

# Strengthening the BWC: Options for the 2011 Review Conference Paper presented at the First Consultative Meeting of the EU Consortium on Non-Proliferation May 23, 2011


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### Ambiguous Purposes



'My wife misread the invite and packed the wrong suit.'



#### Ambiguous Purposes

#### Article I

- "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
  - (I) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
  - (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."



## Ambiguous Purposes- Art III

#### Article III

 Each State Party undertakes not to transfer to any recipient, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention



### Ambiguous Purposes - Article X

#### Article X

(1) SPs undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.

-includes provision for cooperating individually or with other states and intl orgs to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology biology for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) avoid hampering economic or technological development or international biological cooperation, including the international exchange of biological agents and toxins and equipment for peaceful purposes



## The Intersessional Process

2003	National implementation; Biosafety and biosecurity
2004	Global disease surveillance; Enhancing international capabilities for responding to and investigating alleged use or suspicious disease outbreaks
2005	Scientific codes of conduct
2007	National implementation; Regional and sub-regional cooperation on implementation
2008	Biosafety and biosecurity; Education, awareness raising and development of codes of conduct
2009	Promoting capacity building in disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment of infectious disease with a view to enhancing the exchange of peaceful biosciences and technology.
2010	Assistance and coordination with relevant organizations in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems




## Elaborated Scope of Peaceful Purposes

- recognition of cooperation benefits on activities such as
  - enhanced disease surveillance
  - biosafety and biosecurity
  - improved education of scientists



### Transparency in Biodefence



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#### Biodefence

- Number of biodefence R&D programmes reported in CBMs increased from 13 in 1992 to 25 in 2007
  - Since 1991, eight new programs in the EU
- 2001-2011 \$56.58 billion allocated to US biodefence spending
  - More than 300 institutes, and 12,000 scientists with over 80 biological agents studied
  - 2001 Amerithrax
- 2009 annual biodefence funding:
  - US \$613 million; UK \$84 million, GER \$13.2 million;
     SWE \$4.7 million



#### Advances in Biosciences and Technology



"We've done it! We've created a better mouse..."



#### Other issues

- Substate threat
- Biosafety & Biosecurity
- Verification
- CBMs



## A Third Intersessional Round?

- Somewhere between intersessionals and an Annual Conference
- Expanded ISU
- JACKSNNZ Proposal
- Need for industry outreach