

Militarized Competition in Outer Space and the EU draft International Code of Conduct

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Presentation Overview

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
1. Shifting Space Security Paradigm

- Elevated threat to the space domain and the post-Cold War space paradigm due to changing security environment
- Greater dependence on space by ever-growing number of actors
- Increasing congestion (space debris, RF spectrum demand)
- Heightened concern over counterspace activities of Russia and China

Summary of Known or Suspected Chinese ASAT Tests in Space

Date	ASAT System	Target	Altitude Reached	Result
July 7, 2005	SC-19 ³	None known	Unknown (likely LEO)	Likely rocket test
February 6, 2006	SC-19 ³	Unknown satellite ⁶	Unknown (likely LEO)	Likely flyby of orbital target ³
January 11, 2007	SC-19 ⁴	FY-1C satellite ⁴	865 km ⁵	Destruction of orbital target, 3,000+ pieces of orbital debris ⁵
January 11, 2010	SC-19 ⁶	CSS-X-11 ballistic missile ⁶	250 km ⁷	Destruction of target, no orbital debris ⁷
January 27, 2013	Possibly SC-19	Unknown ballistic missile ⁸	Unknown	Destruction of target, no orbital debris ⁸
May 13, 2013	Possibly DN-2	None known	10,000 ¹¹ to 30,000 km ¹²	Likely rocket test ¹⁴
July 23, 2014	SC-19 ¹⁰	None known	Unknown (likely LEO) ¹⁰	Non-destructive test ⁹

Source: Secure World Foundation



Orbits of debris generated one month after 2007 Chinese ASAT test. The white orbit represents the International Space Station (Source: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office)



Russian space object 2014-28E – suspected ASAT weapon (Source: N2YO)

2. Russia and China Call for Space Arms Control

- PAROS initiatives
 - Chinese-Russian draft “Treaty on Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT)
 - Russia’s “no first placement of weapons in outer space” initiative
- PAROS, PPWT and “no first placement” initiatives fail to address space reality

3. An International Space Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities as Contributor to Space Stability

- International space venues should advance a governance regime that protects peaceful and reliable access to, and use of, space, particularly with regard to man-made threats such as deliberate counterspace measures by one or more space-faring nations
- Absent active diplomacy that enhances transparency and promotes confidence, incidents and even conflict involving space domain inevitable
- International Space Code of Conduct can serve as a rules-based beacon that guides a future space traffic management regime

4. Conclusion

- Security-related developments will require more holistic understanding of space security
 - Increasing number of terrestrial conflicts and terrorist activities that could implicate space domain
 - More actors in space increase potential for space “incident” that could lead to conflict and/or political instability
 - Rise of China as a capable space power and its implications for sustainable space security, particularly given maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas
 - Russia’s desire to reassert its great power status in space
- An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities is Europe’s best response to date to contested space domain