



MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA



**STRATEGIC PANORAMA
2009/2010**

**SPANISH INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO**



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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

EDUARDO SERRA REXACH

This is the fourth consecutive year I have been entrusted with coordinating the papers that make up the *Strategic Panorama* which, as usual, is the result of collaboration between the Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE) of the Ministry of Defence and the Real Instituto Elcano (RIE). The panel of specialists chosen as contributors to this year's *Panorama* is furthermore a good example of the progressive collaboration between Spanish institutions for purposes of general interest which, in my view, is very good news. Indeed, in addition to the Ministry of Defence and the RIE, other contributors to this edition are the think-tank INCIPE, through its director, and two universities, that of Granada and the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), each through a professor.

Like last year, 2009 was marked by the economic crisis resulting from the financial turmoil that erupted in the United States in summer 2007. Nevertheless, the violent storm unleashed in 2008, which aroused fears of a total collapse of the financial system, has now given way to a lingering fog which looks set to start lifting soon. Last year we quoted the United States Director of Intelligence, who stated in his address to Congress on February 2009 that the instability deriving from the financial crisis is the biggest threat to national security in the short and medium term, more so than terrorism. Indeed, not only because of the political instability the economic crisis can cause—and is causing, but also because it can fuel Islamist fundamentalism on the one hand and contribute to the creation of new failed states on the other, it multiplies existing threats. And by requiring other budgetary efforts to be stepped up, the crisis can likewise trigger a reduction in the security and defence spending of the most developed countries, adding to the possibilities of war. We have therefore again

included a chapter on the economic crisis, the author of which is Federico Steinberg, senior analyst at the Real Instituto Elcano.

I

Now that we are in the throes of the crisis that emerged in summer 2007, the basic question is to determine at what stage we are at—whether recovery is close or, on the contrary, whether the immediate future can be expected to be no different from the present. Fortunately, states Steinberg, everything would appear to indicate that government measures are bringing about the beginning of an improvement in the economic situation. The IMF estimates that all the economies could return to growth in 2010 (especially the emerging economies) and international trade, following a slump, seems to be starting to pick up. But it also seems certain that the advanced countries will need to get used to living with lower growth rates than in the past and therefore with a lower rate of job creation. In particular, the current situation in which it is the public sector that is keeping economic activity going should not continue indefinitely, and the problem is thus pinpointing the best time to withdraw the public stimuli that have achieved and are still achieving such good results.

Be that as it may, although recovery appears to be near, major risks remain: a) the process of deleverage and recognition of losses in the financial system has yet to be completed, which could lead to the stagnation of credit in wealthy countries; b) countries dependent on external financing (among them Spain) could have difficulties obtaining capital; c) energy prices could begin to creep up even before recovery becomes consolidated; and d) finally, unemployment will continue to be high in both the United States and Europe, especially Spain (nearly 20% in 2010).

The author remarks that fortunately, despite substantial pressure, governments have managed not to succumb to the temptation of protectionism and in this connection he acknowledges the very prominent role played by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Even so, international trade has been one of the main victims of the crisis (it is estimated to have shrunk by 10% in 2009, a figure not witnessed since the 30s). Having withstood the protectionist temptation is particularly important because although protectionism did not cause the Great Depression of 1929, it is a proven fact that it exacerbated it. Indeed, the escalating protectionism of the period caused international trade to slump by 33% in real terms and caused a 14% drop in every country's GDP. This was an important, albeit

painful, lesson to the international community: that governments' well-meaning attempts to protect employment and counter the fall in activity actually resulted in greater unemployment and poverty, which were an excellent breeding ground for nationalism and the world war that ensued. This underlines the very positive effects of the WTO's efforts, as does the fact that it is precisely the non-member states which are most hampering the proper working of the organisation.

There are other players beside the WTO involved in the current struggle to keep protectionism at bay. Globalisation itself has acted effectively against it: multinationals which import intermediate products, for which a rise in tariffs signifies greater costs, have acted as pressure groups against protectionist measures. Steinberg is thus strongly in favour of concluding the Doha round.

The author goes on to discuss the debates which have arisen as a result of the economic crisis and basically studies three:

- 1) The first involves exit strategies, that is, how and when to withdraw the huge monetary and fiscal stimuli put in place to offset the fall in private demand. The problem is that if these stimuli are withdrawn too soon, it is possible (as occurred after the crisis of 1929) that the global economy could again collapse; the risk is the opposite if the stimuli are maintained for too long, as this would cause public deficit and debt to rise to stiflingly high levels leading to a new asset price bubble. There is a certain amount of agreement that they should not be withdrawn until the middle of 2010, although the difficulty of pinpointing the most appropriate moment is recognised. The other question is which *stimuli* to withdraw first, fiscal or monetary. Steinberg is in favour of starting with fiscal stimulus as a rise in interest rates would hamper recovery. Basically, we need to start «handing over» to the private sector, but maintaining credit facilities for a time.
- 2) The second debate is partly linked to the previous one as it refers to the gaping hole the measures to overcome the crisis have left in public coffers. The author, with good judgement, holds that uncontrolled growth of debt is always very dangerous but will be even more so in the coming years as the post-second-world war baby-boom generation begins to retire. He believes that this requires action on two fronts:
 - a) Institutional reforms to ensure fiscal consolidation by guaranteeing high budgetary surpluses during an expansive period.

To this end he proposes the widespread adoption of legislation such as the Spanish Law on Budget Stability (*Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria*) or the European Stability and Growth Pact and the establishment of independent Fiscal Councils such as the Central Banks.

- b) And structural economic reforms to speed up the growth of the developed economies, especially those of Europe. In this respect he underlines three basic areas where they are needed: labour market reform: increased investment in R&D and improving how these investments are used; and promoting greater competition, especially in the services market.
- 3) The last topic of debate is the future of the dollar as a reserve currency as it has been in the past decades. Indeed, the crisis marked a sudden interruption in a continuous process—the steady depreciation of the dollar owing to America’s huge current account deficit and the consequent accumulation of dollars by the central banks of the emerging economies (especially China), which had reached the point of considering the need to diversify their reserves. However, the panic that swept over the markets following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers spurred a flight to security leading to a substantial appreciation of the dollar. Now that the markets are back to normal the depreciation of the US currency has returned, but this has not prevented discussions about which currency—if any—should take over from the dollar as reserve currency; all eyes are on the euro in this respect, but as the author aptly points out, although it would be in Europe’s interests to be able to finance its deficits practically at zero cost, ousting the dollar is not viewed as a real possibility: the euro is a weak, «orphan» currency as Steinberg calls it, without an army behind it to provide the necessary backing of force. The fact is that the dollar clearly continues to dominate the international markets, although the role of the euro can be expected to gradually increase in importance.

The author ends his study by analysing the effects of the crisis on the international economic order:

- 1) The first of these is what the author calls «the return of the nation-state». Whatever the origin of the crisis and whoever is responsible, what seems clear is that we are embarking on a period of more state and less market. Over the past few years, as globalisation intensified, power has become diluted in the world economy: the

nation-states were losing power both «upwards» (to supranational organisations) and «downwards» (to multinationals, NGOs, rating agencies, independent regulatory bodies and in cases like Spain to regional authorities), but above all to the «market». The crisis, states the author, appears to have ground this process to a halt: the action taken by states in programmes to bail out the financial system, fiscal stimulus packages and regulatory reforms has restored their legitimacy to impose their criteria on the markets. The final outcome is unknown—it is not even known whether this new path is the right one, but the change of direction is already a fact.

- 2) The second major consequence is the transformation of the former G-7/G-8 into the new G-20 as the regulatory body of the world economy; this is a phenomenon which had been brewing ever since the start of globalisation and the subsequent appearance of the emerging economies and denotes, as stated in a previous edition of the *Strategic Panorama*, the loss of power of the developed countries. However the crisis has suddenly revealed the need to incorporate the emerging powers into the regulatory bodies. This led to the consolidation of the G-20, which has met three times in less than a year—a fact which should be regarded as excellent news as it accords the organs of economic governance greater legitimacy and, consequently, greater effectiveness.
- 3) Finally, the crisis has granted a primordial role to the IMF, allowing the institution to increase its budget and improve its courses of action, although it has also highlighted the need for a substantial internal reform to make it more representative and, accordingly, boost its legitimacy and efficiency.

The author ends with a reference to the implications of the crisis for the European Union, which, he states, was prepared neither for the financial crisis nor for the ensuing economic recession. On the contrary, the crisis has pushed up unemployment and reduced Europeans' well-being. Basically, Europe has become impoverished with the crisis.

But the crisis is also an opportunity—which is how Steinberg sees it—to win back a certain amount of political leadership. Indeed, in addition to what has been stated with respect to the possibilities of the euro, the necessary increase in the representativeness of the institutions of governance and the foreseeable climate of dialogue fit in well with the European Union's soft power, although this requires it to give shape to a common position, at least on economic matters.

II

The economic crisis was not the only salient feature of 2009. Although climate change is a permanent and ongoing problem, the holding of the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 made it a focus of attention. The size and possible effects of this problem in a broad range of spheres and its indisputable relationship with energy on the one hand (the cause of a significant portion of the phenomenon) and the environment on the other (directly affected by climate change) have made this the second subject dealt with in this year's *Strategic Panorama*.

Yolanda Castro, newly appointed professor of Applied Physics at the University of Granada, has addressed this subject together with collaborators Sonia Raquel Gamiz Fortis and María Jesús Esteban Parra. The authors distinguish, with scientific rigour, between «detected» climate change and consequences for natural and human environments on the one hand and «projected» climate change and its related impacts on the other. They go on to analyse the socioeconomic aspects of climate change (depletion of resources, damage to infrastructure and, finally, migration), and end by discussing the security implications.

The first point to stress about their study is that climate change is not only a threat in itself to security and the very survival of the planet. It is also a multiplier of threats which exacerbates existing tension and instability (as stated by the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union) and in this respect it bears a similarity to the economic crisis.

As for the current situation, Yolanda Castro analyses in detail the increase in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and also of methane and nitrous oxide deriving chiefly from the use of fossil fuels and changes in agriculture.

A direct and immediate albeit not exclusive consequence of these concentrations is global warming, which is measured and recorded (since 1850) and affects not only the atmosphere but also the oceans and the cryosphere, although it is not distributed evenly across the planet. A consequence of this warming is the rise in sea level, of which there is also empirical evidence. The same is true of other atmospheric phenomena such as cyclone activity and droughts. The impact of all this on natural and human environments is variable in quantity but displays a trend that leaves little room for doubt.

As for projected climate change, the authors refer to the various scenarios established by the special report of the International Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC), ranging from the assumption that all gas emissions are immediately frozen to the various alternatives depending on economic growth, trends in world population and the speed at which new technologies are introduced. In any event shrinkage of sea ice, a decline in snow cover and greater warming of land than sea areas are considered to be results of this climate trend. Likewise, more frequent extreme weather events, heat waves and tropical cyclones are considered likely, as is an increase in precipitations at higher latitudes and a decrease in subtropical regions.

Yolanda Castro lists the main impacts of these projected climate changes:

- a) On freshwater resources: more areas affected by drought, a decline in water supplies stored in glaciers and snow cover and reduced availability of water chiefly at some mid- and lower latitudes.
- b) On ecosystems: greater risk of extinction of species (both plants and animals).
- c) On agriculture and forests: increase in crop productivity with slight temperature increases (between 1° and 3° C) but a major decrease beyond that. More frequent droughts and flooding will affect crop production negatively at low latitudes.
- d) On coastal systems: the most important aspect is flooding, which will affect many millions of people.

As is only to be expected, all these impacts will affect many human activities:

- a) Depletion of resources.
 - 1) Basically water, leading to social unrest and major economic losses, as well as regional tensions.
 - 2) A decrease is also expected in world fish reserves and, in general, a rise in food prices, especially from 2050 onwards.
 - 3) Another resource that will be significantly affected by climate change is energy, although the impacts will vary greatly according to the source. While there will be pressure against the use of energy derived from fossil fuels, a substantial rise in renewable energies is expected (and is already occurring). The authors advocate reconsidering nuclear energy.
- b) Damage to infrastructure, especially in areas affected by coastal and river flooding, examples being ports and oil refineries.
- c) Mass migrations. Droughts, food shortages and flooding are expected to cause mass displacements of people and could cause 200 million refugees by the middle of the century.

The authors go on to examine the security implications of climate change. Indeed, as the United Nations Security Council has stated, «climate change is transforming the concept of security» and this is hardly surprising. If we analyse the impacts of climate change we find that some have immediate repercussions on collective security.

Major security implications are as follows:

- 1) Illegal immigration, which will require greater protection at international borders.
- 2) Migration-related crime owing to the fact that the illegality of immigrants' situation is often associated with illicit conduct such as organised crime and trafficking in people and drugs.
- 3) Racial rejections of immigrants, who are seen to endanger the host country's own culture or even its economic situation.
- 4) Extreme weather events. The worrying number of lives which the World Meteorological Organisation estimates are claimed by natural disasters (nearly 250,000 people) could be increased by these extreme phenomena.
- 5) Eco-terrorism, that is terrorism in defence of nature, is a threat that is already a reality and is gradually giving rise to laws banning it.

The study lists the territories that will be worst affected by climate change which, once again, unfortunately appears to be striking the weakest areas particularly hard: Africa (loss of cultivable land, drought and shortage of water), Southeast Asia (where more than 2 billion people live in coastal areas) and the Middle East (loss of as much as 60% of the water supply). There is no need to underline the strategic importance of these territories, which are potentially the hardest hit.

Yolanda Castro is optimistic and believes there is a solution: if no measures are taken losses arising from climate change are expected to amount to 20% of world GDP annually, whereas the cost of effective concerted action may be only 1%. Naturally, the sooner these measures are taken the cheaper and the more effective they will be. In parallel with the IPCC, the paper distinguishes between adaptive measures (aimed at reducing the vulnerability of natural and human systems to climate change, such as the building of dams) and mitigation measures (designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; perhaps the best examples adopted to date are those aimed at improving the efficiency and energy saving and greater use of renewable energies). She criticises the restrictions on the use of all energy forms, in particular nuclear energy, and underlines a

mitigation measure she considers essential: carbon capture and storage, a measure already supported by the European Commission. All in all the authors advocate the joint use of adaptation and mitigation measures which, they hold, can be complementary. They finally criticise the poor results of the Copenhagen Conference which ended up as merely a minimum agreement, although it was signed by the two biggest contaminants, China and the United States.

Yolanda Castro and her collaborators explain in a clear, concise and above all realistic manner what climate change is and what its implications are. Avoiding either alarmism or irresponsibility, they advocate a series of realistic and pragmatic measures which, if adopted as soon as possible, will benefit the whole of humankind.

III

The third chapter, written by Professor Florentino Portero, provides a more general vision of the strategic landscape throughout the year, discussing the unknown quantity of the new American administration, specifically President Obama.

Indeed, in Professor Portero's view President Obama faces what we might call, following philosopher Ortega y Gasset, a «radical alternative»: either continue fostering and encouraging the pioneering spirit that has brought the United States such excellent results throughout its history and, he believes, can continue to do so in the present—and specifically in this serious economic crisis—or opt for a Copernican turn and bring the American way of life into line with European standards, moving it closer to the Welfare State and giving the state a much bigger role in the economy.

The chapter begins by asking what the United States' relative position is in this new world order which has been taking shape since the end of the Cold War in parallel to globalisation: the definition of Empire does not quite seem to fit what the United States is and represents in today's world as, unlike the European empires in their day, it has not extended its sovereignty to remote territories. However, it is evident that currently only the United States has interests all over the planet and the ability to assert them. Therefore, perhaps the term that best fits it «hyper power» as it distinguishes it from mere powers whose sphere of influence is restricted to a regional framework.

The next question asked is whether, as many argue, this hyper power, the United States, already began its decline after the Vietnam War. Florentino Portero believes that such a vision is deceptive: the capacity of the United States is greatly superior in all aspects to that of any other country and looks set to continue that way for a considerable time; it is just that it is extremely vulnerable when anyone manages to cause a rift between public opinion and government. The United States is invincible in the military field but is not very difficult to defeat in the political arena, which leads its enemies to adopt «asymmetric strategies». Indeed, as the author points out, during the recent Iraq War we witnessed the lack of consistency of part of the US elites and social media. In other respects, the state in which the various countries of the world are emerging from the crisis is highlighting the economic might of the United States, which seems far from being in decline. In the author's opinion, crises provide an opportunity not only to reform ways and means of economic production and the corporate network but also to review courses of action and formulate a new national security strategy adapted to the new times, as President Truman did after the Second World War.

Professor Portero goes on to discuss the basic features of the new situation, the first and probably the foremost being the emergence of the India-Pacific area. He holds that it is no coincidence that the new secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, should have chosen as the destination of her first official trip the Pacific instead of Europe or the Middle East as has been traditional practice. It is not only the growing weight of this area; at the same time the Atlantic Alliance (an example and symbol of collaboration with Europe) is gradually losing credibility and is starting to be viewed as an ineffective Cold War relic.

The Pacific region, which has the largest population concentration in the world, is experiencing a period of spectacular economic expansion. Both China and India, in addition to possessing age old cultures, have found their own path for joining the modern world and are progressing along it with a strong national spirit that is unparalleled in Europe, although the challenges they face may trigger major crises in this process of development. The main challenges in the security field are as follows:

- 1) Nationalism in general and Chinese in particular. The age old cultures to which the countries are home together with the humiliation of having been conquered and colonised in the recent past cause them to retain their national pride, which is even growing in pace with economic development. Indians and Chinese are wary of each

other; the Koreans mistrust the Japanese; and the Japanese fear the resurgence of China, not to mention relations between India and Pakistan.

- 2) The second challenge is the rise of Islamism, particularly bearing in mind the serious conflict the Islamic world is experiencing today. While most of the population is open to coexistence with other cultures, a minority sector has become radical and believes that this contact corrupts Muslim values. And so, while some countries (Malaysia and Indonesia) are making positive progress, in others, such as Pakistan, the future is much less clear.
- 3) The third challenge is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (dealt with in Chapter VI), specifically the arms race between India and Pakistan, both of which possess nuclear weapons. No doubt the most worrying scenario is the possibility of the Pakistani government falling into the hands of Islamic radicals. China is also a nuclear power and, as Portero points out, the ultimate guarantor of North Korea. Nor should we rule out in this respect Japan and its recent decision to remilitarise its defence.

But it is not only the Pacific region which commands the interest of the new American administration. The globalisation of the economy brings to the fore the problems of the United Nations system. Heir to the failed League of Nations set up after the First World War, the UN learned the lesson that it was necessary to include the Great Powers, but in order for that to be possible they had to be granted certain privileges, notably right of veto on the Security Council, the only decision-making organ in the system (the resolutions of the General Assembly are merely recommendations) and the system was thus pragmatic although unjust and undemocratic. Today it is furthermore anachronistic, and this undermines its legitimacy and, accordingly, its effectiveness and I consider that an in-depth overhaul of the system is very necessary. The author very aptly criticises the current situation but admits to not being hopeful about the future of any reforms that are undertaken, although he believes that they will be useful in dispelling the myth of what he calls «internationalist fundamentalism». He ends his analysis by asking what the international system currently being shaped will be like. He maintains that globalisation will lead us to a more multilateral and associative world in which, now that the Cold War blocs have disappeared, the leading actors will be a close-knit network of very mixed organisations, some dating from the past and others newly created. In this connection the author takes a look at the world situation in which, in view of Russia's inability to develop either a

truly representative democracy or a modern market economy, the United States will continue to be the only hyper power. He foresees a new role for a militarily more capable Japan and underlines the new leading role of the emerging countries, especially China and also India. The world will thus be divided into specific regions (India-Pacific, Latin America, Arab world), each with its own security problem. However, there will be problems that are not regional but global, among them the supply of energy, the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the tension arising from the modernisation of Muslim societies. This reality which we are approaching might be called «Asymmetric Multilateralism», in which alliances will stem from particular situations (alliances of the willing) much more than from treaties in the manner of the Atlantic Alliance, which the author perceives as clearly obsolete. He proposes, as an alternative to NATO, the concept of a League of Democracies as a platform of democratic countries with shared values and interests as a context for temporary alliances for each relevant case in order to conduct missions of common interest.

IV

Last year's edition of the *Strategic Panorama* dealt with Iraq and Afghanistan. This year we have concentrated on Afghanistan as its situation is much more problematic and its future more uncertain. This year's Chapter IV thus examines Afghanistan, though it also includes Pakistan—even in the title—as we believe that the future of both countries is closely linked and that the fate of one could determine that of the other.

This chapter is written by Ambassador José María Robles Fraga who, having held the post of Spanish ambassador to Islamabad in past years, combines a thorough knowledge of the region with very recent, firsthand experience. Ambassador Robles believes that the current moment is critical. On the one hand the situation is progressively deteriorating; there is less security than in the recent past; and attacks and casualties are on the rise. On the other, Karzai's government, surrounded by corruption and politically and administratively incompetent, has fallen into discredit. In addition the recent elections and subsequent accusations of electoral fraud have badly delegitimized him. And last but not least, western public opinions are calling for the troops to come home soon. We are thus facing a very serious problem (the cradle of al-Qaeda terrorism is in Af-Pak) which is rapidly worsening: not enough time to act (owing to the haste with which the troops are required to return) while the government of Afghanistan,

which ought to take charge of the situation as soon as possible, shows no signs of being willing or able to do so.

Robles maintains that our presence in Afghanistan is absolutely necessary in order to achieve an aim which, as President Obama puts it, is to make possible if not victory at least an acceptable solution.

The author describes the scenario as a set of concentric circles, the innermost of which is the military situation which, as stated, has gradually worsened. A substantial increase in troops is therefore crucial, and such an increase has already been announced. Also needed is a new strategy against the Taliban insurgency, a difficult and dangerous enemy as they are an explosive mixture of holy war, Pashtu nationalism, and insurgency and propagandistic tactics that make them a highly attractive cause to the whole of Islamic radicalism. Nevertheless, the Taliban are still viewed by the Afghan people as a hazard to be avoided, and therefore the worst message we could convey to this population is that international presence will be short lived, as if they see the Taliban as likely victors, the population's adherence to their cause would be tremendous; the international presence and also determination to win is therefore essential. Moving into the next circle, a major civilian effort is therefore also needed to separate and distance the Afghan population from the Taliban cause. This will require new military tactics to bring down the number of civilian victims (the existence of civilian casualties has undermined support for the international forces), although this would necessarily correlate with a greater risk for our own troops. In order for this civilian effort to be possible it is essential to bring about a radical improvement in security conditions. And so, in this second political/military circle, it is necessary to step up efforts to restore the population's confidence on the one hand in the Afghan government and on the other in the international troops. This calls for the comprehensive approach discussed in a previous edition of the *Panorama*. Naturally this will require not only a greater civilian presence but also more funds earmarked to development, especially that of agriculture, which needs to progress from subsistence farming to productive agriculture following by export agriculture and could help eradicate the cultivation of opium poppies. There has even been talk of a Marshall plan for Afghanistan.

This work brings us to the next circle, that of the «regional strategy». This strategy has already begun and is based on the recognition that there are two sides to the problem—one being Afghanistan and the other Pakistan—and that solving it requires both to be addressed.

Indeed, the insurgency and Jihadist terrorism have their training and instruction bases in the tribal territories at the Pakistani border and it is therefore essential to keep this area under proper control. In addition the influence of Pakistan has always been decisive for Afghanistan. And lastly Pakistan has played its own cards there. Indeed, while on the one hand it appeared to be helping the West by fighting against al-Qaeda, on the other it sought to keep on good terms with the Taliban and other Jihadist groups which favoured it in its rivalry with India. It should not be forgotten that in September 2001 Pakistan was the Taliban regime's chief ally and supporter. It is therefore an ally as important as it is unreliable; however this double dealing could turn against it with the emergence of a Pakistani Jihadism which is now threatening the country's security and very existence.

As the ambassador explains, all this stems from that fact that Pakistan has always viewed India as its chief threat and obsession, whereas it continues to see Afghanistan as a secondary scenario in which the only intolerable development would be if it were to fall under Indian influence.

This now brings us to the last circle, which the author calls «the other regional dimension» as it does not only affect Pakistan. India and its collaboration in settling the conflict will play a very important role and in this respect both the United States and Europe can do much to foster relations between India and Pakistan. This is why it is so important for the «all-embracing dialogue» between Indians and Pakistanis to continue. After all, failure in Afghanistan and the consequent and probably inevitable destabilisation of Pakistan would be extremely bad news for India.

In addition to India, the other neighbours in the region should also take an active part. We should consider Russia because of its significant influence in the central Asian republics near Afghanistan and because it has a direct interest in its southern borders; and also China, which is concerned by the Jihadist movements present in some of its regions. Lastly, there is Iran and its traditional rivalry with the Sunni Islamism of Pakistan, which it admires and whose nuclear capability it intends to emulate; and also the Gulf states with their financial clout and ability to mediate are other factors worth taking into account with a view to solving the problem. In conclusion, in the opinion of Ambassador Robles, who coincides with Florentino Portero in pointing out the huge importance of Afghanistan to the new administration of President Obama as its chief foreign-policy priority, we are at a both decisive and important and urgent moment in which we are required to both improve the Afghan situation and hand over res-

possibility for it to the country's government as soon as possible, provided it is in a position to fulfil its purpose.

V

No *Strategic Panorama* could fail to include a chapter on Europe and particular the present edition as it is Spain's turn to hold the Presidency for the first six months of 2010. We felt that the most appropriate subject was the Treaty of Lisbon and the Common Security and Defence Policy. This chapter is written by Lieutenant Colonel Anibal Villalba, who combines personal skills with the circumstance of currently serving as advisor to the presidency of the government and is thus more familiar than most with the aspirations and goals of the Spanish presidency in the Common Security and Defence Policy. This policy adds to the general difficulties of the building of Europe the specific problems derived from the existence of the Atlantic Alliance.

The author begins by commenting on the repercussions for the CSDP of the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into effect on 1/12/2009, as it modified the two basic European Union texts (the Treaty on European and the Treaty Establishing the European Community). Following its entry into force, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is now called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a change aimed at giving impetus to a qualitative leap forward in this field to enable Europe to continue to be a leading actor on the international stage; it will fall to the Spanish presidency to make the transition.

He then goes on to describe and clarify—as the terminology is confusing—the European institutions with competences in CSDP matters: the European Council (which has become a substantive and independent institution responsible for establishing general principles and common strategies and whose president, the recently appointed Herman Van Rompuy, represents the Union externally in CSDP affairs); the Council (of which Spain holds the presidency in the first half of 2010), which includes the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) entrusted with formulating and implementing the European policy in this field. The GAERC will be chaired in CSDP matters by the High Representative—also recently elected—who will contribute with his proposals to drafting the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the «Presidency Trio» which endeavours to ensure the continuity of these policies; the European Parliament (which is to be regularly informed on the development of the CFSP and

exercises its influence through the preparation of the budget, even though its jurisdiction in this field has not been substantially increased); and finally the European Commission, a previously existing institution fully associated with the work of the CFSP.

In any event, the essential organ is the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who will really head the CSDP and may represent the European Union on the United Nations Security Council when the Union has defined a position on a particular issue.

A major novelty introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is the establishment of a «European External Action Service» which will work in collaboration with the diplomatic services of the Member States and will be at the service of the High Representative.

Lieutenant Colonel Villalba goes on to explain with a most praiseworthy Europeanist optimism what he considers to be the progress achieved in the European Security and Defence Policy from 1999 to 2009. This progress was spurred by frustration at Europe's inability to act on the ground during the crisis of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Since then there has been a constant stream of resolutions (only resolutions) adopted at various European summits. Particularly noteworthy are the Nice European Council (December 2000), which incorporated the WEU's crisis management functions into the European Union, and that of Copenhagen, which allowed the EU to use NATO capabilities and planning bodies. This has made it possible for the EU to use a broad range of civilian and military instruments to foster peace and stability in the equally diverse situations in which they may be under threat. All of this establishes Europe as a genuine example of the so-called «soft power»; however not even if we consider the capabilities of the Member States can the same be said about it with respect to «hard power». We used to say that Europe was an economic giant and a military dwarf; nowadays it is rapidly ceasing to be an economic giant and nor is its military stature increasing. This does not mean to say that «soft power» is bad—rather that it must either complement this power with suitable military capabilities or entrust the latter to an ally with whom it has a firm and lasting commitment. Otherwise Europe's ambition to become a global actor will be doomed to fail. This opinion appears to be shared by General Bentegeat (President of the EU Military Committee), who points out as immediate challenges, in addition to the need to speed up the integration of EU capabilities and ensure they do not dwindle as a result of the economic crisis, the need to reinforce cooperation mechanisms with other international organisations, especially NATO.

Lieutenant Colonel Villalba goes on to list the instruments of the Common Security and Defence Policy which, as stated, has replaced the ESDP:

- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC): this is a significant novelty introduced by the new Lisbon Treaty and may be established by Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made binding commitments with one another to conduct more demanding missions.
- Enhanced Cooperation: the treaty provides that states wishing to establish enhanced cooperation may make use of the Union's institutions.

I believe it is important to underline that these instruments could lead to a two-speed Europe in security and defence matters; this underlines the difficulty of ensuring operability in different fields with an EU of twenty-seven.

- Entrustment of tasks to a group of states: the Treaty of Lisbon establishes that the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States who are willing and have the necessary capabilities.
- The Treaty of Lisbon also broadens the «Petersberg tasks» set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam; notably, all these types of tasks may contribute to combating terrorism.
- Another instrument which is particularly interesting is the establishment of mechanisms for the rapid financing of CSDP missions, as in the past the lack of such mechanisms has hindered these operations. Specifically, the treaty establishes, in addition to rapid access to Union budgetary appropriations, a start-up fund consisting of contributions from the Member States.
- Finally, I also find interesting, even though as yet this is only an objective, to bolster the European Defence Agency which is intended to progressively enhance military capabilities, strengthen the defence industrial and technological base and participate in defining a European policy on capabilities and armaments.
- The paper analyses the situation of transition in which it has fallen to Spain to hold the presidency and the priority objectives which underline Spain's high degree of commitment to the EU.

Naturally the overriding aim is to improve the levels of security in the European Union. National Defence Directive 1/2008 stresses that «[Spanish] national security is intrinsically and indissolubly tied to the

security of Europe»; to this end it is necessary to give impetus to enhancing military and civilian capabilities—known as the «Headline Goal»—establishing as a priority the improvement of rapid response capabilities. That is, the aim is to improve the Union’s real capabilities, both military and civilian, leaving behind the realm of theory and good intentions. Let us hope that it succeeds.

An especially significant aspect of the presidency’s programme is the priority it attaches to improving both the planning and the conduct of military operations. Other goals of the presidency are to continue working in the framework of the European Security Strategy, pointing out the need to reinforce the EU’s crisis management capability, non-proliferation, disarmament and fighting terrorism—in short, to reinforce the CSDP in order to consolidate the Union’s role as a global actor in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis response and management and post-conflict stabilisation, placing particular emphasis on the synergy between civilian and military capabilities. As can only be the case, contributing to non-proliferation and disarmament are also objectives.

Spain intends to meet these objectives on the basis of three criteria (consensus, pragmatism and flexibility) and two principles: innovation (which is particularly applicable to the European defence industry); and equality (applicable to all the Member States). There will be three focal areas of action: institutional (as for the time being it is not possible for meetings of defence ministers to have a format of their own, the aim is to strengthen and increase the frequency of these meetings); second, capabilities (at both Battlegroup and Centre of Operations level); and the third, fostering a comprehensive approach to security, which requires a combination of civilian and military assets and, as pointed out more than once in the Spanish *Strategic Panorama*, is an essential requisite of modern military operations.

All in all, as Lieutenant Colonel Villalba concludes, under the Spanish presidency the aim is to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy in the light of the new treaties.

VI

The year 2010 will witness an important event—the eighth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and we wished this to be reflected in the *Panorama*, which deals with the subject in

Chapter VI written by Professor Vicente Garrido, Director of the INCIPE, an expert in this field.

This is a decisive conference for the future of disarmament and non-proliferation and comes at a critical time; indeed, in the new strategic situation, with more active interlocutors than in the past, it is more necessary than ever for compliance with the Treaty obligations to be guaranteed and, above all, for the credibility of the NPT itself to be maintained. The expectations aroused by the advent of Barack Obama as US president are very great; in April 2009 Obama himself announced «America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons», and this declaration was confirmed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Paris at the start of the present year. This statement has brought about a highly favourable change in both governments and civil society and at L'Aquila in July 2009 the G-8 reiterated its full commitment to the three pillars: non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy and disarmament, which has kindled new hope following the resounding failure of the 2005 review conference.

Professor Garrido begins by asking about the why and wherefore of a NPT and considers that the question is best answered by explaining its vicissitudes from the birth of the idea of nuclear non-proliferation in 1961 for the purpose of avoiding both a nuclear war and the accidental launch of these weapons. The treaty itself came into being in 1968, following the start of proliferation with the explosion of China's first atomic bomb in October 1964.

The history told by the professor is a history of success, as there are no more «de iure» nuclear states than there were before the treaty (the only new additions are the «de facto» nuclear states India, Pakistan and Israel), despite the discrimination established by its entry into force (in March 1970). Indeed, there were substantial differences between the regime applicable to the nuclear countries on which relatively few obligations were imposed (not to transfer nuclear weapons to another state or to assist a non-nuclear state in manufacturing or possessing these weapons), whereas the non-nuclear states were totally barred from manufacturing, receiving or possessing nuclear weapons and this prohibition was guaranteed by a verification system entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was exempted from the prohibition. Therefore the treaty confirmed the status quo that existed at the time of its birth by consolidating the «right to nuclear weapons» of the countries that already had them and making it out of bounds in the future to those who did not have

them; as India stated, there was a *ban on horizontal nuclear proliferation* (there were to be no more nuclear-weapon states) but there was no similar prohibition on *vertical nuclear proliferation* (an increase in the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of the nuclear-weapon states).

Naturally this distinction was harshly criticised by the non-nuclear-weapon states, which considered it not only discriminatory but also ambiguous and insufficient.

Even so, as we have stated, the history of the treaty has been a history of success: with 190 States Parties the NPT is the most universal international legal instrument after the United Nations Charter—probably because interest in its implementation was backed by the most powerful states which stood the most to gain from the treaty, that is, the nuclear states which it legitimises, confirms and consolidates as such.

On the other side of the coin, the debit side of the NPT, is its inability to prevent some of the non-nuclear States Parties from acquiring a nuclear capability (this is the case of Iraq, Libya and Iran).

Professor Garrido goes on to analyse the NPT Review Conferences of 1995 and 2000 insofar as they can be considered the basis of the disarmament agenda. As the duration of the NPT was not indefinite but established at twenty-five years, the decision needed to be made in 1995 whether to extend it indefinitely or terminate it. The 5th Review Conference decided to extend it indefinitely (which benefited the nuclear-weapon states) in exchange for defining its commitments much more clearly. To this end a document of crucial importance was signed entitled «Principles and Objectives of Disarmament and Nuclear Non-proliferation» which, although not legally binding, dominated the agenda for negotiations on these matters. The agenda was structured around five main priorities:

- Universalisation of the NPT: that all states should become Parties.
- Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: as proliferation seriously increased the danger of a nuclear war.
- Achievement of full nuclear disarmament under effective international control.
- The prompt adoption of an international agreement banning the production of fissile materials.
- The creation of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.

The 6th Review Conference of 2000 made further headway on this path of specifying the commitments undertaken in 1995 by adopting an

action plan for nuclear disarmament contained in a list to be progressively implemented and the ultimate aim of which would be the adoption of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; until then a nuclear moratorium was agreed on.

In contrast, the 7th Review Conference of 2005 ended in frustration and scepticism and was considered a wasted opportunity owing chiefly to the attitude of some states (mostly members of the Non-Aligned Movement), which pursued an all or nothing policy. Nor did the nuclear-weapon states, who believed that the previous conference had gone too far, collaborate in bringing the meeting to a successful conclusion.

Such are the circumstances that make up the backdrop to the 2010 Review Conference. As stated, President Obama has managed to change the expectations with the aforementioned declarations, instilling optimism into the atmosphere surrounding the conference. This is not surprising since the president's intention of achieving «a world without nuclear weapons» is, after all, the ultimate aim of the NPT. Indeed, America's new attitude has already borne its first fruit—the negotiation of a new START Treaty aimed at a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals.

President Obama's initiative furthermore comes at a good time in which the economic crisis is making it very difficult for Russia to bolster its nuclear potential. And China (which recently upped its nuclear arsenal by 25%) has expressed its readiness to proceed to a substantial reduction.

In view of these factors, the author ends his paper by discussing the prospects for the 2010 Review Conference, which he views as a unique opportunity to debate on the establishment of a new world security order, although he doubts it will be possible for all the disarmament and non-proliferation proposals raised by President Obama to materialise.

All in all, he believes that international consensus is needed concerning the priorities already analysed at the 1995 and 2000 conferences, which he sums up in the seven following points:

1. Definitive entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
2. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (under IAEA control).
3. Make the Additional Protocol of the IAEA the main instrument of non-proliferation in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials for civilian use to a military purpose.

4. Negotiation of new nuclear disarmament agreements by the United States and Russia, if possible involving the other nuclear powers.
5. Apply mechanisms that ensure the full verification and, above all, the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament processes.
6. Adoption of an international agreement on security assurances from the nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon states.
7. Lastly, prevention of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, for which it will be necessary to adopt measures on the improvement of facilities and physical protection of nuclear materials.

Professor Garrido ends by emphasising the need for a real agreement on disarmament and non-proliferation priorities and not merely high-flown declarations even if adopted by consensus.

In short, we have set out to present a Spanish vision, from a strategic viewpoint, of what is going on in the world. At the start of 2010 the fog of the economic crisis appears to be lifting, but problems and unknown factors remain, some of which we hope will be resolved during the year. We trust that readers will find it useful; if so we will be satisfied.

CHAPTER ONE

THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

FEDERICO STEINBERG WHESLER

INTRODUCTION

Although recessions do not usually have a significant impact on security, this is not the case of the current recession. As it is a very deep recession that is synchronized across the world and is triggering the collapse of international trade and a huge rise in unemployment, its geopolitical and security implications are proving to be greater than those of the recessions of the past fifty years.

Accordingly, in February 2009 the US Director of National Intelligence stated before Congress that the political instability the financial crisis was causing in some countries was the biggest national security threat in the short and medium term, more than terrorism (1). Similarly, Moisés Naím, editor in chief of *Foreign Policy* magazine and one of the shrewdest analysts of globalisation, held that the adverse impact the crisis is having on the prospects of prosperity of the emerging economies' new middle classes could give rise to social conflicts and political instability. What is more, a prolonged recession causing job losses and leaving poor countries without possibilities of financing could fuel fundamentalism and create new failed states, which would have a significant international destabilising potential. Lastly, by putting pressure on public budgets, the crisis could curb expenditure on security, intelligence and defence, increasing the vulnerability of most states.

Fortunately, everything appears to indicate that the effectiveness of the programmes designed to rescue the financial system and of the huge monetary and fiscal incentives that governments have set in motion,

(1) See the report on the National Intelligence Strategy at <http://www.dni.gov/>.

coupled with the existence of global economic governance institutions and the progress (albeit still timid) of multilateral cooperation, are making it possible for the economic situation to begin to improve.

According to the estimate of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), most of the world's economies could be growing in 2010 and, what is more, the emerging economies would do so at a much faster pace than their advanced counterparts. If these forecasts are confirmed, the countries will have avoided succumbing to the protectionist temptation that brought such disastrous results during the Great Depression of the 1930s. In short, the determined action taken by the authorities appears to have prevented a new economic depression, and the likelihood of outbreaks of social strife and political instability in the most economically vulnerable countries will be significantly smaller, which could improve the international security outlook.

A different matter is that the advanced countries may well have to get used to living with much lower growth rates, higher levels of public debt and slower job creation rates than in the past. What is more, they will need to come to terms with the fact that the crisis will speed up their relative economic decline, forcing them to hand over a certain amount of power to the emerging countries in international economic institutions.

This context raises major economic policy debates that particularly affect the European Union and Spain. On the domestic front it is essential to design strategies for combating the crisis in the monetary and fiscal areas. In the former, it is necessary to gradually reduce surplus liquidity in order to keep inflation at bay. In the latter, public debt needs to be reduced in the medium term so that current levels of indebtedness do not push up long-term interest rates or hold back growth but ensure that the European social model is sustainable even if it requires reforms. It should furthermore be borne in mind that to the public debt increase triggered by the crisis should be added the greater indebtedness we will witness over the next decade as the baby-boom generation (those born between 1945 and 1975) reaches retirement age.

On the international front the European Union needs to find mechanisms for increasing its influence in the world at a time when the emerging economies are gaining ground on it. In this context the possible decline of the dollar as the only international reserve currency could signify an opportunity for the euro area. However as it is unlikely that the euro will replace the dollar as the hegemonic currency, the only option that remains

to Europe in the long run is to consolidate a single voice at the international forums, in order to be able to exercise a certain leadership in the key issues on the global economic agenda.

THE GLOBAL RECESSION: WHAT STAGE ARE WE AT?

One of the main sources of uncertainty regarding the possibilities of a recovery in the global economy is the difficulty of pinpointing at what stage the recession is. Although there appears to be a consensus that monetary and fiscal intervention has put a floor on the decline in activity, it is hard to ascertain the state of expectations in the private sector, particularly those of consumers. Until consumption (and private investment) returns to growth, the main economies will remain in an abnormal situation in which it will be the public sector that maintains activity, like a patient with artificially assisted respiration. But as public stimuli cannot continue indefinitely, the problem lies in determining when to withdraw them; that is, what the appropriate exit strategy is and when it should be implemented (we will return to this point later on). This means that the authorities need to stake their bets—under conditions of uncertainty—on the ability and willingness to spend of families and companies that remain heavily indebted and whose expectations have proved to be volatile.

Growth forecasts and risks

Despite these uncertainties, which tend to be summed up in the debate over whether recovery will be V-shaped (fast exit) or W-shaped (exit but a new relapse in the short term owing to problems of confidence and of the financial sector), it is possible to find a certain amount of consensus over the possible future growth rates for the coming years in the latest World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published in October 2009.

The IMF's main message is that following the deep recession the world economy has moved into the recovery stage, but recovery will be slow and not without its risks. World GDP will fall by 1.1% in 2009 and will grow by 3.1% in 2010, but not in a homogeneous manner. According to the IMF the emerging economies, particularly of Asia, will head this recovery and will grow by 1.7% in 2009 and 5% in 2010 (thanks to the major fiscal stimulus provided by its authorities and the recovery of global demand, China will grow by 8.5% in 2009 and by 9% in 2010). In contrast, the

economies of the rich countries will shrink by 3.4% in 2009 and grow at a slow 1.3% in 2010. The slump will be prevented from being greater by the huge fiscal stimuli and recovery will be faster in the United States than in the euro area (see table 1).

TABLE 1

GDP growth (%)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011†	2014
United States	2.1	0.4	-2.9	1.2	3.0	2.2
Euro area	2.7	0.7	-4.2	0.9	2.0	2.3
Japan	2.3	-0.7	-5.4	1.7	2.2	1.9
Emerging and developing economies	8.3	6.0	1.5	5.0	n/a	6.7
Oil exporters	7.4	5.4	-2.4	2.9	n/a	4.6
European Union	3.1	1.1	-4.3	0.2	n/a	2.7
Germany	2.5	1.3	-5.3	-0.1	2.2	2.2
France	2.3	0.3	-2.4	0.8	2.0	2.3
Italy	1.6	-1	-5.1	0.2	1.7	1.9
Spain	3.7	1.2	-3.7	-0.7	0.9	2.1
United Kingdom	2.6	0.7	-4.5	0.7	2.5	2.9
Canada	2.5	0.4	-2.3	1.9	3.3	2.2
Africa	6.2	5.3	1.6	4.1	n/a	5.3
Central and Eastern Europe (*)	5.5	3.1	-5.7	1.6	n/a	4.1
Russia	8.1	5.6	-8.5	1.5	4.2	5
Emerging and developing Asia	10.6	7.6	6.1	7.3	n/a	8.8
China	13	9.0	8.5	9	9.3	10.0
Argentina	8.7	6.8	-2.5	1.0	n/a	3.0
Brazil	5.7	5.1	-1.0	3.0	4.5	3.6
Mexico	3.3	1.3	-7.3	3.3	3.9	4.9

Source: WEO, October 2009.

(†) OECD data

(*) Including non-EU Member States.

The causes of this incipient recovery lie in the ambitious policies designed to sustain demand, which both wealthy and emerging countries

have put into practice. In this respect it can be stated that the world has learned from the mistakes of 1929, when the public reacted much more timidly and much more slowly to the crisis. Since summer 2007 (and particularly since Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September 2008) central banks have reacted rapidly by lowering interest rates and implementing heterodox measures to inject liquidity and sustain credit. For their part governments have shored up the financial system with guarantees and capital injections, in addition to launching huge packages of discretionary fiscal stimulus measures, added to the increase in expenditure on automatic stabilisers.

These measures have reduced uncertainty and bolstered confidence, and this is reflected in the relative normalisation of the activity of the financial and exchange markets. Spreads have narrowed, solvent states have easily found buyers for sovereign debt, banking sector results have improved, the dollar has depreciated and the euro and the currencies of emerging countries have appreciated; that is, we have returned to a financial situation similar to that which existed before the crisis.

In addition, as table 2 shows, it would appear that public intervention has warded off the risk of deflation and that prices will again grow moderately in 2010. This is particularly important in a situation of high indebtedness such as the present, because deflation pushes up the real cost of the debt of families, companies and governments, encourages consumption to be postponed and does not allow negative real interest rates however low the intervention interest rates set by the Central Bank are. In other words, moderate inflation is welcome because it allows debts to be «liquidated», whereas deflation increases them, paralysing consumption and making it practically impossible to consolidate recovery.

But once the risk of deflation has been overcome there is a danger that the huge monetary stimuli (interest-rate cuts and policies of quantitative expansion) may give rise to high medium-term inflation, beginning in 2012. The central banks of the countries with strong currencies (the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England) could, if pressured by their governments, succumb to the temptation of attempting to inflate debt in order to reduce its real value. Although this option is unlikely because these central banks are independent, it should not be entirely ruled out. In any event, it is less likely to occur in the euro area because for historical reasons Germany, the key country, has a much lower tolerance to inflation than the United States or the United Kingdom.

TABLE 2

Inflation (%)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2014
United States	2.9	3.8	-0.5	1.3	2.2
Euro area	2.1	3.3	0.2	0.8	1.5
Japan	0.1	1.4	-1.1	-0.8	0.8
Emerging and developing states	6.5	9.3	5.4	4.6	3.9

Source: WEO, October 2009.

Although recovery appears to be close, there continue to be substantial risks. First, that the process of deleverage and recognition of losses in the financial system has not yet been completed. This means that credit could become stagnant in wealthy countries and, furthermore, if new problems surface in the banking system, prospects could take a fresh downturn, leading to a relapse in activity. Second, that the developing countries dependent on external financing could have difficulties raising capital, which could generate economic instability and regional policies whose consequences are difficult to predict. Third, that energy prices could start to rise even before recovery is consolidated, owing to both growing demand and surplus liquidity. This could force the central banks to raise interest rates to prevent inflationary risks earlier than would be desirable, with the consequent negative impact on recovery. Lastly, that unemployment will continue to be high until well into 2010, rising above 10% in the United States and 11% in the euro area, with sizeable differences between countries (Spain's unemployment rate will continue to be the highest in the euro area and could verge on 20% by 2010).

The protectionist temptation

As in previous recessions, governments have again been under considerable pressure to protect national production and employment by erecting protectionist barriers. The various lobbies have promoted the establishment of measures to hinder imports and bias public expenditure towards domestic production in order to prevent part of consumers' and taxpayers' money from contributing to increase foreign as opposed to local demand. And in view of the intensity of the recession some governments, concerned by the destruction of employment (and also seeking short-term political returns), have given into the protectionist temptation. The wealthy countries are thus using subsidies and other internal support measures (such as, for example, aids targeted at the automobile sector or

«buy national» or «buy local» clauses tied to fiscal stimulus packages). For their part, developing countries, which have fewer resources, are resorting chiefly to import restrictions, both tariffs and other kinds.

Notwithstanding this resurgence in trade nationalism, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has described the measures adopted as «low intensity protectionism», as in most cases they are compatible with the commitments countries have both in the framework of the WTO and under other international trade treaties. Therefore, although it is still early days to claim victory, it can be said that most countries are succeeding in stemming the protectionist temptation. This fact is of huge importance because the experience of history shows that the maintenance of free trade is essential to the stability and security of the international economic system.

Even so, it should be recognised that international trade has been one of the main victims of the world crisis. In 2009 international trade will have contracted by 10% (14% in industrialised countries and 7% in developing countries) and more in manufactured goods than in services. Such a contraction has not been witnessed since the 1930s. The last time international trade decreased was in 1982, and that was by less than 2%. But if some of the data reported are confirmed, it is possible that international trade will bounce back to strong growth by 2010, first in Asia and later in the rest of the world. This would mean that, unlike in the 1930s, the international community will have withstood the protectionist temptation. Trade will have fallen on account of the slump in demand and shortage of financing and not because of competitive devaluations and a rise in tariffs and other trade barriers, which are difficult to reverse once recovery is achieved.

It is important to resist the protectionist temptation because although protectionism did not cause the Great Depression, it exacerbated it. The rise in tariffs coupled with competitive devaluations prevented international transactions from cushioning the effects of the recession that followed the crash of 1929. Indeed, just as trade increases the size of the «cake» of world output because it gives rise to a more efficient allocation of resources, the tariff war reduces it. The escalation of protectionism which took place between 1929 and 1932 led to a 33% slump in international trade in real terms and a 14% fall in every country's GDP. The international community learned the hard way that governments' well-meaning attempts to protect employment and stem the fall in activity resulted in higher unemployment and poverty, which was furthermore a breeding ground for

nationalism. Paradoxically, all countries became poorer in the attempt to protect themselves from poverty.

While awaiting confirmation that the errors of the past are not being repeated, we may draw a few lessons. The first is that the discipline imposed by the WTO has been fairly useful in putting a brake on protectionism. It is allowing tariffs to be raised only as far as the established ceilings and not above them. It is also granting governments the possibility of resorting to different safeguard clauses that were designed as escape valves for situations such as the present and enable countries to temporarily relax their trade policies without being forced to withdraw from the institution. These clauses provide temporary protection and are eliminated when the established period has elapsed, and it is therefore not necessary to start from scratch in liberalising trade in the good in question.

Another sign of the importance and effectiveness of the WTO is that it is precisely non-members (like Russia and Algeria) which are hampering the international free movement of goods, services and investments the most. We also find that in areas where the coverage of WTO regulations is limited or non-existent (financial system bail outs, programmes of public purchases, export subsidies and entry restrictions on workers) more measures against free trade are being implemented. International regulation needs to be strengthened in these areas.

Lastly, it should be stressed that the WTO is doing the important job of overseeing the trade policies of its member states; this is particularly significant bearing in mind the lack of transparency that usually accompanies non-tariff barriers. Since the crisis erupted it has published several reports monitoring all the protectionist measures fostered by governments and has created a database with the tariff levels of its member states. All this information is freely available on its website (www.wto.org). In addition the website www.globaltradealert.org also monitors the protectionist measures implemented by countries.

But not everything can be attributed to the WTO's skills. The very dynamic of globalisation has modified the political economics of protectionism. On the one hand, considerably fewer workers are employed in farming and the traditional manufacturing sector today than in the 1930s, and there is consequently less protectionist pressure. But in addition, although governments continue to come up against pressure from lobbies that hinder imports, other pressure groups have sprung up which oppose the closing of borders. They are chiefly multinationals that import intermediate goods

and for which a rise in tariffs entails an increase in costs.

In short, the ability of the international economic system to remain relatively open in such adverse times suggests that the new geography of world production and the discipline imposed by the WTO act as (imperfect) assurances against the protectionist temptation. This crucial role of the WTO tends not to be appreciated in periods of economic growth. Therefore, the value of concluding the Doha Round at a time of recession like the present lays not so much in creating new trade opportunities as in consolidating the system's current level of openness, which is fairly considerable when viewed from a historical perspective. Although for the time being a possible agreement is not envisaged, if the growth in output and trade are consolidated in 2010 the negotiations, which were practically finalised before the outbreak of the crisis, could be resumed.

OPEN DEBATES

Irrespective of whether the incipient recoveries in growth and international trade are confirmed, there are some important questions on which the future dynamism of the world economy, the risks of inflation and the stability of the financial system hinge. These issues are discussed below.

Exit strategies

The first major debate, which was the centrepiece of part of the talks at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009, is on exit strategies; that is, how and when to withdraw the huge monetary and fiscal stimuli implemented to counteract the slump in private demand. As stated, the world economy is beginning to recover thanks to the injections of public expenditure and liquidity made by governments and central banks. Even though the panic is now over, the financial system has been stabilised and savings rates are bouncing back in nearly all countries, private consumption is still at an all time low. Therefore, if liquidity and public spending are withdrawn too soon, as occurred in 1931 following the crisis of 1929, the global economy could again collapse.

Conversely, if the public stimuli are maintained for too long, there is a risk of overheating the economy, triggering inflation (and consequently pushing up interest rates), generating a new asset price bubble and continuing to raise deficit and public debt levels to the point of sparking a crisis of unsustainability.

Although it is impossible to determine with accuracy the optimum time for withdrawing the stimuli, there is a certain amount of agreement on the need to maintain them at least until the middle of 2010 (or until there is evidence that recovery is firmly underway). There also appears to be consensus on the need to withdraw fiscal stimulus before monetary stimulus (just as fiscal stimulus was implemented after it became clear that monetary stimulus was insufficient to reactivate the economy) (2). Therefore, it is possible that the countries with the highest growth rates will adopt counteractive budgets in 2011 (3). However, it should be borne in mind that fiscal policy poses the problem of a time lag that is difficult to determine between the moment the government decides to withdraw spending and the moment when the contraction hits the real economy. Therefore, if the delay is too long, it could cause inflationary pressure to force the central bank to raise interest rates before public expenditure begins to decrease.

But despite these question marks hovering over when to withdraw discretionary fiscal stimulus and how to calculate the size of the time lag, the alternative—to begin with monetary contraction—has even greater problems. The main one is that if interest rates were raised, the cost of financing for businesses and families would increase, hampering recovery. Furthermore, higher interest rates would mean a greater cost of public debt, making it more difficult to put public accounts in order.

It therefore seems that the combination of a contractive fiscal policy and an expansive monetary policy is better for economic growth than a situation where contraction comes from the monetary side. A lax monetary policy will thus be able to carry on stimulating investment projects once the easing of discretionary public spending has taken place, provided that inflationary pressure allows this and the financial system is functioning relatively normally.


Deficit, debt and future growth

Even assuming that the authorities are capable of designing effective exit strategies that are relatively well coordinated internationally and that there will be a return to growth, this crisis has left a gaping hole in public coffers that will have to be closed. As charts 3 and 4 show, in 2010 all

(2) For a more detailed explanation see Clara Crespo «Estrategias de salida tras la cumbre del G-20». Analysis 139/2009 of the Real Instituto Elcano


(3) At any rate no government wishes to repeat the mistake made by the Roosevelt Administration in 1937 when, believing that the Great Depression was over, it approved a tax increase that again crippled growth until the beginning of the Second World War.

CHART 3



Source: compiled by the author from WEO figures, October 2009.

CHART 4



Source: compiled by the author from WEO figures, October 2009.

Source: compiled by the author from the IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009. For ease of representation, I have excluded the data for Japan, whose gross public debt is expected to amount to 226.6% of GDP in 2010.

(*) The data for Spain are taken from the IMF Article IV Consultation Staff Report, April 2009. They do not include guarantees granted to the banking system, on the assumption that they are not used.

the countries' public accounts are in much worse shape than before the crisis in terms of both public deficit and public debt as a percentage of GDP. Uncontrolled growth of debt is dangerous in any situation, but as the baby boom generation will start to retire in the coming years in the wealthy countries, it will be necessary to issue huge amounts of debt to finance pensions and greater health expenditure, and it would therefore be desirable for public finances to be looking as healthy as possible—something that the crisis has made much more difficult

Indeed, according to the European Commission, the crisis has caused debt to increase by 20 percentage points of GDP, more or less the same as in previous crises. However, there are two particularly worrying facts. The first is that the debt increase has occurred in a context in which the debt-to-GDP ratio was already fairly high in historic terms in nearly all the countries (not Spain and Ireland).

The second fact, which is linked to the foregoing, is that this debt increase comes at a time when new (and larger) issues of debt are expected, owing to population ageing. It is calculated that from 2015 onwards expenditure on pensions and healthcare will begin to grow rapidly and more so in countries that have not yet reformed their pension systems. The European Commission's 2009 Ageing Report estimates that the rise in ageing-linked expenditure over the next fifteen years will be equivalent to 5% of GDP in Spain, 3.5% in Germany and 3.3% on average in the 27-strong EU. This is slightly less of a problem for the United States, because its population is younger and because the public education and health systems are less generous than in Europe (Japan faces the same challenges as the European Union).

Action is therefore required on two fronts: institutional reforms to ensure fiscal consolidation in the long term; and structural economic reforms to boost growth potential thereby facilitating a better debt-to-GDP ratio.

The first group of measures will require institutional reforms in order to allow progress towards fiscal consolidation and ensure high budgetary surpluses (not simply a balanced figure) during expansive periods. We may therefore expect to witness the widespread adoption of fiscal regulations such as the Spanish Law on Budget Stability (Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria) and the European Stability and Growth Pact, which «tie the government's hands» by correcting its tendency towards excessive spending. Another is the setting up of Independent Fiscal Councils (institutions based on the model of independent central banks) whose opinions

are sufficiently high profile as to provide the government with an «anchor» for justifying sizeable budget surpluses in times of economic expansion.

As for structural economic reforms, there is a need for policies that boost the growth potential of the developed economies, particularly those of Europe, since the greater the growth the more sustainable the high levels of debt society must deal with and the easier it will be to put public accounts in order. This involves progressing with reforms in line with the Lisbon strategy—that is, improving the functioning of the labour market in order to enhance the dynamism and productivity of the economy, stepping up spending on R&D (particularly that of the private sector, which generates faster applications) and encouraging greater competition in the goods market and, in particular, the services market.

Even if these reforms are carried out, there is reason to believe that the medium-term growth of the world economy cannot be as high as in the years prior to 2007, in which world income per capita reached its highest growth rate in history (even faster than in 1950-1973). From the point of view of supply, the rise in unemployment, which could have a structural component, will curb growth protection through a reduction in activity, particularly in sectors like real estate, the automobile industry and financial services. In addition, population ageing will diminish Europe's working population and put a brake on the dynamism and innovative capacity of workers and companies (bearing in mind that relatively young workers tend to be more productive, more innovative and less averse to risk).

The crisis has furthermore brought about a widespread downturn in investments, as a result of which nearly all the economies will have to address the problem of capital obsolescence. In the case of energy, insufficient growth in investments could push up the price of oil if demand picks up and the necessary projects have not been undertaken in the extraction and refining sectors. Higher energy prices would curb growth potential by increasing costs in all sectors of the economy.

On the demand side, there is also reason to think that lesser growth is on the cards. For one thing, when the crisis is over long-term interest rates may be expected to increase owing both to the increase in public debt and to the fact that the monetary authorities wish to avoid inflationary risks and the emergence of new bubbles. This will amount to higher financing costs for the private sector, which will have a negative impact on growth.

What is more, US consumers, who have been the driving force of the world economy for decades, will lower their level of spending and increase

their rate of savings, both because they are hugely indebted and because the real estate debacle has reduced their net wealth. As the emerging economies (above all China) still have very high savings rates and Germany and Japan do not seem likely to increase their domestic demand or their exports, there will be no substitute for the US consumer, and the world economy will therefore have to adapt to a lower level of expenditure (it is estimated that as a result of the crisis US consumers will cease to spend 800 billion dollars per year, approximately half of Spain's GDP).

Dollar-euro rivalry for global monetary leadership

Another important question that has arisen following the eruption of the international financial crisis is the future of the dollar as a global reserve currency. Indeed, after dominating the international monetary system for decades, the dollar's leadership is beginning to be questioned. But as we shall see, this does not mean that the greenback is going to be replaced in either the short or the medium term. Everything would appear to indicate that the world economy is heading for a slow transition leading to a situation in which three reserve currencies will coexist in the long term: the dollar, the euro and the yuan. Let us now examine why.

Before the crisis America's huge current account deficit and the rapid accumulation of dollars by the central banks of the emerging economies (especially of China and the oil exporters) led to the steady depreciation of the dollar, particularly against the euro. At the same time, a few central banks, worried about the solvency of the United States, began to consider the need to diversify their reserves, as a result of which the dollar lost a certain amount of market share to the euro in both international transactions and global reserves. Nonetheless these movements were timid, as a massive sale of dollars would generate sizeable losses precisely for countries which, like China, possess substantial assets in the US currency.

This tendency was suddenly interrupted by the panic which swept across the markets following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The financial crisis triggered a «flight to security» which led to a sharp appreciation of the dollar, even though the crisis had taken hold in the United States. However, now that the financial markets are starting to get back to normal, there is a return to the pre-crisis situation in which external deficit and the accumulation of US debt, added to the rigidity of Chinese exchange rates, are again tipping the scale of adjustment of global imbalances towards an appreciation of the euro.

This new depreciation of the dollar, coupled with the appreciation of gold and China's statements about the need to replace the greenback as the global reserve currency with the Special Drawing Rights of the IMF, have reopened the debate on the outlook of the reserve currency. And since the Chinese yuan is not yet convertible and the yen, the pound and the Swiss franc have lost some of their international clout in recent years, the debate revolves around whether the euro could replace the dollar as the dominant global currency. Indeed, in a recent essay published in *Foreign Affairs*, Fred Bergsten, a leading specialist in the geopolitics of currencies, stated that the United States ought to realise that it is no longer in its interest to promote the maintenance of the dollar as the sole reserve currency as this hinders the internal discipline that the economy needs to reduce its huge debt (4).

This debate is followed with interest, but also with a certain amount of caution, by the euro countries. On the one hand there are dreams that Europe might one day enjoy the privilege the United States has held for decades: of financing its deficit at practically zero cost and of using the dollar as a geopolitical tool for advancing its interests. However, the authorities have made no declarations indicating that they aim to promote the international use of the euro because, to the European mentality—which has traditionally stayed away from arguments on geopolitical dominance—the costs involved in a short-term appreciation of the euro by far outweigh the possible (but uncertain) future benefits.(5) What is more, the basic problem continues to be that the euro, unlike the dollar (or the Chinese yuan, which is not yet convertible but will be in the coming decades), is an orphan currency without a state or an army to provide it with the security component needed to make it the global benchmark currency.

Therefore, it is most likely that the euro will gradually increase in value and gain market share in international reserves and transactions, but will not take over from the dollar, which will continue to be clearly dominant in Asia and America.

Indeed, although since its creation the euro has secured greater international influence than all the former national currencies together, the dollar clearly continues to dominate the international securities markets.

(4) See Fred Bergsten's article «The Dollar and the Deficits», *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2009.

(5) A strong euro helps contain inflation and lowers the price of oil, but in a situation of recession like the present, with deflationary pressure and weak demand, a strong euro could undermine the incipient recovery in the euro area.

At the end of 2008, 45% of debt securities were in dollars and only 32% in euro, even though the euro had upped its market share by 12 points since its creation and the dollar's had fallen by 5 points. The dominance of the dollar is even greater in the reserves held by central banks: 64% of the total versus the euro's 27%, although the single currency has gained nearly 10 percentage points since coming into existence.

Even so, there are two factors that may work in the euro's favour in the long term and have been heightened by the global financial crisis. The first is the United States' hefty current account deficit and fast accumulation of government debt, which could hasten a lack of confidence in the dollar, causing the euro's share to grow in investor and central bank portfolios. The second is the massive accumulation of reserves by the central banks of emerging economies, which will possibly lead to greater diversification of portfolios and the pursuit of investments providing better yields than US Treasury bonds, which could favour the euro and other strong currencies.

Therefore, although it is unlikely that the euro will replace the dollar in the next decade, it does seem possible that we are approaching a dual monetary hegemony in the medium term, which would become a triple hegemony in the long term when China opens up its financial system and makes the yuan convertible. Most experts agree that the euro will not be able to fully replace the dollar owing to the European Union's military and political weakness and the «anti-growth» bias of the ECB's policies.⁽⁶⁾ In any event, in order to further strengthen the euro's role as an international currency, it is essential for the European Union to deepen its structural economic reforms so as to enhance its growth potential, improve the supervision and economic governance system of the euro area and further integrate and deepen its financial markets.

CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The crisis is causing a major impact on the international economic order. On the one hand it has reinforced trends that had been under way for years, such as the rise of the emerging powers. On the other, it has put a brake on (and may reverse) a trend that seemed difficult to change,

(6) See the essays by Guillermo De la Dehesa, (2009): «Will the Euro ever replace the Dollar as the dominant global currency?» Working Paper of the *Real Instituto Elcano*, and Jean Pissani Ferry and Adam Posen (2009): *The Euro at Ten: The Next Global Currency*, Petersen Institute for International Economics, Washington DC.

whereby nation states had been losing power to the market and to supra-national institutions for decades. In addition the crisis has drawn attention at different times and in different spheres to the shortfalls in the existing international coordination and cooperation mechanisms. This is forcing the international community to rethink the foundations of global economic governance. But it should be remembered that although the crisis is acting as a catalyst for these reforms, the debate on the need to adapt the international institutions to the new international economic reality has been on the table for several years. The markets have been undergoing globalisation for decades, but economic regulation continues to be essentially national. And, as this crisis has shown, this lack of concordance poses major risks. It requires new international economic regulations, particularly in the financial sphere, which in order to be legitimate and in consonance with the current international economic order must be the product of negotiation between the advanced and the emerging countries (and not dictated by the advanced countries as in the past). We will now go on to analyse these issues.

The return of the nation state and the rise of the G-20

Over the past decades, as economic globalisation has intensified, a gradual diffusion of power has taken place in the world economy. The nation states, which had been the only prominent actors in international relations for centuries, began to lose ground to other players. Further «up» supranational bodies such as the IMF, the WTO and the European Union diluted the power of the state and its room for manoeuvre in economic policy. Further «down» multinationals, NGOs, mafias, the Davos World Economic Forum, rating agencies, the so-called global civil society and regional governments to which powers were progressively transferred as part of the decentralisation carried out in some countries also took a slice of the state's sovereignty, becoming new sources of power. Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and liberalisation and privatisation, markets gradually sapped the power of the nation states. Logically not all states lost power with the same intensity. The richer and most influential states, those that were capable of shaping the rules of globalisation in accordance with their own interests, lost less influence than those that were more exposed to the fluctuations of international markets or had to accept economic regulations they did not always share. In short, although the relative power of the state was reduced, this reduction of sovereignty had much more of an impact on poor countries than on wealthy nations.

Although this process of power diffusion and state withdrawal seemed unstoppable in the 90s, the attacks of 11 September slowed it down by putting security back at the centre of international relations. The new laws aimed at combating terrorism and the new rise in military expenditure, particularly in the United States, took us back temporarily to the past, when the «high politics» of war and security took priority over the «low politics» of the economy. However, the huge economic growth that followed the crisis of 2001-2002 and the fresh impetus given to production and trade by the emerging economies led by China allowed economic globalisation to continue its spectacular progress. And with this new wave of liberalisation the nation state's scope for action was again narrowed, as reflected, for example, by growing doubts about the sustainability of the Welfare State in Europe and workers' fears about industrial relocation and the outsourcing of services, phenomena which endangered their jobs and about which there was little that the state could do.

But the global economic crisis appears to have brought this process to an abrupt halt, ushering in a still subtle deglobalisation that is accompanied by a return of strong nation states. The bail-out programmes for the financial system, the huge fiscal stimulus packages the countries have implemented and regulatory reforms in economic matters—which are still underway—have served to strengthen governments, which now consider themselves entitled to curb the market excesses which the crisis has put on the table. Furthermore, higher taxes to square public accounts will be necessary in the medium term and everything appears to indicate that the post-crisis world will be more regulated in many aspects of economic life, but above all in relation to the financial markets. Lastly, public opinion in most of the countries, which was already critical of the economic globalisation process as it considered that the benefits of liberalisation were distributed very unequally, will begin to demand more forcefully a bigger role for public policies. Therefore, as paradoxical as it may seem, the advanced countries that promoted globalisation and lost influence as it progressed will recover power and legitimacy thanks to the first major crisis of globalisation. In short, although it still too soon to judge to what extent this crisis is substantially altering the power balance between state and market, what can be affirmed is that it has marked a turning point in globalisation that is facilitating the return of the nation state.

The other major change precipitated by this crisis is the G-20's takeover from the G-7/8 at the helm of the world economy. The emerging

countries had been criticising the G-7/8 for years as they considered the forum to be insufficiently representative of the current power structure of the world economy (something similar occurred with the United Nations Security Council). But for years the advanced countries turned a deaf ear to these criticisms and merely invited a few emerging countries to the G-7/8 meetings.

But everything has changed with the crisis. As Wolf (2009) states, «crises overturn established orders. The financial and economic crises of 2007-09 are no exception. The rise of the G-20 to prominence is a watershed in history: for the first time since the industrial revolution, economic power is no longer concentrated in western hands» (7). Indeed, it took the international community a devastating financial debacle to realise that the group formed by the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada—and joined by Russia in the 90s—is no longer sufficiently representative to meet the challenges of globalisation. The need to incorporate the emerging powers in order to address a global recession and the rise of economic nationalism have made it necessary to grant leadership to a larger group of countries, the broader G-20, in order to design the new rules that ensure that globalisation does not self-destruct.

The G-20 is an informal forum established following the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and has met three times (in Washington in November 2008, in London in April 2009 and in Pittsburgh in September 2009) in less than a year since the eruption of the crisis. As a group it is large enough (and therefore legitimate) to become the embryo of global economic reforms but is also small enough to be effective. Therefore, its consolidation as the G-7/8's replacement is excellent news. But apart from the fact that this forum is used to agree on the coordination of the relevant policies required to lessen the adverse impact of the crisis and design exit strategies, its most important job in the long run will be to establish the reforms of the formal institutions (or create new ones where necessary).

In short, the G-20 will not prevent the global recession from being traumatic, but if it continues to provide a coordinated response to the problems arising from the crisis and serves as a focal point for deeper reforms, the legitimacy of the international economic cooperation institutions as a whole would increase significantly in the eyes of the emerging countries,

(7) *Financial Times* «The west no longer holds all the cards» 23 September.

which could adopt more cooperative attitudes and cease to behave as free riders in the international system. Some of the most important reforms the G-20 has set in motion relate to the IMF's new role in world financial governance. This subject is dealt with in the next section.

Reform of the International Monetary Fund

After years in the background the financial crisis has returned the IMF to a position as key player in the world economy. Furthermore, it has enabled the institution to increase its budget, change some of its most criticised credit lines and convey a more Keynesian (and therefore less «conservative») image than in the past. Accordingly, since the middle of 2008 the IMF has granted loans to emerging countries taken by surprise by the US crash. And the G-20 summit of April 2009 in London paved the way for a substantial increase in its financing, including a significant allocation of 250 billion dollars of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and the authorisation to issue bonds on the international markets. What is more, its new loans are being paid out with revised conditions through its new flexible credit line, which is going down well with the public of the borrowing countries as it is not forcing them to adopt new adjustment programmes.

But once the recession is over the IMF will still need to address the pending issue of reforming its internal governance and culture in order to reflect the new balance of power in the world economy and to tackle the global financial challenges with legitimacy. These challenges are huge and involve improving international financial regulation and supervision, limiting leverage and risk levels, increasing information and transparency in markets, redefining and harmonising accounting valuation standards, increasing the capital requirements of financial institutions, extending regulation to certain markets that are still opaque, preventing credit from being so procyclical, carrying out better supervision of the derivatives markets, ensuring that asset prices are better incorporated into monetary policy to avoid the emergence of bubbles and revising the functioning of rating agencies.

Although some developments have taken place in the right direction, if the reforms are insufficient there is a risk that the IMF will continue to be perceived as illegitimate by the emerging economies, which would lead it to become permanently insignificant and, as such, incapable of fulfilling its mandate effectively. Therefore, although there continues to be little place

for assessments on ethics and equity in international economic relations, the focus of the debate on the representativeness of the IMF has shifted from justice to effectiveness. Only a legitimate IMF will continue to be effective.

Although the IMF needs reforms, it is important to underline that over the past decade—especially with the modifications of quota and voting shares approved in 2006 and 2008—small steps forward have been made.

At the end of the 90s—along with the World Bank and the initiatives to pardon the debt of the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)—the IMF incorporated poverty reduction into its discourse, through its new concessional lending instrument for the poorest countries, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Fund (PRGF). This was an attempt to allay criticisms that accused it of neglecting the adverse social impact of the macroeconomic stability programmes. It was also intended to bring its actions into line with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

Another of the initiatives adopted in response to those who, like Joseph Stiglitz, claimed that the IMF issued simplistic prescriptions for all the countries that asked it for loans and was not answerable to civil society, was the establishment of the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) in 2001. The aim of this department, which in theory is independent from the Fund's management, is to improve the institution's learning culture through critical evaluations of its actions, to strengthen its external credibility and its accounting systems by fostering greater understanding of its work and to back its governance and supervision functions. However, since it is «inside» the IMF its independence has been questioned.

Lastly, in 2005 the Fund launched its medium-term reform strategy outlining its new 21st-century role focused on its place in the international financial and monetary system and on the problem of the voice and representation of the emerging and low-income countries in its organs of government. These documents contained a host of proposals designed to improve the stability and supervision of the international financial system, prevent crises, build up its resources and improve international macroeconomic coordination. But the financial crisis has shown that most initiatives in these fields had not gone far enough, above all because the IMF's

real powers were limited. For example, the Fund had no coercive ability to reduce global macroeconomic imbalances; its ability to supervise the financial system was limited; and it did not have the authority to act as a supranational regulatory body. Even so, despite its inability to prevent the crisis, some of the progress made in recent years has enabled it to come up with a fairly fast and effective response.

But the acid test for reforming the institution was (and still is) modifying its quotas, which determine the number of votes after discounting the so-called basic votes, which are those all states receive irrespective of their size (8).

The need to further this reform to boost the Fund's legitimacy and representativeness may be illustrated by a simple comparison. The sum of the GDP of Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland as a world total is less than the sum of the GDP of China, India, Brazil, Korea and Mexico (8.1% versus 11.9% measured in market exchange rates and 5.8% versus 20.1% measured in Purchasing Power Parity). However, before the reform of 2006 these five European countries held 10.4% of IMF votes and the five major emerging countries only 8.2%.⁽⁹⁾ And as the trend growth rate of the emerging economies is greater than that of their European counterparts, this gap, in itself difficult to justify, was merely widening.

Every time a quota reform is planned two issues have to be debated. First, a possible increase, which is approved if the IMF is judged to need more resources. Second, the distribution of this increase, which may trigger changes in the internal balance of power as—given that this is a zero sum game—more votes for one country amounts to less votes for another. Whatever the case, any change resulting in winners and losers involves a change in the formula employed to determine the quotas and must furthermore be approved by an 85% majority, which means that the United States, with 17% of the votes, is the only country with power of veto.

Since the establishment of the IMF 13 ordinary quota reviews have been conducted. In five of them it was decided not to make any chan-

(8) The quotas also determine each country's contribution to the financing of the Fund, its access to the Fund's resources and the percentage of SDRs to which it is entitled.

(9) In variables such as population and reserves the emerging countries have a much greater weight than those of Europe but in terms of share of world trade they are practically equal, the European countries holding a slight advantage.

ges because it was not considered necessary to increase the Fund's resources. However, in 2006 an ad hoc reform process was set in motion, ending in 2008 and marking substantial changes. The process progressed in two phases. In the first it was agreed to increase the quotas of China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey as they were the most under-represented countries (their economy and international status had grown significantly in recent years, and this had not been reflected in their quotas). In the second, in April 2008, a much more far reaching reform was carried out, including a major change in the formula to make it simpler and more transparent. With the new formula the weight of a country in world GDP has become the most important variable and is furthermore weighted, measured as a blend of GDP based on market exchange rates (weight of 60%) and GDP based on Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates (40%). The other variables that make up the quota formula are openness (ratio of imports plus exports to GDP), variability of current receipts and net capital flows and reserves. The formula also includes a compression factor to make downward adjustments to the quota share of the largest countries and upward adjustments to those of the smaller ones.

It was likewise agreed to triple the basic votes, which accounted for 11% of votes when the IMF was established and only 2% before the reform. This increase will make it possible to give a bigger say to the poorest countries, in addition to reversing the trend whereby the increase in quotas had progressively diluted the weight of the basic votes.

With this reform the quota shares have been modified as shown in chart 1. With the new formula the quotas of 54 countries (chiefly emerging economies) have been increased by 4.9 percentage points out of the total. If to the new formula we add the modifications of the basic votes, China, Korea, Brazil, Mexico and Spain, Singapore and Turkey show the biggest vote increases (although below 1%), while the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Russia, the United States, Belgium, Switzerland and Australia experienced the largest decreases (although none more than 0.65%).

The reform is undoubtedly moving in the right direction—increasing the weight of the emerging countries and reducing that of the advanced countries (particularly those of Europe except Spain and Ireland)—in order to reflect more closely the new structure of the world economy.

Chart 1: IMF quota and voting shares (%) before and after the reform of 2006-2008 (20 countries with the largest percentage of votes, all above 1%)

	Quota share before reform	Voting share before reform	Quota share after reform	Voting share after reform
USA	17.380%	17.023%	17.674%	16.732%
Japan	6.228%	6.108%	6.558%	6.227%
Germany	6.086%	5.968%	6.112%	5.805%
France	5.024%	4.929%	4.506%	4.288%
UK	5.024%	4.929%	4.506%	4.506%
China	2.980%	2.928%	3.989%	3.799%
Italy	3.301%	3.242%	3.307%	3.155%
Saudi Arabia	3.268%	3.210%	2.931%	2.800%
Canada	2.980%	2.928%	2.672%	2.555%
Russia	2.782%	2.734%	2.495%	2.387%
Netherlands	2.415%	2.375%	2.166%	2.077%
Belgium	2.155%	2.120%	1.932%	1.856%
India	1.945%	1.916%	2.443%	2.338%
Switzerland	1.618%	1.595%	1.451%	1.401%
Australia	1.514%	1.494%	1.358%	1.313%
Mexico	1.210%	1.196%	1.521%	1.467%
Spain	1.426%	1.408%	1.686%	1.623%
Brazil	1.420%	1.402%	1.783%	1.715%
Korea	0.764%	0.760%	1.413%	1.365%
Venezuela	1.244%	1.229%	1.116%	1.084%

Source: IMF.

However, it may also be affirmed that the reform does not go far enough as it generates changes that are too small and continue to allow the advanced countries to form coalitions to maintain wide majorities in key decisions, as well as not giving enough of a say to the poorest countries. In this respect it is true that, owing to the inherent difficulties in achieving greater agreement on the reform of the formula for calculating quotas, the debate on incorporating the population factor (even with a low weighting) was postponed, as was the possibility of according even greater weight

to GDP measured in Purchasing Power Parity, which would result in a much bigger increase in the quotas of the developing countries. In short, in view of the developed countries' reluctance to lose votes, it was decided to adopt a minimum agreement that marks a small (but symbolic) step forward, but merely postpones the real and necessary debate. Instead of having agreed on a permanent formula that could be used for the coming decades, the minimum agreement ensured that there will be more tough negotiations over the next years. Indeed, the crisis itself—and the effort to provide a coordinated international response—have already set in motion a new quota review process which will need to be concluded in 2011.

If it is furthermore considered that the reform did not include changes to make the system for designating the Managing Director more merit based (so that a European is not always chosen in the IMF and an American in the World Bank) and that mechanisms were not put in place to ensure the involvement of a larger number of prominent figures from the developing countries in the decision making bodies, it may be said that the reform was incomplete.

What is more, in order for the emerging countries to consider the institution legitimate, above and beyond the formal changes it is essential to progress in changing the Fund's culture. This would involve incorporating the economic-policy sensibilities and practices of the emerging countries into the economic analysis conducted by the Fund's staff. So far this analysis has been dominated by a transatlantic-liberal approach that is fairly impervious to external influence, which has led to certain political prescriptions that many developing countries consider inadequate (for example, the ban on using capital controls irrespective of circumstances). In any event, this change will take time, although the formal reforms may help speed it up.

Lastly, above and beyond the debate on legitimacy, it should be pointed out that there is a certain amount of consensus on what the goals of a renewed IMF should be, but not on the best way of achieving them. In particular it is politically unfeasible to convert the IMF into a global supervisor capable of anticipating crises, issuing binding recommendations, settling conflicts, imposing sanctions and promoting cooperation to manage global financial risks in a multilateral and coordinated manner. Its members, both rich and poor countries, are not prepared to hand over so many responsibilities to it.

But what we can aspire to is to ensure that the different national regulations are compatible and share common principles agreed within the IMF

and the Financial Stability Council. Furthermore, although it is difficult for the Fund to be assigned functions involving the coordination of exchange rates, it should be a forum for monitoring the vulnerabilities the world economy faces, particularly in connection with financial bubbles or global macroeconomic imbalances.

If the progress made in these areas reduces the frequency and severity of crises and prevents the contagious effects that have such an impact on the emerging economies, the IMF's legitimacy will improve substantially, and with it the ability of the world economy to grow in a more sustainable and balanced manner.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

Like the rest of the world, the European Union was unprepared for the financial crisis and for the ensuing economic recession. Financial panic, plummeting production and the huge contraction of international trade have raised unemployment and reduced the wellbeing of Europeans, who have suddenly become poorer. In this respect the crisis has undisputedly been bad news for EU citizens, companies and governments alike.

However, on the other hand the economic recession that has followed the crisis is proving to be a salutary lesson to the European Union in restoring a certain amount of political and intellectual leadership at a time when its influence in the world was waning. Therefore, if the Union plays its cards right and takes advantage of the opportunities provided by the reshaping of the international order brought on by the crisis, it could regain part of the ground lost in recent years. But to do so it needs to consolidate the institutions and policies that have proved effective in addressing the crisis and to improve those which showed and continued to show weaknesses. It should also strengthen its external position.

Priority tasks will be to build better economic and financial governance for the euro area, to progress in the structural reforms so as to boost growth potential and to address the challenge of population ageing and give fresh impetus to the Lisbon Strategy, which was renamed EU 2020 in the review of 2010. Only if the European countries foster development and innovation policies and their companies secure international leadership in knowledge-intensive sectors will they succeed in boosting their productivity. To achieve these goals the European Union will at last be able to base itself on the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which

puts an end to several years of institutional uncertainty. It will enable it to speed up the decision-making process and raise the Union's international profile through the figure of the President of the Council. In addition, the Eurogroup will begin to have a role of its own, which will enhance the visibility of the euro area.

But the challenges the Union faces are huge. Even after enlargement it will continue to lose relative weight in the global economy owing to the rise of the emerging powers. According to projections made by Goldman Sachs in 2003, in which the concept of the BRIC countries was coined (Brazil, Russia, India and China), by 2036 these four emerging economies (to which Mexico should be added) will have overtaken all the European countries in terms of GDP, though not income per capita. This will mean that not even Germany will be among the six largest economies in the world. The United States will head the list, followed by China, India, Japan, Brazil and Russia (Goldman Sachs 2003) (10). If on top of this we consider the European countries' heavy dependence on gas and oil imports and the fact that less than 6% of the world's population will live in the European Union in 2050, the European Union already had major challenges on the horizon even before the crisis.

Since the crisis will merely speed up this process as it will probably hamper potential growth more in the developed countries than in the emerging economies, the European Union will need to seek ways of increasing its power and influence beyond its shrinking objective weight in the global economy. And it is here that the crisis offers fresh opportunities. On the one hand, it has marked a turning point in economic globalisation, putting an end to the period of liberalisation ushered in by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 80s. Although this turning point will not mean the downfall of capitalism, the state will win back legitimacy and power from the market and the Anglo-Saxon liberal model will lose part of its appeal and influence to the European-inspired models, which involve greater regulation and public intervention and are admired by most Asian and Latin American countries. This will boost the European Union's soft power and its legitimacy to propose international initiatives.

On the other hand, the leadership shown by the European authorities in the early stages of the crisis, the soundness and effectiveness of the

(10) For a detailed analysis of the impact of the rise of the emerging powers on the world economy and the role of the European Union, see chapter VI of the *Strategic Panorama 2007-2008*, in which Emilio Lamo and Michels de Champourcin conduct an exhaustive study.

measures taken by the ECB (which have placed it on the same level as the Fed) and the willingness of the Union Member States to lead the transition from the obsolete G-7/8 to the emerging G-20 have marked an awakening for the European Union following years of passivity and defensive positions in the international arena. Although the European countries are obvious candidates for losing influence to the emerging powers both in the reform of IMF quota and voting shares and in the replacement of the G-7/8 by the G-20, for the time being it is playing its hand shrewdly. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and the rotating EU Presidency, which are permanent members of the G-20, have now been joined by Spain and the Netherlands, which have attended all the meetings held to date, becoming de facto members of the group. What is more, the European countries have succeeded in forging a common position at these forums, which adds to that which they have already adopted in the WTO and in combating climate change and poverty, where they have been presenting ambitious initiatives and exercising leadership for years. Finally, as stated, although the euro is not going to replace the dollar as a global reserve currency in the medium term, its use following the crisis will merely increase, which will also help strengthen the euro area and, accordingly, the European Union.

All this is enabling the Union to export its values and way of understanding the world to the institutions which will give shape to the new rules of economic globalisation that will emerge following the crisis. But this will not be an easy task. It should be remembered that, as Parag Khanna provocatively points out, the European Union is the first «metro sexual» superpower which uses soft power, its economic influence, its values and persuasion (and not military power) to «sell» its model abroad. But in order for it to be able to strengthen its international role in the post-crisis world it is essential for it to be underpinned by a solid, consistent internal position. And only if it overcomes its internal contradictions and manages to maintain a common position and speak with a single voice in all the key aspects of global governance will it have the chance to enjoy influence and make substantive contributions.

CHAPTER TWO

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

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YOLANDA CASTRO DIEZ

INTRODUCTION

Climate change is a reality that poses world-scale problems. Mitigating its consequences requires effective responses based on detailed knowledge of its impacts, both recorded and expected, and the planning of mitigation and adaptation measures.

The report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Council of the European Union (1) states that the best manner of dealing with climate change is to consider it a multiplier of threats which accentuates existing trends, tensions and instability. Climate change is threatening to overload already fragile and/or conflict-prone countries and regions, posing not only humanitarian risks but also political and security hazards. What is more, in keeping with the concept of human security, it is clear that many of the problems of the impact of climate change on international security are interrelated and therefore require global political responses.

Aware of this situation, the Security Council of United Nations General Assembly of 17 April 2007 opened a debate on «Energy, security and climate» (2), and more recently, in its resolution of 11 June 2009 (A/RES/63/281):

(1) Paper of the High Representative and European Commission to the European Council, «*Climate change and international security*», S113/08, 2008.

(2) Including the letter dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2007/186), the letter dated 12 April 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2007/203) and the letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2007/211). See S/PV.5663.

Invites the relevant organs of the United Nations, as appropriate and within their respective mandates, to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications.

The present report studies the consequences of climate change on security matters and mitigation and adaptation as possible responses. It begins by identifying the most significant aspects of the current situation of climate change detected, future projections and expected impacts. It goes on to discuss the subject from the perspective of how it affects the security landscape.

CURRENT SITUATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate change detected

Changes in the concentration of greenhouse gases and atmospheric aerosols and in solar radiation and the properties of the earth's surface are altering the energy balance of the climate system. These changes are expressed as a function of radiative forcing (3) which is used to compare how a variety of human and natural factors influence the warming or cooling of the global climate.

The world atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have risen significantly as a result of human activities since 1750, and have now surpassed the pre-industrial values established in core ice samples spanning several hundred years. The overall increase in carbon dioxide concentration, which has gone from a pre-industrial level of approximately 280 ppm (4) to 379 ppm in 2005, is chiefly due to the use of fossil fuels and changes in land use, while the rise in that of methane and nitrous oxide is mainly due to agriculture. The IPCC-4AR (5) clearly points to anthropogenic influence in global warming, establishing that the

(3) Radiative forcing is used to measure how a factor influences the change in the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the earth's atmospheric system and is an indicator of the importance of the factor as a potential driver of climate change. Positive forcing tends to warm the surface, and negative to cool it. It is measured in Wm^{-2} .

(4) ppm (parts per million) or ppb (parts per billion) is the ratio between the number of molecules of greenhouse gas and the total number of dry air molecules.

(5) IPCC-4AR, «*Climate Change 2007. The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*», S. SOLOMON, D. QIN, M. MANNING et al., Cambridge University Press, 944 pp, 2007.

overall average net effect of human activities since 1750 *very likely* (6) has led to a warming, with a radiative forcing of $+1.6 \text{ Wm}^{-2}$ [between 0.6 Wm^{-2} and 2.4 Wm^{-2}] (7).

To assess the changes in the Earth's climate system it is necessary to consider not only the atmosphere but also the ocean and the cryosphere (8), as well as phenomena linked to changes in atmospheric and oceanic circulation in order to glean greater knowledge of the trends, variability and processes of climate change on a world and regional scale. Analyses based on observational data include fundamental variables such as atmospheric temperature, sea surface temperature, precipitation, winds and atmospheric circulation. The term «extreme climate» is a key expression of climatic variability and its assessment includes current information providing an enhanced view of changes in many types of extreme phenomena such as warming, droughts, heavy precipitation events and tropical cyclones (including hurricanes and typhoons).

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as evidenced by observed increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level. The warmest years in the instrumental record of global surface temperature (since 1850) are 2005 and 1998. Of the past 12 years (1995 to 2006), 11 of them, except 1996, rank among the 12 warmest recorded since 1850. The IPCC-4AR puts the linear trend of the past 100 years at 0.74°C [between 0.56°C and 0.92°C]. This temperature rise is distributed across the planet and is more accentuated in the upper northern latitudes. Land areas have warmed more quickly than the oceans.

The rise in sea level is consonant with this warming. On average, the level of the world's oceans has been rising by 1.8 mm/year (between 1.3 and 2.3 mm/year) since 1961 and by 3.1 mm/year (between 2.4 and 3.8 mm/year) since 1993 owing partly to the effect of the thermal dilatation of water and the melting of glaciers, icecaps and polar ice sheets. It is not possible to ascertain to what extent this higher rate witnessed in recent year reflects a decadal variation or an increase in the long-term trend.

(6) The IPCC-4AR uses the following scale of probability: *virtually certain* (>99%); *extremely likely* (>95%); *very likely* (>90%); *likely* (>66%); more likely than not (>50%); *about as likely as unlikely* (33% to 66%); *unlikely* (<33%); *very unlikely* (<10%); *extremely unlikely* (<5%); *exceptionally unlikely* (<1%).

(7) The figures in brackets indicate 90% uncertainty interval around a best estimate.

(8) The cryosphere is the component of the climate system consisting of snow, ice and permafrost above and below the earth and ocean surface.

The observed decrease in snow and ice cover is also consonant with warming.

Satellite data collected since 1978 indicate that annual average Arctic sea ice extent has shrunk by an average of 2.7 % (between 2.1 and 3.3 %) per decade, with even more accentuated decreases in summer of 7.4 % (between 5.0 and 9.8 %) per decade. On average, mountain glaciers and snow cover have decreased in both hemispheres.

Between 1900 and 2005, precipitation increased significantly in the eastern areas of South and North America, northern Europe and northern Asia, although it decreased in the Sahel, the Mediterranean, southern Africa and certain parts of southern Asia. There is a likelihood of over 66% that throughout the world the area affected by drought has grown since the 1970's.

It is *very likely* that over the past 50 years cold days, cold nights and frost have been less frequent in most land areas, and hot days and nights have been more frequent. It is *likely* that heat waves have been more frequent in most land areas and the frequency of intense precipitations has increased in most areas.

Observations show an increase in intense tropical cyclonic activity in the North Atlantic since approximately 1970, with little evidence of increases in other regions. No clear trend is observed in the annual number of tropical cyclones. It is difficult to identify longer-term trends in cyclonic activity, particularly before 1970.

On average, temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere during the second half of the twentieth century were *very likely to be* higher than those in any other 50-year period in the past 500 years and *likely* to be the highest in the past 1,300 years at least.

Observed impacts on natural and human environments

All the continents and most of the oceans show that climate change, particularly the rise in temperature, affects many natural systems. The following impacts in particular have been detected:

- Enlargement and increased numbers of glacial lakes.
- Increasing land instability in permafrost regions and rock avalanches in mountainous regions.
- Changes in some Arctic and Antarctic ecosystems.
- Increase in surface runoff and earlier spring peak discharge in many rivers fed by snow melt and glacier melts.

- Warming of rivers and lakes in many regions, affecting thermal structure and water quality.
- Earlier onset of spring phenomena, such as leaf-unfolding, bird migration and egg laying.
- Pole ward and upward shifts in ranges in plant and animal species.
- Trend towards an earlier «greening» of vegetation in the spring, linked to longer thermal growing seasons.
- Shifts in ranges and changes in algal, plankton and fish abundance in high-latitude oceans.
- Increases in algal and zooplankton abundance in high-altitude and high-latitude lakes.
- Range changes and earlier migrations of fish in rivers.

Other effects of regional climate changes on natural and human environments are emerging, although many are difficult to perceive owing to adaptation and non-climate drivers. Prominent among them are:

- Effects on agriculture and forest management in high altitudes of the northern hemisphere, such as earlier crop sowing in spring and forest modification due to fires and pests.
- Aspects of human health, such as heat-linked mortality in Europe, infectious diseases in some areas and allergenic pollen in high and middle latitudes of the northern hemisphere.
- Human activities in areas of the Arctic (for example, hunting and travel over snow and ice) and low alpine elevations (such as mountain sports).
- Human settlements in mountainous regions at greatest risk of sudden flooding from glacier lake overflow due to glacier melt.
- Loss of wetlands and coastal mangroves and increased damage from coastal flooding in many areas.

Projected climate change

An emissions scenario is a plausible representation of the future development of emissions of substances which are, potentially, radiatively active (for example greenhouse gases and aerosols), based on a set of coherent and internally consistent hypotheses on the drivers of this phenomenon (such as demographic and socioeconomic development, technological change) and their key relationships. Concentrations scenarios derived from emissions scenarios are used in climate models to obtain climate projections.

In order to describe coherently the relationships between the forces that determine emissions and their evolution, and to add a context to the quantification of scenarios, the IPCC Special Report on emissions scenarios (SRES) (9) explores four different storylines resulting in 40 scenarios which encompass the main demographic, economic and technological driving forces of future greenhouse gas emissions. Each scenario represents a specific quantitative interpretation of one of the four storylines. The set of scenarios based on a same storyline constitutes a scenario «family».

The scenarios examined by the SRES do not include other climate-related initiatives, meaning that none is based explicitly on the hypothesis of fulfilment of the Framework Convention on Climate Change or of the emission goals of the Kyoto Protocol. However, policies unrelated to climate change and aimed at many other objectives (for example, air quality) directly influence greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, government policies may have repercussions, to varying extents, on the driving forces of emissions, such as demographic change, social and economic development, technological change, resource use and pollution management. This influence is broadly reflected in the storylines and resulting scenarios. The chief characteristics of the SRES's four storylines and scenario families are described below.

Constant Composition Commitment (CCC): refers to a hypothetical and impossible scenario in which all greenhouse gas emissions are immediately frozen and the atmosphere retains its current composition. This scenario is used as a scientific control and not as a possibility. Global average temperature and sea level will continue to rise owing to the thermal inertia of the ocean. Warming could surpass 1°C and the forecast for 2400 is between 2° and 6°C. Under CCC conditions the rise in sea level would be 10 cm per century (with ranges of 1 to 30 cm per century).

FAMILY A1: Describes a future world of rapid economic growth, a world population that reaches its maximum towards the middle of the century and subsequently diminishes, and a rapid incorporation of new, more efficient technologies. Its most important distinguishing features are convergence between regions and an increase in cultural and social interactions accompanied by a sizeable reduction in regional differences as to income per inhabitant. The A1 scenario family is developed in three groups

(9) IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, 2000. http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_sr/

which describe alternative paths of technological change in the energy system. The three AI groups differ as to technological orientation:

A1FI: Intensive use of fossil fuels.

A1T: Use of non-fossil energy sources.

A1B: «Balanced» use of all types of sources (meaning by «balanced» a situation in which there is no excessive dependence on any one energy source, on the assumption that all energy supply sources and all end use technologies undergo similar improvements).

FAMILY A2: describes a very heterogeneous world. Its most distinctive characteristics are self-reliance and preservation of local identities. The birth rate across regions converges very slowly, resulting in a population in constant growth. Economic development is basically geared to regions, and economic growth per inhabitant and technological change are more fragmented and slower than in other storylines.

FAMILY B1: describes a converging world with the same world population which attains its maximum towards the middle of the century and subsequently decreases, as in storyline A1, but with rapid changes in the economic structures geared to a services- and information-based economy, accompanied by a less intensive use of materials and the introduction of clean technologies and effective use of resources. In this world scenario priority is given to world-scale solutions that pursue economic, social and environmental sustainability and greater equality, but additional climate-related initiatives are absent.

FAMILY B2: describes a world in which local solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability are predominant. It is a world whose population increases progressively at a slower rate than in A2, with intermediate economic development rates and faster and more diverse technological change than in storylines A1 and B1. Although this scenario is also concerned with environmental protection and social equality, it is mainly centred on the local and regional levels.

The projected global average surfacing warming for the end of the 21st century (2090–2099) compared to 1980–1999, obtained for different emissions scenarios using a hierarchy of models ranging from a Simple Climate Model to several Earth System Models of Intermediate Complexity and a large number of Atmosphere–Ocean General Circulation Models, included in the IPCC-4AR, is displayed in Table 1. The table shows the difference between the different emission scenarios and the likely ranges

of global average surface air warming associated with each of these scenarios. The best estimate for scenario B1 (low) is 1.8°C (the likely range is 1.1°C to 2.9°C), and the best estimate for scenario A1FI (high) is 4.0°C (from 2.4°C to 6.4°C). Table 1 also shows the projections of global average sea level rise at the end of the 21st century (2090–2099) compared to 1980–1999 based on models that exclude future rapid dynamical changes in ice flow.

On the whole, the results show that global warming tends to reduce the atmospheric carbon dioxide uptake on land and at sea, thereby increasing the airborne fraction of anthropogenic emissions. Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise will continue for centuries owing to the timescales associated with climate processes and feedback, even if the concentration of greenhouse gases were to stabilise.

Table 1: Projected global average surface warming and sea level rise at the end of the 21st century (2090-2099) relative to 1980-1999 (*)

Case	Temperature change (°C)		Sea level rise (m)
	Best estimate	Likely range	
Constant year 2000 concentrations (a)	0.6	0.3 – 0.9	NA
Scenario B1	1.8	1.1 – 2.9	0.18 – 0.38
Scenario A1T	2.4	1.4 – 3.8	0.20 – 0.45
Scenario B2	2.4	1.4 – 3.8	0.20 – 0.43
Scenario A1B	2.8	1.7 – 4.4	0.21 – 0.48
Scenario A2	3.4	2.0 – 5.4	0.23 – 0.51
Scenario A1FI	4.0	2.4 – 6.4	0.26 – 0.59

(a) Year 2000 constant composition is derived from Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Models only.

(*) Source: IPCC-4AR (5).

The regional findings are as follows:

- Warming is expected to be greatest over land and at most high northern latitudes, and least over the Southern Ocean and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean.
- Snow cover is projected to contract. Widespread increases in thaw depth are projected in most permafrost regions.

- Sea ice is projected to shrink in both the Arctic and Antarctic under all scenarios. In some projections, Arctic late-summer sea ice disappears almost entirely by the latter part of the 21st century.
- It is *very likely* that hot extremes, heat waves and heavy precipitation events will continue to become more frequent.
- It is *likely* that future tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes) will become more intense, with higher peak wind speeds and more heavy precipitation associated with ongoing increases in tropical sea surface temperature. There is less confidence in projections of a global decrease in numbers of tropical cyclones.
- Extra tropical storm tracks are projected to move pole ward, with consequent changes in wind, precipitation and temperature patterns, continuing the trends observed over the past 50 years.
- Increases in the amount of precipitation are *very likely* in high altitudes, while decreases are *likely* in most subtropical land regions.
- It is *very likely* that the southern overturning circulation of the Atlantic Ocean (10) will slow down during the 21st century. Even so, temperatures in the Atlantic region are projected to increase owing to the much larger warming associated with projected increases in greenhouse gases.
- Contraction of the Greenland Ice Sheet is projected to continue to contribute to sea level rise after 2100. Current models suggest that ice mass losses increase more rapidly than gains due to precipitation and that the surface mass balance becomes negative with global warming (relative to pre-industrial values). If a negative balance were sustained for millennia, the Greenland Ice Sheet would be almost completely eliminated, leading to a resulting contribution to sea level rise of about 7m. The corresponding future temperatures in Greenland are comparable to those inferred for the last interglacial period 125,000 years ago, when paleoclimatic information suggests reductions in polar land ice extent and 4 to 6m of sea level rise.

Expected impacts on natural and human environments

Impacts often reflect the expected changes in precipitation and in other climate variables, in addition to temperature, sea level and atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. The magnitude and occurrence of impacts will vary depending on the duration of climate change and, in some cases,

(10) Southern overturning circulation is essential to establishing climate conditions in the North Atlantic region, particularly Europe.

adaptive capacity. In particular the following impacts are expected, listed according to sector.

Fresh water resources and management

- By mid-century, annual average river runoff and water availability are projected to increase by 10-40% in high latitudes and to decrease by 10-30% in some dry regions at mid-latitudes and in the dry tropics, some of which are already water-stressed.
- It is *likely* that drought will affect more areas. Heavy precipitation events, which are *very likely* to increase in frequency, will augment flood risk.
- Over the course of the century, water supplies stored in glaciers and snow cover are projected to decline, reducing future water availability in regions supplied by melt water from major mountain ranges, where more than one-sixth of the world population currently lives.

Ecosystems

- Over the course of this century, net carbon uptake by terrestrial ecosystems is *likely* to peak before mid-century and then weaken or even reverse, thus amplifying climate change.
- Approximately 20-30% of plant and animal species assessed so far are *likely* to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature exceed 1.5-2.5°C.
- For increases in global average temperature exceeding 1.5-2.5°C and in concomitant atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, there are projected to be major changes in ecosystem structure and function, species' ecological interactions, and species' geographical ranges. These changes are expected to have predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity, and ecosystem goods and services, for example, water and food supply.
- The progressive acidification of oceans due to increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide is expected to have negative impacts on marine shell-forming organisms (for example corals) and their dependent species.

Food and forest products

- Crop productivity is projected to increase slightly at mid- to high latitudes for local mean temperature increases of up to 1-3°C, depending on the crop, and then decrease beyond that in some regions.

- At lower latitudes, especially seasonally dry and tropical regions, crop productivity is projected to decrease even for small local temperature increases (1-2°C), which may increase the risk of hunger.
- Globally, the potential for food production is projected to increase with rises in local average temperature over a range of 1-3°C, but above this it is projected to decrease.
- Increases in the frequency of droughts and floods are projected to affect local crop production negatively, especially in subsistence sectors at low latitudes.
- Regional changes in the distribution and production of particular fish species are expected due to continued warming, with adverse effects projected for aquaculture and fisheries.

Coastal systems and low-lying areas

- Coasts are projected to be exposed to increasing risks, including coastal erosion. The effect will be exacerbated by increasing human-induced pressures on coastal areas.
- Corals are vulnerable to thermal stress and have low adaptive capacity. Increases in sea surface temperature of about 1-3°C are projected to result in more frequent coral bleaching events and widespread mortality.
- Coastal wetlands including salt marshes and mangroves are projected to be negatively affected by sea-level rise.
- Many millions more people are projected to be flooded every year due to sea-level rise by the 2080s. Those densely-populated and low-lying areas where adaptive capacity is relatively low, and which already face other challenges such as tropical storms or local coastal subsidence, are especially at risk. The numbers affected will be the largest in the mega-deltas of Asia and Africa, while small islands are especially vulnerable.

Health

- Projected climate change-related exposures are likely to affect the health status of millions of people, particularly those with low adaptive capacity, through:
- Increases in malnutrition and consequent disorders, with implications for child growth and development;
- Increased deaths, disease and injuries due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts;

- The increased burden of diarrhoeal disease;
- The increased frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher concentrations of ground-level ozone related to climate change;
- The altered spatial distribution of some infectious disease vectors;
- Mixed effects are expected such as a decrease or increase in the range and potential of malaria in Africa;
- Fewer deaths from cold exposure in temperate areas.

According to the World Health Organization, since 1970 climate change has been responsible for approximately 150,000 deaths per year through the increased incidence of diarrhoea, malaria and malnutrition. The balance between positive and negative impacts on human health will vary from place to place and be modified over time as temperatures continue to rise. Factors that have a direct effect on populations' health, such as education, healthcare, public health initiatives and infrastructures and economic development, are of critical importance.

SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

All the aforementioned possible changes will affect numerous social and/or economic activities. The three basic socioeconomic aspects derived from climate change are described below.

Depletion of resources

The three basic resources that will be depleted by climate change are widespread availability of water, food and energy.

The shortage of water may lead to social unrest and give rise to significant economic losses, even in sound economies, sparking tension in some regions of the world, especially where several countries or several regions within a country depend on the same water sources. Some examples of the foregoing are the conflicts arising in northern Africa (over the Nile water supply), in the Middle East (river Jordan) and in South East Asia (river Mekong).

The decrease in world fish reserves and the fall in agricultural productivity owing to soil degradation, flooding, droughts, erosion and pests will cause or worsen food insecurity in the less developed countries and a rise in food prices everywhere which could become unsustainable. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), climate change will affect all four dimensions of food security: availability, access,

utilization and stability. In terms of availability, the increased CO₂ concentration in the atmosphere is expected to have a positive effect on the yield of many crops, although this will not be matched by an increase in the nutritional value of the produce. The poorest regions will be exposed to a higher degree of instability in food production. The forecasts indicate that average food prices will increase in line with the moderate temperature rises until 2050. From then onwards, with new temperature rises, major slumps are expected in the potential agricultural production of developing countries, leading to a substantial price rise. The problem may be further exacerbated indirectly in regions where larger areas of cultivable land are given over to the production of bio-fuels.

Global warming is a consequence of the huge amount of energy we produce and use. As energy needs grow, so does our dependence on fossil fuels (petroleum, natural gas and coal). These fuels, which produce high levels of carbon dioxide emissions, account for 80% of the current energy consumption in the EU. Their growing demand heightens competition for access to and control of these energy resources in order to ensure supply. This problem is worsening owing to the fact that a substantial part of the world's reserves of these resources is located in regions which are vulnerable to the impact of climate change and pose political and economic problems that are difficult to solve.

One of the possible solutions some states are opting for is wider utilization of nuclear energy as a measure to guarantee a secure energy supply while mitigating climate change. However, this increase in the utilization of nuclear energy may give rise to new problems in the context of a non-proliferation regime. Nuclear power stations do not emit CO₂, thereby contributing to reducing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and making it possible to save on current CO₂ emissions by 8%. In Spain nuclear reactors prevent the emission of 50 million tonnes of CO₂, an amount equivalent to the emissions of half of the cars in use in Spain. In Europe nuclear stations supply electricity to 33% of the population and prevent the emission of 600 million tonnes of CO₂ per year, the equivalent produced by 200 million cars. The countries that produce substantial electricity from nuclear energy, such as France, have greatly reduced their CO₂ levels.

As for the use of renewable energies, a recent study conducted at Stanford University (11) proposes a plan based on the use of clean tech-

(11) M.Z. JACOBSON Y M.A. DELUCCHI, «A path to sustainable energy by 2030», Scientific American, Inc., pp. 58-65, 2009,

nologies (which produce almost zero greenhouse gas and atmospheric emissions, including construction, operation and dismantling) using wind, water and solar radiation, according to which 100% of the world's energy needs could be supplied by 2030. Its feasibility depends not only on the chosen technologies and availability of the necessary raw materials (which could be a serious hindrance as some materials, such as neodymium, tellurium, indium, silver, lithium and platinum, are scarce or not available in the required amounts, or could be subject to price manipulation) but also on economic and political factors.

As mentioned earlier, global warming will cause ice thaw in Greenland, the Antarctic and the Arctic, leading to new tension over the exploitation of energy resources. This tension will emerge after the thaw, especially in the Arctic, and will particularly affect adjacent countries such as Canada, the United States, Russia and Norway. The various claims to the Arctic floor are based on the economic benefits derived from the opening of new trade routes and the appropriation of possible natural reserves of gas and petroleum.

The consequences of the rise in demand for these three basic resources (water, food and energy) and for other raw materials will be felt more intensely in areas under major demographic pressure, and in regions affected by the political decisions of the countries that supply these resources.

Damage to infrastructure

The most vulnerable industries, human settlements and societies are those located in areas affected by coastal and river floods, those whose economies are closely related to climate-sensitive resources and those located in areas prone to extreme weather phenomena, especially where rapid land development takes place. It should be borne in mind that coastal regions are already home to one-fifth of the world's population, and this figure is projected to increase. Examples of industrial facilities affected by this situation are ports and oil refineries located next to the sea. The deterioration in coastal conditions owing, for example, to the erosion of beaches, is expected to affect local resources such as fisheries and decrease the value of these tourist destinations. Furthermore, the increase in extreme events will affect key socioeconomic sectors such as communications, transport and energy supply.

Poor communities may be especially vulnerable, particularly those concentrated in the aforementioned high-risk areas. They tend to have

a more limited adaptive capacity and are more dependent on climate-sensitive resources such as local water and food supply.

Mass migrations

Environmental factors have long had repercussions on world migratory flows. The expected droughts, food shortages and flooding will give rise to mass displacements of people, which may reach 200 million environmental refugees by halfway through the 21st century (12).

There is an interrelationship between migration and environment: environmental factors are conducive to migration and migration affects the environment. Climate change makes this relationship even more complex. Many other causes, such as conflicts, wars, famine, human rights, gender, development level, public health and governance are added to the environmental factors which give rise to migrations.

A particularly serious situation is that of small island territories both in the tropics and at higher latitudes, as their characteristics make them especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, the rise in sea level and extreme phenomena. Coastline recession and the submergence of large areas will cause loss of territory and may even give rise to the disappearance of whole countries, such as some island states.

SUMMARY OF THE PREDICTED IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Table 2 summarises the main impacts caused by changes in extreme weather and climatic phenomena based on projections for the second half of the 21st century included in the IPCC-4AR. These impacts do not take into account changes or developments in adaptive capacity. The most significant phenomena that affect the population and environment have been selected, and for which there is high confidence in the Assessment Report.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

The 1994 World Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) establishes seven aspects that affect human securi-

(12) N. MYERS, «*Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century*», *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences*, Vol. 357, No. 1420, pp. 609-613, 2002.

ty: economic, political, personal, environmental, social, food and health. From this multidimensional perspective of security, new threats emerge which relate the concept of security to the stability conditions that entail a benefit for the development of the individual in all the aforementioned aspects, as well as for the development of a country or of the international community.

Both the current situation of climate change and the projections and predicted impacts mentioned in the previous sections clearly underline that climate change has consequences which affect basic security issues

Table 2: Summary of major impacts IPCC-4AR

Phenomenon and direction of trends	Likelihood (*)	Examples of major projected impacts per sector			
		Agriculture, forestry and ecosystems	Water resources	Human health	Industry, settlements and society
Over most land areas, warmer and fewer cold days and nights, warmer and more frequent hot days and nights	Virtually certain	Increased yields in colder environments, decreased yields in warmer environments, increased insect outbreaks	Effects on water resources relying on snow melt; effects on some water supplies	Reduced human mortality from decreased cold exposure	Reduced energy demand for heating; increased demand for cooling; declining air quality in cities; reduced disruption to transport due to snow, ice; effects on winter tourism
Warm spells/ heat waves. Frequency increases over most land areas	Very likely	Reduced yields in warmer regions due to heat stress; increased danger of wildfire	Increased water demand; water quality problems (e.g. algal blooms).	Increased risk of heat-related mortality, especially for the elderly, chronically sick, very young and socially isolated	Reduction in quality of life for people in warm areas without appropriate housing; impacts on elderly, very young and poor.

Heavy precipitation events. Frequency increases over most areas	Very likely	Damage to crops; soil erosion; inability to cultivate land due to water logging of soils	Adverse effects on quality of surface and groundwater; contamination of water supply; water scarcity may be relieved.	Increased risk of deaths, injuries and infections, respiratory and skin diseases	Disruption of settlements, commerce, transport and societies due to flooding; pressures on urban and rural infrastructures; loss of property-
Area affected by drought increases	Likely	Land degradation; lower yields/crop damage and failure; increased livestock deaths; increased risk of wildfire	More widespread water stress	Increased risk of food and water shortage; increased risk of malnutrition; increased risk of water- and food-borne diseases	Water shortages for settlements, industry and societies; reduced hydropower generations potentials; potential for population migration.
Intense tropical cyclone activity increase	Likely	Damage to crops; wind throw (uprooting) of trees; damage to coral reefs	Power outages causing disruption of public water supply	Increased risk of deaths, injuries, water- and food-borne diseases; post-traumatic stress disorders	Disruption by flood and high winds; withdrawal of risk coverage in vulnerable areas by private insurers, potential for population migrations, loss of property
Increased incidence of extreme high sea level (excludes tsunamis)	Likely	Salinization of irrigation water, estuaries and freshwater systems	Decreased freshwater availability due to salt-water intrusion	Increased risk of deaths and injuries by drowning in floods; migration-related health effects	Cost of coastal protection versus cost of lands-use relocation; potential for movement of populations and infrastructure; also see tropical cyclones above

(*) Refers to the possibility of future trends based on 21st-century projections according to the scenarios of the IPCC-4ARC.

Particularly floods, disease and famine which will cause migration on an unprecedented scale in areas that are already under great tension, or droughts and losses of crops leading to fiercer competition for food, water and energy in regions in which resources are already exploited to the hilt.

As mentioned in the introduction, the Security Council of the United Nations General Assembly of 17 April 2007 opened a debate on «Energy, security and climate», in which it became apparent that climate change is transforming the concept of security. Among the various statements made in the debate, the representative of the Congo stressed that a situation is approaching in which the population will be drawn into a struggle both for land and for the availability of water, food and energy on a much greater scale than in other previous conflicts. The French representative described climate change as «one of the main threats for the future of mankind». The representative of Papua New Guinea mentioned that the dangers derived from climate change which are faced by small island states and their populations will be just as or more serious than those faced by nations and peoples under threat of arms and bombs, since, for example, a sea-level increase of only half a metre will endanger the survival of the population of many Pacific island states.

The United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, stated at the Security Council that the prospects we face are alarming. Shortage of resources—whether energy, water or cultivable land—may trigger the emergence of disputes over their availability and management. These disputes will affect not only relations between different countries but also the collapse of the established codes of conduct, which may even lead to open conflicts. Violent responses may also be expected from certain sectors of society. For example, eco-terrorism is currently regarded as one of the main terrorist threats in the United States (13, 14).

It is not merely a question of national security but of collective security in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world, and once again the main people affected will be those who are most vulnerable and least capable of withstanding the impact. Nevertheless, outbreaks of violence between communities and racist rejection of immigrant communities may erupt also in countries with the capacity to adapt to climate change, such as in Europe and North America.

(13) J.F. JARBOE, «*The Threat of Eco-terrorism, Testimony Before the House Resources Committee*», Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, 2002, <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm>.

(14) J. LEWIS, «*Statement Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works*», 2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/lewis051805.htm>.

Bearing in mind the projected impacts associated with climate change, planning of the following aspects is required from a security perspective.

Illegal immigration

Greater protection of national borders, both land and maritime, will be required against flows of illegal immigrants, which will involve greater demand for police resources. Between 2000 and 2005, 106 million people were affected by floods and 38 million by hurricanes (15). Today 146 million people live at less than one metre above sea level (16) and low-lying coastal areas located at less than 10 m above sea level are home to 10.5% of the world's population, equivalent to some 602 million people (17). The Stern Review (18) points out that forced displacements due to sea level rise have already begun in some low elevation regions. For example, flooding is becoming a serious problem in Bangladesh, where approximately 40 million people live in the coastal areas; many have lost their homes and have emigrated to India. Similarly, the governments of some South Pacific islands such as Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu have already started on evacuation plans. Tuvalu is expected to be completely uninhabitable by the middle of the 21st century (19). Once again, the Stern report states that taking as a whole the impact of sea-level rise, floods and droughts, 200 million people could be displaced by the year 2050.

Migration-related crime

An increase in crime in relation to the aforementioned migratory flows is expected. International migration has progressively become a security issue for states, as the growing number of people who illegally enter a country not their own highlights the permeability of borders and governments' inability to guard their territory. What is more, given their unfavourable financial situation, illegal immigrants are often associated with organised crime and

(15) E. PIGUET, «*Climate Change and Forced Migration*», UNHCR Research Paper No. 153. UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2008, <http://www.unhcr.org/47a316182.html>.

(16) D. ANTHOFF, R.J. NICHOLLS, R.S. J. TOL AND A. VAFEIDIS, «*Global and Regional Exposure to Large Rises in Sea-Level: A Sensitivity Analysis*», Tyndall Working Paper 96, 2006.

(17) G. MCGRANAHAN, D. BALK AND B. ANDERSON, «*The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones*», *Environment and Urbanization*, 19(1), 2007.

(18) N. STERN, «*The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change*», HM Treasury, 2006, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.

(19) Norwegian Refugee Council, «*Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Migration*», 2009, www.nrc.no/arch/img/9268480.pdf.

people and drug trafficking and are furthermore one of the entry routes for both terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. From a legislative point of view, it should be stressed that the population who make up these migratory flows are not classified in any legal category and, despite being called «environmental refugees», they do not come under the international legal status of refugees laid down in the Geneva Convention of 1951. In this respect the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Refugee Policy Group (RPG) have opted for the term «environmentally displaced persons», considering that they are people displaced in their own country or displaced across international borders on account of climate change.

Racial rejection

Racial rejection of immigrant communities may be expected. The very culture of a country might begin to be perceived as endangered by the arrival of other people with a very different language, values and behaviour. In this respect defence of a country's own culture may be at odds with the egalitarian distribution of resources through the opening of frontiers. In this situation the inhabitants of a democratic country may oppose this opening and demand the right to choose whether or not to accept immigrants, and may even end up electing governments that adopt an anti-immigration stance. A fundamental aspect that determines the rejection of immigrants resides in their social background and level of education. In some cases immigrants are highly educated professionals whose coexistence poses no problems and who go practically unnoticed. But in general it will be immigrants with a low cultural and professional status who trigger conflictive situations both with the population of the host country and among themselves. Therefore the prospect of mass migration poses a conflict between the moral rights of the citizens of all countries of the world to seek subsistence or a better quality of life and the right of the inhabitants of the host countries not to take in foreigners. This potential or real conflict between moral principles and pragmatic considerations could raise its head in a particularly virulent manner in the event of mass migration such as that expected to be caused by climate change.

Extreme climate phenomena

The occurrence of extreme climate phenomena will call for greater security requirements. Weather phenomena such as El Niño, La Niña,

hurricanes, tropical cyclones, droughts, snowfall and flooding are events that strike the various regions of the planet indistinctly, and their devastating effects evidence that mankind continues to be vulnerable to them. According to the World Meteorological Organization, it is estimated that natural disasters claim nearly 250,000 human lives every year and cause between 50,000 and 100,000 million dollars worth of material damage. In 1991 alone the United Nations (UN) reported that over 90% of disaster victims had been affected by disasters related to droughts, flooding and whirlwinds. Flood damage is exacerbated by the presence of settlements in areas prone to flooding such as natural watercourses in low-elevation areas, and is more severe because water collects rapidly and in greater volume as a result of the loss of plant cover owing to deforestation and desertification. In contrast, long periods of scarce rainfall cause droughts that affect the water supply of populations, harming agriculture, livestock and other economic activities. According to the United States National Climatic Data Centre (NCDC), which reports extreme weather events in the country, the costliest losses in recent years have been due to droughts and heat waves, amounting to more than a billion dollars between 1980 and 2003. The forecast increase in the occurrence of extreme weather phenomena, based on the climate change projections resulting from the General Circulation Models, envisage a huge demand for security measures in response to emergency and disaster-management situations, including evacuation.

Eco-terrorism

Climate change will be conducive to the development of eco-terrorism. Eco-terrorists resort to open violence to defend nature. Their ultimate motivation is to create a new type of environmental activism that is iconoclastic, uncommitted, non-conformist to environmental policies and fond of illegality. Unlike political terrorists, who generally aim to destroy human lives, eco-terrorists have so far concentrated on causing damage to property. According to the FBI, eco-terrorism is a serious threat which caused 200 million dollars worth of damage between 2003 and 2008 (13, 14) and many US states have now introduced laws against eco-terrorism. Another way in which these groups commonly act is to disseminate their ideas through numerous websites that often launch demagogic messages against the interests of industries or countries. The current situation of climate change provides these groups with a motive for performing acts of violence and sabotage against companies, energy installations, political

meetings, etc. Climate change projections point to a probable increase in these actions, which will call for additional security measures and new legal control mechanisms.

New regulations

New government and police requirements will emerge in relation to the development of new regulations associated with the emission of greenhouse gases and mechanisms for monitoring their enforcement. The reality of climate change has spurred leaders of the industry and financial services sectors to reflection. Indeed, in many parts of the world companies are publicly calling for the enactment of climate-related laws, the drafting of guidelines, emission ceilings and other measures, partly because many of them perceive climate change to be an economic risk—and also a significant market opportunity, but only within a framework of a clearly established playing field and rules.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The report submitted by the Secretary General to the Council of the European Union in 2008 lists examples of territories that will be seriously affected by the consequences of climate change. In relation to Europe it only mentions the Arctic, where ice melt will trigger disputes over the use of the new international shipping routes and over the huge hydrocarbon deposits.

Africa is described as one of the continents that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The north and the Sahel area may lose 75% of their cultivable land owing to drought, shortage of water and soil degradation. The Nile delta region will also be badly affected and similar consequences will be observed in the south of the continent and Horn of Africa region, causing millions of Africans to be displaced towards other regions of the continent and, above all, Europe.

Israel, Jordan and Palestine will lose as much as 60% of their water supply. Countries like Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia will also suffer major losses of water and agricultural production resources.

In the case of Asia the rise in sea level will affect the south coast of the continent, where over two billion people live, in addition to the extreme effects of monsoons. The melting of the Himalayan glaciers will affect a

further billion people. All this will trigger mass population flows, posing the aforementioned security problems.

The impacts of climate change will thus vary regionally, but aggregated and discounted to the present they are very likely to impose net annual costs which will increase over time as global temperatures rise. According to the Stern Review, if no palliative measures are taken, the economic impact of the losses caused by climate change is estimated to amount to 20% or so of world GDP annually. However, the cost of effective concerted action could be just 1%. In addition, researchers of the Economics of Climate Adaptation group (ECA) (20) recently reached the conclusion that climate change will cost countries as much as 19% of their GDP by 2030. This study makes an estimate of the economic losses in eight different geographical regions, combining current climate risks, projected climate change and economic development forecasts. It is estimated that if measures are adopted to stem climate change between 40 and 68% of the costs can be avoided, and possibly a higher percentage in high-risk areas.

In 2008, in the aforementioned report, the Secretary General of the European Union warned Member States that they needed to focus more clearly on the benefits of early action, as the impact of climate change on international security is a problem not of the future but of the present. A set of measures therefore needs to be urgently adopted in order to improve the capability to investigate, analyse and manage climate change-related problems.

Being rapidly alerted to particular cases will allow situations of fragility and political radicalisation to be addressed, as well as tensions and disputes over the control of energy supply sources. The EU and its Member States should make plans for civil protection resources and to manage crisis situations arising from possible disasters, using civilian and military instruments. And all this should also be analysed at international forums with the involvement of the multilateral organisations. Experience has shown that being equipped with an early warning system is one of the preventive measures most effective in reducing damage. An illustrative example is the case of Bangladesh, where in 1970 a violent tropical cyclone claimed 300,000 lives, whereas in 1992 and 1994, thanks to improved forecasting, similar cyclones caused only 13,000 and 200 victims respectively.

(20) Climate Works Foundation, Global Environmental Facility, European Commission, McKinsey&Company, The Rockefeller Foundation, Standard Chartered Bank and Swiss Re. «A Report Of The Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group. Shaping Climate-Resilient Development, a framework for decision-making», 2009.

The IPCC-4AR specifies the meaning of the terms «adaptation» and «mitigation» in the context of the study on climate change. Adaptation refers to the set of initiatives and measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems to the real or expected effects of a climate change. Some examples of adaptation are the construction of river or coastal dams, the replacement of plants sensitive to thermal shock by more resilient species, and improvement of building standards to reduce potential losses derived from natural disasters. These are simple government-level activities that can be of considerable help in the future. Mitigation refers to the implementation of policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks through the adoption of measures to change and replace technologies.

The measures adopted so far to enhance efficiency and energy saving, and to increase the use of renewable energies and the use of fossil fuels with lower CO₂ emissions are insufficient in themselves to reduce emissions. The long-term operation of existing nuclear plants is an initial solution to the necessary construction of new power plants in order to solve the current and future problem of the reduction of pollutant emissions. All forms of energy are currently necessary to sustainable development. A balanced energy policy must use a mix of energy sources that meets increased demand and utilises non-greenhouse-gas sources such as nuclear energy.

The feasibility of using renewable energies to supply a significant percentage of world energy needs depends, as stated earlier, on the chosen technologies, the availability of the necessary raw materials and economic and political factors. It should be pointed out in this connection that the achievement of this feasibility would require, at the least, abolishing certain existing subsidies for the exploitation and extraction of fossil resources, and correcting misguided policies promoting energy resources that are less desirable than energies that do not generate greenhouse gases. Such is the case of current policies in various countries which subsidise, for example, coal extraction or promote the cultivation and production of bio fuels.

Bearing in mind that fossil fuels—coal, oil and gas—will continue to be decisive for energy generation during the first half of this century in both Europe and the rest of the world, new technologies that reduce the greenhouse gas emissions produced by fossil sources are required. This need is all the more pressing if we realise that the world energy demand will double between now and 2050 if expectations are met. Fossil fuel

generation is responsible for approximately one-third of current CO₂ emissions in Europe. In this connection the key mitigation measure at the present time is *carbon capture and storage* (CCS), which will make it possible to curtail the CO₂ emissions of the major plants that run on fossil fuels. CCS consists in capturing the CO₂ produced when fossil fuels are burned, transporting it to an appropriate location and injecting it into the subsoil to prevent it reaching the atmosphere. By appropriate locations we mean geological formations such as exhausted oil and gas wells, and abandoned coalmines and aquifers.

Although the individual components of the CCS chain have been well studied and are already operational, the current challenge is to combine them all in fully integrated and commercially applicable technology. In this connection various CCS technologies are being developed for use in the energy sector.

In December 2009 the European Commission approved a set of 15 initiatives which will receive 1.56 billion euro from the EU plan for economic recovery. One billion euro will be earmarked to financing six CCS projects (these will be the first six facilities of this kind in the world, one of which will be located in Compostilla, Leon, with a budget of 180 million euro), while the remaining funds will go to nine marine wind power projects. The aim of the Community executive is to set in motion a total of fifteen projects to capture and store CO₂ by 2020 so that they are commercially feasible.

Bearing in mind the current and future growth in world energy demand—especially for fossil fuels—it is obvious that CCS should be introduced all over the world. The rapid development of emerging economies like China and India is bringing about a sizeable increase in their demand for energy and in their CO₂ emissions. According to the latest estimate, China is building on average two large coal power plants per week, and each of them produces CO₂ emissions equivalent to those of two million cars. CCS includes an option for processing these emissions. Therefore the EU is collaborating with China in the development of CCS and other clean technologies. Cooperation in the *Near Zero Emissions Coal* project (NZEC), which includes research, development and establishment of clean coal technologies and CCS, is a key element of the agreement signed by the EU and China in 2005 to combat climate change. Its main goal is to prove the feasibility of NZEC technology in China and the EU. As part of this initiative a demonstration plant with near zero emissions is to be built in China and will be up and running in 2020. The initial stage of the project is already under way.

As to other key mitigation measures, the following should be stressed:

- Advanced nuclear energy; advanced renewable energies, including tidal and wave power, concentrated solar energy and photovoltaic solar energy.
- More efficient aircraft; advanced hybrid and electric vehicles with safer and more powerful batteries.
- Integrated design for commercial buildings, including technologies such as high-tech meters providing feedback and control; photovoltaic solar energy incorporated into buildings.
- Advanced energy efficiency; CCS for the production of cement, ammoniac and iron; inert electrodes for aluminium production.
- Improved crop yields.
- Green roofs and filters to optimise the oxidation of CH₄.

There is high confidence that neither adaptation nor mitigation alone can prevent all the impacts of climate change. Adaptation is necessary, in both the short and the long term, to address the impacts that warming would cause, even in the more modest stabilisation scenarios envisaged. There are obstacles, limits and costs that are not fully known. Adaptation and mitigation may be complementary and can jointly bring about a sizeable reduction in the risks posed by climate change.

The United Nations conference on climate change held in Copenhagen in December 2009 was intended as the culmination of two years of international negotiations. It was convened with the intention that the international community would come up with a global commitment to combat climate change as a follow-on from the Kyoto protocol, which expires in 2102 and to which major contaminators like the United States and China are not parties. However, it ended up as merely a minimum agreement between the 119 participating heads of state and government. The text of the agreement establishes that climate change is one of the major challenges of our time, that temperature increase should be under two degrees and that emissions should reach a ceiling as soon as possible - and all this will supposedly be achieved with voluntary emission reduction targets which the countries will submit by February 2010. The developed countries are thus committed to submitting emission reduction targets by that date. These reductions and the financing for developing countries will be declared, measured and verified by the UN.

Europe was confident that the United States' commitment would meet the announced expectations, with reductions of between 26% and 33%,

but the Chinese government's attitude served as a pretext to avoid going any further than this minimum agreement. Nor does the agreement state that by 2050 emissions should be half the 1990 level. The clearest aspect is the financing commitment for developing countries, which allowed the African governments to sign up to the agreement. The result satisfies nobody. As it was impossible to reach an agreement on how to progress from voluntary targets to a legally binding agreement in 2010, this part was left blank. It is not specified whether the Kyoto agreement will be extended or whether there will be a new treaty, or when. Simply no mention is made.

As stated earlier, even if all greenhouse gas emissions were to cease, warming would increase, but this cannot be used as an excuse for not adopting as many measures as possible—such as those stated here—to reduce greenhouse gases, as the lower their concentration in the atmosphere the less the resulting warming and impacts. It is not merely a conservationist consideration but an issue which, as has been analysed throughout this chapter, significantly affects our living and security conditions.

CHAPTER THREE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD GOVERNANCE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD GOVERNANCE

FLORENTINO PORTERO RODRÍGUEZ

THE AMERICAN HEGEMONY

One of the salient issues of the US debate on its role in the world relates to its status as an empire. It is no coincidence that it should have been a British professor specialising in colonial history who raised the question, first to a select audience in Washington DC and subsequently in book form. The debate was important in that it was a provocation designed to spur the American elites to attempt to define in easily recognisable historical terms what the United States represents in today's world. As was to be expected, the first answer to whether it could be considered an empire was a radical no. There was an obvious argument: the area of sovereignty of an empire, in the historical sense of the word, extended to remote territories, colonies, whose inhabitants were not always considered citizens. This was not the case of the United States. What is more, as a former colony it had always upheld an anti-imperialist attitude which had led to serious differences with some of its most important allies. The Suez crisis, recalled in this connection by Henry A. Kissinger, was a clear example. It was evident to many US analysts that America's disinterest in incorporating overseas territories and, in particular, its deep-rooted rejection of policies of this kind stemming from its establishment as a state and as a nation spared it from being classified as such. However, new semantic meanings develop over time. Imperial power nowadays is not necessarily conditional upon the possession of remote territories. If we were to confine ourselves to the traditional sense of the word we would have to conclude that empires are a thing of the past. In a global world characterised by the effect of successive revolutions in communications,

the determining factor is ability to influence. In this respect it has to be recognised that only the United States has interests all over the planet and the ability to assert them using economic and diplomatic means or, if necessary, military means. Perhaps the term which best reflects what the United States represents today is «hyper power», coined by the French writer and politician Hubert Vedrine. Once again it is no coincidence that it should be a European who has suggested conceptualising the role of this major power on the international scene. A new term for a new period, one that is devoid of awkward meanings but expresses the fact of the difference: whereas the traditional great powers exercise their influence in a regional or limited geographical framework, hyper powers do so throughout the planet.

Are we facing the irony that while we discuss whether the United States is an empire, a hyper power or a major power that is experiencing its «unipolar moment» it is in fact already in decline? Literature on the decline of the US began to appear after the Vietnam War—a war in which, after winning all the battles, the country yielded to a considerably weaker enemy because its public opinion was incapable of withstanding the necessary tension until the last minute. It was a defeat that gave way to a string of episodes characteristic of a power in decline, such as the show-down with Iran during the Carter presidency, the humiliating withdrawal of the marines from Lebanon under Reagan and from Somalia under Clinton. However, in parallel with the foregoing the United States made impressive shows of power such as «Star Wars» under Reagan, the victory in the Cold War and the consequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, the First Gulf War during the presidency of Bush senior, and displays of technology during the Afghanistan war and the Second Gulf War while Bush junior was in office.

Influence is the result of a combination of two elements: being willing and able. There are those who are willing but not able. And others are able but not always willing, as is often the case of the United States. For many of its enemies and to the West in general, this contrast shows that the great power is invincible if fought on its own terms, but extremely vulnerable when a rift is caused between public opinion and government. «Asymmetrical strategies» are the response to the United States' military dominance in the world. Its armed forces are numerous, well trained and even better equipped. They are lethal on a conventional battlefield. In order to defeat them it is necessary remove them from such a theatre of operations and place them in one where the outcome depends on not

military but political factors. Those who cause them to struggle are those who aspire not to defeat them but, once again, to bring about their retreat. There are now so many precedents, so many political situations which illustrate this vulnerability that any rival strategist will address the challenge in these terms. A state is unlikely to attack the United States directly as it will be perceived by American society as an existential enemy. In such a case the US people will mobilise en bloc and show a high tolerance for suffering. On the contrary, the most likely scenario is that remote crises will lead the United States to intervene to defend its interests, the regional balance or the nuclear non-proliferation regime, among other causes. If the kind of fight the enemy puts up is in the form of guerrilla ambushes and acts of terrorism to the extent of causing a large number of casualties, both civilians and US soldiers, and is financially draining with an uncertain outcome, American society will begin to question the point of the campaign. At this point criticising the government will become an election option so that part of the media and the political class will be working for the enemy for free. We witnessed this recently in connection with the Iraq War. Both media and leading politicians declared that the war had been a mistake, that it was lost and that the best option was withdrawal. As Ambassador Crocker stated, the Iraqi forces chose to abandon violence, resulting in the isolation of al-Qaeda and the Mahdi Army, when they accepted that President Bush, despite the very powerful campaign against him, was going to increase significantly the troops deployed in Iraq to eliminate the nucleuses of insurgent activity through use of force. The radical sectors had been on the verge of securing a new US defeat against militias that are irregular and insignificant in comparison to the US armed forces. They did not succeed. But the whole world has witnessed the lack of consistency of the elites and of American society in crisis situations. They won, but their deterrent capacity has not been restored.

America's will is fragile but there are even those who question its might. For several decades we have been reading analyses which emphasise that the cycle of US hegemony is coming to an end. It is stressed from a somewhat historically deterministic view that the United States is exhausting itself in its attempt to establish a *Pax Americana* and that, like some earlier empires, it needs to adapt to a new status of merely great power. These rather Jeremian prophecies have not been fulfilled. On the contrary, in recent years the US economy has proved to be extraordinarily willing and able to modernise itself and adapt to an environment as changeable as it is global. The current economic crisis, undoubtedly one of the deepest and most serious that the free market economy has

experienced, is going to have very substantial effects on the international balance. Crises are always a time of opportunities. We historians tend to use them pedagogically to explain overall processes, because it is at such times that genuine entrepreneurs take risks and apply revolutionary technology bringing about surprising changes that have repercussions on their competitiveness for years. But it is not only a question of genuine entrepreneurs versus administrators. Crises require societies as a whole to adapt to the new circumstances. Those who make flexibility their goal and do not feel trapped by history to the extent of refusing to renounce certain conquests or services will be stood in good stead for the future. They might be mistaken in their choices, but they will always have the chance to rectify anew. Since its founding the United States has displayed a «pioneering spirit», ever willing to strike camp and venture in search of new lands to colonise. Months before the financial crisis of the «junk mortgages» erupted, Europeans were surprised to hear Americans talking naturally about the seriousness of the crisis that was approaching, the need to thoroughly review energy policies and the impact this would have on the American way of life. We do not know if the US government will make the right decisions, but what there is no doubt about is that Americans are more and better mentally prepared and willing than other peoples to make changes.

However a society long characterised by a particular type of conduct can change. The Americans will not always be as they are today. The «pioneering spirit» which shaped the country and is still clearly perceptible to travellers who explore these parts will not necessarily survive throughout the following generations. The recent election campaign has brought to light new trends in US public opinion. Out of the one hundred senators, none hailed from a more liberal background than Barack Obama. Despite his short biography, his political career is clearly bound to a number of causes: racial integration and development of the «welfare state». To a certain degree Obama is an updated version of Lyndon B. Johnson's «Great Society». The conservative revolution spurred by Ronald Reagan was based on a denouncement of those excesses, their uselessness and the perverse effects they had caused. He proposed as an alternative a return to individual responsibility along with a smaller state. Reagan is part of the national heritage, a point of reference for many reasons. Obama has vindicated him in order to avoid facile comparison, but his aim is in fact to undo Reagan's political work while ushering in a wave of cultural hegemony and democratic policy. His term began with an unprecedented level of state indebtedness and economic interventionism. He has asked

his electorate to be patient, as the gravity of the situation will prevent him from honouring his promises of substantial improvements in social services immediately, but that is his real goal. If achieved, it would inevitably have consequences on citizens' mentality. The United States would become much more European than it is today and would experience problems similar to those of the Old Continent in assuming responsibility on the international scene. The «welfare state» is much more than a set of services; it is a manner of understanding the role of the state in society and of conceiving citizenship. Indeed, it is incompatible with the «pioneering spirit», with flexibility and readiness to change...

This crisis is a major opportunity for the United States, a time to modernise its industrial and business structure, to develop much further the role of computing in all aspects of life. It is a time to carry out an in-depth review of its energy strategy to prevent the future of its economy and its wellbeing from falling into the hands of enemy, authoritarian or irresponsible governments. It is also a time to establish a national strategy for a new era, as occurred after the Second World War ended. On that occasion the point of departure was a diagnosis of the situation, which led to the definition of the Cold War followed by the definition of means and ends, the «containment strategies» which were basically maintained for decades until the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the communist threat to Western Europe. The then president Harry S. Truman was harshly criticised during his lifetime only to be hailed later on by society and historiography as one of the great figures in American history. What needs to be done now is establish a genuine strategy that is capable of surviving in essence the coming and going of different administrations. Throughout his mandate George W. Bush presented a set of documents which, together with ideas expressed in public addresses, came to be called the «Bush Doctrine». It remains to be seen to what extent this doctrine, highly criticised by democrats, will be maintained during the Obama Administration or if the advent of a new team will bring about a thorough redefinition of the principles of the national strategy. President Obama's key addresses, over which he took great care in both content and presentation, display a different style that is clearly at odds with that of his predecessor. But we are still waiting for him to come up with the definition of a strategy in order to be able to evaluate to what extent he has broken away from or merely rectified that of his predecessor.

Just as the crisis is an opportunity to take a major leap forward, so too can it be a chance to progress towards a new social model, characterised

by a bigger role of the state, by the creation of a «welfare state» in line with the European experience. This would entail reviewing the long held concept of citizenship, shifting away from the «pioneering spirit» to establish a more conservative society less willing to take risks and, accordingly, prone to avoid commitments beyond its borders. Similarly, there is no guarantee that on this occasion the United States will be capable of establishing a genuine national strategy which defines threats, risks, assets, challenges and objectives. Bush proposed one, but his own Administration turned its back on it. The same could well occur during Obama's mandate. All that we know for sure is that there is no historical determinism to suggest that the United States is doomed to an imminent decline. No nation is better placed to address the challenges of global society or the present economic crisis. Few states can emerge more reinforced from the present situation than the American hyper power. It all depends on whether they take the appropriate economic measures and are capable of reaching basic consensus on their role in the world.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDIA-PACIFIC AREA

The fact that the US secretary of state chose the Pacific area as the destination of her first official trip as opposed to Europe and the Middle East is an act of premeditated symbolism that points to what will be the main focus of America's external action, whichever party controls the White House and the Capitol. This area has not ceased to grow in significance. But the expectations raised have gained ground as the Atlantic Alliance's credibility has waned among the US elite and particularly among the young generations, who tend to view it as an ineffective Cold War relic.

The Pacific region is experiencing a spectacular economic expansion driven by both demographic growth and substantial progress in education. China and India still have a long way to go to achieve a standard of living equivalent to that of Europe, but they have the means and the determination to do so. Both nations not only feel pride at being the result of age old cultures and humiliation at having been conquered but are also fully aware that following their failed experiments they are on the road to joining the modern world and finally attaining their rightful place on the world stage. They are powers which are imbued with a very strong national spirit and eagerness to exercise the influence they consider that befits them and in this respect have joined others which, like Japan, was one of the great powers of the present age decades ago.

The India-Pacific area is characterised by its heterogeneousness, lack of cohesion and huge potentiality. This potentiality is evident from the waves of democratisation the region has experienced. Insofar as these age old cultures have realised the advisability of developing representative regimes, establishing the rule of law and opening up their markets, economic and social development has been obvious. This explains why since the 1980s we have been hearing insistent talk of how the centre of the planet would shift to this region, an idea that finds no opposition today. This cultural and political variety is also going to characterise the future. The challenges faced by some of these states, such as India and China, are so huge that we should not rule out the possibility of major crises of social or national cohesion that will determine their political future. Perhaps the risks are greater in China owing to the havoc wrought by communism on its culture and traditional values and the absence of legitimate representative institutions to channel the inevitable tension caused by this deep and fast transformation.

Since the end of the Cold War we have been witnessing a realignment which was preceded by the thaw in relations between communist China and the United States. Not only has communism in its different versions failed as an alternative for development and security; so too has the Non-aligned Movement also ceased to be a significant point of reference. The acceptance and consequent success of the system of open economies has become both a basis for regional development and an outstanding nucleus of cohesion. Trade unites; it generates common interests and shared visions. Never before has there been such interrelationship between states and economies in this vast region. Relations are growing, just as a certain regional identity is emerging. Seminars on security and defence are increasing in number and interest; research institutions with varying degrees of connection with governments are growing and analyses of the region's problems and how to address them are accordingly becoming more sophisticated. The old regional organisations have become outdated and are undergoing an overhaul or reform process that is already underway. There is an overall awareness that this new stage entails complex security challenges, the management of which requires intense dialogue between the regional powers.

The first of these problems is nationalism in general and that of China in particular. The India-Pacific area is home to extremely ancient cultures which are the pride of their populations. There appears to be no intention of banishing this sentiment; on the contrary, there is evidence of a certain

growth in parallel with the generation of wealth and wellbeing. Mistrust of each other, often rooted in remote historical events, remains alive if not consciously fuelled. The Koreans mistrust the Japanese for their behaviour during the Second World War. The Japanese fear a resurgence of China owing to its tendency to treat others as inferiors. It is no coincidence that it was known as the «Middle Empire», between heaven and earth, whose emperor enjoyed a profoundly unequal status in relation to any other earthly ruler. The quarrels over territorial waters and energy resources, China's support for North Korea and the threat hovering over Taiwan alarm Japanese society. Pakistan was established as a result of the division of India to constitute the nation of the «pure», but a similar number of Muslims remained in India, fuelling tension—sometimes warlike sometimes pre-warlike, which has characterised relations between the two states since they gained their independence from the United Kingdom.

The second problem is the rise of Islamism. If the coexistence of different cultures in the same state has made it difficult to guarantee domestic security, when one of these cultures adopts a radical stance the tension grows. Islam as a whole is experiencing a serious internal conflict between a majority sector that is open to coexistence with other cultures and globalisation and a minority sector which considers that such contact corrupts Muslim values and leads to decadence. In the view of the latter the only possible path is to purge the religion internally of modernising leaders and ideas, returning to strictness and defeating other peoples whose influence is considered harmful. Following 11 September the persecution of radical groups has been significant and often effective. However, Pakistan continues to be a cradle of Jihadist groups and leaders who are rekindling what are old tensions with India. The provinces of Xingjian in the west and Ningsha in the north are home to the more than thirty million Chinese Muslims who, according to the Beijing government, are becoming increasingly radical. Indonesia has experienced periods in which terrorism has raised its head, although it appears to have subsided as a result of government action. The future is going to depend on both police action and cultural development. Insofar as the population feel that the development of the free market and democracy allow them to live better, improve their expectations and, above all those of their descendents, fundamentalism will give way to more moderate attitudes. In this as in other issues we cannot speak of a trend common to the whole region. Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, India face an uncertain future in the management of this problem. On the contrary, states like Malaysia and Indonesia appear to be making positive progress.

The third problem is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The arms race between India and Pakistan, with the dispute over Kashmir as a backdrop, ended with both states joining the nuclear club. Both possess a large number of nuclear warheads and short- and medium-range missiles. The fact that neither is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not help matters. The risk that differences between the two states could end not in a conventional conflict but in nuclear war is real. Equally real is the danger of the Pakistani regime again becoming the centre of nuclear proliferation for the Islamic world. However the most worrying scenario—and perhaps the most important security threat of today's world—is the possibility of the Pakistani government falling into Islamist hands. India's nuclear programme was justified by the threat of Pakistan, but concealed an underlying concern about China. Relations between the two major demographic powers, the states with the greatest potential for economic and social development, are based on suspicion and mistrust. China is also a nuclear power and its missiles are threatening the island of Formosa. The gravity of the situation is measured in terms of US commitment to Taiwan's security. China is also the ultimate guarantor of North Korea. Ideological sympathies are few, just as understanding of the North Korean nuclear programme is scarce. But the Beijing government does not wish to see a communist regime toppled in the face of a democracy, or to suffer the effects of the collapse of the North Korean dictatorship, which would lead thousands of people to flee to the countryside and try to reach China in search of the minimum to survive on. North Korea already has fissile material and we do not know how many nuclear warheads. Its missiles can reach US sovereign territory and have flown over the Japanese archipelago, driving this country to carry out an in-depth review of its national strategy. Finally, both the United States and Russia are part of the area.

In the India-Pacific area developments in the political and social tensions triggered by the burgeoning of the economies will parallel those in the sphere of security and defence. Objective problems, threats, the armaments race, nuclear proliferation and nationalistic conduct are a recipe for future problems. This region of the world is not only going to be focus of attention for its ability to generate wealth and the emergence of a new economy. The risk of greater crises is real and the powers in question are only too aware of this; this fact has made it easier for US diplomacy to accommodate its status of dominant power also in this region.

Longstanding relations based on Cold War circumstances have been kept alive, such as relations with the Philippines and South Korea. Others

dating from the same origin have been reviewed in pursuit of greater cooperation. Such is the case of Japan. Decades of progress in democracy and an outstanding trade dimension have led Japanese society to feel it is an integral part of the free world. Japan's firsthand nuclear experience led it to reject the use of such weapons, but without them its security is greatly exposed to Chinese nationalism and rearmament, on the one hand, and to the North Korean nuclear programme on the other. The response has been to remilitarise its defence and relaunch its diplomatic, security and defence relations with the United States. The status of defeated nation and de facto protectorate of the United States now is a thing of the past. Japan, on an equal footing, seeks a bigger and better relationship with the United States in the belief that the latter plays an essential role as guarantor of security in the Pacific.

States with which relations were distant not long ago have become key allies with which the relationship currently being developed looks set to become crucial during the present century. India left behind its socialist and non-aligned experiments to fully embrace economic liberalism following its democratic experience and the realisation that it stands much to gain in an open market. Its serious problems with Islamism at home and with Pakistan at its north border, its mistrust of China's ultimate intentions and its global economic interests have led it to forge a special relationship with the United States as a key to defining its new position as an international actor in a global world.

Muslim nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia are proving their ability to give shape to democratic regimes, with the limitations and difficulties that are known to all, and to open and dynamic economies. Others with their roots in the West, such as Australia and New Zealand, have been strongholds of democratic values and models for many of their neighbours. They maintain close relations with their environment and their universities and research centres are excellent observatories for ascertaining how the region is progressing in all its dimensions.

China, together with the United States, is the actor par excellence. Its more than 1.3 billion inhabitants, its spectacular annual growth figures, the share it already accounts for in the world economy, and its significant and growing military capabilities are securing it a fundamental role in international politics during the first half of the 21st century. Its leaders are mentally prepared and ready for this. They have been yearning for it for decades and believe they have found the Chinese way to modernisation. However, the difficulties that await them are huge. Be that as it may, wha-

tever the problems and vicissitudes it must overcome, China will be the focus of attention of the area.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Following the First World War the victors decided to establish an international organisation to avoid situations like those that led to the eruption of the war, which had a cost that was hitherto unseen. The League of Nations was born with a congenital weakness—the United States' refusal to join it. During its short-lived existence it put to the test the ability of a multinational organisation to manage crises of different kinds and prevent a clash of interests between great powers from degenerating into another conflict of a similar scale. The result is only too well known. Important lessons were learned from that experience. The first was that it is no use creating a multinational system if the member states do not believe in it and do not embrace its logic. The founding principles were abandoned when, instead of sanctioning infringing powers, it relaxed its obligations and sought entente. The pacification policies fuelled expansionist conduct and precipitated the conflict. Giving in was an act of irresponsibility and cowardliness, proof that the nations did not believe in the fledgling organisation and in the diplomatic logic that underpinned it. The member states betrayed the League of Nations while betraying their own interests. The second lesson was that only by including the great powers in its system could it work. As the decisive players withdrew owing to isolationism or because they felt uncomfortable, the League's room for manoeuvre shrank to the point that it became inoperable. After the Second World War ended there were attempts to rebuild the multinational organisation that was once the League of Nations but without making the same mistakes that led it to fail. The lessons learned conveyed a contradictory message. In order to be able to count on all the great powers it was necessary to grant them privileges that would be costly. Only if they were guaranteed that nothing could be done against their will would they agree to join. That was the origin of the right of veto, the ability to block any procedure considered detrimental to their interests. In order to have all of them inside the system, it renounced being able to act in most of the really important cases.

The delegates of all the world's governments need to meet somewhere to settle issues of general interest. That place is the General Assembly. As most of these governments are hardly exemplary—and nor is their behaviour on the international scene and in the Assembly itself—its resolutions

are no more than recommendations. Decision-making power is vested in the Security Council, the body made up of the major powers with right of veto and a permanent seat, together with other states that take turns to sit on it. The sobering lesson in realism taught by the Second World War, a war which could have been avoided, led the multinational organisation par excellence, the United Nations, to become precisely what it aimed in theory to combat, a classic directorate. Public international law was thus organised around an institution which legitimised the voice of the most corrupt governments and was based on the principle of inequality between states. But nothing else was possible and it was better to have a United Nations with those limitations than nothing at all.

The Security Council was established, granting the right to a permanent seat and right of veto to the states then recognised as great powers. Over time that share-out has become as anachronistic as it is unfair. Aside from whether or not the very existence of these privileges is acceptable, if we really want the major powers to be represented on the Council, states like Japan, India and Germany, among others, urgently need to be given a seat under the same conditions as the five permanent members. The need for a reform of the Council was raised years ago and little progress has been made to date. The Council's authority depends on its credibility, but its particular composition merely undermines it. Today's global society is a far cry from that of 1945. The Security Council can still perform important tasks and for this purpose its composition needs a thorough overhaul. However to date there is no reason to be optimistic.

Those who designed the Security Council were aware that granting rights of permanence and veto would prevent many of the post-war world's most important problems from being addressed. As soon as one of the five great powers considered that an agreement was contrary to its national interests it would veto it, resulting in inaction. The outbreak of the Cold War highlighted this. The dissolution of the Soviet Union aroused expectations about a possible recovery of the multilateral spirit, but the differences between the great powers have merely caused them to continue in their old ways, save on very rare occasions. The Security Council is very useful as a centre of diplomacy where the member states' ambassadors have the chance to exchange points of view and learn in some detail of the various stances. This information has facilitated rapprochement and the achievement of common positions on many occasions. But when this has not been the case the Security Council has become an ineffective witness to all kinds of disasters.

An organisation set up to solve problems often becomes no more than a blocking mechanism of a great power that seeks to legitimise a particular action. The General Assembly is often used to criticise the United States, Israel and Europe. On many occasions the Security Council has been a witness to American attempts, on occasions backed by European states, to carry forward resolutions that justify the use of force, with very mixed results. This markedly anti-western tone is due to these other nations' need to legitimise their own acts in law. As democracies they love law and make it the framework for their acts. Both times the United States invaded Iraq it sought a resolution justifying the invasion, with unequal and never fully satisfactory results. On the contrary, states which operate outside the democratic sphere do not feel the need to seek a legitimacy which they regard as inherent in the defence of national interests. It never crossed Russia's mind to ask the Security Council to authorise it to invade and occupy Georgia. Nor have its recent threats about the future of Crimea gone through the Council. It is paradoxical that democratic states should feel the need to seek backing for actions approved by democratic procedures from organisations—such as the Security Council—that are deeply antidemocratic in both their makeup and their voting system. It is a consequence of respect for law extrapolated beyond civil society.

The inaction of the Security Council as a consequence of the exercise, or mere threat, of the right of veto has simply resulted in the action in question being performed outside its area of influence. The threat of a Russian veto with respect to the Kosovo crisis did not prevent the campaign of air strikes that ended with the retreat of the Serbian troops and eventually the defeat of Milosevic himself. The Franco-Russian manoeuvre to prevent the invasion of Iraq did not paralyse the military operations; it damaged the United States' international image but at the cost of drawing attention to the powerlessness of its rivals. The US troops have gained control of the country, albeit with difficulty, but nothing remains of the Franco-Russian agreement. The Security Council allows showdowns between the great powers, but in the end it is the one that truly is great which asserts its authority.

The Security Council needs to embark on a thorough overhaul in the short and medium term. Even if it succeeds, the overhaul will probably be less drastic than necessary. At best the Council will be able to carry on playing its highly useful role as a meeting point where the major powers can exchange information and attempt to bring their positions closer together. A low-key but very important function. What the Council will never be is a world government or a democratic organisation. The price of having

everyone participate is high, but it will continue to be worth paying above all if the Council is capable of renewing itself and is joined by the states which are truly democratic at the start of this century.

The United Nations system will be more useful if it rids itself of the myth of internationalist fundamentalism which it has developed over the past decades, whether out of idealism or interest. It was established with a utilitarian perspective and aware of its many limitations. Given its design, we should neither expect of it more than it can offer nor allow legal formalism to take precedence over democratic principle. In the future as in the past, democracies will attempt to reach agreements within it. If they do not manage to, those which feel sufficiently strong will attempt to settle their problems outside the United Nations ambit. In the future as in the past, non-democratic nations will act outside this sphere when it is in their interests, and will use the Council to block the actions of those who feel the need to seek legitimisation and go against their interests.

Up until now the United Nations has been the international organisation par excellence since its establishment. However, most conflicts have been settled outside its walls. Everything appears to indicate that we will continue in the same vein in future. No major power is going to grant the Security Council the right to veto its foreign policy.

A WESTPHALIAN WORLD?

There is no going back in history. It is not possible to return to the Peace of Westphalia, which lent legitimacy to the nation-state as the main player in international politics vis-à-vis the Empire. Change is the only constant feature in history aside from the existence of human society. Now that the Cold War is over we find ourselves in a situation in which globalisation is putting to the test states' ability to act in a much larger space. Just as businesses join forces to boost their competitiveness, so do states feel the need to forge alliances. Unlike in the Europe of Westphalia the future will be more multilateral and associative. Those who have made reference to the treaty which marked the starting point for an international system that survived until the First World War have done so to underline the elements of continuity with that world or, in the opposite sense, the exceptional nature of the Cold War.

The Soviet threat and the evident risk of the tension ending in the destruction of Europe and/or a nuclear holocaust set the stage for the

development of a system of blocs which lasted until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These blocs disappeared once the exceptional circumstances did. The new international society is characterised and will continue to be characterised by a more close-woven network of organisations that are very different in nature. States need to organise themselves more than ever to address the challenge of globalisation and interdependence. To this end they have organisations that date from the past and now face the challenge of adapting to a new international environment. Together with them others will emerge from the urgent need to find responses to the problems of our time. We are therefore not dealing with a Cartesian design. Only a war disaster would allow a coherent design to emerge from the ruins of the old organisations. If we succeed in avoiding a major war the map of the international institutions will grow chaotically but pragmatically until the conditions are in place for a general agreement allowing it to be simplified.

A global world is not an integrated world. We are interdependent to a degree never witnessed before; our cultures are mutually influential; and we know more about each other than in earlier times... yet we continue to be different and geography continues to play a crucial role. A global world entails a larger number of actors on the stage and, accordingly, greater complexity. The United States will continue to be the «hyper-power», the only state with interests throughout the planet and the ability to act—be it diplomatically, commercially or militarily—anywhere in the world. Russia has not managed to develop either a modern economic system or a democracy. High energy prices have enabled it to knock its accounts into shape but it has not succeeded in consolidating an attractive national project. The most obvious proof is its demographics. Russia's population continues to shrink and its average life expectancy, of less than sixty, indicates that we are dealing with a depressed society. Unless a major change occurs, Russia will continue to suffer from its old problems in the future: inability to join the developing world and difficulty of defending borders that are out of proportion to the existing population. Neither France nor the United Kingdom has sufficient critical mass to be an actor on the global stage. Both would need to bring Europe around to their own viewpoints, but cultural differences and the weight of Germany, which is inclined towards pacifism and non-intervention, will make such a manoeuvre difficult. Japan is an economic power that is perfectly integrated into the world economy. It was the first of the great cultures of the India-Pacific area to understand and join in the process of modernisation. Its international status was determined by its being a loser in the Second

World War, which caused it to renounce having armed forces and capabilities in keeping with its population and economic might. Since the end of the Cold War Japan has followed the opposite path to Europe and, more specifically, Germany, the nation with which it wished to share a destiny during the last world war and with which it was forced to pay the price of defeat. With an established democratic regime and intense, prosperous relations with the West, the Japanese elites have turned around their national strategy in pursuit of an even more intense relationship with the United States and greater military capabilities. We do not know to what extent this process will be altered by the arrival in government of a new political group following the latest general elections.

Of the emerging states, nations like India and China have a size and a population that allow them to take on greater challenges in international politics. In these cases we may find a renaissance of the «balance of power» mechanism that is characteristic of the Westphalian system. Their national strategies and armaments policies—open-sea fleets, nuclear capabilities—characteristic of «diplomacy of power» also recall times past. The crudest «realism», diametrically opposed to Europeanist positions, governs their assessments and doctrines. However, unlike in the 18th and 19th century, these new powers will act in a multilateral framework which will tend to ease bilateral tension. There will not be a return to the balance of power system, but this future framework will bear more of a resemblance to it than the current one and, above all, it will be markedly different from the Cold War system of blocs.

The limited capacity of most of the major powers and the characteristics of each area cause the planet to be divided into specific areas, each with its own players and security problems, which they will attempt to resolve through exclusive systems and balances. While the India-Pacific is structured around the emergence of China, this fact does not appear to affect neighbouring Latin America, which has other kinds of problems. Nor do the difficulties derived from the instability of the Arab world and Russia's demand for a sphere of influence, which determine European security, appear to have much in common with the longstanding stability problems in sub-Saharan Africa. Each area requires its own solutions, which only the local governments will be able to find. New organisations or the reform of some that already exist must provide responses to a new reality. The extent to which they complement the United Nations system or the existing organisations will vary from case to case, leading to an asymmetric institutional architecture.

Some problems have shifted from a particular geographical environment to the global stage, affecting regions as a whole. How these problems are tackled is going to determine the immediate future, the balances between the major powers and, lastly, international security.

Our economy will continue to depend on fossil fuels for several decades. Following the slump in demand caused by the current economic crisis, we will enter another phase in which scarcity of resources will clash with the industrialised nations' urgent need for them. Out of the major powers, only Russia can provide its own supplies. The rest have to have to resort to the international markets, which are exposed to very considerable political and international tensions. The Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the Caribbean are, or could be, willing to make politics of hydrocarbon supplies, leading to limit situations with an unclear outcome. Competition between major powers for access to these still indispensable resources may spark serious tensions.

Indeed this competition has led to the failure and consequent crisis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which will foreseeable drive new states to develop this technology for military purposes as a deterrent to problematic neighbours. An increase in the number of members of the nuclear club and the fact that some of them have unstable or radical regimes will make nuclear war much more likely than it is now. The major powers will engage their diplomatic efforts in addressing this threat during the coming years.

Internal tensions derived from the complex process of modernisation Muslim societies are undergoing as they adapt to a globalised world have triggered a rise in Islamist movements. These trends are expressed in two ways: through the use of force and through more long-term strategies of cultural penetration aimed at seizing power and imposing regimes based on the Sharia in the case of states with a Muslim majority; and elsewhere through the Muslim population's rejection of integration into host states in order, in the medium term, to bring about the collapse of common law and the recognition of these communities' right to live under the Sharia. The failure of many of these states, particularly in the Arab World, to transform themselves into democratic regimes with dynamic economies has degenerated into corruption, incompetence, economic and cultural backwardness and large flows of emigrants. The double challenge of modernising while combating radicalism will continue to be a fundamental problem whose effects will be felt in very different areas.

Russia, China and, above all, India have very large Muslim populations which are the source of very serious problems even today. Pakistan is a nuclear power with a political regime as unstable as it is corrupt. The wealthy Gulf States finance the expansion of radicalism across the planet, which is evident in places like Latin America, North America and Europe. Energy, nuclear proliferation and Islamism are not watertight compartments each with its own logic. On the contrary, there is a great deal of convergence between these problems, Iran perhaps being the most exemplary case: an Islamist regime with substantial petroleum and gas reserves located in the Persian Gulf at the centre of the routes devised to transport gas from Central Asia to open seas, and close to equipping one of its medium-range missiles with a nuclear warhead. These problems, which present themselves in a complex manner, can only be tackled—that is if we are willing to tackle them—from a comprehensive perspective and after a tricky and complex diplomatic process involving the main players.

The expression «asymmetric multilateralism» is a clear reflection of the current situation. But the 21st-century world is not just multilateral. As a continuation of the Westphalian world, bilateral affairs will still be of crucial importance, although they will be conducted in parallel or from multilateral organisations. When the then Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld referred to the concept of «alliances of the willing» he was not, as many thought, letting off steam or threatening «Old Europe». He was literally describing a reality that was approaching and has now arrived. The Atlantic Alliance was established on an incredibly vague legal commitment. The famous article 5, the wording of which was an imposition of the US, basically means that in the event that one of the signatories is attacked the rest will decide what to do—from sending a telegram of condolence to mobilising all military forces. NATO is an institution which contrasts with the European tradition, in which alliances were based on total commitment of mutual defence, as enshrined in the Brussels Treaty of 1948. It was the Soviet Union and US willingness to deploy troops to the border line which gave NATO a cohesive commitment which is not found in the treaty. Today, without the Soviet threat and with gaps in the strategic vision, NATO has again become an «alliance of the willing». Following the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance with the Cold War, the western nations belonging to this organisation need to establish relevant agreements for each crisis situation. This is not an option, it is a necessity. However action of this kind is not without a multilateral element. NATO, having become a security services agency, provides its members with doctrines and

experience of working together that are of great importance in conducting missions not covered by the organisation.

A global world requires security links throughout the planet. The Alliance considered the possibility of being global, of becoming the platform on which to build an alliance of democratic states willing to cooperate in defending the principles and values established in the Treaty of Washington, the democratic heritage, but many member states have rejected this proposal, not always for the same reasons. They have chosen freely to limit the Alliance to a regional sphere, even though the military operations in progress—on which prestige and very existence hinge—are conducted many kilometres away. The United States has been strengthening its security links with the major democratic states, particularly those of the India-Pacific area. The concept of League of Democracies has recently begun to be used in both academic and political circles as an alternative to NATO. Nobody has succeeded in developing it, but some of its characteristics are patently obvious. While a great alliance of western nations, with the sole exception of Turkey, was organised during the Cold War to defend western values and interests, this perspective is now pointless, it has become anachronistic. On the one hand problems are global and require actors who are present in different parts of the world. On the other, values once considered exclusive to the western world are no longer owing to the expansion and espousal of democracy across the world. Democracy is not the expression of a particular culture, as Islamists think; rather, it is a system for settling conflicts that is based on universal values. The League of Democracies is, at the least, a platform of democracies which share common values and interests and are prepared to fight for them as the basis for organising alliances of the willing to settle specific crises. Unlike NATO the League is not a treaty-based organisation with a permanent headquarters. On the contrary, it is a network of security links, some multilateral others bilateral, which provide the legal and diplomatic basis for organising joint missions. Each crisis has a particular geography and set of interests, and each crisis thus determines the number of states affected and the willingness of their governments.

It is just as evident to the US elites that they already live in the framework of a vague League of Democracies as it is that the Atlantic Alliance is a Cold War institution. How it develops depends on them, on the clarity of their strategic vision and on their diplomacy's skills at weaving common interests which add stability to security links. The European states, not the Union, are part of this design. Willingness to participate depends on those states. There is no doubt that the two great European powers,

the United Kingdom and France, wish to take part and will decide case by case on the basis of exclusive national interests. Chancellor Schroeder was right when he stated that strategic dialogue had disappeared from NATO owing largely to positions such as that upheld by his government. Dialogue had shifted to the bilateral sphere, to the nation states belonging to the Westphalian tradition, whether western or in other parts of the planet. The most characteristic feature of this new landscape is that dialogue has become global; concepts rooted in western cultural tradition no longer prevail and it is much richer and more complex as it incorporates perspectives rooted in different age old and histories.

THE «G» ENIGMA AND NEW WORLD GOVERNANCE

The limitations of the United Nations system are patently obvious as is the need to equip ourselves with international mechanisms for the joint resolution of the serious problems of all kind which we face. The outbreak of the current economic crisis led the then US president George W. Bush to convene the so-called Group of 20 or G-20 after consulting with other world leaders. In doing so he highlighted the lack of a better forum while acknowledging that nor was the group the perfect option either. The convening of the meeting established a dialogue between the major states on the characteristics of this future entity capable of acting as an effective framework for discussing and adopting by consensus relevant measures for shaping the new international society. We are therefore at the threshold of the design of new mechanisms of world governance, on whose success our wellbeing and security will depend.

The G-20 has become an everyday institution. Its meetings are followed in detail by the media and it is evident that it has played a significant role in managing the economic crisis. It did not succeed in reaching a general agreement on the most advisable policy. Nor did the European Union achieve an agreement of this kind. However, it does not appear that the significance or continuity of its work is being questioned. The future of world governance in economic affairs, whatever it may be, is in the making at the G-20. Will it have an external and security dimension in future given the close relationship between these two spheres? Only time will tell. So far it seems much more focused on tackling the necessary reform of the international economic organisations dating from the forties.

Making progress in this direction fitted in perfectly with the conceptual parameters of President Bush's Republican administration. They never

concealed their scepticism about the operational efficiency of the United Nations system or their preference for ad hoc mechanisms. When convening the meeting of the leaders of the member states of the G-20 Bush gathered around a table the people responsible for the most industrialised states and those of the emerging economies—in other words, those with the interests and the authority to make decisions about the future of the world economy. In Latin terms, this puts us more in the sphere of *auctoritas* than of *potestas*.

To what extent is the new Democratic administration of President Obama comfortable with this policy? In his political discourse first as candidate and subsequently as president Obama stressed his criticism of Bush's «unilateralism» and his commitment to a more multilateral diplomacy. In democracies political discourse is characterised not by its rigour but rather by academic terms or expressions used in a distorted manner to the benefit of the speaker. President Bush put the main items on his international agenda before the United Nations. In some cases he found backing, in others he did not. Like previous White House tenants, he did not allow the right of veto of other Security Council members to block the United States' external action and pushed ahead by forging alliances with nations that shared the same vision and interests. It does not appear that the Obama Administration is going to question the foundations of this policy. More than advocating multilateralism as it is interpreted in Europe, Obama's criticism of «unilateralism» is directed more at the assumption of global responsibilities. What the Democrats objected to in Bush's policy is that the United States took upon itself to decide on and carry out very costly military campaigns in remote places as a matter of general interest and against the wishes of allies and major powers. What is more, they denied the principle that the United States was a nation with a special «mission» in defending democracy and preserving international security. In their view the United States should not make a greater effort than other nations. In this connection «multilateralism» refers more to a better distribution of the burden of managing international affairs than submission to the United Nations system. Criticising the excessively complacent role which in their opinion the United States has played on the international arena for decades, they propose an attitude that is more open to dialogue and less interventionist and greater restraint regarding the use of force. They believe that this will win them the confidence they need to foster a spirit of greater cooperation between the major powers and, accordingly, be able to share out the burden, which they consider essential for moral, diplomatic and economic

reasons. It is not right for the United States to consider itself superior to other nations. It is not intelligent for it to embark alone on campaigns scattered around the world. And lastly, it is not economically feasible. At a time when American society is suffering the most serious crisis since the Great Depression, it is understandable that most of the population consider that energy should be focused on solving internal problems and not on war campaigns with an uncertain outcome.

During his first year in office Obama does not appear to have made any significant contributions to the G-20 mechanism. He has concentrated on trying to convince member states of his willingness to exercise a more cooperative diplomacy, so far with paltry results. We are therefore dealing with a rectification of traditional diplomacy which is more a matter of form than substance and remains greatly exposed to the necessary achievement of results. The possibility that Obama, like Carter before him, will end his mandate with a discourse that is harsher and closer to tradition than that employed in the election campaign and during this first year in office is real. In essence both Bush and Obama, each wielding a different discourse, have progressed on what we might call a hybrid path between the unilateralism that never was and multilateralism in the European sense. The G-20 is not a multilateral institution resulting from an international treaty signed by the member states of the United Nations. It is, simply a classic directorate centred on international economic affairs. Both Republicans and Democrats are very willing to move forward in flexible forums of this kind which are a far cry from the rigidities of the United Nations and lack secretariats, civil servants, headquarters... The United States has always wanted and needed to discuss matters of common interest with the rest of the actors concerned and has done so intensely. This classic diplomacy is now called multilateralism.

AF-PAK: THE KEY TO A MANDATE

The Afghanistan war and its impact on the stability of Pakistan will be the most significant feature of US external action during Barack Obama's presidency. With the situation in Iraq now on the right track and the recognition by the US president himself that the Af-Pak theatre is the main front in the fight against Jihad, developments in that region, the adoption of a strategy and its results will have a determining effect on the final assessment of his presidential term and on the fate of Jihadist ideas within the cultural conflict Islam is experiencing.

Obama arrived at the White House after making the commitment to increase the number of troops deployed and carry out a thorough review of the strategy to be followed. At the request of the White House, generals Petraeus and McChrystal reviewed the situation and proposed an alternative to the current strategy, which had been determined by the limitation of available resources and the need to stabilise the situation in Iraq first. Although well known, General McChrystal's acknowledgement that the Taliban were present throughout nearly the whole of Afghan territory and could win back power nevertheless had a major impact on both the members of the Atlantic Alliance and Islam as a whole. The leaking of the McChrystal report to *The Washington Post* did much for the image of the Taliban forces and for international Jihadism in general. Unlike in the early years of the Iraq War, the US forces already had an updated counterinsurgency strategy—devised under the direction of General Petraeus and implemented successfully in that war. It was now necessary to adapt it again to new, specific geographical and social situations but maintaining the basis concepts. In McChrystal's view the key to victory lay in isolating the Taliban insurgency by winning the civilian population over to our side. This was something that could only occur if their security was guaranteed, releasing them from the blackmail of the Islamist guerrillas; if they could be convinced that we would stay with them until victory was achieved; and if they perceived that the new state erected after so many sacrifices would be useful to their wellbeing by building roads, making education widely available and improving healthcare, among other things. A strategy based exclusively on military considerations was insufficient, but a forceful military action to contain and restrict the area of action of the insurgency was essential. The time had come to increase the military contingent, taking advantage of the reduction in the number of brigades deployed in Iraq, and to turn around the course of the conflict.

Whereas the question of what strategy to follow in the Iraqi theatre had triggered a major debate among military themselves, the success of the Surge implemented by Petraeus had secured a broad consensus on the essentials of the counterinsurgency strategy to be followed in Afghanistan. However, from the outset the new strategy did not go down at all well, particularly with the congressmen closest to the president, who feared that their voters would neither understand nor share the new goals. Obama's defence of the Afghan campaign during the election period had been interpreted by many as an argument used to delegitimize the intervention in Iraq but not as a commitment to do in Afghanistan what had been done in Iraq. What generals Petraeus and McChrystal were proposing was a cam-

paign lasting several years with a contingent equal to or greater than had been deployed in Mesopotamia and with prospects of even more casualties. Many Americans who had voted for Obama had done so expecting the new president to withdraw the troops from both theatres as soon as possible, while steering US foreign policy towards greater cooperation and a more restrictive use of force. After all, these ideals had been part and parcel of the Democrats' propaganda. At a time of economic crisis, public debt and unemployment, the more «liberal» voters rejected the idea of keeping up an exceptionally high level of military expenditure to support the deployment of large human contingents in remote places.

President Obama faced a complex dilemma. If he accepted his generals' advice, within no time at all he would find himself doing the same as his predecessor whom he had criticised so much and vis-à-vis whom he had presented himself as the best option for change. If, on the contrary, he rejected this advice, it could lead the United States to military defeat after years of war against a guerrilla armed with assault rifles and mortars. This could have serious implications for international security. The first option could lead to poor results in the 2010 elections and perhaps dash his chances of re-election in 2012. The second could guarantee him his followers' support in the short term, but a defeat in Afghanistan would end up confirming Republican criticisms of his defeatist diplomacy. After an unusually long period of reflection, President Obama delivered what is to date his most important address on the strategy in Afghanistan to the cadets of West Point military academy, in which he disclosed some of the pillars of his new strategy. According to the new Administration, the reason for US military presence there is al-Qaeda and action needs to be focused on combating this Jihadist organisation. The Taliban forces do not deserve the same attention. It is considered a priority to stabilise the country and this fact is linked to the security of Pakistan, an idea that goes back a considerable way, but a timeframe is now established for collaboration. The United States will allocate a further 30,000 troops to its contingent, increase anti-Taliban efforts, collaborate with its allies in training the national army and helping the government to develop the institutions... but will pull out in eighteen months.

The new strategy follows not a military but a political logic, as is only normal in a democracy. Obama owes his majority support in Congress to an electorate who demand a change in foreign policy, while his generals are presenting him with a strategy that clearly advocates continuity with the Bush Administration. The distinction between al-Qaeda and

the Taliban forces is somewhat fictitious. They are not the same, but they are closely linked. Al-Qaeda is no longer a centralised organisation, and therefore it is not as important as it was six years ago to strike its leaders and commanders in hiding at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. If the Taliban return to power al-Qaeda will again have a command and control base and a training centre. The setting of the date for withdrawal immediately before the next presidential polls reveals one of the goals of the current Administration with a view to the election: to present themselves as being responsible for there being no US troops on battlefields: Bush started conflicts, Obama ends them. While we do not doubt the effect of this discourse on the presidential elections—which will coincide with a complete renewal of the House of Representatives, one-third of the Senate and a good many posts in the states—it is not clear whether, in Afghanistan, the necessary institutional development, stemming of corruption and containment of the insurgency to guarantee the stability of the current political regime can be achieved within such a short space of time. The White House has repeatedly stated that the setting of a withdrawal date stems from the need to pressure Karzai's government into hastening the implementation of the necessary reforms. Even if this argument is true, it is extremely risky. In fact, it may be having the opposite effect to that intended.

Many Afghans, whether from the Taliban world or otherwise, may think that by setting a date for pulling out its forces the United States is announcing its withdrawal from the country, its abandonment of its ally Karzai and acceptance of its defeat. Many clan chiefs will believe the time has come to reach an understanding with the Taliban, thereby undermining the political regime's possibilities of taking root. This is exactly what General McChrystal viewed in his widely disseminated report as the main hindrance to stabilising Afghanistan. The population have shown over the years that they do not want to return to living under a fanatic Islamist dictatorship, but if they become convinced that the United States is pulling out they will be forced to come to an arrangement with the future rulers as soon as possible in order to preserve their lives and property. Should this trend be confirmed, we would be up against a problem with very serious consequences for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and which will furthermore influence the decisions that NATO member states have to make on the effect of the new US strategy on their own missions. If the burden of containing the Taliban forces is going to be handed over to the Afghan army within a year and a half and if responsibility for training its units falls to the NATO member states, we will have to take into account

a fact of paramount importance: that Afghans' loyalty to their families and clans is greater than their loyalty to the state. If, for the aforementioned reasons, a clan transfers its loyalty to the insurgency, so will the soldiers of that clan. There is a direct relationship between social support for the political regime and the operational capacity of the army. If our acts lead the Afghans to the conviction—whether or not grounded—that we are abandoning Karzai's government, our work in training the army will only serve to boost the capabilities of the Taliban units. We will be dealing with one of the biggest mistakes the West has made in years—that of having spent time, money and human lives on training those who are going to be used to destabilise moderate regimes and attempt to impose Islamist radicalism, beginning with Pakistan. The Pashtun are not only the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan and the social base of the Taliban, they are also a majority in northeast Pakistan and the backbone of some of the most radical fundamentalist groups.

President Obama's address at West Point Academy has shown to what extent the White House is willing not to follow its generals' recommendations for political reasons, but it cannot be interpreted as the basis of a new strategy. Many aspects need to be explained in order to have an exact idea of the United States' plan of action. What is evident is that the decision making process has ignored the Atlantic Alliance. Neither during the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit nor after the presentation of the McChrystal Report has NATO debated on the essentials of the strategy to be followed. This may explain the distant reception the aforementioned address got and the demand for further clarifications before some countries make any new decisions.

If the United States remains firm in its stand to send the troops home it is essential for more forceful action to be adopted immediately against the Taliban forces while providing sufficient assurances to the Afghan people that in the future the western powers will remain firmly linked to their destiny as a nation, and that they are not on the verge of a withdrawal but of a new stage in the construction of a modern state. The idea that the western states are incapable of carrying on military campaigns for a prolonged period is deeply rooted among the more radical sectors of Islam. If the withdrawal of our troops were to bring about the collapse of the current political regime we would be facing a historic event with extremely serious consequences for moderate Islam, for the United States' influence in the world and for the survival of NATO.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE AF PAK SCENARIO

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JOSÉ MARÍA ROBLES FRAGA

A CRITICAL AND DECISIVE MOMENT

The Afghanistan-Pakistan scenario is currently at a critical moment. Added to the deterioration in the security situation and the spread of attacks by the different insurgent groups is the disrepute of President Karzai—re-elected in polls that should be considered a failed exercise—together with widespread corruption and the political and administrative incompetence of his government. The scrapped second round of the polls marked by fraud in Karzai's favour has also brought to light the limits of America's influence on a government we are obliged to defend. Added to the pressing need to stem the advance of the insurgency is the challenge of making possible the «Afghanisation» of security in order to provide western troops with an exit strategy.

To quote General McChrystal in his report to the president, «the situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort».

The Afghan people's disappointment, disillusionment and fear is an explosive combination that must be taken into account when devising any new approach. Nor should it be forgotten that this debate must necessarily examine the possible alternatives and most likely post-2010 scenarios and include in this outlook the regional scenario, particularly developments in Pakistan, which are a key element.

It seems predictable that the strategic turnaround, the allocation of more resources, the change in tactics and the increase in US civilian personnel will require other ISAF partners to come up with a simi-

lar response or at least one that adapts to and does not contradict President Obama's determination to correct the mistakes of the Bush Administration and the shortfalls of previous years. This is the necessary and just war proclaimed at the time by the then candidate in contrast to that of Iraq, the main crime of which, according to the present analysis, was to divert resources and attention away from that of Afghanistan which, unlike Iraq, was inevitable following the attacks of 11 September. In 2002 haste was made to proclaim what proved not to be such a victory as the leadership of al-Qaeda and the Taliban had survived and carried on fighting while regrouping in the border areas of Afghanistan and, above all, Pakistan.

Many of the European partners who applauded this discourse must now accept the consequences—which are not only rhetorical—of those words and will find it extremely difficult to escape the overwhelming logic of the political consensus built at up the time concerning the need to go to Afghanistan and fight al-Qaeda and its allies there, even though public opinions at the time were considerably concerned about the course events were taking in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Withdrawal is impossible and it will be necessary to follow US leadership. It would therefore be a good thing to go further than merely formulating general objectives or even debating on what kind of result we want in national terms. What is required is to contribute in this decisive year to reviewing and adapting civilian and military contingents and the particular strategies and tactics of each of the partners and allies.

It is not a bad idea to take reality as a starting point for formulating these intentions. This calls for banishing the idea of building an impossible state that is a far cry from the traditions and particular characteristics of Afghan politics in which tribal, ethnic and clanship ties and remoteness and mistrust of the central power hold more weight than any other considerations that we might regard as more significant. Dire poverty (Afghanistan is the fourth poorest country in the world), corruption and the historical weakness of the central government are by no means negligible factors, to which is added the legacy of thirty years of civil war, guerrilla warfare and foreign intervention—of which ours is simply the most recent example.

We run something of a risk of presenting this new proposal for action and this major political and military impulse as the West's last opportunity to consolidate an Afghanistan free from the Taliban menace and, accor-

dingly, to deny Bin Laden and his followers victory against the world's Great Satan which, if not achieved, would lead us to withdraw, once again abandoning the Afghan people to their terrible fate. It is as if this were the last battle in a war which we have resigned ourselves to losing if this last attempt does not turn out well with right and reason on our side and for every good reason in the book. And this is a grave danger, even if only because in order to stand a reasonable chance of winning and not to abandon this land to chaos and civil strife again there is nothing more contagious among Afghans than the idea that we are departing and that it will only be a matter of time before another victor comes through the gates and bazaars of Kabul and Kandahar. The consideration of a timeframe for troop withdrawal cannot, under any circumstances, signify ceasing to be responsible for the viability of an Afghanistan whose fragility and fragmentation will require the international community's constant and permanent attention. President Obama's proposal and the subsequent clarifications thus entail both a timescale and a general commitment to non-abandonment.

This strategy must therefore include different options and variants based on the consideration that, as we have proclaimed at all European, Atlantic and United Nations forums, we are determined to honour a lasting commitment with no expiry date.

From these elections has emerged a Karzai, twice delegitimized in his own country and discredited in western eyes, who needs to address and solve the internal political problem highlighted by the worryingly low election turnout of the Pashtu population (only 8% are reported to have voted in the so-called «Pashtu belt») — namely the disaffection of Afghan's largest minority. This is an important fact — which, incidentally, is incessantly pointed out by neighbouring Pakistan and should not be underestimated as unless Karzai soon recovers the support he once commanded from part of the Pashtu ethnic group it will hardly be possible to speak of a stable Afghanistan or a strong government in Kabul. It is not just Karzai's political survival that is at stake — perhaps even the future possibility of there being a united Afghanistan.

Pakistan is now also emerging as one of the keys to stabilising Afghanistan, as not only are its tribal areas home to a sort of reconstructed Taliban mini state but it is also a significant regional actor and the main player in a quarrel with India that is even older than the Afghan conflict and is spreading its poison to the whole region.

THE AFGHAN SITUATION

Backsliding on the commitments acquired by the West before the international community is unthinkable in Obama's plan, despite the deterioration in the security situation, western frustration and the doubts and rejection of the Afghan people owing to widespread corruption at all levels, the election fraud and the incompetence of their rulers.

Nonetheless, by no means can we compare the weariness of the western public with the Afghans' sentiments about what is happening to them. They continue to be favourable to the presence of foreign troops but this feeling is now accompanied by fear of the return of the Taliban, weariness of this endless war and frustration at the hardship of daily life.

Despite the announced increases neither are there presently nor will there be enough foreign troops to control the whole of Afghan territory unless the Afghan army is capable of deploying within a reasonable period, operating by itself or with western support and withstanding the attacks of the insurgents. Basically, more soldiers are needed on the ground, although this in itself is no doubt insufficient to reverse the deterioration in security levels. In 2008 34% more armed clashes, nearly 37% more deaths of ISAF troops and 50% more civilian casualties were reported. Throughout 2008 there were more casualties in Afghanistan than in Iraq, while a growing number of districts fell into the hands of the various insurgent groups: Taliban commanded by the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network and Hekmatyar's Hiz-e-Islami, above all. Even districts of the north and west, far from the Durand Line which separates Afghanistan from Pakistan and from Pashtu areas, have witnessed an increase in attacks and the presence of insurgents.

Although in March 2009, when still a candidate, Obama spoke of a «civilian surge» as a novel element of the Democratic alternative in Afghanistan, the fact is that there is little to be done in this respect under the current security conditions. These conditions have worsened even in Kabul, whose security is now the responsibility of the Afghan army, and have led to the evacuation—in principle provisional—of part of the UN's expatriate personnel. The arrival and deployment of hundreds of US voluntary workers and technicians in Afghanistan to promote economic and social development and start up infrastructure projects is unthinkable, as the risk level is still unacceptable. On the contrary, if progress were made on the security front these projects could very well accompany a new counterinsurgency strategy that sought the consensus of the population and an improvement in their living conditions.

From now on ISAF and Enduring Freedom will have the goal not only of eliminating enemies but also of defending and protecting the population under threat. This would entail a new, different war requiring different rules of combat in which air strikes would be limited and, as a result, soldiers would be at greater risk as their firepower would be diminished in an attempt to cause fewer civilian casualties and other collateral damage. Although it is logical to assume that the map of the areas to be protected and the population centres left to their fate will be kept secret, it seems likely that efforts will be centred on Kabul and the most heavily populated cities and on securing the axis of communications—the ring road that connects its cities and the highways that ensure trade and supplies to the population and logistic networks of ISAF from the neighbouring countries.

In all likelihood throughout 2009 and 2010, in addition to the 30,000 more soldiers announced by the White House, we will see an adjustable and variable combination of more US combat and support troops and a considerable rise in the number of instructors and advisors for the Afghan national army and police, both from the US and from the other members of ISAF.

The first consequence of this increase in the number of US soldiers will be even greater US hegemony in Afghanistan and consequently a smaller relative weight of the other partners and allies, which will presumably follow suit by assigning more soldiers to ISAF.

This military superiority on the ground would make it possible to consider operations and options for which it has so far been difficult to enlist the support or involvement of some European countries, to extend even further the radius of its actions in areas threatened by the insurgency in the north and west and, in the rest, implement the counterinsurgency tactics to be announced by Washington—which incidentally comes fairly close to what some European allies proposed, at least in theory.

As the strategic review was accompanied during summer and autumn 2009 by an increase in attacks on the expat community in Kabul, US plans for this «civilian surge» appear to have been dashed, at least temporarily. Therefore what would remain of this strategy, almost as the main trump card, would be a different counterinsurgency policy which, following military reinforcements, would enable the territory to be better secured and make it possible to reverse a situation that seems to be getting out of hand.

The new US Administration has made Afghanistan its chief foreign-policy priority and one of its main concerns. This «necessary war» is furthermore the major foreign-policy risk that the Democrats must address and has all the ingredients for poisoning Obama's presidency throughout this first term in office and, accordingly, for making his entire political and personal project and even his possible re-election conditional upon its outcome. The spectre of Vietnam and the failure of the political agenda of the Democrat Johnson owing to an endless war in a faraway land will continue to hover menacingly over this incoming administration and over public debate in the US for the next few years.

In addition to Secretary of State Clinton, another heavyweight of the foreign policy establishment, Holbrooke, as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is in charge of directing and coordinating political efforts in the region and of addressing them in conjunction with the other countries involved.

The aim is not only to use the most appropriate tactics in this irregular war and to coordinate the diplomatic/political and military effort more effectively. It also extends to addressing the deeper causes and political and diplomatic conflicts which ravage the region and prevent the countries in the region from doing their utmost to stem a danger that also affects them but to which they have so far reacted in a manner that is not always consistent and positive.

2011 will be year zero for the international coalition in which the stability not just of Afghanistan but of the entire region could be at stake, as well as the credibility of NATO and US leadership itself.

With their brutality and simplicity the Taliban and affiliated groups are a formidable enemy. As practitioners of a very simple and effective version of fighting the West, they have made holy war the centrepiece of the Islamic religion and a focus of attraction for the dissatisfaction and radicalism of Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and the whole world, coupled with an even more primitive Pashtu tribal nationalism. This combination is an extraordinarily appealing cause that draws recruits and aspiring martyrs from all over the world, who have espoused this image of an Islam under attack which must be defended with martyrdom. This Jihadism, fuelled and disseminated by the internet, has a simply devastating propagandistic force.

The destabilising potential of the Taliban model as an explosive combination of holy war and insurgency tactics is huge and more powerful and

dangerous than ever. Pulling out of Afghanistan would not only end up ruining the country and plunging it into another civil war but would endanger the whole of central Asia, beginning with Pakistan and India.

Changes in European and American opinions and the logical impatience of the allied governments will be a hard test of the United States' leadership and its ability to keep the coalition united and prevent premature unilateral withdrawals. For the first time in a history that began on 11 September 2001, it will be forced to deliver winning results and a strategy with realistic goals and timeframes aimed at alleviating the political and military burden of the Afghan commitment in the foreseeable future. It is difficult to establish a final time limit, but it is necessary to lay the groundwork for a radical change of trend in Afghanistan in the decisive year 2011.

NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

Since the Korean and Vietnam wars it has been common practice for the US media to raise the debate on the definition of military success and on the best way of reaching the point at which the troops can be sent home as soon as possible. However, the history of Afghanistan has shown that such a victory is always elusive there and that the most to which we can aspire is an arrangement or a balance that suits our interests, even in the knowledge that the Afghans' ability to break any agreement and capacity for discord are more than notable and continuous. We would have to categorically deny that Afghanistan is a tomb of empires but at the same time remember that all the powers which have had some involvement in the region have had serious difficulties coping with and limiting damage to their interests and objectives as a result of their proximity or dealings with Afghan tribes.

It is therefore advisable to start defining what we want to achieve, which is tantamount to stating why we have made the huge commitment of sending troops and generously spending taxpayers' money in a place so remote from our traditional spheres of action. I assume that, beyond the rhetoric and United Nations lingo, there is sufficient consensus that we would settle for reaching an equilibrium in which a stable Kabul government backed by the international community could guarantee the minimum security of its territory and deny al-Qaeda and its allies the possibility of using Afghan soil for its global terrorist enterprise.

For this purpose it would be useful to know what President Karzai's objectives are and what stabilisation scenario he believes can be achieved with the means he has at his disposal. The scant progress of the national reconciliation initiatives and plans to break up the illegal armed groups, who could total some 125,000 combatants throughout the country, seems to indicate that the Kabul government is not clear about this. Even with the mediation of Saudi Arabia, the initiatives directed at the Hizb-e-Islami group headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar have neither achieved appreciable results nor been continued and developed. So far Karzai appears to have been playing to the gallery more than genuinely attempting to get anywhere with these initiatives.

Although the insurgency as a whole lacks coherence and even the ability to coordinate on the ground, it appears to share the belief that these calls for dialogue are signs of weakness and not strength on the part of Karzai and his partners of the international community and should therefore be despised or used for propagandistic purposes to project an image of weakness of the international coalition. In this regard the insurgents share a common aim, namely to topple the Afghan government and expel the infidel foreigners from their country and are indifferent to Karzai's overtures or to the messages of the UN and ISAF.

It would be very difficult to speak of a structured Afghan public opinion owing to the extreme ethnical and tribal division of Afghan society and the difficulty of conducting studies of this kind in rural areas, especially those controlled by the insurgency. Nevertheless, it is possible to understand the prevailing sentiment or the Afghans' ideas about what is happening to them and what they expect of the future, as despite this social structure there is a genuine Afghan national awareness which is expressed as such. The latest poll, the 5th since 2004, conducted by the Asia Foundation underlines that 70% of interviewees maintain that the Afghan police and army still need the support of foreign troops and, similarly, that they are indeed tired of the war, and a similar percentage, 71%, are in favour of reconciliation and dialogue with the armed rebel groups.

Although the doubts about the firmness of the West's commitment and historical rejection of foreign occupation could be exacerbated by the dashed expectations of the western intervention of 2002, we must continue to rely on the continued support for ISAF's presence expressed in these data—a backing that is reinforced above all by fear of the return of the Taliban.

The Afghans realise that whatever the case it is of course the ISAF and Enduring Freedom contingents which are guaranteeing the permanence of the Kabul government and protecting them from the return of the Taliban and should continue to do so until the Afghan forces are able to perform this task in the future.

This permanence in format—and even more so the perception of this permanence—is the only thing which can currently stop the armed rebel groups from toppling the Kabul government and is what is keeping the Afghans, who do not view the Taliban as winners in this fight, on our side. It might take only a little to turn this opinion around, but it is precisely this little, this «tipping point», which still gives us the chance to put Afghanistan back on track.

Having accepted that this is a necessary war, we need to ensure that it is also a possible war which can put a brake on the rapid spiralling out of control we are witnessing, the «descent into chaos» as writer Ahmed Rashid put it. Although the scenario is now much worse, the keys are the same as in 2002 and 2003: international military force, governance and development in the framework of a regional policy which takes into account the neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, and the other regional actors.

A NEW COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

Some 30,000 more US troops will progressively be sent in addition to the nearly 70,000 who are currently deployed. Indeed, in March President Obama announced the sending of about 30,000 more soldiers. The figure was already double the total as of the end of the Bush presidency, and could even be tripled with the new troops sent over the course of 2010.

The aim is not only to reinforce ISAF and Enduring Freedom personnel with new combat and support troops but also to implement a new strategy against the insurgency over the coming 12 months. This strategy consists primarily in stemming their advance and geographic expansion, allowing improved security and stability conditions to be established, maintaining the support of the Afghan population and making possible the growth and deployment of the Afghan army in sufficient numbers.

To protect the population from armed attacks and terrorism it would furthermore be necessary to change the Afghan army's rules of combat and even the methods of training. We are now working on the assumption

that aiming to physically eliminate the Taliban and other enemies of the Kabul government has only served to spread the rebellion across a tribal territory in which vengeance is a basic duty and where the threshold of pain its inhabitants are prepared to tolerate has been very high for decades. To quote General McChrystal's report «the insurgents cannot defeat us militarily but we can defeat ourselves».

The high number of civilian victims has further contributed to weakening support for ISAF (although ISAF reckons that 80% of civilian casualties are caused by rebel action and only the rest by its own forces and those of Enduring Freedom) and accordingly to damaging the legitimacy of the coalition. According to the present analysis, ISAF's methods are politically more dangerous and harmful than the insurgency itself. The use of fire-power should therefore be limited, especially in situations in which civilian lives would be endangered or in populated areas, even though this would pose a greater risk to western troops in the theatre of operations and mean more casualties, making this option more costly in terms of western public opinion.

The fact is that the insurgency, in its various forms, has not ceased to exploit the population's discontentment with ISAF and Karzai's government and has not had to offer anything in the way of development or social improvements of any kind. It has been sufficient for these insurgent groups to show their power and armed capability accompanied by the exercise of terror, intimidation and fast and simple justice based more on Pashtu tradition than on the Koran even in the unsophisticated version of the Taliban and similar groups such as Hizb-e-islami.

Any reflection on counterinsurgency efforts brings us to the subject of the national and local police and to issues relating to the incapacity and corruption of Karzai's government, as they are at the root of much of the dissatisfaction and rejection that it is being attempted to correct. It would therefore be appropriate to consider corruption almost as a major rather than a minor cause of the problems the coalition needs to tackle. This gives an idea of the complexity of the task it faces, which is none other than to support an unreliable and barely legitimate government even though what is needed is one that is responsive and responsible.

The relationship between the military chiefs and political and diplomatic agents of the coalition will thus be one of the keys to progress in this direction. Civilian-military coordination will need to be more perfect than it has been up until now because the aim is not only to defend the

population—or at least the most populated cities and regions. It is also necessary to find a better institutional and above all political balance so that these inhabitants recover their lost confidence in ISAF and in their own government or feel that they are represented by, and are part of, this form of government, especially the Pashtu minority who are the Taliban power base. More than the policy of Kabul, what seems even more important is to act sub-nationally and locally, as it is on these levels which most Afghans live and operate and the civilian and military action of the coalition has more of an impact.

It is this policy of gaining allies from among the population and eroding the support of the insurgency in order to divide and ultimately defeat it which will require a political presence on the ground, more funds to back counterinsurgency operations and above all better intelligence and information than has so far been available to ISAF vis-à-vis the greater capabilities of the insurgents in this field.

A consideration that is shared by European and Americans is the need to accompany the new counterinsurgency effort and tactics with a greater civilian deployment and greater development funds, particularly in agriculture, which is the means of living of 80% of the Afghan population and generates 55% of the country's GDP. Agriculture is in a state of decline and neglect in Afghanistan owing to the havoc wrought by the successive wars and lack of investment in irrigation infrastructure, seeds and proper training, whereas the cultivation of opium poppies, which finances a considerable part of crime and the insurgency, is thriving. The need has been considered for a sort of integrated, comprehensive «green Marshall Plan» which, in addition to improving the population's living conditions, would guarantee food security and enable the Afghans to switch from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture and, ultimately, export agriculture.

As the withdrawal of our troops will need to be considered at some point, the strategy must include a very significant reform of the Afghan security forces. This will involve not only increasing them in number but also enhancing their capabilities and the loyalty of their personnel, as well as commitment to creating a new relationship of greater trust between ISAF troops and their Afghan colleagues as a further means of exploiting the relative prestige the Afghan army enjoys among the population, unlike the discredited police. As is nearly always the case, the diagnosis and even the recommended remedies may be correct but there is a shortage of time to put some of them into practice. Indeed, the date set, 2011, for beginning to change the reality in the field of operations could be too soon

and end up becoming an arbitrary deadline more than a realistic and reasonable commitment.

The aim is to do at once two things that are hardly compatible: significantly increase foreign military forces and encourage the Kabul authorities and Afghan security forces to take on their responsibility in a war which, after all, is theirs.

The old Afghan saying that «you may have the watches but we have the time» could unfortunately prove true. To expect too much in such a short space of time could be the definitive error in this terrible land which is experiencing a different historical moment and in which life and death do not have the same worth as in the West. The huge amount of resources employed, the narrowness of the timeframe established and the impatience of governments and public opinions, beginning with those of the US, could become a simply deadly combination that causes terminal weariness in the US and the rest of the coalition.

Even so, the success of this counterinsurgency effort will largely depend on the result of the overall regional strategy set in motion. This strategy springs from the recognition that we are dealing with a scenario that has two sides, with their differences—the Afghan side and the Pakistani side, and both need to be dealt with in order to deprive the insurgency and Jihadist terrorists of their main bases in the tribal territories at the border and at the same time defend Pakistan from the attacks of the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda. Although improving the security situation in Afghanistan and stemming the advance of the insurgency does not depend solely on what happens in the FATA in Pakistan, hindering or destroying their operations at border areas or those of their allies based there would amount to eliminating a considerable tactical advantage which has enabled the Afghan Taliban first to survive following their expulsion from Kabul in 2002 and subsequently to regroup and reorganise themselves, with the invaluable collaboration of their Pakistani contacts in a tolerated exercise in duplicity which has proved devastating in the long run.

In Afghanistan we should not forget that we are up against a shrewd and tenacious enemy who is capable of holding out and resisting. But complacency can be as perilous as self-deceit or lack of rigour. The Kabul government and Karzai himself will survive if they are capable of changing and taking note of the huge effort the international community is preparing to make. They cannot survive without it and although there are currently no alternatives to the discredited president and his coalition partners, nor

should they think that at this stage in the game their credit and the West's patience are unlimited.

It is now up to the international community, the US and its European and Atlantic allies to insist that the time has come to crack down on inefficiency and corruption and to broaden the political and ethnic base of Karzai's government, accompanying the improvement in ISAF's military capability and the arrival of US reinforcements with policies that bolster its weakened authority and promote a division between the insurgents and national reconciliation.

Karzai has little room for manoeuvre but it is he who should seize the opportunity he is being offered to steer Afghanistan in a new direction and avoid the failure of an entire country which, despite all odds, is still holding out against the Taliban and their barbarous and bloodthirsty plans. The alternative is not acceptable to the international community and nor should it be to the current Afghan leaders.

If the international community is capable of maintaining its commitment to Afghanistan over time, adapting to the tactical and strategic changes that progressively occur, and of facing up to the insurgency with the right means and methods, and if pressure is kept up from the Pakistani side we would have a genuine opportunity to fulfil the mandate that was begun to be established in 2001. This would allow us to contribute to stability in the region, to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan and to defeating global Jihadist terrorism at its base and main recruiting centre.

PAKISTAN

The shadow of neighbouring Pakistan has always weighed heavily on Afghanistan's destiny. It has also been one of most glaring absences from the West's policy. Since the beginning of the intervention against the Taliban the need to bear in mind the regional dimension of the Afghan problem has been discussed but very little has been done in this direction and we are not devoting much effort to neighbouring Pakistan, a major actor on this stage of which it is an integral and essential part. Settling—for want of anything better—for the assurances given to Washington by the then president, General Musharraf, we let him off for the constant ambiguity that allowed him to retain US and European support, fight against al-Qaeda and at the same time preserve his relations with the Afghan Taliban and other Jihadist groups. In the throes of the «war on terror» Pakistan

kept on trying to seek a «strategic depth» in Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan factions and groups it judged to be closest and most favourable to its interests, even if this contradicted and endangered the western intervention in Afghanistan. After all, this was what it had done in the past—first helping part of the anti-Soviet resistance that inspired greatest confidence, then Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during the civil war and, finally, the Taliban themselves, who would never have established their regime and defeated the other armed groups without Pakistan's support and help. The Taliban originated from the madrasahs at the border, gradually became an army that won the civil war thanks to Pakistani soldiers and even today have as their most trusty allies the country's Islamist and Jihadist groups.

In his memoir («In the Line of Fire») Musharraf himself even develops the concept of the difference between good Jihadist and evil terrorist in a manner that is highly revealing of the complexities of Pakistan's position on these matters.

That is why we need to put Pakistan in its right place in the AF-PAK puzzle and, at such a critical moment, call for the means, interest and political will to establish a common European position and consistent western stance including a strategy towards Pakistan that is more than just a footnote quotation or an occasional reference in documents on Afghanistan. In other words, it is necessary to devote attention to this difficult and complex country that was once defined as the «most dangerous in the world», where an essential battle also needs to be fought and won against the Taliban and Jihadism.

In September 2001 Pakistan was the Taliban regime's main ally and support. Since then, following the forced volte-face of the then President Musharraf, Pakistani politics have been conditioned by the situation in Afghanistan and relations with the United States, as well as by the traditional alternation between military dictators and weak civilian governments—described by author Zahid Hussain as «the Pakistani soap opera of alternation between authoritarian rule by an elected government and authoritarian rule by a self-appointed leader from the army»—and a persistent strategic ambiguity.

Pakistan thus has the unsettling status of being an ally as important as it is unreliable. The Islamabad security establishment has constantly been playing a double game in its dealings with our Afghan and Jihadist enemies. In addition to irking its western allies and donors, this double dealing has ended up confusing the entire population and further hampe-

ring the implementation of a consistent and continued policy to combat terrorism and its tribal allies at the border. It is undeniable that the Afghan insurgency is backed from Pakistan both by the presence of its leaders in Quetta and in the tribal areas of the FATAs («Federally Administered Tribal Territories») as well as by the ties and alliances with al-Qaeda and affiliated movements.

Musharraf's fall after a long drawn out political crisis and the arrival in power of a civilian government came during 2008 amid a major terrorist offensive from al-Qaeda and the Taliban which repeatedly struck the heart of Pakistan's most important cities and assassinated one of the country's most important leaders, former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, and approached the capital from Swat Valley. It now seems easy to say that Pakistan's double dealing led inexorably to the strengthening of Taliban power and its spread to new parts of Pakistan's territory. But nobody could have predicted the change and huge adaptive capacity of Pakistani Jihadism, which has succeeded in establishing itself as an autonomous player no longer dependent on its former employers of the secret services of the ISI and adopting an agenda of its own which threatens the security and very existence of the Islamic Republic.

The dual language of Pakistan's diplomacy stems from a basic misunderstanding: whereas to us westerners the common enemy is the Taliban and al-Qaeda, to Pakistan the chief obsessive threat is India, against which the action of the Jihadist terrorist groups in Kashmir became an effective instrument of attrition.

In Islamabad Afghanistan continues to be viewed as a secondary stage where the deadly rivalry with India is fought out and not as a country whose stability and security are values unto themselves that are important to Pakistan itself. To Pakistan's political class, an Afghan state is only meaningful if it is under the influence of Pakistan, as otherwise, if it fell under the influence of India, the worst of strategic nightmares would occur—that is, Pakistan would be encircled by its worst enemy. There are few things that concern Islamabad more today than the growing influence of India in Afghanistan and the activities of the Indian consulates near the borders with Pakistan. Therefore, in order to secure the fullest collaboration of Islamabad, to create a climate of confidence in security matters—both in the fight against terrorism and in dismantling the Taliban rearguard at the border and in the tribal territories—and to change this perception of the Afghan problem in terms of enmity with India, it is necessary to address the question of relations with India and the perception of this

country as a threat to Pakistan's existence as a viable state and begin to overcome more than 60 years of war and hatred between the region's two nuclear powers.

While India asserts itself in the world as an emerging power and builds an extraordinary military might, it should not be forgotten that unless sound mechanisms are established for resolving its conflicts with Pakistan this might and the stability of the whole area will be built on fragile and insecure foundations.

Broad mindedness and collaboration of the neighbouring countries, especially India, will be keys to ensuring that Pakistan changes its national security priorities and has the means to face up to its internal enemies and to achieve the economic and social development it needs.

We Europeans have much to do in Pakistan. As Pakistan's biggest trade partners and one of its main donors, the European Union should now follow a suitable political strategy that complements what is being done in Afghanistan and helps contain and defeat Jihadism and the Taliban groups in Pakistan. The main component of this strategy should be security, but nor should we neglect trade issues, support for democratic institutions, social development, human rights and issues such as the capacity building and training of the police forces and the reform of justice.

That Europe pays insufficient attention to Pakistan is easily proven by the scant number of visits made by European leaders and the low level of talks between Europe and the Islamabad authorities, the sole exception being the United Kingdom. At this crucial moment Pakistan should become one of the compulsory destinations of the High Representative of the EU.

If we acknowledge the significance of Pakistan, of which its nuclear capability is a key factor, and the huge danger to regional peace and world stability that losing this country or seeing it disintegrated as a result of Jihadism and terrorism would signify, we should also acknowledge the need to urgently reconsider the goals of the western and European presence and politics.

Fortunately this is changing and the US and Europe are beginning to devote significant efforts to Pakistan. The US made General Musharraf's Pakistan a key ally in the fight against terrorism, declaring it a «major non-NATO ally» in 2004, and have granted it some 10 billion dollars worth of aid since 2001, of which 75% was for military and counterterrorism assistan-

ce. Following the fall of Musharraf and the advent of a civilian government amid a serious political and economic crisis, appalling terrorist attacks in the country's main cities and a military offensive in the tribal areas and northern territories, bilateral collaboration has been further intensified with President Obama. In 2008 1.29 billion dollars were earmarked to military and civilian assistance to Pakistan and non-military aid is to be increased substantially as much as threefold and could amount to 1.5 million dollars annually over the next five years in accordance with the Kerry-Lugar initiative. Although there continue to be major divergences between the strategic visions of America and Pakistan, a sizeable improvement would appear to be taking place in collaboration against terrorism in intelligence. Examples of the foregoing are army action against the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas at the border and the intensification of strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles acting on information supplied by Pakistan's own intelligence services. For the time being the army is attacking the Pakistani Taliban of Swat and South Waziristan which are openly rebelling against the state. It remains to be seen if this operation will continue against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Quetta Sura of Mullah Omar, allies of al-Qaeda and two of the most dangerous Afghan insurgent groups.

The action of the Pakistani army and paramilitary forces in south Waziristan stems mainly, as could not be otherwise, from its own interests and is carried out in response to the major threat posed to the state of Pakistan by the local version of the Afghan Taliban and their allies in the Jihadist conglomerate. But this action is driven by US pressure and has no hope or possibility of being maintained and broadened without the military assistance of the US and coordination with ISAF.

It is therefore indispensable to increase the level and intensify of relations with Pakistan as far as possible and to overcome the indifference and disinterest of the past or the idea that all that can be discussed with Pakistan is police matters or counterterrorism. The European Union seems to have begun to do so, even at times of handover and major institutional changes, and 2009 has been a crucial year with respect to the emergence of an EU strategy for the whole region, and particularly towards Pakistan.

The seventeenth of June saw the holding of the first EU-Pakistan ad hoc summit which sought to provide political backing to Pakistan and its democratic institutions. It was the political and security crisis which ultimately moved the European leaders to take this step and accordingly recognise Pakistan's strategic importance. The summit also served to underline the importance of the fight against terrorism and of other bilate-

ral issues such as the development of trade relations, migration, support for institutions and democracy, among others.

This summit, to which Pakistan had long aspired, is the first result of the EU's new AF-PAK strategy which was established in the joint Commission/Council paper entitled «EU engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan» and is also reflected in the Council Declaration of June on both countries.

Together with several Member States individually, the EU also takes a very active part in the «Friends of Democratic Pakistan Group», which was set up in 2008 as a strategic political forum to act in parallel to the donor groups such as the recent Tokyo Conference or the Pakistan Development Forum.

In addition to the dialogue on fighting terrorism and on support for civil society and capacity building for the security forces, the EU will also engage in the long term in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the areas affected by fighting against the Taliban and other extremist armed groups, especially in the so-called Malakand Plan in the NWFP. In addition, the EU already provides humanitarian assistance to alleviate the situation of the almost two million people displaced by army operations in several areas of the country.

The reform of the colonial structures and laws in order to integrate the tribal border areas into the rest of the country and the institutional normalisation of these territories is one of the pending issues in Pakistan for which donor aid will be essential. The Talibanisation of the FATAs is not so much the result of local traditions as of unambitious policies and the shortage of reforms and opportunities and the continuance of the colonial structures which isolate this region from the rest of the country and separate it from the NWFP, as stated in the October 2009 report of the International Crisis Group. Likewise, the reform of the system of government of the northern territories such as Swat and the implementation of the Malakand Plan with international support will be necessary to help these other areas of the country break out of the marginalisation and isolation which are conducive to the presence of Taliban groups.

Pakistan is a forgotten political and diplomatic issue to which attention needs to start to be given. The internal political game of this great Muslim country must be monitored and studied with interest in order to help consolidate the democratic system, promote universal values and rights, and foster the economic and social development of a stable and predic-

table Pakistan to ensure that Pakistan plays a positive role throughout the region.

Pakistan is experiencing a phase of serious political turmoil that is prolonging the crisis which led to the fall of General Musharraf and followed the assassination of the People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto. Since then the presidency of the Islamic republic has been held by her widower Asif Ali Zardari and the prime minister is Raza Yousaf Gillani, also a member of the PPP. In contrast Punjab, Pakistan's main province, is governed by their rivals belonging to the Muslim League Party of the former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. The coming year the president will have to confirm or change the army chief General Kiyani and until then we will not know whether, at this decisive time for the world agenda, Pakistan continues to be the indispensable partner we need in the region. Several factors may complicate matters, among them the army's defence of its strategic autonomy, which may lead it to continue with the ambiguity and duplicity in relations with the West and in the fight against the Afghan Taliban and Jihadism or may trigger another political crisis in the headship of state resulting in yet another change of leadership and government.

Pakistan must ultimately choose between contributing to the defeat of the Taliban and Jihadism and running the risk of finding itself neglected and isolated in a scenario that would be much worse than the current situation. The world has changed considerably since this war began and Pakistan must adapt and change its national security model and strategy accordingly.

THE OTHER REGIONAL DIMENSION

Europe's attitude should bear in mind that, although Pakistan is a key country for Afghanistan, its other neighbours in the region also need to be involved in the sustainability and stability of Afghanistan. Any European strategy must be accompanied by constant action towards the other neighbouring countries with which we have different instruments of relationship and important means of influence and pressure.

The Af-Pak scenario is part of a puzzle of latent conflicts and crossed interests in which the immediate neighbours and regional powers are involved. Russia, China and, above all, India are parties concerned and affected by the instability of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the threat of Jihadist terrorism.

For various reasons, and in different ways, these three great countries must be involved in any strategy in the region.

The rivalry and wars between the two nuclear powers India and Pakistan, which are focused on the Kashmir conflict, are the origin of Pakistan's national security doctrine which concentrates military force on the east border, thereby reducing its capacity to act against the Taliban enemy to the west. Pakistan's inferiority—from a conventional viewpoint—vis-à-vis the Indian giant explains its use of irregular instruments of attrition such as the Jihadist groups that operate in Kashmir or in other parts of the area and the connivance of the Pakistan intelligence apparatus with the terrorist conglomerate. Their destabilising ability is huge and potentially devastating, as was proven when the countries were on the verge of war in 2002 following the attacks in Kashmir and Delhi.

The Pakistani doctrine of «strategic depth», which spurred support first for Hekmatyar and later for the Taliban, springs from this rivalry with India and from this conventional inferiority. Even if only to put an end to terrorist activities it would be worth continuing the «all-embracing dialogue» between Indians and Pakistanis. Although this process has been maintained and the bilateral climate has improved, even despite the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, no progress has been made in any of the pending issues of substance (Kashmir, Siachen Glaciar, Sir Creek, etc.) which are still poisoning relations between the two countries that resulted from the division of what was once British India.

The Indians refused to allow this issue to be included—even indirectly—in the portfolio of the US envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, or the matter to even be mentioned in the regional dossier. However it escapes nobody's notice that any progress in the «all-embracing dialogue» would help improve things in the region and, accordingly, the Afghan question and the very situation of Pakistan.

Western failure in Afghanistan leading to the destabilisation of Pakistan would ultimately be the worst news for India, which would immediately suffer the consequences vis-à-vis its Jihadist and terrorist enemy at home and abroad. While India asserts itself in the world as a regional power with global aspirations and works at building up its extraordinary military might, it should not be forgotten that unless sound mechanisms are established for settling its conflicts with Pakistan and progress is made in them, creating a climate of greater confidence and shared interests in the security field, there will always be a risk of bilateral crisis and backtracking towards confrontation.

The collaboration of the neighbouring countries, especially India, will be a key factor in getting Pakistan to change its national security priorities and equipping itself with the means to face up to its internal enemies and achieve the economic and social development its population needs.

Russia is an important country which should be involved in the international effort. Not only because it is essential to providing supplies to our units and enjoys huge influence in the Central Asian republics that border on or are close to Afghanistan, but also because it has a direct interest in the stability of its southern borders and a long history of dealings and knowledge of Afghan affairs and also a major responsibility in Afghanistan's history. This concern about its Asian borders is a constant feature of its foreign policy and should be added to the positive side of the international engagement. The future of former USSR republics as important as Uzbekistan would undoubtedly be seriously threatened by a new Talibanisation of Afghanistan or by the ensuing chaos or civil war.

China views developments in the Af-Pak scenario with concern. Its rivalry with India does not prevent it from sharing a common enemy—the Jihadist movements, which are present in the Xingjian region that was formerly Chinese Turkestan and thrive on the conflicts between the Uyghur and the Han peoples. Its longstanding alliance with Islamabad would not protect it from an overflow of Jihadism from the Afghan and Pakistani bases and the destabilisation of Pakistan would deprive it of major regional support. For the sake of its friendship with China, the current Pakistani establishment prosecutes Chinese Muslim Jihadists, but loss of control of the region would threaten China directly by establishing a new Islamist cause against Chinese power. It would take little for the Uyghur cause to be added to the list of grievances of the Ummah of believers and of recruiting grounds for global terrorism along with Palestine, Chechnya, Karshmir, Iraq and Afghanistan. China would then become the third empire to be defeated in the mythology of the world Jihad.

Iran has a special situation in this scenario and a role that is ambiguous to say the least. The Shia power has a long festering rivalry with Pakistan, whose status as nuclear power it envies. Although Doctor A. Q. Khan's nuclear smuggling network supplied it with particle accelerators and plans, the last thing Pakistan wants is to have another atomic neighbour. Iran, as protector of Afghanistan's Shia minority, already came up against the policy of the dictator Zia Ul Haq and his Saudi-inspired version of Sunni Islam which, among other things, marginalised and persecuted Muslims of other sectors, especially Shiites. Arab-Persian rivalry also operates in Pakistan

and Afghanistan indirectly and both Gulf and Iranian money promote the spread of their respective versions of Islam through their local affiliates. Iran, like the other neighbours, acts indirectly, above all through the Shia minorities in this Af-Pak scenario and even if only for its aversion to the Taliban it would not want to see the Kabul government collapse, although it could play at wearing down its US enemy in the Afghan scenario. The spread of Sunni Jihadism could affect Iranian Baluchistan through the action of the tribal groups that are allies of the Taliban and other insurgent or criminal groups linked to drug trafficking. Although there are various sides to this diverse issue, it is evident that an improvement in the Iranian regime's relations with the West could contribute to more positive Iranian action in Afghan affairs, in which Tehran has been accused of arming insurgent groups and of constant intervention in border areas, especially that of Herat.

Without regional responsibility there will be no solution and there are no clear indications of these countries wishing to progress from the wearing down of ISAF to the disastrous withdrawal of international forces and the destruction of the current unstable balance in Afghanistan and the surrounding areas, to the benefit of the Taliban.

Although absent from the military field, the Arab countries of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, are nevertheless—and for very different reasons—one of the financial, political and religious/ideological keys to the question. Arab money continues to finance madrassas and Islamic institutions of all kinds in Afghanistan and Pakistan and it seems clear that some Jihadist and insurgent groups receive substantial aid from this part of the world. Their ability to mediate is important and could be useful in achieving rapprochements with part of the insurgency at some time. The Saudi dynasty's role of guardians of Mecca accords this country's institutions a significant weight throughout the Ummah and therefore the leadership and authority of the Saudi monarchs and clergy is undeniable.

CONCLUSION

Any strategic analysis or situation report on the Afghanistan-Pakistan scenario, the so-called AF PAK, of the type that are circulated in Washington or any other Atlantic or European capital, points out that we are currently at a key, decisive and crucial moment in the stabilisation and reconstruction endeavour the international community has embarked on in this regional scenario, particularly the United States, NATO and their

coalition allies, naturally including the European Union and the rest of the international community. It has taken President Obama a long time to decide what course to follow in view of the strategic and tactical review carried out by his team from the moment he arrived in the White House. A new strategy for combating the insurgency was finally announced, along with a major increase in the number of American soldiers deployed to the field in both combat missions and missions to train the Afghan army.

The Obama Plan proposes increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan, including more US and also European troops, and a turn-around in the manner of acting, the rules of combat with the enemy and the relationship with the Afghan population. The coming months will see an intense effort in civilian and military human and material resources on the part of the US, which will strengthen the US's lead and responsibility in this international operation. Barack Obama's presidency and an important part of his country's leadership could be at stake in this complex decision, which leaves little room for error and includes a regional strategy that will reinforce Pakistan's role in solving this serious crisis.

On it hinge victory in the most important battle against global terrorism, the credibility of NATO and the peace of a highly dangerous area.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

THE TREATY OF LISBON AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

ANÍBAL VILLALBA FERNÁNDEZ

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty of Lisbon has modified the two fundamental texts of the European Union: the Treaty on European Union (TEU); and the Treaty establishing the European Community, now called the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

When the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union came to be called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Following ten years of ESDP, the Union has progressed in shaping security and defence structures and mechanisms which integrate the different sensibilities and concerns of the Member States.

This period has witnessed substantial headway in defining the EU's identity in a sphere that affects societies' most intimate interests.

The CSDP marks a qualitative leap in the field of security and defence, establishing instruments that are expected to allow the Union to progress by generating and exporting security as an indispensable element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The stimulus which the Lisbon Treaty provides to the CFSP is designed to allow the European Union to continue to progress towards its goal of becoming a comprehensive actor on the international scene. Structures have been modified by creating instruments, simplifying procedures, enhancing capabilities and increasing the flexibility of mechanisms, and a powerful structure has been devised which is expected to enable the EU to develop its potential in the fields of international politics and security.

The Preamble to the Lisbon Treaty enshrines the European Union Member States' determination to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to foster peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.

It falls to Spain to carry out the transition to the design envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty for the CFSP and CSDP. As holder of the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU, Spain must facilitate the adjustment of the new structures in an exercise that requires rigour, flexibility and political leadership.

THE CFSP IN THE TREATY OF LISBON

The Common Foreign and Security Policy has acquired a new dimension following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A significant change in the new architecture of the EU is the abolishment of the structure of «pillars» introduced by the Maastricht Treaty.

The legal personality of the EU, which is introduced in article 47 of the Lisbon Treaty, is a very significant aspect. Article 37 states that the Union may conclude agreements with one or several states or international organisations in the areas covered by the chapter on the CFSP. The Union's single legal personality will bolster its capabilities as an interlocutor, making it a more effective actor on the international scene and a more visible partner for third countries and international organisations.

Nevertheless, this legal personality does not entail a different handling of the EU's decision-making process. Unanimity will continue to be indispensable for any decision to allow the Union to sign a contractual document with security or defence implications, as laid down in articles 31 and 38 of the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Treaty of Lisbon has brought substantial institutional changes designed to give impetus to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Two significant appointments have been made in relation to these institutional changes: that of the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, previously Prime Minister of Belgium; and that of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, until then European Commissioner for Trade, who is also one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission (hereinafter referred to

as HR when discussing her functions in the sphere of the CFSP and HR/VP when her functions as a whole are mentioned).

Although the appointment of Catherine Ashton at the helm of the Union's foreign policy triggered a certain amount of controversy, with opponents claiming that she lacked experience in this field, analysts such as Giji Gya hold that her experience in the area of trade and nuclear disarmament will allow these two sensibilities to be incorporated into the CFSP and may strengthen the EU's approach in matters such as the nuclear issue of Iran, providing a fresher perspective when addressing the challenges of merging the community pillars (1). Furthermore, the fact that Ashton has been a Commissioner will facilitate her role as one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission.

The following pages analyse the effects on the EU's core institutions with respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy that is derived from it.

The European Council

Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has become an independent institution. Before the Treaty of Lisbon the European Council was not an institution but the configuration of the Council when it met at the level of heads of state and government and President of the Commission.

The European Council lays down the general principles and guidelines of the CFSP and, on its own initiative or that of the Council, approves the common Strategies (articles 13.1 and 2 of the TEU-Nice). It is also incumbent on the European Council to decide to pave the way for a common Defence (article 17 TEU - Nice). The European Council is ultimately the highest body of appeal in the event that a state were to oppose a decision that may be adopted by a qualified majority (art. 23.2 TEU - Nice).

Although the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the European Council may decide unanimously that a Council decision normally requiring unanimity may be approved by a qualified majority or ask the High Representative to exercise his right of initiative for the same purpose, this does not apply to decisions having military or defence implications (article 31.4 TEU - Lisbon).

(1) GYA, GJI. «*Enacting the Lisbon Treaty for CSDP: Bright light or a tunnel?*» European Security Review, No. 47, December 2009. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_esr_80_esr47-dec09.pdf

Under the Lisbon Treaty the European Council elects by a qualified majority its President, who serves a two and a half year term that may be extended once. One of the functions of the President of the European Council is to represent the Union externally, in accordance with his status and condition, in CFSP matters, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.

It is the responsibility of the European Council, with the approval of the President of the Commission, to appoint by a qualified majority the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure (article 18 TEU - Lisbon). If international developments so require, the President of the European Council shall convene an extraordinary meeting to define the strategic lines of the Union's policy in the face of such developments (article 26 TEU – Lisbon).

It is important to accommodate the new figure promptly among the rest of the Union's players. For his part, following his appointment, Van Rompuy promised to take into account the interests and sensibilities of all parties and to endeavour to guarantee consensus in the decisions of the Twenty-Seven.

The Council

The Council is comprised of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of that Member State (article 16 TEU - Lisbon). Its functioning is regulated by its Rules of Procedure (2) (RP, which will need to be amended now that the Lisbon Treaty is in force). Prominent among the Council configurations up until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon was the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).

The GAERC covered two main areas of activity (article 2.2 of the RP):

- Preparation for and follow-up to the European Council meetings, including the necessary coordination of all preparatory work, overall coordination of policies, institutional and administrative questions, horizontal dossiers which affect several of the European Union's policies and any dossier entrusted to it by the European Council.
- The whole of the European Union's external action, namely CFSP, ESDP, foreign trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

(2) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:285:0047:0071:EN:PDF>

Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the rotating Presidency of the Council was held by each Member State for a period of six months. Under the Treaty of Lisbon this arrangement has changed: although the rotation of the Council Presidencies held by the Member States is maintained, this does not include CFSP, an area in which most of the functions attributed up until now to the Presidency have passed to the HR, who shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council, contribute through his proposals towards the preparation of the CFSP and ensure the implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council (article 27.1 TEU - Lisbon).

The GAERC has been divided into two different configurations:

- *The General Affairs Council (CAG)*, which is chaired by a representative of the Member State that exercises the rotating Presidency and is responsible for ensuring consistency in the work of the different Council configurations, and preparing and ensuring the follow-up to meetings of the European Council in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission (article 16.6 of the TEU - Lisbon).
- *The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)*, which is now chaired by the HR, and shall elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is consistent (article 16.6 of the TEU - Lisbon).

For the purpose of the organisation of the Spanish Presidency of the EU, it should be stressed that the Declaration of the European Council of December 2008 on transitional measures concerning the Presidency of the European Council and the Presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council states that in the event that the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force at a date when a six-monthly Presidency of the Council has already begun, the European Council agrees that, as a matter of transition, in order to take into account the preparatory work and ensure harmonious continuity of work:

- The competent authorities of the Member State holding the six-monthly Presidency of the Council at that time will continue to chair all the remaining meetings of the Council and the European Council, as well as third country meetings, until the end of the period of office;
- The following-six monthly Presidency of the Council will be in charge of taking the necessary specific measures relating to the organisational and material aspects of the Presidency of the European Council and of the Foreign Affairs Council during its period of office,

in conformity with the Treaty. On these issues, close consultation will be established between this Presidency and the President (elect) of the European Council and the HR (3).

It should also be pointed out that Article 21. 3 TEU - Lisbon states that «the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect».

The trio of Presidencies

This is enshrined in article 2.4 of the Rules of Procedure, which establishes that «every 18 months, the three Presidencies due to hold office shall prepare, in close cooperation with the Commission, and after appropriate consultations, a draft programme of Council activities for that period. The three Presidencies shall jointly submit the draft programme no later than one month before the relevant period, with a view to its endorsement by the General Affairs and External Relations Council».

Article 1 of the Draft Decision of the European Council annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon states that the Presidency of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration, shall be held by pre-established groups of three Member States for a period of 18 months. The groups shall be made up on a basis of equal rotation among the Member States, taking into account their diversity and geographical balance within the Union. Each member of the group shall in turn chair for a six-month period all configurations of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration. The other members of the group shall assist the Chair in all its responsibilities on the basis of a common programme.

The current trio of Presidencies that begun on 1 January 2010 is formed by Spain, Belgium and Hungary.

The European Parliament

The European Parliament (EP) is consulted and regularly informed by the President and the Commission of the development of the CFSP. The EP holds an annual debate on the progress made in the implementation

(3) Brussels European Council, 11-12 December 2008. Presidency Conclusions http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/104692.pdf

of the CFSP (article 21 TEU – Nice). The HR is furthermore responsible for ensuring that the EP and Member States are kept fully informed of the implementation of enhanced cooperation in the field of CFSP (article 27d TEU - Nice).

In practice, the EP has more influence in CFSP matters than it might seem, through its participation in the approval of the Budget, which includes the overall sum earmarked to the CFSP and through its appearances before the Plenary, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Subcommittees on Human Rights and Defence.

As to the role of the EP in the Treaty of Lisbon, Declaration 14 annexed thereto states that the provisions covering the CFSP neither give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor broaden the role of the European Parliament.

Under these circumstances the EP should simply be consulted and informed by the High Representative in respect of the main aspects of the CFSP and the CSDP.

Nevertheless, the Parliament's powers in this area have been indirectly reinforced, as its consent is required for the appointment of the HR as Vice-President of the Commission, and it continues to be able to pass a censure motion against the Commission, which would affect the HR in his capacity as a member of the latter.

The Parliament has gone from one annual debate to two debates on the CFSP, and the CSDP is expressly included in them. Finally, the EP can address questions not only to the Council but also to the HR/VP, who will be the person in charge, in lieu of the Presidency, of holding periodic consultations with it concerning the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP (including the CSDP), of informing it of the development of these policies and of ensuring that its views are duly taken into consideration.

The European Commission

The European Commission is fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field (article 27 TEU - Nice). It has right of initiative in CFSP matters (though not exclusively as in Community matters but shared with the Member States, in accordance with article 22 TEU – Nice) and furthermore shares with the Council the responsibility of ensuring the consistency of the Union's external activities as a whole (article 3 TEU - Nice). It also shares with the Presidency the responsibility of keeping the EP regularly

informed on the development of the foreign and security policy (article 21 TEU - Nice).

Under the Treaty of Lisbon the Commission no longer enjoys right of initiative in CFSP matters, as it is the HR in this capacity who may submit proposals to the Council in this field (article 18. 2 TEU - Lisbon). Nevertheless, pursuant to article 17.1 TEU - Lisbon, except in CFSP matters and in other cases provided for by the treaties, the Commission shall ensure the Union's external representation.

Other Institutions

The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of Auditors do not have jurisdiction in CFSP matters.

Article 24 of the TEU - Lisbon establishes that the Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions on CFSP, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with article 40 of the Treaty, concerning enhanced cooperation, and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in relation to the establishment of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons.

OTHER CFSP BODIES

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Common Security Policy

One of the chief novelties introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in the field of CFSP is the new figure of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission. As the HR is also one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, in which capacity he is in charge of the Union's external relations and action, his appointment as such is subject to the rules applied to the Commission and, therefore, to the approval of the EP.

The HR heads the CFSP, chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and ensures the consistency of the Union's external action (article 18 TEU - Lisbon). When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security.

Council agenda, the Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the HR be invited to present the Union's position (article 34 TEU - Lisbon).

The HR may submit proposals or initiatives on CFSP/CSDP matters (articles 30 and 42 TEU - Lisbon). In cases requiring a rapid decision the HR, of his own motion or at the request of a Member State, may convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period (article 30 TEU - Lisbon). Lastly, the HR shall represent the Union for matters relating to the CFSP, conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and express the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences (article 27 TEU - Lisbon).

The Treaty of Lisbon provides for the creation of a *European External Action Service (EEAS)*, which will assist the HR in fulfilling his mandate. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services.

Both the organisation and the functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the HR after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission (article 27 TEU - Lisbon). This decision is expected to be adopted during the Spanish Presidency of the EU, and will probably also be begun to be put into practice during this period.

Catherine Ashton has expressed her perceptions of the new dynamic generated by the Treaty of Lisbon and its potential for building a better Europe that lives up to its citizens' expectations and for helping Europe speak with a stronger and more unified voice on the world stage.

Ashton states that the EU has a good reputation all over the world based on strong values of freedom and democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The EU has also spoken with conviction and clarity on the major challenges that face us, be they climate change, poverty, conflict or terrorism. The EU is present on the ground in civilian and military missions in four continents. The EU is the biggest provider of humanitarian aid and a superpower economy with 500 million people. However, Ashton remarks that the EU continues to be accused of not punching its weight politically. Under these circumstances she reckons that her job is to make

the EU's voice stronger and more unified still, through quiet diplomacy and concerted action.

The High Representative holds that her main priority is to set up the new diplomatic service provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon, the *European External Action Service*, which will be based in Brussels with representations all over the world. Ashton defines this Service as «a network that is the pride of Europe and the envy of the rest of the world, with the most talented people from all the Member States of the EU working in our common interest. It should offer our citizens added value to what their countries already do, and give our partners around the world a trusted and reliable ally on European issues.»

As for the CSDP, Ashton states that the EU must pull its weight in areas of crisis and conflict. This is the responsibility of a global actor and also a sound policy for the security of Europe. The High Representative describes her objective as being «to enhance cooperation, to use the various crisis-management tools we already have and develop them and our civilian and military capabilities further in order to get the job done»(4).

The Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States (COREPER)

A Committee of permanent representatives of the Member States is responsible for preparing the work of the Council and performing the tasks assigned to it by the latter. COREPER is chaired by the permanent representative or deputy permanent representative of the state holding the Presidency of the Council.

With respect to the Treaty of Lisbon, the draft European Council Decision annexed to the Treaty concerning the exercise of the Presidency of the Council states that COREPER shall be chaired by a representative of the Member State chairing the General Affairs Council.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC)

Without prejudice to the role of the COREPER, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), convened at ambassador or political director level, shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the

(4) ASHTON, CATHERINE, «Quiet diplomacy will get our voice heard», *The Times*, 17 December 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6959513.ece.

CFSP and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. In this aspect the Treaty of Lisbon also adds the initiative of the HR.

The PSC shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the Presidency, the Commission and the HR. Under the responsibility of the Council—and also of the HR since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty—the PSC shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of crisis-management operations.

The Treaty of Lisbon envisages that the PSC shall be chaired by a representative of the High Representative.

The network of European correspondents

The network of European correspondents, which was set up at the time of European political cooperation, is composed of the heads of CFSP departments in the Member States. They assist the political directors and constitute points of contact between the capitals of the Member States, for which purpose they manage the COREU network. They also accompany the ministers of foreign affairs at informal meetings in Gymnich format (5).

The Treaty of Lisbon has discarded the CFSP classification that distinguished between common strategies, common positions and joints actions and refers more generally to «decisions», although in practice the difference is limited, as the new name does not substantially affect the decision-making process and because the new classification follows the previous model.

It thus refers to:

- Decisions of the European Council that define the Union’s strategic interests, establish its objectives and define the general guidelines of the CFSP, including for matters with defence implications (article 26 TEU – Lisbon). These decisions correspond to the common strategies of the TEU – Nice.
- Decisions that define the Union’s approach to a specific matter of a geographical or thematic nature (article 29 TEU – Lisbon). These decisions correspond to the common positions of the TEU – Nice.

(5) The «Gymnich», which is held once every six months, takes its name from the German castle which hosted the first meeting of this kind (1974) of foreign ministers of the European Union, then presided by Germany. This informal meeting—in that it allows a free, in-depth exchange of opinions between participants—does not give rise to conclusions strictly speaking, but allows European diplomacy to prepare its positions with a view to the following months.

- Decisions required for the implementation of operational actions of the Union (article 28 TEU – Lisbon). These decisions correspond to the joint actions of the TEU – Nice.

As for reciprocal reporting and consultations between Member States, the latter shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest, giving shape to the so-called common approaches (article 32 TEU - Lisbon).

PROGRESS OF THE ESDP FROM 1999 TO 2009

One of the CFSP instruments to have undergone the most development in recent years is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which sprang from frustration at Europe's inability to act on the ground during the crisis of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and, in particular, the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict.

With the precedent of the Anglo-French summit of Saint Malo in December 1998 at which the two countries decided to give impetus to the ESDP, targets were set for the development of crisis-management military capabilities at the Cologne European Council of December 1999, and for civilian capabilities at the Feira European Council of June 2000.

The Nice European Council of December 2000 incorporated the crisis-management functions of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU, created permanent structures specialising in ESDP matters in the General Secretariat of the Council and defined relations between the EU and third countries in defence matters.

At the Laeken European Council in December 2001 the ESDP was declared operational and at the Seville European Council in June 2002 the EU broadened the scope of the ESDP to include combating terrorism. At the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 it concluded an agreement with NATO, known as «Berlin Plus», allowing the EU to make use of NATO capabilities, planning bodies and command structures.

Javier Solana, the European Union's High Representative for CFSP during these ten years of ESDP, states that the Union was ahead of its time in 1999. Solana points out that the comprehensive and multifunctional nature of the EU's approach to security was novel. The EU thus continues to be the only organisation capable of drawing on a broad variety

of stabilisation instruments both to prevent crisis situations and to restore peace and rebuild institutions after a conflict. These capabilities of the EU, in addition to the traditional political tools of the Member States, are where the EU's added value lies, and enable it to combine humanitarian assistance, support for institutional rebuilding and good governance in developing countries with crisis-management and technical and financial assistance capabilities, as well as classic diplomatic tools such as political dialogue and mediation.

Solana states that the EU's purpose in ESDP matters is to promote peace and security worldwide; the *raison d'être* of its operations is crisis management; its hallmark is its holistic approach; and its key attribute is its flexibility. The Union seeks to offer solutions that are tailored to complex security needs—and with the awareness that the conflicts of toady evidence that a military solution is neither the sole nor the best option, particularly during the stabilisation of a crisis. Nevertheless, the EU offers a combination of civilian and military resources which can be used separately or jointly.

Solana furthermore points out that the EU acts autonomously or in cooperation with others, and although it is in the Union's own interests to promote stability in its neighbourhood, the Union's action is not limited to this scenario, as the EU is a global player with international responsibilities. The Union insofar as it is a political community wishes to continue to contribute to improving the common good, with democracy, freedom and the rule of law as the basis of its action(6).

Elaborating on the foregoing, General Bentégeat, President of the EU's Military Committee, reckons that a collective feeling of confidence in the effectiveness of the ESDP has taken shape, based on concrete results and fuelled by the steady and sustained development of the EU's collective military capabilities, its chain of command, operational concepts and procedures, and prompt reactions in intervention operations.

On the other hand, Bentégeat points out three challenges to continued progress. The first and most important is the need to speed up the integration of the EU's overall external action, which requires planning and crisis management to be fully integrated, both in Brussels and on

(6) SOLANA, JAVIER. «*Ten years of European Security and Defence Policy*». ESDP newsletter. European Security and Defence Policy 1999-2009. October 2009. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDP%20newsletter%20-%20Special%20issue%20ESDP@10.pdf>

the ground. The second is the economic crisis, which must not limit the Union's capacity for action or autonomy. Lastly, the EU must reinforce its cooperation mechanisms with other organisations such as the UN, NATO and the African Union (7).

It is a fact that the ESDP has progressed steadily and harmoniously. The launching of 22 civilian and military operations over the course of these ten years in complex scenarios gives an idea of the soundness of this initiative, which, following the Treaty of Lisbon, has now become the Common Security and Defence Policy. The experience gained should allow the Union to make a qualitative leap and address shortfalls such as the lack of a European Union military headquarters in Brussels from which to plan and direct these operations. The headquarters should incorporate civilian and military capabilities in accordance with the philosophy expressed by Javier Solana of offering tailored, comprehensive solutions to security challenges.

It seems appropriate to stress that the creation of the Military Staff of the European Union in Brussels already marked a substantial improvement in the EU's crisis response capabilities. Likewise, the setting up of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) has given impetus to the EU's ability to handle civilian aspects of crisis management.

Other analysts point to comprehensive solutions such as the establishment of a civilian and military strategic planning structure for CSDP operations and tasks, consisting of a political and security committee, a military committee, military personnel and a civil-military cell with a centre of operations (8).

It is also considered necessary to progress in the EU's relationship with NATO in the field of crisis management. The solutions provided by the ESDP in this field reflect an improvement on the mechanisms established in the «Berlin Plus» arrangements, which were based on a superseded conception of division of labour between NATO in the purely military sphere and the EU in the field of humanitarian crisis management(9).

(7) BENTÉGEAT, HENRI. «*Nous avons développé un sentiment de confiance dans l'efficacité de la PESD*». ESDP newsletter. European Security and Defence Policy 1999-2009. October 2009.

(8) PÉREZ DE LAS HERAS, BEATRIZ and CHURRUCA MUGURUZA, CRISTINA. «Las capacidades civiles y militares de la UE: estado de la cuestión y propuestas de cara a la Presidencia Española 2010». Fundación Alternativas. Working Paper 41/2009. <http://www.falternativas.org/opex/documentos-opex/documentos-de-trabajo/las-capacidades-civiles-y-militares-de-la-ue-estado-de-la-cuestion-y-propuestas-de-cara-a-la-presidencia-espanola-2010>

(9) ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION. «*The EU-NATO Berlin Plus agre-*

Up until now only two EU operations have used this mechanism: Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from March to December 2003 and Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 2004 and still under way. Some analysts question the value of assigning the direction of these operations to the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR), who runs the operation from Mons in Belgium on a part-time basis, far away from the theatre of operations and with an ad hoc Military Staff that belongs nominally to the EU and is embedded in the NATO Headquarters(10).

These circumstances and experiences point to the need for a European Union military headquarters in Brussels that is capable of interacting with other EU players and of effectively addressing the challenges posed by the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

The Treaty of Lisbon changes the name of the European Security and Defence Policy to Common Security and Defence Policy, bringing it into line with the other common policies. Following the experience of a decade of ESDP, the Lisbon Treaty reflects the experiences of the development the Union has undergone in security and defence, incorporating the lessons learned from 22 civilian and military operations

Generally speaking, in the field of security and defence the Treaty of Lisbon affects the harmonisation of the institutional structure, and this should facilitate relations between key institutions such as the Council and the Commission in respect of the Common Security and Defence Policy (11).

Permanent Structured Cooperation

A significant novel feature is that, pursuant to article 42.6 of the TEU – Lisbon, Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and

ements». Factsheet No. 14. November 2009. http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/Fact%20sheets/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus.pdf?PHPSESSID=ad7ba3060e75d20eca30f2c9c9daaedd

- (10) STEWART, EMMA J. «*The European Union and conflict prevention: policy evolution and outcome*». Pp. 220-225. Polity Press. United Kingdom. 2008.
- (11) MÖLLING, CHRISTIAN. «*ESDP After Lisbon: More Coherent and Capable?*» Center for Security Studies (CSS), Zurich, Switzerland. Vol. 3, No. 28, February 2008. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=46839>

which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) within the Union framework.

This formula is designed to bolster the European Union's defence capabilities in order to strengthen its crisis response skills (12).

Article 46 establishes that those Member States which wish to participate in the PSC, fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on PSC, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the HR. Within three months following the notification, the Council, after consulting the HR, shall adopt a decision by a qualified majority. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the PSC shall notify its intention to the Council and to the HR. The Council, acting by a qualified majority after consulting the HR, in a vote in which only members of the Council may take part, shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in the aforementioned the Protocol.

The Treaty also provides for the possibility of the voluntary withdrawal of a Member State or suspension of its participation if it no longer fulfils the criteria or is unable to meet the commitments.

Sven Biscop warns of the risks posed by an imbalance in the implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation. While an «avant-garde» of a few committed countries could probably achieve greater cohesion and improve expectations of short-term results, the consequences of leaving other nations out could obscure this initiative politically. Indeed, this could even lead to a divide between Member States in the implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy measures (13).

The conclusion is that PSC is a mechanism that allows participation in the development of the capabilities of a «Europe of defence» by giving impetus to processes for which it would otherwise be very difficult to achieve consensus. Nonetheless, PSC should be inclusive and facilitate as far as possible the progressive incorporation of Member States who wish to join.

(12) COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Ministerial Declaration: «*ESDP Ten Years – Challenges and Opportunities*». 2974th External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 17 November 2009. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111253.pdf

(13) BISCOP, SVEN. «*Permanent Structured Cooperation and the future of ESDP*». Egmont Paper 20. Royal Institute for International Relations. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep20.pdf>

Enhanced Cooperation

Article 20 of the TEU – Lisbon states that Member States wishing to establish Enhanced Cooperation between themselves within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences may make use of its institutions and exercise those competences by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties.

Enhanced Cooperation shall be permitted in any of the areas covered by the Treaty, among them the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The decision authorising enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by the Council as a last resort, when it has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole, and provided that at least nine Member States participate in it.

Furthermore, the Council and the Commission shall ensure the consistency of activities undertaken in the context of enhanced cooperation and the consistency of such activities with the policies of the Union, and shall cooperate to that end, as laid down in article 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.

These safeguards are consonant with the concern shown during the political process which has led to the Treaty of Lisbon. In this connection, initiatives such as Pierre Lellouche’s proposal that progress in common defence should be driven by an «enhanced cooperation» core group of six nations—France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland—sparked concern in various milieus owing to the risk of ignoring the potential of other Member States, although Lellouche himself pointed out that the other countries could join the «pioneer» group at any time (14).

An interesting aspect of the development of *Enhanced Cooperation* in the areas of security and defence is its relationship with *Permanent Structured Cooperation*, as this is the first time the latter mechanism is included in a Union text. Although concerns over its implementation, such as the worry that the Member States participating in Permanent Structured Cooperation might decide to establish a mission of their own mutual accord on behalf of the EU, have been incorporated into the EU decision-making process, there is nothing to prevent this group of countries from

(14) LELLOUCHE, PIERRE. «8 propositions pour donner à l’Union une défense commune». Le Figaro. 31 January 2008. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/2008/01/31/01005-20080131ARTFIG00515--propositions-pour-donner-a-l-union-une-defense-commune.php>

deciding, for example, to set up an ad hoc mission outside the scope of the EU, which could lead to a *de facto* institutional conflict (15).

Broadening the scope of ESDP tasks

In accordance with the development of the ESDP in recent years, the Lisbon Treaty completes the «Petersberg tasks» set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which were classified as humanitarian or rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.

Article 43 of the TEU – Lisbon specifies that the Union may use civilian and military assets in missions conducted outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. These missions encompass joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

The Council shall adopt decisions relating to these missions, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.

Implementation of tasks by a group of states

With regard to tasks of this type, article 44 of the TEU – Lisbon states that the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task.

Those Member States, in association with the HR, will agree among themselves on the management of the task. Member States participating

(15) QUILLE, GERRARD. «The Lisbon Treaty and its implications for CFSP/ESDP». Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, European Parliament, February 2008. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200805/20080513ATT28796/20080513ATT28796EN.pdf>

in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State and shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.

According to Sophie Dagand, this provision institutionalises EU initiatives such as the French-led Artemis mission conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in September 2004(16).

Rapid financing mechanisms for CDSP tasks

One of the aspects expected to boost the EU's ability to react in the sphere of CFSP/CSDP is the establishment of financial mechanisms which facilitate the rapid implementation of initiatives in this area.

This initiative is a response to the difficulty experienced during the past ten years of ESDP operations when it came to financing the preparatory activities for the deployment of a mission.

After consulting the European Parliament, the Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing prompt access to the Union budgetary appropriations earmarked to the urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of CFSP/CSDP.

The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the HR, decisions establishing the setting up, financing, and administration and financial control procedures for the start-up fund consisting of contributions from the Member States.

When the task planned cannot be charged to the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the High Representative to use the fund. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.

Incorporation of the European Defence Agency into the Treaty

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004, and the Treaty of Lisbon incorporates it into the Treaties (articles 42 and 45).

(16) DAGAND, SOPHIE. «*The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP*». European Security Review, No. 37, March 2008. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_150_esr37tol-mar08.pdf

The commitment made by the Member States to progressively improve their military capabilities states that the EDA shall identify operational requirements, promote measures to satisfy those requirements, contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and assist the Council in evaluating improvements in military capabilities.

The European Defence Agency is subject to the authority of the Council and has as its task to:

- a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;
- b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;
- c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;
- d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;
- e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.

The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.

Mutual Assistance Clause

According to article 42.7 of the TEU - Lisbon, if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

In this connection, in its report on the function of NATO in the EU security architecture, the European Parliament acknowledges the essential role that NATO has played and continues to play in the latter. It points out that for most of the Member States, which are also NATO members, the Alliance continues to be the cornerstone of their common defence and that European security as a whole continues to benefit from the maintenance of the transatlantic alliance. It thus considers that the future collective defence of the EU should be organised in cooperation with NATO as far as possible (17).

The special case of the Solidarity Clause

The Treaty of Lisbon states that the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

- a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; and assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;
- b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the HR. The Council shall act unanimously where this decision has defence implications.

In addition, the European Parliament shall be informed. The Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee with the support of the structures developed in the context of the CSDP and by a standing committee in charge of ensuring that operational cooperation on internal

(17) VATANEN, ARI (Rapporteur). «Report on the role of NATO in the security architecture of the EU», EP (2008/2197(INI)). Committee on Foreign Affairs. European Parliament, 28 January. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2009-0033+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>

security is promoted and strengthened within the Union. Furthermore, the European Council shall regularly assess the threats the Union faces.

It should be pointed out that although the Solidarity Clause provides for the use of military means and refers to the assistance of the PSC and the support of the structures created in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy, it is not part of the CSDP and is separate from the section of the Treaty dealing with it.

Nevertheless, the explicit use of military means and the mechanisms of the CSDP and the obligation of the European Council to assess terrorist-related threats link this Solidarity Clause to the areas of security and defence, which could lead to the establishment of coordination mechanisms or other types of political and technical routes yet to be explored.

THE SPANISH PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL

On 1 January 2010 Spain took over the six-month Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the fourth time. On this occasion the Spanish Presidency needs to give impetus to the EU's transition process designed by the Treaty of Lisbon. This requires the Spanish Presidency to be one of transition to the new model.

The Presidency trio. Spain, Belgium and Hungary

When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009, the first Presidency trio formed by Spain, Belgium and Hungary presented the common programme for the 18-month period in which the three nations are to hold this responsibility, lasting from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2011.

The Treaty of Lisbon requires that the three Presidencies coordinate between themselves and with the new President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, who will chair the Foreign Affairs Council. In addition, the directives of the new Commission should be taken into account, based on the political guidelines established by the President of the Commission in September 2009. All this will be in coordination with the European Parliament whose role has been reinforced.

The programme of the Presidency trio states that enhancing security levels in the European Union will continue to be a main priority. In this

connection, impetus will be given to bolstering civilian and military capabilities in order to enable the EU to contribute to crisis management and the stabilisation and resolution of conflicts in the framework of close collaboration with the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the African Union, among other global actors.

The programme recognises the need to continue with the work performed in the context of the European Security Strategy and points out the need to strengthen crisis-management, non-proliferation, disarmament and counterterrorism capabilities and to reinforce multilateral cooperation.

The Presidency trio will continue to reinforce CSDP in all its components in order to enhance the role of the Union as a global and autonomous actor in the field of conflict prevention, crisis response, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation with a special focus on civil-military synergy.

With a view to improving the effectiveness of crisis management, new ways of cooperation will be encouraged, including multinational solutions, such as pooling of resources, training and logistics, as well as new security and defence possibilities and mechanisms provided under the Lisbon Treaty.

Special attention will be paid to the capability development mechanism known as Headline Goal in the implementation of civilian and military objectives. Enhancing the EU's rapid response capabilities will be a priority. In this connection new possibilities for the development of civilian capabilities will be further explored and the activities of the European Defence Agency for developing capabilities will be further developed.

In relation to the international cooperation component in security matters, the Presidency trio expects the EU to strive to develop close cooperation with the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE, the African Union and other international and regional organisations. In particular special attention will be given to further improving relations with NATO at the political strategic level, including the development of capabilities.

The Presidency trio is determined to take stock of the decade's progress in crisis prevention and intends to propose new measures on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (Gothenburg Programme).

A particularly significant aspect of the Presidency trio's programme is the priority given to improving the planning and operational conduct of military and civilian operations.

To mark the tenth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, the Presidencies have undertaken to promote human rights and gender mainstreaming in the planning and conduct of ESDP missions.

The trio also intends to foster the promotion of the European security and defence culture, and will therefore continue to support the development of the European Security and Defence College.

As for non-proliferation and disarmament, the Presidencies intend to continue with the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. To this end, the potential of international meetings scheduled for the period of the three Presidencies will be further exploited, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. The EU will also participate actively in the implementation of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1887 of 2009, in cooperation with third countries.

Work on the EU's strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition will continue, as well as active engagement in the negotiations for an Arms Trade Treaty.

CSDP objectives of the Spanish Presidency of the EU

The Spanish defence minister appeared before the Senate on 26 November 2009 to report on the security and defence priorities for the Spanish Presidency of the EU (18). These objectives were prepared in coordination with the previous Swedish Presidency and also with the following two Presidencies, Belgium and Hungary, in the framework of the aforementioned Presidency trio. These priorities were also agreed with the rest of the EU Member States and institutions.

Spain is firmly committed to the construction of Europe project. National Defence Directive 1/2008 underlines that «national security is intrinsically and indissolubly tied to the security of Europe». This means that Spain is better placed to defend its interests in a Europe that plays a fundamental and supportive role on the international scene. This is the framework of Spain's commitment to the Europe of Security and Defence.

(18) Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales. Comisiones Mixtas. Año 2009 IX Legislatura No. 95 http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CORT/DS/CM/CM_095.PDF

Europe's political weight is now also reflected in its ability to assert its principles through multiple instruments. In addition to traditional diplomatic, trade and development assistance instruments, the Union now has more and better civilian and also military crisis-management capabilities.

Three criteria: consensus, pragmatism and flexibility. Two principles: innovation and equality

In the context of the security situation, the Spanish Presidency's objectives in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy will be underpinned by three criteria: consensus, pragmatism and flexibility.

In accordance with the guidelines for the Spanish Presidency of the Union in 2010, which were adopted by the Council of Ministers on 23 January 2009, these actions will be guided by two principles, also in the field of Security and Defence, innovation and equality.

First of all, *innovation* is essential to the effective development of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Improving the competitiveness of the European defence industry depends on ability to innovate. And in this connection it will also be a key to evolving towards dual-use technologies (civilian-military) that are also multidisciplinary, in the process of establishing a strong European defence industry.

Although substantial headway has been made in industrial military research, it is considered necessary to improve its connection with the civilian sector—in particular, in the development of new key capabilities through joint projects, in addition to promoting dynamic European projects centred on research and technology. Innovation should likewise be the key to achieving more efficient systems in logistics, procurement and design.

It is also considered necessary to keep up the pace of innovation in the field of operations, in doctrine, and in the manner of acting in increasingly complex scenarios.

As for the second priority, *equality*, Spain wishes for our current levels of security and defence to be extended to all Member States. The concept of security should embrace all the Union countries equally, in order that all European citizens feel they enjoy the same protection.

In order to meet the expectations of our citizens and guarantee security, Europe must continue to equip itself with the necessary security and defence capabilities and assets. Only in this way will it have leadership and decision-making capabilities, exporting security to other scenarios.

Three core target areas: institutional, capabilities and a comprehensive approach to security

The objectives Spain has designed in security and defence matters may be grouped into three core target areas of action: the institutional sphere; the development of capabilities; and the shaping of a comprehensive approach to security in crisis response.

With respect to the *institutional sphere*, Spain will strive to strengthen the meetings of the Member States' heads of defence. Throughout the ten years of ESDP the defence ministers have met only informally in a period in which military affairs have taken on great importance.

Furthermore, the Mutual Assistance Clause established in the Treaty of Lisbon and the other mechanisms incorporated into the security and defence fields make it reasonable to think that defence ministers can structure their meetings in another format in pursuit of greater consistency and harmonisation of decisions on issues such as the development of capabilities and the monitoring of operations.

Giving impetus to these events will enable the joint meetings of foreign and defence ministers, which are the only formal meetings that exist as yet, to focus on launching new operations as in other important aspects of foreign policy, such as the deepening of the partnerships.

As for the second core area, that of the *capabilities* which the European Union has at its disposal, Spain believes that the existing capabilities should be reinforced, such as the Tactical Groups or Battlegroups. These groups are a key element of the European Union's rapid response. The Swedish presidency's efforts to reinforce these Battlegroups will therefore be continued by facilitating mechanisms that enable them to be used flexibly and effectively.

One of the initiatives Spain will propose with a view to facilitating the use of the Battlegroups is the employment of the EU Operations Centre as a preferred headquarters in the event that these groups are activated. This would enable the Centre to reinforce its operational planning and conduct capability in preparation for when the European Union has a military headquarters of its own integrating the civilian and military capabilities required to direct its operations.

The aim of Permanent Structured Cooperation is to enable countries that are willing and meet a series of requirements as to military capabilities to pool them and boost efficiency in crisis management. Spain will

address the initial debate on the question in a prudent manner, enabling the Member States to express their political vision of this new instrument with a view to the future development of this cooperation.

Similarly, the capabilities development mechanism known as the Headline Goal 2010 will expire in the second half of next year, making it necessary to analyse its accomplishments and reflect on its future.

Finally, development of the capabilities required to support the Common Security and Defence Policy requires the agreement of two essential actors: on the one hand the European Defence Agency (EDA), together with the other European armaments organisations; and, on the other, the European defence industry.

Spain considers that the Agency should advance in all its areas of activity, such as capabilities planning, cooperation in technology and research, and the shaping and launch of programmes in collaboration. Therefore, once the Headline Goal 2010 expires, it will strive to make the European Defence Agency responsible for developing these capabilities.

Impetus will also be given to the debate on the European defence industry. In this field it is considered necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis on its current situation with a view to improving competitiveness through innovation, in addition to fostering the reassessment of its relations with the EDA.

The third core target area is centred on fostering a *comprehensive approach to security*, which needs to be incorporated both into the Union's policies and into the theatres of operations in which other actors are involved.

Crisis response and crisis management require a combination of civilian and military assets. The Swedish Presidency has focused on achieving synergies in the development of these capabilities. During the first half of 2010 Spain will strive to further this process. For example, progress is intended to be made in the training of helicopter crews, for which Spain will organise the AZOR training exercise in hot, desert and mountain environments. To cite another example, in the field of improvised explosive devices, capacity building in deactivation techniques will be furthered, proposing the dual use by the European Union and NATO of the C-IED Hoyo de Manzanares Centre of Excellence.

In addition, it is aimed to progress in the initiatives set forth in the declaration on the strengthening of the European Security and Defence Policy adopted by the European Council of December 2008. Spain will strive:

- To improve force projection in operations.
- To reinforce the gathering of space-based information and intelligence.
- To increase the protection of the forces and their efficiency in operations.
- To improve interoperability and ability to work together.

Spain is furthermore convinced that cooperation between the different policies and institutions of the European Union will be beneficial to citizens as a whole and will provide a better all-round guarantee of security. The maritime sphere is a clear example of the foregoing. Greater attention will therefore be focused on studying the synergies and opportunities arising from cooperation between two of the main European policies in the field of maritime security: the Common Security and Defence Policy and the Commission's Integrated Maritime Policy.

Lastly, related to the comprehensive approach, during the Spanish Presidency attention will be given to relations with other international organisations and with third states in theatres of operations.

The European Union and the Atlantic Alliance are engaged concurrently in major efforts. Both organisations have 21 Member States in common, and it is therefore essential for them to act as strategic partners and for progress to continue to be made in furthering collaboration mechanisms. In this connection Spain intends to improve the framework for technical cooperation between the two organisations when both are involved in the same theatre.

Attention will also be given to encouraging the participation of third countries in the Common Security and Defence Policy, especially in the Maghreb countries. This is the context of the meeting with the countries involved in the 5+5 initiative (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya), in the margins of the informal meeting of defence ministers to be held in Palma de Mallorca in February 2010.

As to the operations conducted by the European Union, the Spanish Presidency will address the monitoring the missions currently under way and, as the case may be, the launch of new missions, both civilian and military.

CONCLUSIONS

In the sphere of the Common Foreign and Security Policy the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has marked the beginning of a process aimed

at providing the European Union with a more harmonious structure and enabling it to address challenges more effectively in its external action.

The appointment of the President of the European Council for a two and a half year term, which is renewable once, is expected to afford stability to a post that represents the Union externally in CFSP matters. The choice for this post of the former Belgian prime minister Herman Van Rompuy, who has proven experience in solving complex political crises, met with the approval of all the heads of state or government of the Member States.

The same backing was given to the choice of Catherine Ashton as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The fact that Ms Ashton was previously EU Trade Commissioner is expected to benefit her work as one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, a status associated with the appointment as HR.

The fact that the newly appointed High Representative will chair the Foreign Affairs Council is expected to give impetus to the EU's external and security action. In this connection it is also envisaged that the Political and Security Committee will be chaired by a representative of the High Representative.

The creation of the European External Action Service, whose support will be enlisted by the HR in exercising her mandate, is a challenge of outstanding political significance. Given that both the organisation and the functioning of the EEAS will be established by a Council decision, which will be issued unanimously at the proposal of the HR after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the consent of the Commission, the EEAS is expected to provide a balance allowing harmonious development.

The shaping of the legal personality of the European Union constitutes an aspect of far-reaching importance which will enable the Union to conclude agreements with states or international organisations in the areas of the CFSP. The Union's single legal personality will strengthen its ability to act as an interlocutor, making it a more effective actor on the international stage and a more visible partner for third countries and international organisations.

Following ten years of European Security and Defence Policy, the Treaty of Lisbon has made it possible to transform this policy into a Common Policy, in consonance with the rest of the Union's Common Policies. The success of the ESDP, with 22 civilian and military missions deployed on the ground, has led to the definition of this Common Security and Defence Policy, which will continue to generate and export security.

The preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon is highly significant as it enshrines the determination of the European Union Member States to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to foster peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.

The Presidency trio from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2011, comprised of Spain, Belgium and Hungary, is expected to provide an added value by ensuring the continuity of the different policies in a broader timeframe, enabling the Union to consolidate its goals.

It has fallen to Spain, as holder of the rotating Presidency of the Council in the first half of 2010, to foster the transition to the design envisaged by the Treaty of Lisbon for the CFSP and the CSDP. In this respect the goals have been coordinated with the aforementioned actors with competences in these fields, in accordance with the two principles that will guide the Spanish Presidency of the Council, innovation and equality, which also apply to Security and Defence.

The foregoing will be carried out in accordance with the criteria of consensus, pragmatism and flexibility, in order to apply the principles enshrined in article 21 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which states that «the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law».

The challenges faced by the European Union following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon continue to be substantial. Nevertheless, the new design of the structures, capabilities and mechanisms with which the EU has provided itself will enable it to address these challenges with a new vigour, adapted to future needs.

A whole new range of possibilities have been opened up in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy which may enable the EU to continue with the work carried out so effectively through the European Security and Defence Policy. The appropriate organisation of the capabilities for addressing future challenges will require the EU to act in a responsible and balanced way so as to rise effectively to the challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

CHAPTER SIX

THE FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR NON- PROLIFERATION REGIME: THE 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

THE FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: THE 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

VICENTE GARRIDO REBOLLEDO

INTRODUCTION: THE NPT AT A CROSSROADS

The eighth Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is due to take place at the United Nations headquarters in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010. In addition to examining the functioning and effectiveness of the Treaty, the 189 States Parties are to reflect for slightly more than three weeks on the future of disarmament and non-proliferation, two concepts, which, as we shall see, are closely linked.

This is a decisive conference and will take place at a critical moment. The so-called nuclear non-proliferation regime needs to be reinforced in order to ensure that all the States Parties, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, comply with the obligations contained in the Treaty. But, above all, what is at stake is the credibility of the very NPT as the «cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament», as it has often been defined (1). There are proposals of all kinds for the future of the Treaty, each stemming from specific interests (nuclear countries that are signatories to the Treaty or P5s, which uphold divergent national stances on some aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation; States Parties which are non-nuclear but technologically and industrially advanced; countries at the nuclear threshold which are Parties to the NPT; nuclear countries which have not signed up to the Treaty; coalitions of states sharing common positions such as the New Agenda Coalition and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries; and the European Union,

(1) See, among others, the *Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State*, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 2009, p. 8., <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/ClintonTestimony090113a.pdf>.

the League of Arab States, the African Union, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and partner states, to cite a few examples, in addition to the particular national stances of many states).

In October 2009 Pierre Goldschmidt, an analyst at the prestigious Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, delivered a paper thought-provokingly entitled «The future of the NPT: should it be enhanced, changed or replaced?» at an international seminar on the NPT in Rio de Janeiro. The conclusion he reached was that the Treaty should be fully implemented and furthermore enforced, as it will only be effective if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is able to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities (2). Goldschmidt thus placed emphasis on another of the key aspects which will be very much present at the 2010 NPT Review Conference: the legal authority of the IAEA to conduct special inspections with a view to detecting the possible existence of undeclared unlawful activities in States Parties to the Treaty(3).

Attention at the conference will be centred, on the one hand, on the commitments achieved at the last two successful Treaty review conferences (not including that of 2005, which was a total flop) (4): that of 1995 (review and indefinite extension of NPT) and that of 2000, where an action plan was adopted towards nuclear disarmament, set out in a list of «13 practical steps». But on the other, some *de iure* (5) nuclear powers (headed by the United Kingdom, France and, until very recently, the US, which has yet to specify the contents of its proposal for bilateral nuclear disarmament with Russia and which in turn depends on its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)) have a vested interest in having the 2010 conference focus on the aspects related to the strict compliance by all states (clearly in allusion to the cases of North Korea and, in particular

(2) The full text of the paper may be consulted at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/goldschmidt_riopaper.pdf.

(3) For an analysis of this issue see the report by the IAEA, *Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity. The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond*. Report prepared by an independent Commission at the request of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, May 2008.

(4) On the results of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., *Cuatro semanas de mayo, cinco años por delante: el fracaso de la VII Conferencia de Revisión del TNP*, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI), N° 72/2005, 7 June 2005. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/756.asp>.

(5) The NPT considers a nuclear weapon state to be «one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967» (art. IX.3). Hence the difference between *de iure* nuclear-weapon state, Party to the Treaty, and *de facto* nuclear-weapon state but nuclear power (India, Pakistan and Israel, although the latter has never conducted a nuclear test).

Iran) (6) with the non-proliferation commitments, minimizing the disarmament clauses and obligations assumed by the *de iure* nuclear countries in the context of the NPT, especially at the 1995 and 2000 review conferences.

However, throughout 2009 we have witnessed a highly favourable change in governments' and civil society's perception (especially that of the study and research centres, experts and specialist NGOs) of the future of the NPT, largely as a result of the expectations of the so-called «Obama effect» on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As various government representatives pointed out during the third session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the NPT Review Conference (New York, 4-15 May 2009) «atmospherics are very important in discussions» on the NTP (Ireland). In addition, «the speeches made by leaders of nuclear-weapon states on disarmament are an important element because they create a positive psychological signal» (Brazil), although, as a representative of the League of Arab States recognised, «the «good intentions of the new Government of the United States» are welcome, but «have yet to result in any tangible measures and do not diminish the need to address the obstacles and challenges that threaten the future of the Treaty» (7).

Indeed, as the Ambassador on a Special Mission for Disarmament Affairs, Miguel Aguirre de Cárcer, pointed out at the beginning of 2009, the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament agenda had stalled and the mood was predominantly pessimistic. No substantial progress had been made in the strategic nuclear disarmament process since Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Treaty of Moscow in 2002. The 2005 NPT Review Conference had ended in a resounding failure. Cooperation between the five nuclear powers recognised by the NPT and permanent Security Council members was at its lowest. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) had been at a standstill for over 10 years. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 had not yet entered into force as it still had to be ratified by nine states, including the US. The lack of progress in the nuclear issues of North Korea and Iran aroused expectations of an

(6) As pointed out, for example, by Eliot Kang and Judith Gough in their papers delivered at the international conference entitled «The future of the non-proliferation regime: prospects for the 2010 NPT Conference» organised by the INCIPE in Madrid on 19 November 2009. See a summary of the conference in <http://www.incipec.org/19nov2009.html>.

(7) The statements are published in CHOUBEY, Deepti, *Restoring the NPT. Essential Steps for 2010*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, November 2009, pp. 5-7, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/restoring_the_npt.pdf.

irreversible breakdown of the international non-proliferation regime embodied by the NPT (8).

At the end of 2009 neither have all issues been settled nor do there cease to be serious threats looming on the horizon. However, owing largely to the new proposals put forward by the Obama Administration, several problems are being steered along a new path and an opportunity is arising to resume and strengthen multilateral cooperation in this field. The outlook for the 2010 NPT Conference is much more encouraging, as transpired from the 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee (and from many of the statements issued at the meeting of the First Disarmament and International Security Council at the 64th session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 2009). On the last day of the PrepCom the five nuclear powers issued a joint statement reaffirming their collective support for the NPT and undertaking to seize the opportunity provided by the 2010 Review Conference to preserve and reinforce international confidence in the Treaty and ensure a satisfactory and balanced review. In her testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Ambassador Susan F. Burk, Special Representative of President Obama for the NPT, referred to the May 2010 conference as a «critical milestone in the [non-proliferation] regime» and explained in detail the Obama Administration's aims for ensuring a balanced review process that shores up the NPT (9).

The Statement on Non-proliferation adopted by the G8 on 8 July 2009 at the L'Aquila (Italy) summit also recognised that the NPT continues to be the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The signatories reiterated their «full commitment to the objectives and obligations of its three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament» and undertook to «work together so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty's regime and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty's three pillars». They likewise «call upon all States Parties to the NPT to contribute to the review process with a constructive and balanced approach» (10).

(8) AGUIRRE DE CÁRCER, Miguel, *Las propuestas de la administración Obama frente a los restos del desarme nuclear y la no proliferación*, Working Paper 46/2009 (21 September 2009), Real Instituto Elcano, pp. 3-4, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/7c8b2b804fa877f5a072ff8bf7fc5c91/DT46-2009_Aguirre_de_Carcer_Obama_desarme_nuclear_no_proliferacion.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=7c8b2b804fa877f5a072ff8bf7fc5c91.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 20.

(10) http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/2_LAquila_Statement_on_Non_proliferation.pdf, para. 2.

Nevertheless, the starting point of the 2010 Conference is that any progress in non-proliferation must go hand in hand with significant progress in the field of disarmament in order for the NPT to retain its credibility in the future. In this connection Barack Obama's advent to the White House has marked an important turning point with respect to George W. Bush, especially if we consider that the new Administration has launched numerous nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation proposals which have led to the unblocking of some international initiatives and agreements. Some examples of the foregoing are the signing of a new START Treaty with the Russian Federation (scheduled for the end of 2009) on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals, the negotiation of which has in turn been made possible by a substantial change in the architecture of the US missile shield (which initially involved stationing a ground radar on Czech territory and ten laser missile interceptors in Poland); the ratification of the CTBT; and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT or Fissban).

THE WHY AND WHEREFORE OF A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Although the idea of nuclear non-proliferation began to be considered in 1961, the term itself was not coined until four years later following the start of negotiations on the NPT. It was initially based on the statistical danger nuclear proliferation posed: on the one hand, the possibility that a nuclear war could also increase the number of states in possession of nuclear weapons; and on the other, concern about the devastating effects of an accidental launch of these weapons by the US or USSR (11).

Following the explosion of China's first uranium 235-based nuclear bomb on 16 October 1964 (contrary to all calculations) (12), the other four nuclear states (the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France, in order of access to nuclear weapons) began to be aware of the problem posed by an increasing number of countries possessing nuclear weapons and of the need to set a limit, by means of political and diplo-

(11) For a detailed analysis of the negotiations and contents of the NPT see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, Vicente, *El régimen de no proliferación nuclear: participación e implicaciones para España*, doctoral thesis, Servicio de publicaciones de la UCM, Madrid, 1995 (1032 pp.).

(12) One of the most complete studies on the history of nuclear energy and the political motivations of states in relation to their access to nuclear weapons is GOLDSCHMIDT, Bertrand, *The Atomic Complex. A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy*, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1982.

matic measures, to this situation, which was starting to get out of hand. And so 1965 saw the beginning of negotiations for what became known a few years later (in 1968) as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The negotiations were preceded by a vote taken by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in June that year (Omnibus Resolution DC/225) calling for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) to urgently examine the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with a view to adopting a related international treaty. Months later United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) was adopted, formally establishing the principles of the treaty, which is based on five elements (13):

1. it should be void of any loopholes which might permit Powers (nuclear or non-nuclear) to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;
2. it should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;
3. it should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, in particular, nuclear disarmament;
4. there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treat; and
5. nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

The novelty of this resolution lay in its broadening of the concept of non-proliferation to embrace simultaneously an increase in the number of atomic weapons in the hands of established nuclear states, their geographical distribution by these states and also the manufacture or procurement of such weapons by non-nuclear countries(14). Until then the definition of the concept had never taken into account an increase in the nuclear weapons in the hands of the nuclear-weapon powers—only an increase in the number of states possessing weapons of this kind. The Indian physicist Homi Jehangir Bhabha, who later played a decisive role

(13) General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) on *The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons*, 19 November 1965.

(14) For further information on the NPT *vid.*, GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «El futuro del Tratado de No proliferación Nuclear (TNP): apuntes para el debate» in *Anuario del CIP 1994 - 1995*, Edit. Icaria, Barcelona, 1995, pp. 289-299; «La Conferencia de Revisión del TNP: entre el desarme y la no proliferación», *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI)*, No. 63/2005, 17 May 2005; «Tratado de No proliferación de Armas de Destrucción Masiva (TNP)» in REYES, R. (dir.), *Diccionario Crítico de las Ciencias Sociales*, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, <<http://www.ucm.es/info/eurotheo/d-vgarrido2.htm>>.

in the development of his country's nuclear programme, proposed that a distinction be drawn between *vertical nuclear proliferation* for the first case and *horizontal nuclear proliferation* for the second.

India referred constantly to the acquisition of atomic weapons by established nuclear states as «vertical», «*de facto*», «existing», «actual», «continued» or «real» proliferation, and to non-nuclear states' option of going nuclear as «horizontal», «additional», «future», «possible» or «likely» proliferation. In India's view, vertical nuclear proliferation was the direct cause of horizontal nuclear proliferation: the growing acquisition of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers had a direct impact on states that did not possess them as it threatened their security. Therefore, India (as one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement) stated that the NPT should crack down on the proliferation of all forms of acquisition of nuclear weapons, including vertical proliferation (that is, an increase in the number of nuclear warheads of states already possessing nuclear weapons or even the technical enhancement of these arsenals) instead of focusing solely on horizontal proliferation (15), as advocated by the United States and the Soviet Union in their respective treaty drafts (16).

Indeed, the USSR had its own draft treaty, submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at the end of 1965, establishing a total ban on the manufacture, possession, control or use of nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear state. Moscow made it clear during the debates held at the UN that the real aim of the project for an Atlantic nuclear force proposed by Washington was to supply nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany. During the secret talks held at the end of 1966 between US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Washington relinquished the idea of setting up a multilateral nuclear force but, in exchange, Moscow agreed to the presence of US nuclear weapons on the territory of US allies and did not object to consultations between the latter on the possible use of weapons of this kind—that is, to the establishment of a Nuclear Planning Committee within NATO (17).

(15) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Guía para entender la política nuclear de India» *Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales*, No. 59-60, CIP, Madrid, December 1996, pp. 37-42.

(16) Document of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament ENDC/PV. 223. On the positions of other states see SCHÖTTLE, Enid, *Postures for Non-Proliferation. Arms Limitation and Security Policies to Minimize Nuclear Proliferation*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Taylor & Francis Ltd., London, 1979.

(17) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «El futuro del desarme y la no proliferación», *Política Exterior*, No. 105, May-June 2005, pp. 93-101.

The effect of the foregoing on the NPT was the creation of two regimes with different obligations in the Treaty depending on whether states were nuclear or non-nuclear states. For non-nuclear-weapon countries a total ban was established on the manufacture (even on technical assistance), acquisition, reception (direct or indirect) and/or storage of nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices (article II). A system was also established whereby the IAEA could verify their civilian nuclear activities in order to prevent the diversion of fissionable material employed for peaceful ends to a banned military purpose (article III).

For their part, the nuclear-weapon states undertook not to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient either directly or indirectly and «not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons» (article I). With respect to disarmament, the Treaty featured a general—and operationally highly controversial—clause which established the commitment of each Party to the Treaty «to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control» (article VI).

For the non-nuclear-weapon states, this provision signified that nuclear disarmament was an integral part of the obligations of the nuclear states under the NPT. On the contrary, the US and the USSR (it should be remembered that France and China did not sign the NPT until 1992) gave an a posteriori interpretation of the commitments relating to the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, pointing out that the article in question neither referred exclusively to the nuclear countries nor required the conclusion of agreements on disarmament and that it failed to establish the manner of conducting such agreements («in good faith») or a specific date for this («early» but not even «as soon as possible») (18).

In the paragraph on the application of the nuclear safeguards, the resulting commitment was also uneven, as these safeguards would not be applied to the military activities of the nuclear-weapon states. America's President Johnson made a unilateral statement on 2 December 1967 pointing out that the IAEA safeguard system would be applied to «all nuclear activities in the United States excluding only those with direct national

(18) On the United States' defence of these arguments see the statement by Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, *US compliance with article VI of the NPT*, 3 February 2005. <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0502/doc13.htm>

security significance». This statement was followed by similar ones from the United Kingdom and the USSR basically establishing an additional dividing line between the two categories of states envisaged in the NPT by distinguishing between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy. However, as a concession to the non-nuclear-weapon states (especially the Federal Republic of Germany), it was necessary to agree to the introduction of an article in the NPT establishing that «nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty» (article IV). This provision, which was criticised by many states at the time on the understanding that it was very difficult to establish a priori when nuclear material or even technical assistance could be used for a civilian or military purpose, has been used for the nearly four decades of the Treaty's existence to justify many states' dubious civilian nuclear programmes.

India was also one of the states to level particularly fierce criticism in 1967 at the NPT drafts submitted by Soviets and Americans. It argued that they purposely omitted specific non-proliferation measures—such as the limitation of weapons and nuclear disarmament—which it considered necessary not only because they guaranteed the security of the non-nuclear-weapon states thereby lessening the risk of horizontal nuclear proliferation, but also because their omission from the new Treaty amounted to discrimination against non-nuclear-weapon states (19). Basically India, like many states, held that the concept of nuclear non-proliferation, as defined in the NPT, was incomplete, as it made no reference to the nuclear weapons possessed by states that were already nuclear powers and failed to comply with the most important point of UN General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) which stated, among other things, that «the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers».

Many states felt that the general disarmament measure contained in article VI of the Treaty was ambiguous and insufficient compared to the obligations demanded of the non-nuclear-weapon states. In the view of the latter, the ultimate aim was to consolidate the nuclear status of the then five nuclear-weapon powers, the only ones which, retaining the right

(19) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «India: ¿potencia militar hegemónica?», *Cuadernos de la Escuela Diplomática*, No. 25, Madrid, 2004, pp. 259–287.

to keep and even modernise their nuclear arsenals, would not be considered proliferating countries (20).

After more than three years of negotiations, the NPT was adopted on 1 July 1968 with 95 votes in favour, 4 against and 21 abstentions (among them Spain). The main objections put forward by countries like India and Brazil were that the final text of the Treaty did not embody the spirit of Resolution 2028 (XX), especially with respect to the «acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers». They accused Soviets and Americans of intentionally omitting certain specific non-proliferation measures such as a limitation on weapons and nuclear disarmament, both of which were considered necessary in order to guarantee the security of the non-nuclear states, thereby lessening the risk of horizontal nuclear proliferation.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE NPT TO NON-PROLIFERATION

The NPT entered into force on 5 March 1970 after being ratified by 40 states (as well as by the three depositories) and was joined by a growing number of States Parties until 2003(21). With 189-190 States Parties (depending on the inclusion in the list of North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT on 10 January 2003(22)) it is furthermore one of the most successful international treaties. Rarely in history have such a substantial number of states been willing to refrain voluntarily from the military application of nuclear energy through the signing of a multilateral treaty which is also the basis of what many consider to be a markedly discriminatory

(20) With respect to this clause, special attention should be given to the statements made by the Canadian ambassador Burns during the negotiation of the treaty in: Document of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, *ENDC/PV.228*.

(21) The last two countries to ratify it were Cuba (2002) and East Timor (2003).

(22) *Letter, dated January 10, 2003 by the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the French Presidency of the United Nations Security Council and the States Parties of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*. The withdrawal would be effective three months following the notification, that is, from 10 April 2003, provided that it included a statement of «extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, [which] have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country» (article X.1), which North Korea did not provide. In addition, according to international doctrine based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of an obligation under the treaty (article 61.2 of the Vienna Convention). Therefore, North Korea would have continued to be a Party to the Treaty in respect of those actions related to its non-compliance with the NPT before 10 January 2003.

regime for the aforementioned reasons. This makes the NPT the most universal international legal instrument (after the Charter of the United Nations), but also a rare example of the establishment of institutionalised discrimination in international law.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime, of which the NPT is the maximum expression, is based on an essential premise and a balance of commitments in three different areas of nuclear activity. The premise is not to recognise any new nuclear states, only those which have conducted a nuclear test before 1 January 1967 (article IX.3). The commitments consist of: 1) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons for states not in possession of them prior to that date (article II); 2) nuclear disarmament for states possessing them (article VI); and 3) the guarantee that nuclear energy be used for peaceful purposes for all states (a particularly controversial aspect which is addressed in article IV of the Treaty).

Unlike other treaties, such as the Convention on Chemical Weapons and that on Biological Weapons, the NPT establishes two «categories» of states with different binding regimes depending on whether they are nuclear or non-nuclear states. It entrusts an existing organisation, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), set up in 1957 to provide technical assistance and encourage peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with responsibility for verifying the nuclear activities of the States Parties to the Treaty, through nuclear safeguards. However, the implementation of the safeguard system is uneven, as the military activities of the nuclear states are expressly excluded.

The NPT legitimates possession of nuclear weapons by a few states and bars the vast majority from manufacturing (including technical assistance for this purpose), acquiring, receiving (directly or indirectly) and storing nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices (article II). In practice, only the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China are considered *de iure* nuclear states. The rest of the states are given the consideration of non-nuclear-weapon countries and accordingly must accede to the Treaty with a non-nuclear status. This is the case of the nuclear former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which undertook through the Lisbon Protocol to START I, signed on 23 May 1992, to sign the NPT as non-nuclear states (23).

(23) On the debate on the ratification of the Lisbon Protocol see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «El futuro del arsenal nuclear soviético», *Anuario del CIP 1991 - 1992*, Edit. Icaria, Barcelona, 1992, pp. 125-138; «Problemas Nucleares en la CEI: ¿un futuro incierto?» in *Cuadernos del Este*, No. 8, editorial Complutense, Madrid, 1993, pp. 79-86.

Conversely, countries like India (which conducted its first nuclear test in 1974), Pakistan (which retaliated to the nuclear tests carried out by its neighbour India in May 1998 with a series of six explosions) (24) and Israel (which, despite its nuclear capability, has never conducted a nuclear test) are considered de facto but not de iure nuclear powers, and for this reason refuse to sign the NPT, being the only three states not to have done so. India accuses the «deficiencies» of the NPT of making the world «a more dangerous place and called for the replacement of the NPT with a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would agree steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons» (25).

In March 2006 the US and India signed a controversial agreement on nuclear cooperation in civilian matters which includes, among other things, the supply of nuclear fuel and technology. Negotiation of the civilian nuclear cooperation deal was conducted through two legislative instruments. The first of these instruments, the Henry J. Hyde United States and India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (the «Hyde Act»), marks a substantial change in US non-proliferation policy of the past three decades (amendment to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978). It furthermore allows cooperation with a nuclear country that does not accept the total IAEA safeguards and to which highly sensitive nuclear technology so far subject to strict international checks will be exported, such as those established by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which was precisely set up after India's nuclear explosion of 1974. The second of the legislative instruments is a bilateral cooperation agreement concluded pursuant to Section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act («the 123 Agreement»). It took 4 rounds of negotiations to reach a final agreement on 27 July 2007, which was viewed as a major triumph by the New Delhi authorities. India accepts nuclear safeguards only for civilian installations and activities, not for military activities, but the US considers it «a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology», amending the guidelines of the US Non-Proliferation Act. The signing of the agreement on 8 October 2008 involved amending certain

(24) On the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «India, Pakistán y el Régimen de No proliferación Nuclear», *Política Exterior*, No. 64, July-August 1998, pp. 99-107; «India y Pakistán: ¿dos nuevas potencias nucleares?», *Revista Española de Defensa*, July-August 1998, pp. 72-77; «¿Locura nuclear asiática?», *Tiempo de Paz*, No. 49, MPDL, Autumn 1998, pp. 53-63; «India y Pakistán: El nacimiento de dos Estados nucleares» in *Anuario del CIP*, 1999, Icaria, Barcelona, 1999, pp. 107-114.

(25) «Indian Prime Minister attacks nuclear treaty», *Financial Times*, 29 September 2009, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb5b3a26-acf5-11de-91dc-00144feabdc0.html>.

international agreements at the IAEA and NSG, apart from requiring ratification by the US Senate (26).

As for Pakistan, construction of the atomic bomb has always been psychologically important to its rulers, as it makes it the only nuclear state in the Islamic world and grants it a special status in the Islamic Community of nations (the dream of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who referred to the Islamic bomb in terms of civilisation). This obsession with succeeding in equalling India in the arms race led Ali Bhutto to state that his people would «eat grass if necessary but build the atomic bomb», underlining the huge economic effort this would entail for the country. Like most of the states which have developed nuclear weapons, Pakistan has not settled for producing first-generation weapons based on uranium enrichment. Since the past decade (coinciding with the conducting of its nuclear tests, which used a solid core of highly enriched uranium), it has been developing plutonium production capabilities. This suggests that Islamabad is preparing to increase and redesign its nuclear forces in response to India's plans to deploy a «nuclear triad» based on nuclear missiles launched from air, surface and underwater platforms. Nevertheless, it is difficult to calculate the type and number of nuclear weapons that make up Pakistan's current nuclear arsenal, as they are highly variable. Estimations range from 40 to 70 already manufactured nuclear weapons and a capability, based on its reserves of fissionable material, to build between 30 and 52 additional nuclear warheads. Pakistan furthermore stores its delivery vehicles and warheads separately, except in Kahuta and Multan. In 2000 President Musharraf established a new C2 system by creating a Nuclear Command Authority (27). Pakistan, which like India has not signed the CTBT, has on occasions requested the US to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement similar to that concluded with India, but this is highly unlikely to occur.

In February 2004 the architect of the Pakistani nuclear programme, Abdul Qadeer Khan, publicly admitted to having been involved in transferring nuclear material and technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya between 1986 and 1993 (28). The Khan affair again came to light early in 2008

(26) On the contents of the agreement see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «La cooperación nuclear Estados Unidos -India», *Política Exterior*, No. 108, November-December 2005, pp. 28-34; «India, potencia nuclear. Implicaciones regionales» in YSART, Federico (ed.), *India. La democracia de la diversidad*, Cuadernos de la Fundación Marcelino Botín, No. 11, Observatorio de Análisis y Tendencias, 2008, pp. 223-255.

(27) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Pakistán, armas nucleares y seguridad», *Política Exterior*, No. 122, March-April 2008, pp. 111-122.

(28) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Pakistán y el doctor Khan: del orgullo a la clemencia», *Política Exterior*, No. 98, March-April 2004, pp. 7-13.

during the denuclearisation negotiations with North Korea which forced Pyongyang to make a full declaration on its military nuclear programme. In his biography, entitled «In the line of fire», Pervez Musharraf disclosed that Dr Khan sold nearly «two dozen» P-1 and P-11 prototype centrifuges for uranium enrichment to North Korea, and that «to the Iranians and Libyans, through Dubai, he provided nearly eighteen tons of materials, including centrifuges, components and drawings».

Finally, Israel is the only non-declared nuclear state, as its nuclear policy is based on refusing to officially confirm or deny if it possesses a nuclear arsenal, has developed nuclear weapons or has a programme of nuclear weapons. Although it has never conducted a nuclear test, the consideration of Israel as a de facto nuclear power is based on the statements made in 1986 by one of the architects of the programme, Mordechai Vanunu and, specifically, on the Dimona installations in the Negev desert⁽²⁹⁾. Israel, which has not signed the NPT either (although it is a party to the CTBT) requires as a condition for doing so the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the region, which would involve putting an end to the programmes for the development of chemical and biological weapons of many of what Israel regards as its hostile neighbours. In May 2008 the former US president James Carter declared that Israel possessed 150 or more nuclear weapons.

Many non-nuclear states (especially those belonging to the Non-Aligned Group) regard the NPT not as an end in itself but as a means of transition along the path leading to total nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty itself. This article contains a general, abstract clause whereby the nuclear states undertake (as a minimum commitment to keep the non-nuclear states happy) to «pursue negotiations *in good faith* on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race *at an early date* and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control».

However, in the view of the nuclear states (especially the United States) which gave an *a posteriori* interpretation of this article, the obligation to desist from the arms race neither refers solely to the nuclear countries nor explicitly requires the conclusion of agreements on disarmament, since the Treaty neither indicates the manner of conducting such negotiations (save «in good faith») nor even establishes a specific date (beyond «early»).

(29) The (almost only) reference book on the Israel nuclear programme, although not without controversy, is HERSH, Seymour, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*, Ramdon House, 1991.

It was attempted to remedy this vagueness in 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, which we will go on to deal with.

Despite the criticism levelled at the NPT for its discriminatory nature, there is no denying the decisive contribution it has made to the containment of the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons for the past forty years. Apart from the nuclear powers, only India, Pakistan and South Africa have successfully exploded an atomic bomb. Only three states, none of which is a Party to the NPT, currently have sufficient nuclear capability to manufacture nuclear weapons: India, Israel and Pakistan. North Korea is the only state that has withdrawn from the NPT (after announcing it had sufficient nuclear capability to build several atomic bombs) and, despite having conducted two nuclear tests (9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009 respectively), its status as a nuclear power has always been debatable. As for Iran, despite international suspicions about the dual nature (civilian and military) of its nuclear programme, coupled with repeated complaints of its failure to cooperate with the IAEA in providing complete information about this programme, there is currently no clear evidence of its nuclear military capability. Should this capability materialise, it would have an extremely worrying «domino effect» in the region and would question the NPT's efficiency at preventing future cases of proliferation.

All in all, with the exception of the above cases, it may be said that the current situation constitutes a considerable success for the Treaty bearing in mind that, when it was signed in 1968, forecasts predicted that some two dozen countries would have access to nuclear weapons by the end of the 1980s. South Africa is the first example of a state which, having acquired a nuclear capability of its own after the entry into force of the NPT, chose voluntarily to decommission its nuclear arsenal and subject its civilian nuclear programme to the international inspections provided for in the Treaty. In the 1990s the NPT was reinforced as a result of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) condemning Iraq for repeated non-compliance with the NPT, obliging it to dismantle its military nuclear programme and place all its nuclear installations under the control of the IAEA, which was responsible for verifying the commitments adopted by states under the NPT.

In 1993 the director of the IAEA stated that the programme had been fully decommissioned and there were no indications of Iraq «having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material». It was the first time in the history of the *nuclear non-proliferation regime* that the Security Council gave its unanimous support

TABLE I
World Nuclear Arsenals (November 2009)

State	Strategic Nuclear Weapons	Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons	Total (Strategic + Tactical)
USA	2.126	500	2.623 (+2.577 res. + 4.200 d.) = 9.400
Russia	2.668	2.050 (5.390 ?)	4.718 (+8.282 r/d)↓ = 13.000
China	176? Deployed	?	240 ? ↑ 25% increase in arsenal since 2005
France	300	0	300 (Mirage 2000N /ASMP + Super Étendard /ASMP + SLBMs M45)
United Kingdom	200→160	0	160 (renewal SLBMs (Trident) decided on by Parliament on 14/6/2007) + 10/15? = 180-185
Israel	80-200?	?	170? 80 operational
India	60?	?	60-80? 60 operational↑
Pakistan	60?	?	70-90? ↑ 60 operational↑
North Korea	5-12? PU reserves	?	?
TOTAL			~23.360*

Res. = nuclear warheads in reserve; d = nuclear warheads withdrawn, awaiting decommissioning. * The estimated total number of nuclear weapons manufactured since 1945 worldwide amounts to over 128,000 warheads, 98 percent of which were built by the US (55% or 70,000 warheads) and the USSR (43 percent or 55,000 nuclear warheads). Source: Compiled by the author from data published in the «Nuclear Notebook: Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009», *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 65, No. 6, November-December 2009, pp. 86-98, <http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/xm38g50653435657/fulltext.pdf>.

to the IAEA by adopting concrete sanctions against Iraq that amounted to backing the NPT even though two of its permanent members, France and China, had not yet signed the Treaty.

In what might be regarded as the other side of the coin, many argue that the Treaty has been unable to prevent some States Parties from benefiting precisely from their non-nuclear-power status to acquire a nuclear military capability through transfers of products and technologies from other countries, whether or not Parties to the Treaty, under the guise of technologies for exclusively civilian purposes (in addition to Iraq and Libya in the 1980s, Iran in the early 1990s).

As a result of the debate—and, in particular, following the discovery of Iraq's secret nuclear programme (which, despite the US's accusations, the IAEA stated to have been fully decommissioned in 1993) (30)—efforts were stepped up to stem nuclear proliferation by strengthening the IAEA safeguard system to prevent similar cases from going undetected in the future.

After several years of talks, in 1997 the new enhanced system of safeguards was adopted. Set out in a «Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements for the Application of Safeguards» (INFCIRC/540), under the name of «comprehensive safeguards», the system reinforces the organisation's powers of verification by encompassing the whole cycle of nuclear production (uranium mines, nuclear materials, waste and installations). The Protocol, ratification of which was non-compulsory (it was not signed by Iran), allows inspectors access to all nuclear facilities and infrastructures in a country, guaranteeing fuller knowledge of the activities it is carrying out (even through the collection of environmental samples) and identifying more clearly any possible diversion of nuclear materials.

THE REVIEW CONFERENCES OF 1995 AND 2000 AS THE BASIS OF THE DISARMAMENT AGENDA

Another of the particular features of the NPT lay in the fact that it was not a treaty of indefinite duration. Initially concluded for a 25-year period,

(30) The report submitted by the Director General of the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council on 27 June 1998 (S/1998/684) stated that «there are no indications of Iraq having achieved its programme's goal of producing nuclear weapons», «most of the IAEA activities involving the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the components of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme [...] were completed by the end of 1992» and «there are no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material».

its indefinite extension for one or several supplementary periods or, conversely, its termination, was to be decided on in 1995 by a Conference of States Parties to the Treaty. However, the main idea was that the indefinite extension of the NPT should not be viewed as the ultimate and exclusive aim of the 1995 Conference, but that the Conference should be used to secure greater concessions from the nuclear powers and to progress in negotiations on nuclear disarmament (31).

In disarmament matters the 1995 Review Conference decided that the indefinite extension of the NPT required, in exchange, much more specific commitments from the nuclear states in the light of article VI of the Treaty. As the Russian foreign minister stated during the conference, «indefinite extension should not mean indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers».

Some non-nuclear states (especially those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement) saw the conferences as a chance to establish a closer link between disarmament and non-proliferation commitments so as to be able to define the obligations to which the nuclear states were subject under article VI of the Treaty. To this end (in addition to two decisions on reinforcement of the NTP review process and indefinite extension of the Treaty and a resolution on the Middle East) one of the most significant (and unexpected) documents on nuclear disarmament was adopted. Entitled *Principles and Objectives of Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation* (32) (commonly known as «P&Os»), although not considered legally binding by the nuclear powers (it is not a resolution but a decision adopted in the context of the indefinite extension of the NPT), it topped the negotiation agenda during the following decades (33). The agenda was structured around several major short- and medium-term priorities, the first three of which are still perceived today as essential aspects of the non-proliferation regime.

The first priority was to achieve the universalisation of the NPT as a matter of urgency: that is, to ensure that states which were not yet Parties to the Treaty signed it as soon as possible (especially those with

(31) For an analysis of the genesis and results of the 1995 NTP Review and Extension Conference see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «La Conferencia de Revisión y Prórroga del TNP: el debate entre consenso o mayoría», *Meridiano CERJ*, No. 3, Madrid, 1995, pp. 13-16; «Después de Nueva York: la fragilidad de la no proliferación nuclear» *Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales*, No. 55, CIP, Madrid, 1995, pp. 81-87.

(32) Conference Paper NPT/CONF.1995/L.5 of 9 May 1995. Available for consultation at http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/bb2008/partii/sectione.pdf.

(33) GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., *La Conferencia de Revisión y Prórroga del TNP...*, op. cit.

nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards, namely Israel, India and Pakistan—which remain reluctant to do so to this day).

The second priority was the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as proliferation seriously increases the danger of a nuclear war. «Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty».

The third was to achieve nuclear disarmament in a broad sense. The nuclear-weapon states reaffirmed their commitment, as stated in article VI of the NPT, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. To ensure the full and effective enforcement of this article an action plan was adopted (constituting the essence of the decision on the P&Os), based in turn on five progressive measures beginning with the negotiation and entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996 (finally adopted on 10 September 1996 but not yet in force owing, among other things, to the failure of the United States, Israel, India and Pakistan to ratify it (34)). As of December 2009, the CTBT had been signed by 181 states and ratified by 150 (31 of the 44 states necessary for the definitive entry into force of the Treaty have signed but not yet ratified it). The second priority was the immediate commencement of negotiations leading to the prompt adoption of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT or Fissban)(35). Lastly, a commitment was sought from the five *de iure* nuclear-weapon states (P-5) to make systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of completely eliminating them, and to promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(34) On the CTBT see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Pruebas Nucleares: Punto y final» in *Anuario del CIP 1996-1997*, Icaria, Barcelona, 1997, pp. 347-359.

(35) «Fissionable» refers to any material with atoms capable of undergoing nuclear fission. «Fissile» applies to materials which are fissionable by neutrons with zero kinetic energy. «Fissile» is thus more restrictive than «fissionable»—although all fissile materials are fissionable, not all fissionable materials are fissile. Uranium-238 (U-238) is fissionable but not fissile. Neutrons produced by fission of U-235 have an energy of around 1 MeV (100 TJ/kg, i.e. a speed of 14.000 km/s) and cannot fission U-238, but neutrons produced by deuterium-tritium fusion have an energy of 14.1 MeV (1400 TJ/kg, i.e. a speed of 52,000 km/s) and can effectively fission uranium-238 and other non-fissile actinides. The neutrons produced by this fission are again not fast enough to produce new fissions, so U-238 does not sustain a chain reaction.

The bilateral US-Russian talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals (START Treaty, the renewal of which is still under negotiation as of the end of 2009) should be placed in this context.

Point four on the agenda was the development of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs): the importance of creating such zones is recognised, especially in the Middle East (where the task is made more difficult by the existence of a non-NPT nuclear state, Israel, in its midst) and is stated that the establishment of additional zones in the future would be welcome. Three new NWFZs have been established since 1995: in Southeast Asia (1995 Bangkok Treaty, in force since 28 March 1997), in Central Asia (Statement issued by the Five Nations at Almaty, on 8 September 1996, in force since 21 March 2009) and in Africa (1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, in force since 15 July 2009). These new zones are added to three existing ones: the Antarctic (Antarctic Treaty of 1959, in force since 23 June 1961), Latin American and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, in force for all states in the region since 23 October 2002) and the South Pacific (Rorotonga Treaty of 1985, in force since 11 December 1986). In addition, Mongolia declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon-free territory on 25 September 1992, a status effective since 3 February 2000, the date the United Nations General Assembly adopted a specific resolution, 63/56(36).

The fifth issue addressed by the NPT Conference, albeit with little success, was to secure a commitment from the P-5 on the non-first use of nuclear weapons (in the form of adoption of a legally binding international treaty) against States Parties to the Treaty (*negative security assurances*).

In sixth place was the strengthening of the IAEA international safeguard system with a view to preventing cases of non-compliance with the Treaty in the future which, as stated, following several years of negotiations, resulted in the adoption of the «Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements for the Application of Safeguards» (INFCIRC/540).

Lastly, the document on «P&Os» included an extensive reference to what is the third pillar of the NPT, «the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop [...] use of nuclear of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty». As well as a right, it is considered a duty of the states with more advanced nuclear technology to facilitate the involvement of the

(36) The resolution is entitled «Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status». For a retrospective analysis of this question see <http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/mongol.pdf>.

rest of the States Parties to the NPT in the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and such commitments are to be fully implemented.

One of the most controversial topics dealt with by the conference was the conclusion of a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the most important implication of which was renunciation by Israel of its nuclear capability (indeed, Israel's nuclear programme was one of the issues over which the Arab countries clashed with the nuclear states during and up until the end of the conference, as demonstrated by the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East, from which any express mention of the Israeli nuclear programme was finally omitted) (37).

Five years later, in 2000, the sixth NPT Review Conference went one step further in specifying the commitments established in 1995 by adopting an action plan on nuclear disarmament set out in a list of «13 practical steps» to be progressively implemented. The document, adopted by consensus, proposed a set of measures aimed ultimately at fully implementing article VI of the NPT: entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty (rejected by the US Senate in 1999) and, until then, an indefinite nuclear moratorium; negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; application of the principle of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament; establishment at the Conference on Disarmament (the only multilateral body capable of negotiating international treaties on disarmament and armaments control, but practically at a standstill since 1996) of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament; unequivocal commitment by the nuclear states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, including entry into force of the START II Treaty (which was aimed at limiting US and Russian strategic nuclear arms to 3,000-3,500 warheads and never entered into force owing to Moscow's denunciation of the treaty on 12 June 2002 in response to Washington's unilateral withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM); and, in addition, development of the necessary verification capabilities to ensure compliance with the nuclear disarmament agreements(38).

The seventh NPT Review Conference ended on 27 May 2005 in a climate of frustration and scepticism. The 153 states that took part in the

(37) *Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution*. Document NPT/CONF.1995/L.8, 10 May 1995.

(38) For the full document and an analysis of its application, see Tariq Rauf, *Towards NPT 2005: An action plan for the «13 Steps» towards nuclear disarmament agreed at NPT 2000*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, 2001.

conference were incapable, after four weeks of debating, of agreeing on a final document embodying the main commitments adopted at the previous two review conferences, that of 1995 and, particularly, that of 2000(39).

There were three main causes for the overriding feeling of a «wasted opportunity»: firstly, the participating states' lack of determination when dealing with substantial Treaty issues (they took more than two weeks to define the work programme of the conference); secondly, the attitude of some states (especially those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement) which, far from seeking consensus, repeatedly attempted to implement an «all or nothing» policy; and thirdly, the perception of the nuclear countries that the agreements achieved in 2000 went much further than what they were prepared to accept. During the conference the debates were focused on several issues, such as North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and the disputes over whether Iran had violated the Treaty.

Special mention should be given to the position of the League of Arab States and also that of Egypt, which many openly accused of being chiefly to blame for the fact that the conference was unable to adopt a final document by consensus. The League of Arab States stated from the outset (and Egypt was entrusted with defending this position) that their main priority during the conference was to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the commitments adopted in 1995 and reiterated at the 2000 Conference. Bearing in mind that Israel is the only state in the region that has not yet acceded to the NPT and that it refuses to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards, the League of Arab States, and Egypt in particular, made a proposal to the Conference by means of a «missive» of acceptance or blockade of the final document, and called on all the States Parties to the Treaty to undertake «not to transfer nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, or assistance in the nuclear field to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards» (40). The imposition of sanctions on Israel thus became the main cause for the lack of advancement of the different committees and their disastrous consequences.

(39) On the results of the 2005 NPT Review Conference see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Cuatro semanas de mayo, cinco años por delante: el fracaso de la VII Conferencia de Revisión del TNP», *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano* (ARI), No. 72/2005, 7 June 2005. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/756.asp>.

(40) () Document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.40

The other major pending issue was related to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran, at the centre of the controversy for months, was particularly active during the conference. Furthermore, as the days passed, tension mounted between Tehran and Washington over the mutual exchange of accusations as to their respective intentions. Iran has never recognised that it possesses or is developing a military nuclear programme; on the contrary, it claims its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes pursuant to article IV of the NPT, to which it has been a signatory since 1970. Iran's geostrategic position and the fact that it is a leading player on the energy scene are keys to understanding the current nuclear crisis. But in addition to economic implications, Iran's nuclear programme has a necessary strategic connotation as complete mastery of the fuel cycle provides it with a certain deterrent capability stemming from a possible future ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, even if it does not actually materialize this possibility. Therefore, it is not only a question of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, which would have major regional and international consequences and, indeed, would seriously influence the attitude of other states in and outside the region (a sort of «domino effect»). Over and above this fact, which is undoubtedly worrying, what is at stake is the efficiency of the already badly discredited nuclear non-proliferation regime and the credibility of the system of international inspections applied through the mechanism of IAEA safeguards.

Since then many states considered non-nuclear countries from the NPT viewpoint have been accusing the five nuclear powers of not allowing them to take part in multilateral negotiations aimed ultimately at adopting a legally binding commitment with a specific date for the total elimination of the five's nuclear arsenals. For their part, the nuclear states argue that in order to arrive at nuclear disarmament it is necessary to pursue a step by step policy without establishing specific dates or limits on negotiation. The P-5 furthermore consider that neither the United Nations General Assembly nor the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) (41) is the most appropriate international forum for negotiating the future disarma-

(41) The Conference on Disarmament (established in 1979) is the only multilateral forum for negotiation on armaments control and disarmament issues. It functions on the basis of a list of items known as the «Decalogue» (eight following the adoption of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, and seven since 2007). Decisions are adopted by consensus of its sixty-five member states, but from 1997 to 2009 it has been blocked owing to the lack of agreement between its members over the adoption of an agenda or work programme.

ment agenda, and prefer direct negotiations between the P-5. These negotiations should initially take place at bilateral level between the United States and Russia and later be extended to the rest of the nuclear states within a restricted multilateral framework.

The main criticism levelled by the non-nuclear countries is that the nuclear powers have not done enough to meet the objectives established in the action plan adopted in 2000. The former point out that the P-5 have systematically attempted to disassociate themselves and reinterpret the list of the «13 practical steps», claiming that what matters is not the issues relating to article VI of the NPT, but violations of the Treaty. Another example of the different perceptions of the priorities is the French-US alliance forged at the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee in which references to the 2000 document were minimal and, what is more, not even a document with recommendations for the 2005 conference was adopted (42).

The US has traditionally been at the centre of the criticisms of failure to comply with disarmament commitments, beginning with former president Bush's refusal to ratify the CTBT, failure to support the adoption of an FMCT (regarded as not effectively verifiable) and the doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons (in favour of negative security assurances for the States Parties to the NPT, but without relinquishing the use of nuclear weapons against a state possessing chemical and/or biological weapons) (43).

In turn, the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (following its unilateral denunciation) on 13 June 2002 drove a wedge into bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow in disarmament and armaments control issues. Moscow viewed the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of disarmament and retaliated to the US withdrawal by declaring itself no longer bound by the (Nuclear) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) the following day, 14 June. The ABM Treaty was based on the principle of nuclear deterrence, according to which a country would abstain from using its nuclear weapons if it knew that the target state would respond with its own nuclear weapons. Under the Treaty the number of weapons and radars permitted was limited and it was agreed to use missiles only in the national territories. Both countries agreed not to manufacture any

(42) For a summary of the results of the 2004 PrepCom see «Laying Substantive Groundwork for 2010: Report of the 2009 NPT PrepCom», *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No. 91, summer 2009, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd91/91npt.htm>.

(43) SCHEINMAN, Lawrence, «Disarmament: Have the five nuclear powers done enough?», *Arms Control Today*, January-February 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/Scheinman.

system other than that of the fixed, ground-based defences they had already developed, but the Treaty allowed them to continue with tests and to develop weapons of this type (although it also banned national missile defence systems). The Treaty began with the words «proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind». The then US president, George W. Bush, concluded that the ABM Treaty «hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks» (44), and regarded it as a «relic of the past, of the Cold War days and, consequently, obsolete» (45).

However, underlying the whole debate was a weighty reason: the ABM was greatly hampering the future deployment of the US missile defence shield—that is, up to a point, because the Treaty permitted the completion of tests for the medium-range land-based system, the centrepiece of the National Missile Defence programme. Former President Clinton's plans for the deployment of a missile defence shield only envisaged the installation of a new land-based radar in Alaska, where the missile interceptors were also to be located. This involved introducing slight changes to the ABM Treaty by amending articles 1 and 3.

It should also be borne in mind that Clinton's initial proposal was only intended to protect the US's west coast from a potential attack with ballistic missiles launched from enemy or rogue states such as North Korea or, subsequently, Iran. By no means did the system aim to offer protection to Europe against a potential attack by one of these countries (which fell under the global, non-specific and changeable heading of «the axis of evil»). The formal request submitted by the US to Poland and the Czech Republic in January 2007 to negotiate the installation of 10 silo-based missile interceptors and a radar station respectively against medium- and long-range ballistic missiles from the Middle East triggered the new missile crisis with Russia, which viewed these plans as a direct threat against the country and its borders. The proposal was part of the Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) and would be the third ground-based site following the deployment in Alaska and California.

The proposal to extend the BMDS programme to European territory raised political and technical objections. The former were based on the

(44) LOBE, Jim, «Desarme-EEUU: Adiós al Tratado de Misiles Antibalísticos», *Inter Press Service New Agency*, Washington, 13 December 2005, http://www.ipsenespanol.net/ataque/1312_5.shtml.

(45) «Bush y Putin redefinen las reglas de la seguridad mundial», *El Mundo*, 16 June 2001.

manner in which the decision had been adopted, according to the US counterproliferation procedure: a bilateral proposal to the most favourable allies and, if appropriate, facilitation of «multilateralisation» if the other Member States so wished, but never before, in order to prevent delays in its unilateral programming. To these objections was added Russian pressure over the measure and some NATO states' misgivings about counter proliferation in case it ended up superseding non-proliferation. From the technical viewpoint the objections expressed reservations about the possibility of Iran ending up having long-range missiles and about the feasibility of the system as the results of the tests were disparate and not known in detail (46).

Tension reached a head in February 2007 at the 43rd Conference on Security Policy in Munich, when Vladimir Putin accused George W. Bush of encouraging nuclear proliferation (47) and the US of being «unilateralist in using the threat of Russia to conduct its wars and install a missile shield in Europe» (48).

To Russia (and China), the real aim of the deployment of the missile shield was none other than to undermine the deterrent capability of Russia's arsenal; indeed, they held that the early warning radar system actually aimed to control possible launches of Russian ballistic missiles. Moscow retaliated by announcing that it would install missiles in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad at the border with Poland and that it would withdraw from all the armaments control agreements to which it was party, among them, in addition to the START II Treaty (following the US denunciation of the ABM Treaty in 2002), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, the implementation of which was suspended on 14 July 2007), while also threatening to denounce the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 (INF).

Russia thus made the future of the treaties on armaments control and disarmament conditional upon the US missile defence system and, especially, the European architecture of the system in Czech and Polish territories. In strategic terms, Russia announced that, by allowing the system on their soil, both states could be the «target» of an attack with Russian missiles.

(46) ARTEGA, Félix, «La contraproliferación» in GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V. (coord.), *Respuestas al resto de la proliferación*, Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa, No. 27, CESEDEN-Ministerio de Defensa, Madrid, 2009, p. 96.

(47) «Putin acusa a Bush de fomentar la proliferación nuclear», *El País*, 11 February 2007, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Putin/acusa/Bush/fomentar/proliferacion/nuclear/elpepuint/20070211elpepiint_3/Tes.

(48) «Misiles de Putin contra EE UU», *Revista Cambio* 16, 26 February 2007.

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA'S PROPOSALS FOR GLOBAL DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVES

On 5 April 2009 (the same day North Korea launched a long-range missile), Barack Obama announced «with conviction» in a speech delivered in the centre of Prague «America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons». He stated that «as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act [...] to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons» and that «together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation» in order to «put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create» nuclear weapons (49). In particular, President Obama described the «trajectory we need to be on» in order to achieve «a world without nuclear weapons»: «To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same».

Not that the idea of a «world without nuclear weapons» is entirely new, as it is basically the ultimate aim of the NPT, envisaged as a legally binding commitment in article VI (even though the date established is no more specific than «early» and the legal obligations no more specific than «in good faith»). However, at the opposite end of the scale, there are many who question compliance with the disarmament and non-proliferation commitments announced by President Obama and, above all, the difficulty of specifying them by the time of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010.

The first consequence of this appeal was the negotiation of a new Russian-US Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty (signed in 1991 and in force until 5 December 2009). For more than four decades, nuclear parity (and, by extension, also chemical but not biological parity owing to the shortage of specific data on their programmes and biological capabilities) between the USSR/Russia and the US was one of the main pillars of relations between the two countries.

The first round of talks on the new Treaty took place on 19-20 May 2009. Since then eight rounds of consultations and intense negotiations have been held between the two countries (the most recent on 9

(49) *Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 5 de abril de 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.*

November 2009). The Treaty will set a limit of between 1,500 and 1,675 nuclear warheads for each state for the first seven years, while the number of delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles, bombers and submarines) would be established at between 500 and 1,100 projectiles.

Bilateral relations in nuclear strategic weapons issues are currently regulated solely by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT, or the Moscow Treaty, which expires in 2012). The SORT Treaty sets a limit of 2,200 nuclear warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles, but lacks the transparency and confidence measures of the START Treaty, as it fails to specify the number of missiles each party may retain or the number of warheads each missile may carry. What is more, each of the parties may establish the structure and composition of its nuclear forces (ground bases, strategic bombers or nuclear submarines), and nor does the Treaty establish specific control mechanisms or restrictions of any kind on the missiles and nuclear warheads when withdrawn from active service (i.e. it omits any obligation to destroy them).

In any event, the differences between the US and Russia over the curtailment of their respective nuclear arsenals are obvious, as evidenced by the fact that they have not yet managed to agree on the replacement of the START Treaty by a new one before the first one expires. In a joint communication issued on 12 December 2009, Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev agreed, following a telephone conversation, to broaden the talks on the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. After delegations from both countries held talks in Geneva that were described by the Kremlin as «intense and full of determination», Obama and Medvedev agreed on the need to start working towards a treaty which could successfully replace START I (50).

The US and Russia turned into the new year without having yet achieved a new treaty on nuclear disarmament, though their leaders claim that the document is nearly ready and will be signed when the last technical details are finalised. Barack Obama stated on 18 December, after meeting his Russian counterpart Dmitri Medvedev in Copenhagen, that the two countries have made «excellent progress» and are «fairly close» to reaching a consensus on the agreement that will replace the START Treaty. In their last attempt to clinch a deal, the White House and the Kremlin had the two teams of negotiators travel to the World Climate Summit in Copenhagen, and the presidents themselves were so engrossed in their

(50) «Rusia y EE UU extienden conversaciones por pacto armas nucleares», *Reuters*, 12 December 2009, <http://it.reuters.com/article/topNews/idLTASIE5BB0LE20091212>.

task that Obama sat beneath the Russian flag and Medvedev beneath that of the US (51).

The Russian side stressed the presidents' promise to have the text of the new treaty ready «in the visible future, within a short time», but they have refused to set specific deadlines, recalling that the START Treaty of 1991 had taken two years to draft. «Our positions are close, and the negotiated matters, finalised. There are technical details that need finalising. I hope we can do so in a short time», pointed out Sergei Prikhodko, the Kremlin's advisor in the negotiations. On 21 December 2009 the Russian foreign ministry confirmed that Russia and the US had practically completed the drafting of the new treaty. «To finalise the last details of the agreement and present it to the Russian and US presidents for signature, several problems need to be sorted out... Negotiations will continue in January 2010», stated an official document (52).

A substantial reduction in both states' nuclear arsenals has thus been agreed on, but the broad range of possibilities, particularly with respect to the number of delivery vehicles, shows that there is still a noticeable gap between the intentions of each party. The US government wishes to focus on curtailing the nuclear warheads currently ready to be fired. Russia is insisting on a bigger cut in the number of vehicles, as it considers that the US has a greater capacity to store warheads that would not contravene the agreement, and to subsequently assemble them if required. The main discussion point is precisely the number of delivery vehicles, as the US is not prepared to reduce them to 500, as Russia wants. In addition, when it comes to making counts of nuclear loads, Moscow wants them to be counted according to the maximum number of warheads each missile can carry, even if at the time it has only one warhead. Moscow fears that the nuclear loads disassembled and stored by Washington may again be rapidly deployed in the event of an outburst of tension between the two powers (53).

(51) «Moscú y Washington cerrarán en 2010 el nuevo tratado de desarme nuclear», *Agencia EFE*, 19 December 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/epa/article/ALeqM5hT1Su2cGyj_g1KZUBmTx0uqFO_2w.

(52) «Cancillería rusa confirma que la preparación del nuevo Tratado START está prácticamente concluida», *RIA Novosti*, Moscow, 21 December 2009, <http://sp.rian.ru/online-news/20091221/124440269.html>.

(53) For the contents of and developments in the negotiations for the new treaty see the report drafted for the members of US Congress, which is periodically updated, WOOLF, Amy F., *Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options*, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, R40084, 9 October 2009, <http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/nuke/R40084.pdf>.

At any rate, everything appears to indicate that President Obama's initiative has come at a good time. It should be borne in mind that Russia's current economic situation does not allow it to increase its strategic nuclear potential in the short term, particularly considering that over the next ten years it needs to replace at least 300 intercontinental ground-based ballistic missiles and a further 100 missiles on board Soviet-made nuclear submarines. From this viewpoint it would even be feasible to think of strategic nuclear reductions in the region of 1,000 warheads.

Another of the important novelties is that Russia has shown itself to be in favour of dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons only after the talks on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons are concluded. The Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated at the end of October 2009 that he was sure that the new treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons will establish a link between offensive and defensive weapons.

Naturally, the future architecture of the US missile defence system will also determine strategic nuclear relations with Russia, especially after President Obama announced he was scrapping the project to install part of the components of the missile shield in Eastern Europe. The US president justified the controversial decision by the need to adapt military assets to the development of the Iranian nuclear programme in recent years. According to the White House, this had made it necessary to replace the initial defence programme—much more costly, technologically advanced (and, above all, more politically explosive)—with the simple deployment of SM-3 interceptors. These systems will first be installed in ships and will subsequently (not before 2015) begin to be deployed on the ground, chiefly in some southern European countries and Turkey. «Our new missile defence architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter and swifter defences of American forces and America's allies. It is more comprehensive than the previous programme; it deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective», stated Barack Obama when announcing his decision (54). For his part, the Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, applauded the US decision, which he described as responsible and positive and as giving «impetus to the joint work to address the risks of the proliferation of nuclear weapons»(55).

(54) «Obama renuncia al escudo antimisiles», *El País*, 18 September 2009, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obama/renuncia/escudo/antimisiles/epepiint/20090918elpepiint_2/Tes.

(55) «Una victoria diplomática para Rusia», *El País*, 18 September 2009, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/victoria/diplomatica/Rusia/elpepiint/20090918elpepiint_3/Tes.

In addition to the new nuclear disarmament initiatives, the Obama Administration has shown itself to be in favour of reinforcing most of the international legal instruments of non-proliferation. This attitude is evident, in particular, in the US Senate's ratification of the CTBT (necessary for its definitive entry into force); the support for the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT or Fissban); the strengthening of the IAEA safeguard system; and the reinforcement of civilian nuclear cooperation in nuclear matters, including the establishment of an International Fuel Bank to provide states with access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without increasing the risks of proliferation.

On 9 July 2009 the White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction, proliferation and terrorism, Gary Samore (*the nukes guy* as he admitted President Obama calls him) delivered an address on «The Obama Administration's arms control and non-proliferation strategy», which he described as being based on four pillars (56):

- (1) Nuclear disarmament, especially the new positions on the negotiation of a post-START agreement, ratification of the CTBT and the beginning of negotiations for an FMCT.
- (2) Nuclear non-proliferation, which focused above all on the most immediate risks deriving from the policies of North Korea and Iran.
- (3) Nuclear energy, recognising the right to its development but preventing the announced «nuclear renaissance» from giving rise to the spread of national uranium enrichment facilities.
- (4) Nuclear security, aimed at guaranteeing the security of all world nuclear materials.

Gary Samore also explained some of the important principles that inspire the Obama Administration's strategy. He defined the first as «practice what you preach», which is essential to legitimising America's new proposals. He stressed that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should be synergetic and mutually reinforcing mechanisms, but in order for this to occur it is up to the US and Russia to prove their willingness to reduce their nuclear arsenals significantly in order to enlist the cooperation of the other countries in their attempts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He also pointed out the Obama Administration's conviction that the new disarmament agreements with Russia, by creating a new climate of confidence and cooperation between the two countries, would contribute significantly to achieving a closer understanding between them

(56) Quoted in AGUIRRE DE CÁRCER, M., *Las propuestas....*, op. cit., p. 5.

on how to address the proliferation challenges posed by some countries, especially Iran. All this, according to Samore, will bring a series of benefits to US national security, which will be essential to enabling the Obama Administration to secure the political support it needs from Congress and other domestic interlocutors to be able to bring to fruition its new vision of these issues.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed on 28 October 2009, referring to «the next steps on non-proliferation», that «no nation is safe from the threat of nuclear proliferation, and no nation can meet this challenge alone. [...] That is why the United States has launched a major diplomatic effort to forge a renewed international consensus on non-proliferation» (57).

However, all this brings us to a more significant debate based on the future of the role of nuclear weapons in the security strategies of the two foremost powers (and, by extension, of China, France and also the United Kingdom, which decided in 2007 to renew many of the missiles of its Trident submarine fleet). However, it should not be forgotten that existing world nuclear arsenals number more than 23,000 warheads and that others (fortunately not many) have the technology to produce nuclear weapons.

There is a widespread perception (especially in the US) that the efforts made by the international community to date to prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea (58) and Iran (59) have failed miserably. In the first case, despite the agreement reached on 13 February 2007 to denuclearise North Korea (see the contents of the action plan in Table II), hopes of the

(57) CLINTON, Hillary, «The Next Steps on Nonproliferation», *Foreign Policy*, 28 October 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/28/the_next_steps_on_nonproliferation.

(58) For a detailed analysis of the origin and development of the nuclear programme, see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Corea del Norte: Entre el Desarme y el Rearme Nuclear», *Tiempo de Paz*, núm. 32-33, Madrid, spring-summer 1994, pp. 104-113; «La situación nuclear en Asia: ¿cuál es el atractivo del arma nuclear?» in *Asia, escenario de los desequilibrios mundiales*, Seminario de Investigación para la Paz, Centro Pignatelly (ed.), Zaragoza, 2000, pp. 227-264; «La crisis nuclear norcoreana: conflicto nuclear y trascendencia en la región asiática» in OJEDA, A., Hidalgo, A. and LAURENTIS, E. (eds.), *Corea: tradición y modernidad*, Ed. Verbum, Madrid, 2004, pp. 141-166. on the contents of the Framework Agreement, see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «Corea del Norte: El último glaciar de la guerra fría», *Tiempo de Paz*, no. 37, Madrid, spring-summer 1996, pp. 28-39.

(59) For an analysis of the origin and development of the Iranian nuclear programme, see GARRIDO REBOLLEDO, V., «El programa nuclear iraní y las dificultades para visitar a los amigos», *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales* (REEI), No. 12/2006, [http://www.reei.org/reei%2012/GarridoRebollero\(reei12\).pdf](http://www.reei.org/reei%2012/GarridoRebollero(reei12).pdf).

country putting an end to its military nuclear programme and returning to the NPT (as a non-nuclear state) seem far off for the time being. Indeed, one of the first crises President Obama has had to address is precisely the nuclear crisis with North Korea stemming particularly from the second nuclear test conducted on 25 May 2009 and followed by several ballistic missile tests.

TABLE II
NORTH KOREA – DENUCLEARISATION ACTION PLAN (60)

- The agreement is to be implemented in a phased manner based on the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, following the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks.
- The plan is progressive («action for action») and consists of different phases, the ultimate goal of which is to achieve early denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner in accordance with the commitments made by the Parties in the Joint Statement.
- The agreement of 13 February consists of an initial, 60-day phase of «action» and a subsequent phase of «disablement».
- During the initial 60-day phase the Parties undertake as follows:
 - North Korea will shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, allow international inspections and supply a list of all its nuclear programmes to the other parties to the Six-Part Talks ;
 - the other parties will provide an initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. If the provisions laid down for the initial stage are fulfilled, a further 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil will be provided;
 - five working groups will be set up and will meet over the next 30 days. These groups will focus on denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, normalisation of US-North Korea relations, normalisation of Japan-North Korea relations, economic and energy cooperation and the establishment of a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism;
 - in the framework of the US and North Korea working group, the countries will hold meetings aimed at settling «pending bilateral issues» and moving towards full diplomatic relations;
 - The United States will also examine the situation of North Korea on its list of states that sponsor terrorism.
 - Once the initial actions have been implemented, the six parties will hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means of promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
 - The parties reaffirm that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust and will make joint efforts to achieve peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

(60) The full text of the agreement in English can be found at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm>. parece que el link ya no está

However, the Obama Administration's new approach to the North Korean nuclear issue differs substantially from that of the Bush Administration. For example, despite North Korea's announcement in November 2009 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods and had accomplished «Noticeable successes [...] in turning the extracted plutonium weapon-grade for the purpose of bolstering up the nuclear deterrent» (in violation of its own denuclearisation commitments and several UN Security Council resolutions), the US has not adopted any sanctions, stating that «Washington is only focused on achieving «a comprehensive peaceful solution to the

As for Iran, the Obama Administration's official line is also diametrically opposite to that of its predecessor. Barack Obama stated at Prague that «Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon. My administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We believe in dialogue. But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. We want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, politically and economically. We will support Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. That's a path that the Islamic Republic can take. Or the government can choose increased isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for all.»

Nevertheless, the course of events has led this discourse, which was initially optimistic about the Iranian nuclear crisis (in his address to Cairo University on 4 June 2009, President Obama reiterated his willingness to the Iranian leaders and people to «move forward without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect») to become more realistic. Indeed, pressure on Iran and a more favourable attitude on the part of the US towards the implementation of stricter sanctions has become more evident following the discovery in September 2009 of a second underground pilot uranium enrichment plant not previously declared to the IAEA in Qom, which, according to the organisation, «does not contribute to the building of confidence» (61).

On 15 December 2009, the US House of Representatives approved by overwhelming majority new sanctions against Iran and companies that do business with its government as a punishment for failing to suspend

(61) *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran*, Report by the Director General of the IAEA, GOV/2009/74, 16 November 2009.

its nuclear programme. The measure stipulates that the Executive will impose sanctions on energy companies that supply refined oil to Iran, help it import these resources or help it maintain or expand its petroleum refining capabilities. The United States will ban access to its market to the foreign companies that violate this legislation to; nor will they be able to receive financial assistance from institutions such as the US Export-Import Bank. The initiative goes beyond the Iranian energy sector but its chief goal is, for practical purposes, to eliminate petrol exports to Iran, which relies on up to 40 percent of foreign refined petroleum and diesel fuel to supply its needs. It also restricts the United States' nuclear cooperation with countries whose governments or citizens supply Iran with equipment and materials that enhance its ability in this field. It furthermore imposes sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and any Iranian financial institution involved in terrorist activities or nuclear proliferation and on entities which conduct financial transactions with these institutions (62). The day after the sanctions were approved, the Iranian army announced the «successful» testing of an advanced version of its medium-range solid-fuel Sajil-2 missile, which is capable of reaching Israel and the US bases in the Persian Gulf (63).

As Miguel Aguirre de Cárcer points out, the Iranian nuclear issue is probably the most significant challenge currently faced by the US, especially the question of how to address it in a few months' time if the offers of direct diplomatic talks prove unsuccessful and sanctions are reinforced. This is due, above all, to the negative impact this could have for security in the Middle East and the regional peace process, but it could also affect the «resetting» of bilateral relations between the US and the Russian Federation which President Obama is attempting to promote(64).

Finally, it should be stressed that fighting nuclear terrorism is high on the list of the Obama Administration's priorities. In his address given at Prague, Barack Obama stated that «we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would

(62) «La Cámara de Representantes aprueba más sanciones contra Irán», *El Mundo*, 15 December 2009, <http://www.elmundo.es/america/2009/12/16/estados-unidos/1260924441.html>

(63) «Teherán prueba «con éxito» una versión avanzada de un misil capaz de alcanzar Israel», *Agencia EFE*, 16 December 2009, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/epa/article/ALeqM5gWNFkDJgpfP1LmEieREFkzIAKmbg>.

(64) AGUIRRE DE CÁRCER, M., *Las propuestas...*, op. cit., p. 12.

have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay». To this end, Obama announced «a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials». Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in this connection that to the global pillars of global non-proliferation (preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy) should be added a fourth: preventing nuclear terrorism⁽⁶⁵⁾. Everything would thus appear to indicate that combating nuclear terrorism is also going to be put on the global non-proliferation agenda even though strictly speaking the NPT does not refer to the possible use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors, and this may trigger a certain amount of disagreement more than consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

Prior to the conference, the US has convened a World Summit on Nuclear Security, which is due to take place in Washington on 12 and 13 April 2010 and to which more than forty states have been invited, among them Spain. Nevertheless the summit poses a few political difficulties. Some states do not consider they have a problem of nuclear security; others regard nuclear materials as useful instruments of economic and technological progress; and a third group views nuclear terrorism as an inflated threat that chiefly affects nuclear states. It is therefore going to be very difficult to achieve global consensus on what measures to implement to stem nuclear terrorism. The goal is also highly ambitious: to put an end (in four years) to black markets, intercept materials in transit and use financial instruments to prevent the illicit trade in nuclear materials.

CONCLUSIONS: OUTLOOK FOR THE 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

Given this situation, what are the global priorities in disarmament and non-proliferation matters with a view to the 2010 NPT Review Conference? Or, to put it another way, what steps would need to be taken to ensure that the world may continue to put its trust in the NPT as the «cornerstone of disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons»? The fact

(65) CLINTON, Hillary, *The Next Steps on Nonproliferation...*, op. cit.

is that there is little to add to what has been proposed for over forty years and reiterated on countless occasions. However obvious it may seem, what needs to be done is implement the Treaty obligations fully and effectively: articles II (not to acquire nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly) and IV (peaceful uses of nuclear energy) for non-nuclear states; and article I (not to transfer them) and, especially, VI (general and complete disarmament, the ultimate aim of the Treaty) for the nuclear powers.

For this purpose, international consensus is first required on the international priorities which were defined at the 1995 NPT extension conferences («Principles and Objectives of Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation») and specified in the document on the «Thirteen practical steps» adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.

The first priority, as a confidence-building measure, should be the definitive entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the establishment of a ban on the development of new types of weapons. This entails ratification of the CTBT by some key countries such as the US, China, North Korea, India, Israel and Pakistan (the last three being de facto nuclear powers). As stated, the US intends to submit the text of the CTBP to the Senate again for approval, but it is not clear whether the Obama Administration currently has the 67 votes needed to ratify it. Therefore, bearing in mind that it is not wished to run the same risks as in 1999 (when the Treaty obtained only 48 votes in favour), in order to prevent what would be a failure of President Obama's policy in non-proliferation matters, it seems unlikely that the text will be submitted to the Senate without previously securing political assurance of its approval—something that is not certain to be achieved before the holding of the 2010 NPT Conference. This could irritate some groups of countries (Non-Aligned Movement, New Agenda Coalition, among others) and become a focus of attention of a good many of the Conference's debates, with the risk of turning it into the only issue discussed during the first weeks of the event.

Second, negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) under the basic premise that it should be verifiable - the question which is the main reason why the Treaty was opposed by the George W. Bush Administration. Among the proposals for achieving a verifiable FMCT is

that of placing world production of fissile material under IAEA control, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities. On 29 May 2009, after a deadlock of more than twelve years, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) approved a programme of work. The programme adopted will apply to the 2009 session, and will have to be approved again when the CD resumes work in January 2010(66). Four working groups and three special coordinators linked to the agenda of the annual Conference on Disarmament have been established.

Working group two, known more informally as the fissile materials working group, will be tasked with negotiating a treaty «banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices». The main challenges the working group must address are to establish existing fissile material stocks or reserves (for accounting purposes, in the event that the treaty applies to not only those produced in the future but also those produced in the past and currently stored), the verification mechanisms to be implemented and, above all, definition of the nuclear materials to be included. On 4 June 2009 Rose Gottemoeller, acting under secretary of state for arms control and international security for the United States, urged all CD delegations to ensure that «until the FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty) is completed [...] the CD not return to deadlock, to pledge themselves to passing in the beginning of each year a Program of Work authorising the resumption of focused negotiations on an FMCT and discussion of related disarmament issues» (67).

The third priority would be to make the IAEA Additional Protocol the main instrument of non-proliferation to the extent that its implementation would guarantee not only the non-diversion of nuclear materials from civilian uses (permitted by the NPT) to a different military purpose (banned), but also the non-existence in the country of nuclear activities not declared to the organisation. This would furthermore bolster the IAEA's authority to detect and conduct inspections of nuclear facilities and, ultimately, would also lend legitimacy to the NPT's legal authority. As of December 2009, the protocol has been signed by 128 states and ratified by 93, as well as by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) (68).

(66) The current programme is recorded at the Conference on Disarmament under no. CD/1864.

(67) SNYDER, Susi, «Conference on Disarmament Adopts a Programme of Work Prospects for NGO Engagement» at <http://www.un-ngls.org/spip.php?article1576>

(68) *Vid.*, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html.

In fourth place, as a logical consequence of the foregoing, the negotiation of new nuclear disarmament accords between the US and Russia (such as the aforementioned renewal of the START Treaty), but without dismissing the possibility of involving the three other *de iure* nuclear powers in the process, especially China. Beijing has stated on several occasions that it would be willing to cut back its nuclear arsenal (it should be borne in mind that of the five nuclear powers China is the only one to have increased its arsenal by 25% since 2005) if the US and Russia were to reduce theirs to under 1,000 warheads each. Such a decision would also require Washington to reconsider the composition and size of its nuclear force, especially the withdrawal of some of its modern submarines, and also to limit the number of warheads in its missile force. In official statements and in the addresses delivered to the Conference on Disarmament or the First Committee of the United Nations on Disarmament and International Security, Chinese representatives generally hold that the purpose of disarmament and armaments control is «to increase the security of all states» and that it therefore «should not be used by stronger nations (in allusion to the US) to control weaker nations». In addition «countries should refrain from trying to achieve absolute security. Only by reducing threats from militarily stronger countries will weaker countries feel security enough to refrain from improving their nuclear arsenals».

Fifth, the implementation of mechanisms to ensure full verification and, more importantly, the irreversibility of the processes of nuclear disarmament (but also chemical and, to a lesser extent, biological, until the necessary conditions for verification are met) as this is not guaranteed under the current Moscow or SORT Treaty.

Sixth, progress in defining and adopting an international agreement on security assurances (positive and negative) from nuclear states to the non-nuclear states, and redefinition of the doctrine on the utilisation and role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies. This is an aspect of particular interest because the three main nuclear powers are currently reviewing their nuclear stance.

The 2009 work programme of the Conference on Disarmament also

established a working group (the fourth) under agenda item 4 entitled «Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons». This aspect is often referred to as «negative security assurances». Many states which do not possess nuclear weapons, especially those which are not protected under any nuclear sharing agreement with a nuclear weapons state (as NATO members are) have sought a legally binding agreement that those which possess nuclear weapons will never use them against those which do not possess these weapons. Many of these states, including all of Latin America, enjoy some kind of protection through Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) treaties. However they argue that this is not sufficient, as some of the nuclear weapons possessing states have either not fully ratified the NEFZ agreements or have done so with reservations (69).

With respect to the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—a process that began on 13 May 2009—which would replace that of 2001, there does not appear to be any consensus between members of the congressional committee on the main points to be included in the Posture Review (referring chiefly to disarmament measures or even the appropriateness of ratifying the CTBT). Although the NPR was expected to be made known at the end of 2009, everything would appear to indicate that it will be announced shortly before the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. There are doubts as to whether the US will abandon its «calculated ambiguity» with respect to the use of nuclear weapons or, instead, whether the Obama Administration will adopt a nuclear no-first-use policy if it considers that its conventional defence capabilities are sufficient to stem or neutralise a possible attack with nuclear, chemical and/or biological weapons (70).

Russia was also discussing its new nuclear doctrine at the end of 2009. Although little information has been made available on the terms of the doctrine, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, has stated that the most important novelty is the possibility of using nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries from attacking Russia or its allies, as well as in regional (or even local) conflicts to stem a conventional attack. Were this to be confirmed, it would mark a substantial change with respect to the traditional principle of nuclear no-first-use on the part of Russia, by opting for what we may interpret as being preventive strikes

(69) SNYDER, Susi, «*Conference on Disarmament...*» op. cit.

(70) POLLACK, Joshua, «Reducing the role of nuclear weapons», *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 30 October 2009, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/joshua-pollack/reducing-the-role-of-nuclear-weapons>.

(*uprezhdayushchiy udar*) and even against an adversary not possessing nuclear weapons (negative security assurances)(71).

Finally, China's official policy on nuclear no-first-use, negative security assurances and other commitments in nuclear weapons control is currently more symbolic than real, as it is practically impossible to verify commitments in these fields. China has never clearly articulated a nuclear doctrine on the deployment and response capability of its nuclear arsenal, although both its activities and its programmes (on the basis of the scant information available) indicate that Beijing only possesses a few limited options regarding the utilisation of nuclear weapons. Nor does it appear to be clear how the nuclear no-first-use policy can be maintained, especially if it undermines China's deterrence capability, a fundamental element of its nuclear doctrine.

Lastly, the seventh priority on the new non-proliferation agenda is to prevent terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (not only nuclear). This brings us to the need to adopt a series of measures that are absolutely essential, such as the improvement of facilities and physical protection of nuclear materials. In this respect it is important to stress some important advances such as the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540, but it would be necessary to promote universal accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, among other measures. As stated earlier, the convening by the US of a World Summit on Physical Nuclear Security three weeks before the holding of the NPT Review Conference may be a good time to reflect on this possible «fourth pillar of non-proliferation», but, we stress, it should not be used as a pretext to divert attention from the rest of the substantial issues of the NPT.

Many pending issues that are not easy to solve undoubtedly remain on this «list of good intentions» – such as how to guarantee the universality of the NPT (that is, how to secure the accession of India, Pakistan and Israel, which are highly reluctant to join). Pakistan considers that nuclear weapons are its most valuable strategic asset and, ultimately, guarantee the existence of the nation vis-à-vis what is considered to be the threat of India. As a Pakistani general stated in a widely disseminated article, «Oxygen is basic to life, and one does not debate its desirability, the «nuclear deterrence»

(71) «New Russian doctrine and preventive nuclear strikes» in *Russian strategic nuclear forces*, http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/10/new_russian_doctrine_and_preve.shtml.

has assumed that life-saving property for Pakistan» (72).

This assertion helps structure Pakistan's (unofficial) nuclear doctrine around two premises: first, that nuclear weapons are necessary to neutralise India's conventional superiority vis-à-vis a possible attack on its territory; and second, that nuclear weapons make it a match for India in terms of power (in strategic but also political terms). However, there is a substantial difference in the doctrine or strategic thought of both countries: Pakistan, unlike India, considers militarily utilisable nuclear weapons (even in the event of a conventional war) to be not only a defensive instrument but also an offensive instrument and even envisages their use in a low-intensity conflict or in defence against «punitive action» by third parties (73).

As for Israel, any agreement involves establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (applying not only to nuclear weapons, in view of the chemical and/or biological capabilities of some countries in the region). It should be remembered that only three Middle East states (Jordan, Kuwait and Libya, in addition to Turkey if we include it in the area) have total safeguard agreements in force with the IAEA. What is more, developments in the nuclear crisis with Iran (and, to a lesser extent, talks with North Korea aimed at its denuclearisation and return to the NPT, a situation that is not envisaged in the short term) will also influence debates in the field of the NPT Conference as what is at stake is, after all, the ability of the non-proliferation regime and of the Treaty in particular to stem Tehran's military nuclear aspirations.

In November 2005 Mohammed El-Baradei, former director of the IAEA, announced a document containing a package of measures to advance in non-proliferation and nuclear weapons control which is still valid: establishment of a moratorium of five to ten years on the construction of new uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities; conversion of highly enriched uranium-fuelled research reactors into non-military uranium and making the former unnecessary for peaceful nuclear uses; adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol as a compulsory verification regulation of the NPT; involvement of the United Nations Security Council in cases where a country decides to withdraw from the NPT; commitment on the part of all

(72) General ISLAM BEG, Mirza, «Pakistan's Nuclear Imperatives», *National Development and Security*, No. 19, February 1997, pp. 23-75.

(73) SETHI, Manpreet, «Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy», Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), article no. 2361, 23 August 2007, <http://www.ipcs.org/newKashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2377&subCatID=null&mod=null>

states to comply and prosecute cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and technologies (in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1540, of 28 April 2004); speeding up of the implementation of unequivocal nuclear disarmament commitments by the five nuclear states and, especially, negotiation of a treaty on the irreversibility of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear programmes as a starting point; and, finally, recognition of the volatility of the long drawn-out tension leading to proliferation in regions such as the Middle East and Korean Peninsula, and the adoption of actions that resolve the existing security deficit and, when necessary, provide security assurances (74).

The 2010 NPT Review Conference provides a unique opportunity to debate on the establishment of a new world security order as the discussions will cover many existing Cold War doctrines and conceptions of the role of nuclear weapons. Nor, obviously, will it do to be too optimistic. As stated, it is materially impossible for all the disarmament and non-proliferation proposals made by President Barack Obama to be specified before the conference. Nor should we forget that Russia continues to be a leading international actor in this area and must be taken into account. However, today, unlike during the Cold War, US military spending is ten times greater than that of Russia (not counting the cost of military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq). Indeed, although before the international economic crisis erupted President Putin announced a «grandiose» modernisation of Russia's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, the fact is that in February 2009 Moscow announced a 15% cut in its military budget owing, among other things, to the reduction in state revenues as a result as the drastic fall in the price of raw materials.

The NPT Review Conference of May 2010 needs to come up with a real agreement on short-term disarmament and non-proliferation priorities— not simply a high-sounding declaration adopted by consensus and with commitments in limbo, very much in the style of the Treaty review conferences, but full of nuances on its legal, political or moral value, as occurred in 1995 and 2000. In this respect the current US Administration deserves a vote of confidence in its disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives, especially as it was so widely criticised for lack of cooperation. It is a duty of everyone to restore confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general and in the NPT in particular.

(74) *Vid.*, <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n017.html>.

COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING GROUP

- Coordinator:* **D. EDUARDO SERRA REXACH**
President of «Eduardo Serra y Asociados, Consultoría Estratégica».
Minister of Defence (1996-2000).
President of the Real Instituto Elcano (2001-2005).
- Member and Secretary:* **D. FRANCISCO JOSÉ RUIZ GONZÁLEZ**
Lieutenant Commander, Spanish Navy.
Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos.
- Members:* **D. FEDERICO STEINBERG WHESLER**
Senior analyst in International Economics, Real Instituto Elcano
Lecturer of the Department of Economic Analysis at the Universidad Autónoma, Madrid.
- DOÑA YOLANDA CASTRO DIEZ**
Professor of Applied Physics at the Universidad de Granada
- D. FLORENTINO PORTERO RODRIGUEZ**
PhD in Contemporary History
Lecturer at the UNED
- D. JOSE MARIA ROBLES FRAGA**
Diplomat
Member of Spanish Parliament (1993-2001)
Ambassador of Spain to Moscow (2001-2004)
Ambassador of Spain to Islamabad (2005-2009)
- D. ANÍBAL VILLALBA FERNÁNDEZ**
Lieutenant Colonel, Spanish Army.
Advisor, Department of International Politics and Security, Cabinet of the Presidency of the Government.
- D. VICENTE GARRIDO REBOLLEDO**
Lecturer in International Relations, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos.
Director of the INCIPE.

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