

Editorial

10 years already! The European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ("the Strategy") was endorsed by the European Council in December 2003. The least one can say about this tenth anniversary is that it is proving relatively low key...

The strategy's mindset and method is based on support for the major instruments, mechanisms, and institutions of multilateral non-proliferation through regular funding and targeted outreach activities. This is the principal approach of joint actions and Council decisions, to which can be added initiatives arising from the European Stability Mechanism (chiefly the 2009 CBRN Action Plan, and the Centres of Excellence currently under construction), the non-proliferation clause (or WMD clause) governing EU relations with third-party countries, and diplomatic action regarding the North Korean and Iranian proliferation crises.

Aside from the latter two fields of activity that employ a coercive approach, prevention within the major existing multilateral frameworks remains the by-word of the European counter-proliferation policy, a fact that can be explained by both political and historical reasons. Politically speaking, it constitutes a common denominator among EU Member States. This was the case in 2003 in the midst of the Iraqi crisis and remains so today in a 28-member Union. From an historical point of view, it is also a response to the Bush Administration's active anti-multilateral stance at the beginning of the millennium.

Ten years later, although impact assessments are very much the order of the day, the task of evaluating a strategy based on "effective multilateralism" is not straightforward. The advantage of the European approach is grounded in a long-term desire to strengthen the collective security tools approved by the greatest possible number of States. Its weak point comprises its occasional tendency to clash with a strategic reality that is as contradictory as it is obstinate.

Benjamin Hautecouverture
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There are no binding international standards for the security of nuclear materials

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As a sharp observer of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, Elena K. Sokova analyses the interim agreement with Iran and the prospects for the third Nuclear Security Summit (NSS, The Hague, 24 – 25 March 2014).



Elena K. Sokova is Executive Director of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). Prior to Vienna, she held a number of senior research and management positions at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey, California. Her primary research topics include nuclear security, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, fissile materials disposition and control, nuclear safeguards, international nonproliferation regimes, and nuclear disarmament.

Last 24 November 2013 the P3+3 and Iran signed a "Joint Plan of Action," which consists of a short-term freeze of portions of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for decreased economic sanctions on Iran. What are its strengths and weaknesses?

The deal reached in Geneva last November is a major and much needed breakthrough in efforts to establish tighter controls over the nuclear program in Iran, ensure its peaceful nature, and hopefully reverse it. The interim agreement slows down Iran's acquisition of special fissile materials—highly enriched uranium and plutonium, which are the main ingredients for a nuclear device. It puts limitations on Iran's capacity to enrich, caps the enrichment of uranium at 5%, and eliminates half of the 20% U235 stocks. It also postpones Iran's acquisition of plutonium by putting on hold the launch of the Arak research reactor. Most importantly, these limitations will be subject to intrusive inspections and verification measures. However, the deal is only an interim solution. It puts a break on the nuclear developments in Iran and gives the two sides time to develop trust and to hold further negotiations on a comprehensive, lasting agreement. Iran's break-out capabilities and possible dismantlement of some facilities are likely to be the subject of future negotiations. In this regard, the effective implementation of the "Joint Plan of Action" in the next six months by both sides is critical for

any follow-on deals.

The theft of radioactive materials that took place early December 2013 in Mexico poses questions on the protection of radioactive material worldwide. What do you think should be done at a regional and international level to strengthen the regime in place?

The theft of a truck with a cobalt-60 source in Mexico and its successful recovery provide many valuable lessons and point to vulnerabilities. What if the thieves were after the radioactive material and wanted to use it for terrorist purposes? Why wasn't the truck equipped with a GPS or other tracking device and why was it left unattended by the driver? The Mexican authorities, no doubt, will be deriving their own lessons. They should be praised, however, for issuing an international alert and making this information public. They did so despite the absence of a legal instrument that requires such reporting. This incident highlights another shortcoming. There are no binding international standards for the security of nuclear materials and radioactive sources. The IAEA's recommendations and codes of conduct are extremely valuable but still fall short when it comes to the enforcement, transparency, and universality. Hopefully, the forthcoming Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague could tackle some of these issues. We need to overcome the insistence of states to treat nuclear security as a domestic issue

and use national sovereignty and secrecy as a pretext for not committing to binding international obligations.

In March 2014, the first ever Nuclear Knowledge Summit (NKS), parallel to the Nuclear Security Summit, will be held in Amsterdam. What role does civil society play regarding nuclear security?

Similar symposia have already been held in parallel with the Nuclear Security Summits in Washington, DC, in 2010 and in Seoul in 2012. The NKS in Amsterdam is a continuing recognition of the role that civil society plays in setting the agenda, providing expertise, and contributing to the capacity building in the nuclear security field. Examples range from the development of draft highly enriched uranium transparency guidelines, self-assessment tools on nuclear security culture, model legislation kits, online training modules, and academic programs. The NKS is also an opportunity to generate new ideas and tackle some issues that do not find their way to the official Summit agenda, or that governments are too timid to discuss, such as non-civilian stocks of fissile materials. In addition, the NKS allows representatives from different regions to share ideas and approaches to advancing nuclear security in their respective regions and globally, chart priorities for future work, and discuss ways to promote them.

Interview conducted by
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EU Institutional news

Second Round of Open-ended Consultations on the Proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Bangkok, 20 - 22 November 2013

On 20-22 November 2013, representatives from 60 countries met in Bangkok to discuss the latest version of the draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities released on 16 September 2013 by the EU. The first EU Code of conduct proposal dates back to 2007 and was intended to regulate both civil and military space activities. More precisely, its main objective was and still is to reinforce existing conventions and instruments towards their universalization and to codify best practices in terms of outer-space activities. The draft promotes compliance of signatory states to treaties and conventions such as the CTBT; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; and the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Since then, a process of broad consultations on the proposal has been launched between EU and all interested states, with the objective to achieve the widest possible support. A first round of open-ended consultations was held in Kiev in May 2013 and was aimed at getting different states on the same level of information and knowledge. The second multilateral consultation held in Bangkok focused on the actual content and wording of the proposed text. A reviewed draft will be released early 2014.

The spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, stated the day of the second round of consultation that “[Catherine Ashton, on Behalf of the EU,] encourages diplomats and space experts to engage in in-depth discussions on this new proposal that would create a voluntary set of norms of behaviour with the aim to reduce the potential for accidents, incidents and conflicts in an increasingly complex and congested outer space environment”.

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Draft

Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the consultations for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities

The E3+3 and Iran, Geneva, 20 - 24 November 2013

The EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and the Foreign Minister of Iran, together with the Foreign Ministers and the Political Directors of the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) met from 20 – 24 November in Geneva to set out an approach towards reaching a comprehensive solution to ensure that Iranian’s nuclear programme will always be exclusively peaceful.

It emerged from these talks a “Joint Plan of Action” between Iran and the E3+3, in which it has been decided to decrease economic sanctions towards Iran in exchange of a freeze and partial rollback of portions of Iran’s nuclear program, for a duration of 6 months. This interim agreement would enable Iran to enjoy its right to nu-

clear energy for peaceful purposes by involving a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme. The agreement is a first step towards a long-term and comprehensive solution. A joint Commission will be established to monitor the implementation of near-term measures, in collaboration with the IAEA.

[Joint Plan of Action](#)

[Statement by the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso on Iran talks](#)

[Joint Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Iran Foreign Minister Zarif](#)

EU CBRN CoE: implementation on the way

The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE) initiative was launched in May 2010 in order to respond to a capacity deficit of numerous States in terms of CBRN risk management.

More than three years after the establishment of the CoE, January 2013 marked the beginning of a new operational phase, based on the initiation of twenty-four projects piloted by the initiative’s, on the whole civilian, partner institutions. The evaluation of risks, the identification of on-site materials, nuclear forensics, bio-safety and bio-security, along with awareness raising among scientists with regard to CBRN risks are some of the major working themes. Most of the initial

activities of the projects were oriented towards assessing the current situation in the countries and regions. The CoE’s total budget should reach 100 million Euros this year.

After the official opening of the CoE regional secretariat for the Middle East in Amman (Jordan) in June this year, currently 31 projects are being implemented with two more approved for funding (project 15, August 2013; project 33, september 2013). To date, all implementers have submitted an inception report and several have already delivered their first progress report.

[CBRN CoE Newsletter No.7, November 2013](#)

Upcoming events

January 20 – March 28, 2014: Conference on Disarmament 2014, Part 1, Geneva, Switzerland

January 23 – 24, 2014: Berlin Session on Humanitarian Disarmament, Berlin, Germany

February 13 – 14, 2014: Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Nayarit, Mexico

March 03, 2014: IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, Austria

March 03 – 05, 2014: UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 61st Session, New-York, USA

March 20, 2014: EU High Level Event on «*International cooperation to enhance a worldwide nuclear security culture*» Contribution to the Nuclear Security Summit 2014, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Network News

Publications and web resources

European Union initiatives to control small arms and light weapons: towards a more coordinated approach, Cédric Poitevin, NP paper No.33, December 2013, 24p.

Dual-Use Biology: How to Balance Open Science with Security, Wilton Park, Conference report WP1260, 17 December 2013, 10p.

Nouvelles perspectives pour l'organisation d'une Conférence sur une ZEADM au Moyen-Orient ?, Béangère Rouppert, Grip, 2 December 2013 (in French).

Belief in the WMD Free Zone: Designing the corridor to Helsinki and beyond, BASIC, 26 November 2013, 5p.

EU's Diplomatic Machine Behind Deal with Tehran, Clingendael, 25 November 2013

Arms Transfers to the Syrian Arab Republic: Practice and Legality, Mélanie de Groof, Les rapports du Grip 2013/9, 15 November 2013, 56p.

Strengthening Non-Proliferation, Ward Wilson, BASIC, 21 October 2013, 35p.

A New Canal and Chinese Missiles, Marc Pierini, Carnegie Endowment, 19 October 2013.

China's Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Mark Bromley, Mathieu Duchâtel and Paul Holtom, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 38, October 2013, 68p.

Starting the Process of Trust-Building in NATO-Russia Relations: The Arms Control Dimension, Jacek Durkalec, Ian Kearns, Lukasz Kuleza, PISM Report (in collaboration with ELN), October 2013, 31p.

From Nuclear Weapons to WMD: the Development and Added Value of the WMD-Free Zone Concept, Harald Müller, Aviv Melamud, Anna Peczeli, NP paper No.31, September 2013, 20p.

FRS - Conference-debate "Nuclear Security: Challenges Ahead – Towards the 2014 NSS", 6 December 2013, Paris

On Friday 6 December 2013 was held the conference "Nuclear Security: Challenges Ahead" at the residence of the Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Paris. This conference, which was held under the Chatham House rule, was organized by the Embassy of the Netherlands and the *Fondation pour la recherche stratégique* (FRS) and was aimed at discussing the issues at stake for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). The participants were mainly representatives of embassies of European States in Paris, members of French Ministries, academics and industrials.

While the first NSS (Washington 2010) was concerned with making political agreements and the follow-up in Seoul (2012) focused on the progress made on implementing those agreements, the third NSS will be centered on the results achieved and the future of nuclear security. What should be done to preserve the momentum created four years ago at the first NSS in Washington? This is one of the main questions that were debated at the conference.

The official positions of France and the Netherlands on nuclear security were discussed as well as their role for the 2014 NSS. The role of industry, expert and civil society was then debated and put in perspective with two parallel events to the 2014 NSS: the Nuclear Knowledge Summit (NKS) and the Nuclear Industry Summit (NIS). Lastly, experts provided critical analysis on conceptual changes regarding nuclear security and non-proliferation.

The role of the European Union in strengthening nuclear security, Ian Anthony, Non-Proliferation Paper No.32, November 2013, 16p.

The 32nd issue of the Non-Proliferation Papers series of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, written by Ian Anthony (SIPRI), outlines EU nuclear security policies within the borders of the Union as well as European efforts to strengthen nuclear security worldwide.

The European Union (EU) will continue to rely on nuclear energy as one element in a balanced energy strategy, and a large number of nuclear reactors will continue to operate for at least the next several decades. The EU (including its member states and common institutions) has a full spectrum of expertise on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. There is unique experience in areas of great relevance to nuclear security, such as operating gas centrifuge enrichment plants, spent fuel reprocessing plants, the production of mixed oxide fuel and construction of final repositories for spent fuel.

The EU has made a commitment to implement the highest international standards in the field of nuclear security. The significant expertise (including some unique technical expertise), budgets and financial instruments, and frameworks for internal and external action that exist at the EU level should be used to strengthen nuclear security. Taking advantage of the capacities that already exist in different EU institutions in this field would be to the mutual benefit of the EU, its member states and the wider international community.

Although EU action is being internationalized to facilitate the construction of an international nuclear security regime, Ian Anthony calls for the establishment of a more open architecture of European governance. While the member states of the EU are ultimately responsible for ensuring nuclear security, a growing number of relevant issues fall within areas where common EU rules and institutions also have a role to play. Outside the EU, the launch of an ambitious nuclear security cooperation program is advisable.

The Role of the European Union in strengthening nuclear security, Ian Anthony, NP paper No.32, November 2013, 16p.

Upcoming events

January 13-15, 2014: The future of power: implications for global actors by 2014, Wilton Park conference, WP1294, Wilton House, UK

February 5, 2014: Launch of the Military Balance 2014, IISS, Arundel House, London, UK

February 24 – 25, 2014: Autonomous Weapons: Governance, Technology, Legality and Ethics, Chatham House, London, UK

March 17 – 21, 2014: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Short Course, VCDNP, Vienna, Austria

March 21 – 22, 2014: Nuclear Knowledge Summit: Towards Sustainable Nuclear Security, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Spotlight on...

Latest publications

Russian INF Compliance, Nikolai Sokov for *Arms Control Wonk*, 1 December 2013.

UNSCR 1540: Improving Capacity, Communication, and Civil Society Engagement, Elena Sokova, *1540 Compass*, #4, 4 November 2013.

Controlling Soviet/Russian Weapons in Time of Instability, in *Nuclear Weapons Security Crisis: What Does History Teach?*, Nikolai Sokov, 2 August 2013, pp. 88-153.

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education: Four Countries, One Goal, Elena Sokova et al., NAPF, August 2013, pp. 16-21.

A Wider Perspective: Russia, Nikolai Sokov, in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Euro-Atlantic Security: The future of NATO*, Paolo Faradori, ed., Routledge Studies in European Strategy and Security, 2013, pp. 158-176.

US-Russian Relations: Beyond the Reset, Nikolai Sokov, *European Leadership Network*, 29 January 2013.

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education: Recent Developments and the Way Forward, Elena Sokova, *CTBT Spectrum*, Issue 19, 3 October 2012, pp. 16-18.

U.S.-Russian Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security Agenda, Anton Khlopov and Elena Sokova, eds., June 2012, 35p.

Prospects for Nuclear Security Partnership in Southeast Asia, May 2012, 70p.

NATO-Russia Disputes and Cooperation on Missile Defense, Nikolai Sokov, May 2012

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The Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation



The Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation is an international non-governmental organization established at the initiative of the Austrian Foreign Ministry in 2010 and officially opened in 2011. The Center's mission is to promote international peace and security by providing a platform for independent analysis and dialogue in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In order to fulfill its mission, the VCDNP employs conferences, seminars, and other fora to foster result-oriented discussion among international organizations, national governments, non-governmental experts, scholars, and civil society. The Center partners with other academic and non-governmental institutions, as well as international organizations in conducting research, outreach, education, and training on non-proliferation and disarmament. The VCDNP is operated by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (a graduate school of Middlebury College).

The team

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Dr. Nikolai Sokov is Senior Fellow at VCDNP. Prior to moving to Vienna, he spent fifteen years at the Monterey, California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). His main areas of research include arms control and disarmament, verification of arms control and disarmament agreements, nuclear policies and nuclear strategies, nuclear and conventional deterrence, security policies of the United States, NATO, Russia and other nuclear weapon states, and international organizations. Dr. Sokov has published numerous books, monographs, and articles in scholarly journals; he has been invited to speak on numerous occasions in the United States and other countries. He has a Soviet equivalent of a PhD from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1986) and a PhD from the University of Michigan (1996). He worked at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies in 1981-85 and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in 1985-87. From 1987 to 1992, he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

the USSR/Russia, where he participated in START I and START II negotiations as well as numerous summit and ministerial meetings.

Marcy Rutan Fowler is Research Fellow at VCDNP. Her main areas of research include nuclear arms reductions, fissile materials and safeguards, former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states and nuclear weapon test-ban treaty negotiations and verification. She is pursuing a PhD in War Studies at King's College London focusing on multilateral nuclear arms reductions. Ms. Fowler holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and Slavic Languages and Literatures (Russian) from the University of Kansas, and a Master of International Affairs degree in International Security Policy from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). Prior to joining VCDNP, Ms. Fowler worked at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a nuclear safeguards analyst, and also volunteered as the Vienna Liaison for the International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists. She further has experience working at the Carnegie Moscow Center and at the US National Nuclear Security Administration.

Tamara Patton is Research Associate at VCDNP. Her main areas of research include satellite imagery, digital three-dimensional modeling, geo-referenced data fusion and other geospatial tools for analysis of issues relevant to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. She holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies from the University of Washington and a Master of Arts in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Prior to joining VCDNP, Ms. Patton served as a researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme. Additionally, she has worked with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva, US Naval Postgraduate School's Operational Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory and Remote Sensing Center and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu.