

**EU Non-PROLIFERATION CONSORTIUM**

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# Conceptualizing CSBMs Properly in the Delivery Vehicles (DVs) Sector for the Middle East Conference (MEC)

BERND W. KUBBIG

## Background paper

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## About the Author

Bernd Kubbig is a Senior Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and Coordinator of the Project “Ballistic Missile Defense Research International”.

## Abbreviations

ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
HCOC	The Hague Code of Conduct
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNMOVIC	UN Monitoring, Observation, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNODA	UN Office of Disarmament
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM	UN Special Commission
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WMDFZ	Weapon of Mass Destruction-Free Zone

## 1. The Case for Missiles at the MEC Table

This paper with its specific emphasis on delivery vehicles – and here again on missiles – makes the case for a number of conceptual, political, and procedural advantages that this category of delivery systems has for the planned Middle East Conference. Needless to say, delivery systems are explicitly mentioned in paragraph 7(d) of the Mandate for the MEC: referring there to the “full implementation” of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. While ‘the other’ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) comprise biological and chemical weapons, delivery systems or delivery vehicles (DVs) usually consist of missiles – ballistic and cruise missiles, of aircraft as well as of unmanned aerial vehicles; missile defence systems could also be included, since they are the ‘technological twins’ of ballistic missiles. It is taken for granted that regional asymmetries in the WMD/DVs area are a fact that has to be taken into account. These imbalances, therefore, are an additional challenge, but also an opportunity both for any Track II analysis such as this paper as well for the Middle East Conference itself.

Properly managed by Ambassador Jaakko Laajava and his team, missiles can contribute to the success of the prospective Helsinki Conference. In fact, missiles

- can be seen as the starting point from which it is possible to reach out to other means of delivery such as aircraft and make them part of the overall asymmetrical equation;
- (this may be even more important) can work as bridge builders to all three kinds of WMD – this applies to those types of missile which are designed to carry nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads (see next bullet point);
- can be introduced in line with the mandate. Based on the findings of the Routledge study.<sup>1</sup> I suggest dealing with missiles having a 70 km range or more because they can be verified (verifiability is also an advantage, especially compared to biological warheads). Such a ‘red line’ enables negotiators to leave conventional arsenals outside the Helsinki room, and thus, to reduce complexities at the nevertheless, if they wish the parties in Helsinki can, at a certain point in time, go beyond the state level and include the rocket/missile arsenals of organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah – this will certainly complicate the discussions;
- can be used at the MEC table as starting points for discussions and as test balloons to explore certain options, because missiles are politically less loaded than especially nuclear weapons;
- (this is especially relevant) are supposed to be part of a broader Helsinki agenda – although they may not constitute the most pivotal topic of debate, which could prove to be beneficial. This Having a more sweeping agenda in Helsinki also covering strategic missiles increases the chances for trade-offs and for bargaining chips and by implication for a compromise-oriented tit-for-tat approach. At the same time, the inclusion of all three categories of WMD and of DVs reduces the danger of singling out countries with an actual (Israel) or possibly emerging nuclear weapon capability (Iran). In line with the MEC Mandate, all results will be ‘freely arrived at’ – a stipulation that may provide an additional incentive for all

<sup>1</sup> See Bernd W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds), *Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East*, London: Routledge (2012).

Middle East states to come to Helsinki, since it underscores their sovereignty at the MEC table.

*In a nutshell, missiles matter, because without them and other delivery vehicles nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads will, to a considerable extent, become sitting ducks.*

While all this indicates that missiles can become part of the solution, they are first of all part of the problem: They are an element of an ongoing and in fact intensifying arms race. Because of their technical characteristics, they can be especially destabilizing in a crisis situation, since they cannot be called back. Missiles have been used in Middle East wars, and they are threatening the life-style of Israeli citizens who endure the rockets launched by organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. The Structure of this Paper

I proceed first by defining confidence- and security-building measures<sup>3</sup> (CSBMs) together with arms control, reductions, and disarmament.<sup>4</sup> This will allow us to lay down a gradual path forward in the areas of delivery systems on the way to the ambitious goal of a missile free zone as part of a much more comprehensive zone free of WMD/DVs as envisaged by the international community in May 2010. Confidence- and security-building measures will thus be understood as one element of an integrated and long-term concept. Secondly, I conceptualize missile-related CSBMs as well as arms control/reductions as part of a conflict formation-centred approach. Missiles, like all other DVs or WMD, have to be seen primarily in the regional context. This approach has important implications for the – limited albeit relevant – role of all measures in addressing and even reducing and eventually eliminating those delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction.

My focus in this paper is one dyad only: among the many existing adversarial/inimical relationships in the Middle East the Israeli-Iranian one stands out because it is highly explosive. In fact, all elements of a gradual strategy striving towards a zone free of WMD/DVs currently have to be seen as escalation control/de-escalatory measures – speaking about CSBMs/arms control and reduction measures in this dyad actually amounts to efforts to *manage and decrease deeply rooted mistrust*. Such emergency measures are in part more basic and more modest than *building* confidence, although they are not mutually exclusive.

Because of the precarious relationship between Israel and Iran, I will lay my emphasis on urgent short-term measures. The medium- and long-term efforts on the way to the goal of a WMD/DVs Free Zone described elsewhere in greater detail<sup>5</sup> will be mostly neglected here;

<sup>2</sup> I nevertheless will confine myself to the missile problem on the state level, and here for the reasons mentioned above to those with a range of more than 70 km. But it is important to note that the focus on missiles has allowed the authors of the Routledge study to include all relevant conflict formations, those on the non-state level included, in a feasible way. See Bernd W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds), *Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East*, London: Routledge (2012), p. 167-214.

<sup>3</sup> The terms CSBMs and CBMs (confidence-building measures) are used as synonyms. In the terminology related to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe the added notion of ‘security’ (CSBMs) implies additional criteria. See on this Sven-Eric Fikenscher *et al.*, The promise of military transparency. Building on East–West experiences and on the UN Register of Conventional Arms, in: Bernd W. Kubbig and *ibid.* (eds), *Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East*, London: Routledge (2012), p. 218.

<sup>4</sup> In order to make things easier for the reader I will often reduce the three terms of ‘arms control, reductions, and disarmament’ to the first two elements.

<sup>5</sup> See Martin Senn *et al.*, Caps and bans: limiting, reducing, and prohibiting missiles and missile defence, in: Bernd W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds), *Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East*,

they are in fact sketched out in outline near the end of this paper. Two aspects need to be mentioned: first, CSBMs are part and parcel of this long, cumbersome, and gradual arms control and reduction path towards the planned zone; secondly, as I will explain below, far-reaching CSBMs and traditional arms control measures overlap. Therefore, for the Helsinki Conference to be successful, I suggest a flexible approach that keeps all CSBM and arms control and reduction options in principle on the table at the same time. Nevertheless, let us face the realities of the utterly precarious Israeli–Iranian dyad: it is hardly conceivable that arms control/reduction measures will be at the forefront at the beginning of the Helsinki discussions.

The guiding question for this paper is the following one: What specific tasks can missile-related CSBMs and arms control/reductions achieve, and which ones can they *not* fulfil?

My paper culminates in a proposal for this conference of the EU Consortium in Brussels to send a Track I or Track II surprise signal from here to the world by capping the range of those missiles which are seen by Israel and Iran as the most threatening ones, because they can reach the other side's territory.

### 3. Defining and Conceptualizing Missile-related Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

#### 3.1 Defining the Basic Terms

Basically, confidence- and security-building measures aim at reducing the dangers of tensions and of armed conflict, but also the misunderstandings associated with military activities. The dimension of lack of clear and timely information, especially in crisis situations, is of special relevance. Therefore, military openness/transparency is a central element of the concept of CSBMs.<sup>6</sup> They are to lead to the 'reduction of uncertainty' with regard to general military escalation, crisis escalation, surprise attacks, and low-level violence.<sup>7</sup> Many confidence- and security-building measures are technical ones, but not necessarily weapons-related – the classical example being the 'hotline' established between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the Middle East the CSBMs achieved (but not implemented) in the wake of the talks on Arms Control and Regional Security in the first half of the 1990s regarding maritime issues (search-and-rescue and incidents-at-sea); prior notification of military exercises and the exchange of information regarding, among others, military personnel; the establishment of a communication network in the Middle East and of three regional security centres.

There is some overlapping between CSBMs and arms control, since both aim at enhancing strategic stability; at the same time, arms control has a confidence-building orientation, although the tools are in part different. Indeed, arms control, too, aims at reducing tensions resulting from uncontrolled arms dynamics and from delicate crisis situations. Arms control measures are stability-oriented (arms race and crisis stability) and are characterized by their

London: Routledge (2012), p. 251-276. In this phased, long-term concept missile defense systems, which are ignored in this paper, are dealt with in great detail.

<sup>6</sup> See on this Sven-Eric Fikenscher *et al.*, 'The promise of military transparency: building on East–West experiences and on the UN Register of Conventional Arms,' in *ibid.* and Bernd W. Kubbig (eds), *Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East*, London 2012: Routledge, 218.

<sup>7</sup> Yair Evron, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Arab–Israeli Context, in: *Contemporary Security Policy*, 16: 1, (1995), p. 152-153 (quotation: 152).

focus on tackling the destabilizing character of the respective weapons/delivery vehicles. Arms control initiatives are often cooperative ones in a bi- or multilateral setting; since they are stability-oriented in the first place; they can imply (and in fact have in reality in the East-West context) a coordinated ('controlled') build-up.<sup>8</sup> The concepts and measures for reducing those arsenals with the final objective of disarmament differ fundamentally from the instruments and the stability-oriented goals of classical arms control. Disarmament can take the form of a regional zone and include a broad range of categories (such as WMD and DVs), but it can also mean a 'global zero' concerning specific weapons (e.g. nuclear).

However, because of the specific history of proposals in the missile realm, the difference between CSBMs such as the non-deployment of certain types of missiles and the traditional arms control notion is not clear cut. Such a distinction is in fact becoming more blurred. This applies also to limiting missile capabilities qualitatively (by constraints on 'modernization') or quantitatively (by, for instance, capping the range of missiles or reducing the number of delivery vehicles). Prohibiting the deployment of a certain missile type, amounting to a qualitative constraint, can be regarded as more restrictive than limiting numbers as part of traditional arms control.

Thus, confidence- and security-building measures differ in scope ranging from relatively simple/modest to ones which are far-reaching. Transparent information and communication measures fall under the first category. In the missile-related area they involve, for instance, the exchange of information on missiles projects, regular reporting on activities, and pre-notification of flight tests.

Far-reaching confidence- and security-building measures include limits on the striking range of missiles tested; moratoriums or even bans on flight tests; non-deployment, de-targeting and de-alerting of missiles; no first-use of delivery vehicles; restraint in missile technology transfer and development of indigenous capabilities; a moratorium/ban on missile-related transfers.<sup>9</sup> Again, these measures touch upon the weapons themselves – an impact that is normally attributed to classical arms control measures.<sup>10</sup>

Therefore, which category of CSBMs is involved must be made clear. The concrete context will be relevant. Simple/modest measures can be extremely important in crisis situations involving countries such as Iran and Israel whose hostile relationships do not in all likelihood include any formal communication mechanisms.

### 3.2 Conceptualizing the Basic Terms

As far as conceptualizing CSBMs is concerned, this paper adopts the approach of previous works and builds on their results. This implies that the region is structured on a country/state-related level according to existing conflict formations and their associated alliances. Israel and Iran appear as two crucial centres which structure the state relationships both with their allies and mostly adversaries/enemies. In the case of Israel, with its 'special ally,' the United States, relevant countries include Iran, Syria, Egypt, and the members of the Gulf

<sup>8</sup> See Martin Senn *et al.*, Caps and bans: limiting, reducing, and prohibiting missiles and missile defence, in: Bernd W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds), *Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East*, London: Routledge (2012), p. 253-255.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 61<sup>th</sup> session, *The issue of missiles in all its aspects. Report of the Secretary-General*, (New York, N.Y., July 20, 2006 [A/61/168]), p. 19.

<sup>10</sup> This is one reason why the strict sequencing of 'CSBMs first – arms control later' as a major hurdle for any serious talks – is in principle moot in the missile area. I will deal with this potentially explosive issue for the MEC in the extended version of this paper, since it \ mainly focuses on the Israeli–Egyptian dyad.

Cooperation Council; in the case of Iran, with its pragmatic ally, the Assad regime in Damascus, Israel would have to be added, and so would the United States. On the non-state level Hamas and Hezbollah can be considered adversaries of Israel and allies of Iran.

A forthcoming policy brief,<sup>11</sup> which in part summarizes previous studies, will present the following crucial results involving the most relevant state relationships in the Middle East: tensions of different degrees and conflict potentials ranging from low to extremely high/explosive. Also, among the weapons of adversarial/hostile countries some are seen as more dangerous than others – not surprisingly, (emerging) nuclear arsenals in first place, and within the spectrum of delivery vehicles those aircraft and missiles that can reach the territory of the adversary. Military doctrines – whether they are perceived as primarily or exclusively offensive or defensive – matter, too.

In addition to the identified lists of country-based security concerns/external threats as the most important driving force, that policy brief highlights the following motives and interests behind the weapons procurement strategies of the states analysed:

- the hegemonic aspirations of two states in the region (Iran and Saudi Arabia);
- the interest in not having foreign policy options constrained across the board (this applies to Israel especially vis-à-vis Iran) by a possibly emerging (near) nuclear power state;
- historical experience (Israel's experiences of the Holocaust and of its wars with Arab countries; and Iran's experience of receiving no support in the First Gulf War [1980-88], including the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein);
- cultural factors (such as a strong inclination to self-defence in Israel and prestige and national pride associated with nuclear programs in the Islamic Republic); and finally
- domestic factors, i.e. public attitudes, power constellations, a network of the military, industry, bureaucracies and universities involved in the research, development, testing, and production of the relevant military capabilities (the latter applies in particular to Israel, and to a certain degree to Iran).

Two assumptions remain relevant:

- In principle, conflict formations are paramount in explaining state behaviour in the entire security area – this does not exclude the relevance of weapons and the need to control, reduce, and finally to eliminate them.
- The security concerns, motives, and interests that have been identified are stumbling blocks for any successful strategy – including CSBMs – in connection with the zone as the key issue at the MEC. This explains why I start by putting the specific weapons – and CSBMs and arms control/reductions – into the overall bilateral contexts.
- The Iranian-Israeli relationship, with its emphasis on delivery systems, can be expanded at a later point in two ways: first, by including other important adversarial relationships; and second, by extending the DVs to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In the Iranian–Israeli dyad the potential for expansion includes above all the United States and its relevant arsenals, since Tehran views Israeli and American capabilities as a joint threat that cannot be separated.

<sup>11</sup> Christian Weidlich and Bernd W. Kubbig (in Cooperation with Other Members of the Academic Peace , Orchestra Middle East), *Coping Constructively with Military Asymmetries in the Middle East. Lists of Security Concerns as a First Step at the Middle East Conference* (working title, forthcoming as a Policy Brief).

## 4. CSBMs as Escalation Control/De-escalatory Measures in the Israeli–Iranian Relationship

### 4.1 Embedding Missile-related CSBMs and Arms Control/Reductions in the Overall Bilateral Relationship

On *Israel's* list of security concerns/threat perceptions regarding the Islamic Republic two factors loom large: first, Tehran's aggressive rhetoric and foreign policy, i.e. its support of a hostile regime (Syria) and non-state actors ( Hamas and Hezbollah) are seen as part of an overall quest for Iran's regional hegemony; second, the suspected Iranian nuclear weapon activities and the obvious programs of missiles which can reach Israel.

The *Islamic Republic of Iran*, in turn, is afraid of an Israeli attack on its nuclear and missile facilities based on the 'Begin Doctrine' of pre-emption; Tehran is also concerned about the Israeli monopoly on nuclear weapons as well as about the superiority of its aircraft and of its missiles, which can reach Iranian territory. In a more specific way the elites in Tehran also fear (further) killing of its scientists. Yet whereas a (near) nuclear Iran is the paramount threat for Israel, from Tehran's perspective the United States – and not Israel – is the number 1 menace.

But their mutual fears do not explain the nuclear and missile activities of both countries. As indicated above in short-hand, for both Israel and Iran the motives and interests identified have to be taken into account, too – and to be overcome during the gradual strategy for achieving a zone free of WMD/DVs. Again, one specific difference is especially important: Whereas Iran has become the most important factor in Israel's recent arms build-up, Tehran's activities in the nuclear and missile realm had nothing to do with Israel in the past and even today such activities are considered to be a secondary driving force.

The Israeli–Iranian relationship is characterized by absence of diplomatic ties and a lack of visible mechanisms of communication. At the same time, rhetoric and actions across the board are mutually antagonistic; they include technological cyberspace interventions and the alleged targeted killing of each other's citizens. All in all, the tensions between these two countries are extremely high, with an equally great escalation potential to more war-like violence – military strikes against Iranian nuclear and missile facilities and a violent, probably asymmetrical response by Tehran cannot be ruled out. For good reasons the current state of affairs has already been described as a bilateral multifaceted war with strong support on the part of Israel for even more intrusive international economic and financial sanctions against Iran.

### 4.2 Exploring the Relevance of CSBMs and Arms Control/Reductions in the Missile Realm

What specific tasks can missile-related CSBMs and arms control/reductions achieve and which ones can they *not* carry out?

First of all, the pre-war or war-like situation between the two countries warrants every effort to improve the dyad 'on all fronts.' Flexible and simultaneous steps will be imperative, and they may be designed as mutually reinforcing offers. The Three Milestones (see below) should be understood in this way – depending on the situation, elements of all three Milestones, for instance, can be launched as test balloons and be put forward in parallel. I

trust that the experienced facilitator and his team at the MEC table will be skilled in selecting and proposing suitable specific measures.

- In line with the assumed paramount importance of conflict formations for arms dynamics, major initiatives will have to be taken in the policy field and in the entire military area. The Iranian-Israeli relationship can basically and generally be improved by parallel steps involving initiating bilateral dialogue on all levels (Track I, 1,5 and II), increasing public awareness of the military dangers and ceasing to use bellicose rhetoric. Special emphasis should be put on initiating mechanisms of communication (hot wire). Informal signalling possibly via third parties (Switzerland, Norway or by Track II organizations) and behind the scenes is especially important for a start.

In the military area additional steps could include risk reduction and strategic restraint across the board, safety and security measures plus improvement of intelligence. As missiles are part of the basic bilateral problem, there is a – limited and yet relevant – role for CSBMs and arms control/reductions. In the current bilateral crisis situation de-escalatory steps are urgent, but (as indicated in the Three Milestones approach below) this does not at all exclude mid- and long-term initiatives on the long and rocky road to a Missile Free Zone as part of the broader WMD/DVs Free Zone which the international community envisaged in May 2010.

CSBMs in the missile area can endorse these goals, and also fulfil specific ones – but it would be too much to expect them to fundamentally change the Iranian-Israeli relationship in all its dimensions. This applies to all measures related to all other DVs and WMD as well. In fact, CSBMs in the missile area can

- signal good will based on a courageous leap of trust (see concretization in the next sub-chapter);
- help start dialogue on the WMD/DVs Free Zone not only at the Middle East Conference but also by making use of other already existing forums (“First Milestone”), for instance in the context of the
  - United Nations. Its Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) is a fruitful starting point for establishing a certain degree of military transparency in the context of military asymmetries, since it covers both categories: missiles and aircraft. In the past the register was in principle supported by almost all states in the region, Israel and Iran included.
  - The UNROCA only lists imported items, and therefore needs to be revised and expanded. But it should cover all stockpiles of conventional military capabilities and procurement from each country’s own production. Unmanned aerial vehicles need to be included as well. In principle, the revised UNROCA can create the political will needed to embark on the gradual reduction path towards a Missile Free Zone as part of a more comprehensive WMD Free Zone. But ironically, Israel and Iran are in the same boat, since they are the only states in the region with an indigenous military production capacity. It remains to be seen whether the required reforms produce a kind of glue effect between the two countries.
  - two existing missile regimes (“Second Milestone”), i.e. first, the Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (HCOG), whose 134 member states are only required to annually report their missile and space activities as well as to notify other countries before they test a

missile or launch a space vehicle. The potential for taking these two minimalist requirements seriously *and for expanding them* is gigantic. Ironically, the weakness of the HCOC could be attractive for the missile-relevant Middle Eastern/Gulf countries, none of which is a member. If Israel and Iran joined the HCOC they would show that regional cooperation is possible in the security sector. But even accepting its two stipulations without joining it formally would contribute to confidence building.

- Second, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and its export controls. They can reduce incentives for proliferation in the future too if the member states abandoned the ‘my missiles are good, yours are bad’ attitude. In addition, the MTCR members should reward good missile behaviour with increased technical cooperation in the space sector. The states in the Middle East/Gulf, which so far have only undertaken minor missile transfers within and outside the region (above all Israel), may want to subscribe to the controls of the MTCR without formally joining it. In fact, a regional MTCR variant is recommended. The optimal way would be if Israel and Iran were inspired by other states of the region to join them in this respect.

### **4.3 A Track I or Track II Surprise Signal from Brussels to the World: Capping the Range of the Most Threatening Missiles**

Offering the concrete step of an informal understanding or bilateral agreement about capping the ranges so that Israeli and Iranian missiles cannot reach the territory of the adversary would constitute a tremendous CSBM; relocating the missiles in Iran only because of its vastness could also be a promising step. The same applies to the third proposal: de-alerting the regional strike forces of both sides, i.e. keeping the launchers/aircraft separately from the strike weapons (this measure would bring the United States into the picture).

The first initiative, in particular, would be a far-reaching one. Such a move should be seen in the context of the above-mentioned advantages associated with the Mandate for the MEC in Helsinki: first, the greater chance for trade-offs among missiles, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and missile defence systems; second, the promising procedural principle ‘give a little, take a little’; also, constructive results can be expected from a formula that is ‘freely arrived at’ under the MEC Mandate.

As a unilateral step taken, for instance, by Iran, it could be perceived by Israel at first glance as a diversionary tactic or as just another gesture of typical Iranian ‘over-transparency’ (Uzi Rubin). Needless to say, an adequate verification scheme would have to be put in place. Tehran may have its reservations, too, involving the Israelis acting first. As the comprehensive list of the two countries’ current missile (defence) capabilities (see Table) shows, Israel is superior across the board. The gap widens if attention is expanded from the DVs to the WMD realm because of Israel’s nuclear monopoly in comparison with a possibly emerging (near) nuclear Iran.

Nevertheless, Tehran has the potential for bargaining power. This is due to the fact that Israelis perceive Iranian medium-range missiles (Shahab-3; Sajjil/Sajjil-2) as a threat because they can reach Israeli territory (the short-range and probably the long-range missiles are not important in this dyad).

This specific capping option cannot be seen in isolation from the entire spectrum of delivery vehicles. Israel is superior in that both its sea-launched cruise missiles as well as

some of its multi-role fighters can reach Iran. Tehran would be imprudent if it did not factor this asymmetry into its missile bargaining. Therefore, the Iranian leadership could offer a cap for a certain number of its medium-range missiles. To achieve tangible results, Israel would have to respond within a strategy of mutual responses in a productive, asymmetrical way that would include (some of) its aircraft.

*In any case, such a surprise signal could be explored at the Track II level first, thus demonstrating the greater freedom over Track I – the Iranian and Israeli participants in this very panel may want to endorse the signal publicly. In fact both panellists from Israel and Iran could use this conference of the EU Consortium to give greater exposure to this surprise signal.*

Table: Identifying Trade-Offs and Bargaining Opportunities in the Context of Military Asymmetries Between Israel and Iran in the DVs Area<sup>12</sup>

		<b>Israel</b>	<b>Iran</b>	<b>Assessment</b>
<b>Ballistic Missiles</b>	short-range	+	–	Advantageous/superior position for Israel
	medium-range	+–	+–	<b>Rough Parity (favourable condition for bargaining)</b>
	long-range	+	–	Advantageous/superior position for Israel
<b>Cruise Missiles</b>		+	–	Advantageous/superior position for Israel
<b>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</b>		+	–	Advantageous/superior position for Israel
<b>Missile Defence</b>		+	–	Advantageous/superior position for Israel
<b>Aircraft</b>		+	–	Advantageous/superior position for Israel

Source: Based on Michael Haas and Bernd W. Kubbig (Compilers), “Appendix: the arsenals of actors relevant to a missile free zone in the Middle East/Gulf,” in: Bernd W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds), *Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East*, London 2012: Routledge (no pages indicated)

#### 4.4 Mid- and Long-term Measures

- The steps described above would basically constitute Phase 1 of the ‘Third Milestone’ which is a stabilization phase, since build-ups in terms of traditional arms control cannot be ruled out. The two phases that would follow on the long road to a missile free zone as part of the more demanding zone free of WMD/DVs can be sketched in the following way:
- *Phase 2:* A reduction and prohibition both of offensive weaponry as well as of so-called defensive weapons would be pursued. Missile defence is basically not ‘purely defensive.’

<sup>12</sup> Quantitative and qualitative parameters to be provided in later version for which the WMD-related dimension will have to be included, too. And so will the much more important assessment of how important missiles are within the arsenals and the doctrines of both countries.

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Our argument is that reductions in weaponry and greater stability can be pursued and achieved in tandem.

- *Phase 3:* Comprehensive bans would be in place along with a Missile Free Zone. There would be two major challenges to cope with: First, effective verification measures which would have to be far-reaching and sustainable would have to be applied in order to deter and detect potential cheaters and to reassure those abiding by the regime. Second, certain safeguards, excluding missile defence, would be required in order to prevent a reversal of commitment and capabilities in crisis times.

As unrealistic as these phases may appear from today's perspective, they would be necessary elements of a comprehensive and long-term concept which right now has to focus on the escalation control/de-escalatory measures presented, in order to avoid war between Israel and Iran – or, to end on a more optimistic note: to introduce them as steps that are deserving of the name confidence- and security-building.

### 5. The Way Ahead

This paper has made the case for the added value of missiles and CSBM/arms control and reductions in this area as part of a long-term path towards the ambitious objective of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and of all kinds of delivery vehicles. This amounts to underscoring the wisdom of the Mandate for the Middle East Conference whose expanded agenda allows for greater trade-offs and bargaining opportunities which imply a compromise-oriented approach with terms concurrently fulfilled by each party.

While probably not being at the centre of the Helsinki discussions, delivery vehicles would be attractive, because they are politically less loaded. Experience in this area may have a positive spill-over effect to the debates on weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear warheads. Reducing delivery vehicles will finally increase the chance of solving the WMD issues, since they transport the lethal payload to the territory of adversaries.

CSBM and arms control/reduction need to be embedded in the regional context. The focus of this paper on the Iranian–Israeli dyad will have to be expanded by analysing all relevant state relationships and by including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In addition, transparent criteria for measuring the military asymmetries will have to be developed.

After all, conceptualizing CSBMs as part of a long and rocky road to the extremely demanding goal of a zone free of WMD/DVs and the zone itself are a tool – not ends in themselves. They would increase security for all in the region. Therefore, it is necessary and helpful to involve external actors – especially the United States – in the process of establishing more comprehensive security arrangements.