuclear Security Centres of Excellence’, Stanley Foundation, May 2012, <<http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/AlanHeyesPAB512.pdf>>.

coordination of current and planned efforts to establish and maintain COEs, stating that it is important to 'ensure that there is consistency of approach in terms of the technical and educational aspects which will determine the long-term sustainability of the centres'.⁹

The approach adopted by the EU in establishing the CBRN COE Initiative is innovative and broad-ranging.¹⁰ The initiative aims to provide training and assistance in the implementation of international commitments to mitigate CBRN proliferation risks; support national capacities to develop and enforce legal measures; ensure ownership and sustainability through an integrated regional approach; and provide a coherent package covering all aspects of CBRN proliferation, including export controls, illicit transfers, safety and security (taking due account of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation, and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Actions), emergency planning and crisis response.¹¹ However, the use of the term 'centres' misrepresents the COE concept—the EU does not intend to construct buildings of any sort but rather to create a 'network' of experts, facilities and training areas.¹²

The initiative is jointly implemented by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the scientific and technical arm of the European Commission, and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in close cooperation with the European Commission Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Relying on seven scientific institutes with a wide range of laboratories and unique research facilities, the JRC provides scientific advice and technical knowledge to support EU policies.¹³ Its status as a European Commission service guarantees its independence from private or national interests. UNICRI is an independent UN agency with a long history of experience in security governance. UNICRI supports governments and the international community in tackling criminal threats to social peace, development and political stability. The UNICRI

programmes aim to promote national self-reliance and the development of institutional capabilities.¹⁴

Structure

The structure of the CBRN COE network comprises EU member states and international organizations, international working groups (e.g. the Working Group of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction) and Regional Secretariats. The Regional Secretariats communicate with National Focal Points (NFPs) and CBRN teams, and assist in the implementation of projects in each region. The NFPs in partner countries are designated by the authorities and constitute the nodes of the CBRN network. The Regional Secretariats are responsible for supporting countries in the identification of needs, the formulation of regionally focused project proposals, the development and improvement of CBRN National Action Plans and the execution of approved projects. Each Regional Secretariat organizes biannual round table meetings for all NFPs in the region in order to coordinate activities, exchange views and opinions and ensure the sustainability of the network.

Current status of the Regional Secretariats

While eight regions have expressed interest in hosting Regional Secretariats, only five have so far been set up. The countries included in each region were described both at the COE International Conference in May 2012 and at the G8 Global Partnership meeting in August 2012.¹⁵ The situation is very dynamic and evolving continuously as new partner countries are invited to join the COE Initiative. The status of the Regional Secretariats at the end of March 2013 can be summarized as follows.

1. *Middle East*. This Regional Secretariat comprises Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, with the possibility that Egypt and Syria will join in the future. The secretariat

⁹ Heyes (note 8).

¹⁰ EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative, 'A coordinated strategy for CBRN risk mitigation', [n.d.], <<http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/ReadMore.aspx>>.

¹¹ European Commission (note 5), p. 23.

¹² Thorton, M., 'The network of excellence', *CBRNe World*, Spring 2011, <<http://www.cbrneworld.com>>.

¹³ On the Joint Research Centre see the JRC website, <<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm>>.

¹⁴ On the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute see the UNICRI website, <<http://www.unicri.it/>>.

¹⁵ First COE International Conference 'Working with EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence: What concrete role for EU Stakeholders and Partners', Brussels, May 2012; and Meeting of the Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and materials of Mass Destruction, Stockholm, Aug. 2012.

is located in Amman, Jordan and officially opened in September 2012.¹⁶

2. *North Africa*. This Regional Secretariat will be located in Algiers and the participating countries will be Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.

3. *African Atlantic Façade*. The countries that have adhered to the initiative and that have been designated NFPs are Gabon, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal. The second round-table meeting was held in October 2012 in Rabat, Morocco and representatives of other countries in the region—including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia—participated as observers. The Regional Secretariat will be located in Rabat.

4. *South Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine*. This Regional Secretariat will be placed in Tbilisi, Georgia, and the countries involved are Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Montenegro, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. In October 2012, Croatia hosted the fourth round-table meeting of the NFPs for the region.¹⁷

5. *South East Asia*. This region includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. The Regional Secretariat is located in Manila, the Philippines, and was officially opened on 6 March 2013.¹⁸

6. *Central and Eastern Africa*. This Regional Secretariat will be sited in Nairobi, Kenya. The countries in the region that have been designated NFPs and which participated in the round table meeting held in Nairobi in November 2012 are the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya and Uganda. Representatives from Burundi, Ethiopia, the Seychelles, South Sudan and Tanzania participated as observers.¹⁹

7. *Central Asia*. This region comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The Regional Secretariat will be located in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

8. *Gulf Cooperation Council countries*. A Regional Secretariat is foreseen in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). In January 2013 the UAE hosted a conference to promote the CBRN COE initiative. Representatives from Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia attended the event.²⁰

This summary indicates that the operability of the Regional Secretariats differs from region to region, with only three secretariats—in Jordan, the Philippines and Morocco—officially opened thus far. The secretariat in Amman was the first to be officially set up, with Jordan's Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS) receiving the endorsement of the Jordanian Government and of the COE partner countries in the region that attended the round-table meeting in September 2012 inaugurating the operations.²¹ MESIS is associated with the Royal Scientific Society and is an independent Jordanian non-governmental organization that has been classified under Group E and cited as an example of an awareness-raising organization which is in part dependent on the support of partners to provide funding for a range of capacity building and scientists' engagement activities.²²

Nevertheless, the CBRN COE team undertook an impressive range of activities in 2012 including bilateral meetings, round tables, awareness raising, and CBRN governance workshops. The initiative has also been presented at various international events including the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit (in March 2012); the EU–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting in Brunei Darussalam (April 2012); a workshop on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 organized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in Lithuania (June 2012); the World Health Organization (WHO) Conference in Bali (June 2012); the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) meeting of experts in Geneva (July 2012); the G8 Global Partnership meeting in Stockholm (August 2012); the international working group of the Landau Network Centro Volta in Italy (September 2012); and the ASEAN

¹⁶ CBRN COE, 'Newsletter', no. 4, Oct. 2012, <<http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/Portals/0/cbrn-coe-public-documents/cbrn%20coe%20newsletter%20volume%204%202012.pdf>>.

¹⁷ CBRN COE, 'Newsletter', no. 5, Feb. 2013, <<http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/Portals/0/cbrn-coe-public-documents/cbrn%20coe%20newsletter%20vol%205.pdf>>.

¹⁸ Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines, 'The European Union Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence Initiative Regional Secretariat for South East Asia opens on 6 March', Press release, 6 Mar. 2013, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/philippines/documents/press_corner/20130603.pdf>.

¹⁹ CBRN COE (note 17).

²⁰ CBRN COE (note 17).

²¹ CBRN COE (note 16).

²² On the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security see the MESIS website, <<http://www.mesis.jo/>>.

Regional Forum in Manila (September 2012). Finally, participants at the COE conference in Brussels in May 2012 discussed the concrete role of EU stakeholders, and the initiative was presented to an international audience at the CBRN COE conference at the UN in New York in June 2012.

These communication efforts are undoubtedly extremely important and should be praised, but the question that arises immediately is whether the management of the Regional Secretariats can be achieved properly and efficiently without the presence on the ground of EU experts. In order to solve this crucial challenge, UNICRI and DG DEVCO are settling Regional Coordinators in the countries that have officially agreed to host the Regional Secretariats, in order to reinforce local and regional capabilities and strengthen relations between the EU and the partner countries.

III. FUNDING AND PROJECTS

Funding under the Annual Action Programme

As stated in the most recent six-monthly report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Annual Action Programme (AAP) budget for the different phases of the COE CBRN initiative was €79.3 million, of which €56.45 million was for the implementation of projects, with the remainder allocated to management contracts with the JRC and UNICRI.²³

The budget for the preparation phase of the CBRN COE initiative, as reported in the AAPs for 2007 and 2008, was €2 million.²⁴ The first phase under the AAP for 2009 reserved an amount of €5 million for the CBRN Initiative including the conceptualization of the initiative; the setting up of the Ukraine, Caucasus and South East Asia Regional Secretariats; the development of key performance indicators (KPIs) for projects; and two pilot projects in South East Asia, implemented by the University of Milan and the JRC in Karlsruhe, Germany, respectively.²⁵

²³ European Council, 'Six-monthly Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2012/II)', *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2013/C 37/04, p. 3.

²⁴ European Council (note 23), p. 22.

²⁵ European Commission (note 5); and European Council (note 23), p. 23.

The budget for the second phase under the AAP for 2010 was €20.8 million, of which €4.5 million was allocated to UNICRI to set up new centres in the Middle East and, possibly, in North Africa, Central Asia, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Central and East Africa, and the extension of the secretariats in South East Asia, South Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine. A total of €16.3 million was allocated for the implementation of projects.²⁶

The third phase, under the AAP for 2011, earmarked €14.7 million for the initiative, of which €9.2 million was for projects and the remainder for management costs incurred by the JRC and UNICRI.²⁷

The fourth phase, under the AAP for 2012, had a budget of €36.8 million for the initiative. This amount was to be spent on (a) extending existing activities (i.e., the management contracts with JRC) until the end of 2014 (€5 million); (b) extending the existing Regional Secretariats managed by UNICRI until the end of 2014 (€3.1 million); and (c) improving national CBRN policies through the implementation of concrete actions in the areas of export control of dual use goods; illicit transfers of CBRN materials; biosafety and biosecurity; and engagement of scientists (€30.2 million).²⁸

In April 2012 a total of 19 projects were approved for funding.²⁹ The evaluation of the proposals for implementation was carried out by UNICRI. The contracting procedures for 14 projects ended in 2012 and the corresponding activities started in January 2013. The application process for five further projects is still ongoing.³⁰

In October 2012 the European Commission, through DG DEVCO, invited consortia of EU member states to take part in the tender procedure to implement eight projects with a total budget of €5.7 million by means

²⁶ European Council (note 23), p. 24.

²⁷ European Council (note 23), p. 25.

²⁸ Key recommendations from the G8 L'Aquila Summit identified the value of global scientists' engagement and nonproliferation awareness-raising programmes. They also reinforced the fact that scientists' professional responsibility and codes of conduct can be effective risk-reduction tools for addressing long term CBRN proliferation concerns. See Global Partnership Working Group, 'Recommendations for a coordinated approach in the field of global weapons of mass destruction knowledge proliferation and scientist engagement', G8 L'Aquila Summit, 2009, <http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/Annex_B%2c2.pdf>; and European Council (note 23), p. 26.

²⁹ CBRN COE, 'Newsletter', no. 2, Jan. 2012, <http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/Portals/0/cbrn-coe-public-documents/cbrn-coe-newsletter_vol_2.pdf>.

³⁰ CBRN COE (note 17).

of direct centralized management. Four additional projects were also launched in October 2012: two to be undertaken by the JRC (with a total value of €1.3 million); one awarded to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, €1 million); and one awarded to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, for the establishment of a Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training policy (€0.4 million). Publication of tenders related to these projects was carried out within a tight deadline, considering the long list of documents and the need to have two governmental institutions in each consortium. The projects started in January 2013.

Table 1 shows the subjects, geographical regions and funding amounts for the 32 projects that were approved during 2011 and 2012.

Development and selection of projects

The project proposals for funding of CBRN risk assessment activities under the AAP were developed by the countries themselves on the basis of the CBRN Needs Assessment Tool (NAT), a questionnaire that helped the countries to perform a 'self-assessment' of their current status, identifying gaps and possible areas of cooperation.³¹ Partner countries were encouraged to submit project proposals using a dedicated project proposal form developed by the CBRN COE team. Once proposals were formulated and submitted by the NFP representing a partner country in the relevant Regional Secretariat, they were subjected to a review and approval process. The first 19 projects were selected through a coordinating committee, with the remaining projects directly assessed by DG DEVCO.

The CBRN COE Coordinating Management Committee was made up of representatives of DEVCO, the EEAS, the JRC and UNICRI. In July and September 2011, the committee approved the first 19 projects to be carried out in the frame of the EU CBRN COE initiative. The composition was described in the first edition of the CBRN COE newsletter.³² Both the call for proposals and the project implementation were managed by UNICRI. The committee ended its operations in 2011, and the remaining projects were approved directly by DEVCO.

³¹ CBRN COE, 'Newsletter', no. 1, Oct. 2011, <http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/Portals/0/cbrn-coe-public-documents/cbrn_coe_newsletter_vol1.pdf>.

³² CBRN COE (note 31).

Scope of project activities

The 32 approved projects can be organized according to four main categories: specific technical support; knowledge development; awareness raising; and training and equipment. The areas of interest are illicit transfers, biosafety and biosecurity, first response, misuse of biotechnology, the CBRN legal framework, e-learning on CBRN risk mitigation, chemical and biological waste management, border control and CBRN imports and exports, awareness raising on CBRN threats, and the dual use of chemical materials.

Some projects have the same title and objectives, but different geographical areas of implementation. Furthermore, provision of equipment is foreseen in only a few projects and some countries are involved in a great number of projects, all of which are due to start in 2013. There might be a limit to the absorption capacity of partner countries and their ability to manage and coordinate the different processes and projects.

It is clear that needs assessment is critical. While the fact that projects have been proposed by partner countries assures ownership, cooperation and sustainability, the question remains as to whether self-assessment is an effective and sound tool to identify gaps and needs. The NAT must be systematic, comprehensive and accurate to ensure that the projects are relevant and to establish a baseline to measure progress. To achieve a good level of confidence in the needs assessment, the process itself must be done on a country-by-country basis via coaching and guidance that take into account EU objectives and priorities. This calls for complementarity between the regional approach and activities and assessment focused more narrowly on individual countries. In some recipient countries, small, short-term actions can be very efficient while other countries need long-term actions that require entirely different preparation and tools.

IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE

This section presents a preliminary analysis of the CBRN COE Initiative's strengths and weaknesses, as well as the opportunities and threats it faces.

Strengths

While the NAT on the basis of which the projects were elaborated must be improved, one of the major

strengths of the COE Initiative is the bottom-up approach for the elaboration of project proposals that represent the countries' needs. The ownership of the process by the recipient countries is an asset that helps ensure that the results achieved will be integrated into mainstream policies, legal systems, decision-making and administrative processes, and daily practice. Political willingness and commitment to implement the results is crucial for the success of the project work.

The identification of the NFPs within the partner countries' relevant administrations denotes a willingness to be part of the initiative and to collaborate in its implementation. Having people on the ground constitutes an added advantage.

Weaknesses

Weaknesses of the COE Initiative include the risk of duplication and the overburdening of partner countries. A mapping of the activities at the international and regional levels in the broader context of CBRN mitigation is lacking. Some limited surveys undertaken in the UN context could be taken as the starting point for a more comprehensive and inclusive mapping of actors, mandates and programmes.³³

Opportunities

In February 2012 the IAEA instituted an International Network for Nuclear Security and Support Centres containing working groups on coordination, best practices and IT support and other emerging issues. At the same time, a sub-working group on the COE created by the G8 Global Partnership has among its wide-ranging objectives increasing the partnership's collaboration and coordination with COEs and networks, including the CBRN COEs.³⁴

However, partner countries expect more than awareness raising and outreach. There is a strong demand for tangible capacity building involving not only training but equipment and infrastructure as well as the creation of a stable means of communication and collaboration with the EU. As the ability of the COE

Initiative to meet these expectations (especially with regard to equipment and infrastructure development) is very limited, such needs should be addressed through other instruments and donors. The development of the COEs as platforms for multi-donor funding could be considered as an opportunity.

Threats

The limited availability of human resources in member states to participate in the projects—which is due to the highly specialized expertise required—as well as in partner countries that will follow several projects at the same time, and must therefore absorb concepts and practices within knowledge development, can certainly be considered a threat to the success and sustainability of the COE Initiative. More specifically, with 32 projects beginning in the first months of 2013, the coordination of the activities of different project teams working in the same geographical areas has not been addressed properly.

An additional important issue is the speed of EU decision-making processes and the ability of the system to react to new challenges. Personnel turn-over, both in Brussels and in member states, as well as the replacement of National Focal Teams, undoubtedly have a negative impact on the speed of implementation.

V. OPEN ISSUES

Access to analysis of and results from completed projects

The flexibility mechanism put in place by the IFS Expert Support Facility (ESF) has carried out more than 100 fact-finding visits and missions covering the two IFS priorities—CBRN risk mitigation and transregional threats to security.³⁵ However, it is difficult to access the results of the work carried out by the ESF. A practical demonstration of the ESF database took place during a May 2011 meeting on the mobilization of EU member states' expertise. An indicative timetable was provided that foresaw a pilot phase and, under the condition of a successful pilot phase, roll-out to all member states was expected by mid-October 2011. However, the functionality of the

³³ Heyes (note 8).

³⁴ US State Department, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), 'Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs', [n.d.], <<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c34463.htm>>; and Concept Paper for the Global Partnership Center of Excellence Sub-working Group, Unclassified paper circulated at the 1st GP meeting under UK Presidency, Wilton Park, Feb. 2013.

³⁵ European Commission, *Long-term Responses to Global Security Threats: Contributing to security capacity building in third countries through the Instrument for Stability* (European Commission: Brussels, 2011).

Table 1. List of CBRN COE Initiative projects as of December 2012 (pilot projects not included)

No.	Title	Countries/regions	Budget	Material	Notes
1	Identification and strengthening forensic capabilities in the area of prevention of organized crime and illicit trafficking of chemical agents, including training and equipment for front line customs officers	Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina	€640 000	C	
2	Building capacity to identify and respond to threats from CBRN substances	Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	€160 000	CBRN	
3	Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on biosafety, biosecurity and bio-risk management	South East Asia, South Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine, African Atlantic Façade, North Africa	€1 920 000	B	
4	Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on inter-agency CBRN response	South East Asia, South Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Moldova, Ukraine	€960 000	CBRN	
5	Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on CBRN import/export monitoring	African Atlantic Façade, North Africa, Middle East, Central Asia	€1 440 000	CBRN	
6	Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on chemical and biological waste management	South East Asia	€480 000	CB	
7	Guidelines, procedures and standardization on biosafety and biosecurity	Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia	€1 200 000	B	
8	Prerequisite to strengthening CBRN national legal frameworks	Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia	€800 000	CBRN	
9	National Response Plan in Lebanon for CBRN Events	Lebanon	€160 000	CBRN	
10	Development of e-learning courses for CBRN risk mitigation	International	€400 000	CBRN	
11	Promoting good practice and inter-agency procedures for assessing the risks of CBRN misuse	Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Laos, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan	€1 920 000	CBRN	
12	Sharing experience between EU and South East Asian countries in the field of regulations on biosafety and biosecurity as well as laboratory management systems through Regional Centers of Excellence –Phase 2	Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam	€320 000	B	Continuation of pilot project 2
13	Capacity building and raising awareness for identifying and responding to threats from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials in sub-Saharan Africa	Sub-Saharan African	€320 000	CBRN	
14	Provision of specialized and technical training to enhance first response capabilities	South Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Moldova, Ukraine	€400 000	CBRN	
15	Strengthening laboratory bio-safety and bio-security through development of a laboratory iso-bank system	Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand	€480 000	B	

16	Supporting development of an integrated national nuclear security system	North Africa	€400 000	N	
17	Establishing a National Response Plan in Ghana and Kenya for responding to unauthorized events involving CBRN material	Ghana, Kenya	€240 000	CBRN	
18	International network of universities and institutes for raising awareness on dual-use concerns in biotechnology	International	€400 000	B	
19	Development of procedures and guidelines to create and improve secure information management systems and data exchange mechanisms for CBRN materials under regulatory control	International	€400 000	CBRN	
20	Identification and strengthening of forensic capacities in the area of prevention of organized crime and illicit transfers of chemical agents, including training and equipment for front-line agencies	Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Moldova, the Philippines, Tunisia	€1 500 000	C	Cf. project 1
21	Building regional border control capacity to identify and detect CRN materials	African Atlantic Façade, South East Asia	€700 000	CRN	Flagged by JRC
22	Provision of specialized technical training to enhance first responders' capabilities in case of CBRN incidents	African Atlantic Façade, South East Asia	€700 000	CBRN	Cf. project 14
23	Building capacity to identify and respond to threats from CBRN substances	Albania, Cambodia, Iraq, Moldova, Senegal, Tunisia	€500 000	CBRN	Cf. projects 2, 13
24	Development of a methodology for RN materials detection, management and protection of the public	Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal	€600 000	RN	Flagged by JRC
25	Knowledge development and transfer of best practice on biosafety, biosecurity and bio-risk management	Middle East	€480 000	B	Cf. project 3
26	Pre-requisite to strengthening CBRN national legal frameworks	Lebanon, Tunisia	€300 000	CBRN	Cf. project 8
27	Bio-risk management	Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand	€480 000	B	
28	Supporting development of an integrated national security system for nuclear and radioactive materials	South East Asia	€1 000 000	NR	IAEA/JRC; cf. project 16
29	Regional human resource development for nuclear safety, security, and safeguards management through a University Master's programme carried out in Thailand	South East Asia	€340 000	N	
30	Network of Excellence for Nuclear Forensics in South East Asia	South East Asia	€600 000	N	
31	Network of universities and institutes for raising awareness on dual-use concerns of chemical materials	All regions	€800 000	C	Cf. project 18
32	Establishment of a Mediterranean Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (MedPIET) Policy	Non-EU countries covered by the EU Enlargement and Southern Neighbourhood	€400 000	B	Coordinated by the ECDC

C=Chemical, B=Biological, R=Radiological, N=Nuclear materials.

Source: CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative.

ESF database remains unclear. This is just one example of the problems encountered when seeking information about the EU's work in partner countries.

An evaluation study of the functionality of the ESF for the period 2009–11 was assigned to a consulting firm that interviewed public and private organizations in member states that engaged their experts in the framework of the ESF. It would be useful to know the conclusions of this study to learn about the successes and failures of the ESF tool.

Interactions between the different project teams

As stated above, 32 projects will start in 2013, many of them in the same countries, and this represents a huge coordination challenge. In February 2013 UNICRI convened a kick-off meeting for all of the CBRN projects that it manages. The meeting was well organized and represented an opportunity to get acquainted with the different teams, and exchange information and ideas. However, devising a mechanism to communicate the status of the projects while going forward, and developing a common standardized approach to capacity building and raising awareness among the different project teams, remain open issues.

General issues

Several more general aspects of the EU CBRN COE initiative also need to be considered, including setting clear geographic and thematic priorities; carrying out systematic, comprehensive and accurate needs assessment at country level; assuring greater involvement of EU member states in the different phases of project definition and implementation; establishing a verification regime to monitor performance and long-term impact of the projects on CBRN risk mitigation; and communicating the EU's contribution to security and development to a wider public audience.

There is a need to develop a strategy with clear geographic and thematic priorities and critical areas of intervention, reflecting an understanding and knowledge of how to leverage existing national, regional and international initiatives.

The CBRN COE must also focus on the EU's own coherence and coordination, in order to increase awareness of the EU as a unified actor. For instance, it would be beneficial to create a systematic, comprehensive and accurate needs assessment that

can be conducted on a country-by-country basis with coaching and guidance provided by EU experts. A greater systematic involvement of EU member states in the development and implementation of CBRN projects would also be helpful.

In terms of projects, the initiative will need to enhance transparency in the process of evaluating project proposals, and establish a monitoring and evaluation system to assess the quality and effectiveness of project implementation.

In terms of information sharing, the initiative should increase structured coordination and cooperation, and discuss with stakeholders the most suitable mechanism to achieve the initiative's goals. It should explore ways of sharing country assessments that have been completed by international organizations and other governments.

The operability and functionality of the Regional Secretariats should also be improved, so as to guarantee the physical presence of qualified EU experts on the ground. Furthermore, a verification regime should be established to monitor project performance and the long-term impact on CBRN risk mitigation.

Finally, the accomplishments of the CBRN COE initiative should be communicated to a wider public, highlighting the EU's contribution to security and development.

VI. THE FUTURE OF THE INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY

The new IFS will cover the period 2014–20. The European Commission carried out a public consultation proposing different options for the future. The preferred choice was to retain the main features and characteristics of the IFS while streamlining its provisions to increase its flexibility and enable the EU to respond more effectively and rapidly to future international peace and security challenges.³⁶

The Council Conclusions on Security and Development emphasized that the nexus between development and security should inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of the EU's external actions. Within this context, the new proposed IFS has an additional aim, concerning

³⁶ European Commission, 'Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability', COM(2011) 845 final—2011/0413 (COD), 7 Dec. 2011.

the need 'to address specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilising effect, including climate change' (Article 1).³⁷

CBRN risk mitigation measures have been moved to a separate article (Article 5) under the heading 'Assistance in addressing global and transregional threats' and the areas of technical and financial assistance are described. Specifically, the measures relate to 'threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health'; and 'mitigation of and preparedness against risks, either of an intentional, accidental or natural origin, related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents'. While the COEs are not mentioned specifically, the eight measures listed under the latter group coincide with what the initiative is carrying out at present and will assure its continuity in the coming years. The foreseen allocation for the IFS is €2 829 million for the period 2014–20, compared to €2062 million for the period 2007–13.³⁸

VII. CONCLUSION

The EU CBRN COE initiative is supported by EU member states and presents an innovative and broad-ranging approach, in alignment with European security objectives, aiming to help partner countries build institutional capacities and implement a coherent and coordinated strategy for CBRN risk mitigation. It has been welcomed at the international level and represents an opportunity to show the visibility of the EU action.

The set-up of Regional Secretariats in different geographical areas and the designation of NFPs in partner countries has helped create a flexible structure that should guarantee ownership and sustainability of the initiative. Eight Regional Secretariats are planned and should be operative in the coming years.

However, some general aspects of the EU CBRN COE initiative need to be carefully addressed, including setting clear geographic and thematic priorities; carrying out systematic, comprehensive and accurate needs assessments at the country level; assuring a greater involvement of member states in the different phases of project definition and implementation;

and establishing a verification regime to monitor performance and long-term impact of the projects on CBRN risk mitigation

Finally, the accomplishments of the CBRN COE initiative should be communicated to a wider public, highlighting the EU's contribution to security and development. In this respect, EU member states' support for the initiative and the appreciation demonstrated by international organizations and other interested stakeholders should help ensure the continuity of the actions currently being undertaken by the EU to control the proliferation of CBRN materials.

ABBREVIATIONS

COE	Centres of Excellence
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for Development and Cooperation
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESF	Expert Support Facility
IFS	Instrument for Stability
JRC	Joint Research Centre
NAT	Needs Assessment Tool
NFP	National Focal Point
UNICRI	UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

³⁷ European Commission (note 36), p. 11.

³⁸ European Commission, EuropaId, 'Instrument for Stability', [n.d.], <http://ec.europa.eu/europaId/how/finance/ifs_en.htm>.

A EUROPEAN NETWORK

In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to create a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centres from across the EU to encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.

STRUCTURE

The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is managed jointly by four institutes entrusted with the project, in close cooperation with the representative of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The four institutes are the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) in Paris, the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Consortium began its work in January 2011 and forms the core of a wider network of European non-proliferation think tanks and research centres which will be closely associated with the activities of the Consortium.

MISSION

The main aim of the network of independent non-proliferation think tanks is to encourage discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, particularly among experts, researchers and academics. The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to conventional weapons. The fruits of the network discussions can be submitted in the form of reports and recommendations to the responsible officials within the European Union.

It is expected that this network will support EU action to counter proliferation. To that end, the network can also establish cooperation with specialized institutions and research centres in third countries, in particular in those with which the EU is conducting specific non-proliferation dialogues.

<http://www.nonproliferation.eu>



FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH

FRS is an independent research centre and the leading French think tank on defence and security issues. Its team of experts in a variety of fields contributes to the strategic debate in France and abroad, and provides unique expertise across the board of defence and security studies.

<http://www.frstrategie.org>



PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN FRANKFURT

PRIF is the largest as well as the oldest peace research institute in Germany. PRIF's work is directed towards carrying out research on peace and conflict, with a special emphasis on issues of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

<http://www.hsfk.de>



INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

IISS is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. It aims to provide the best possible analysis on strategic trends and to facilitate contacts.

<http://www.iiss.org/>



STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

<http://www.sipri.org/>