{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"HCoC","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc","author_name":"Emmanuelle Maitre","author_url":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/author\/emmanuelle-maitre\/","title":"North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25 - HCoC","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"VR5kzppv6J\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/north-korean-short-range-systems\/\">North Korean Short Range Systems: Military  consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/north-korean-short-range-systems\/embed\/#?secret=VR5kzppv6J\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;North Korean Short Range Systems: Military  consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25&#8221; &#8212; HCoC\" data-secret=\"VR5kzppv6J\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/DPRK.png","thumbnail_width":899,"thumbnail_height":504,"description":"This study focuses on the new systems introduced, and assesses their potential impact as conventional weapons and as non-conventional weapons. Through an analysis of the possible capacities of these systems, this study examines their consequences on North Korean strategy. It concludes by exploring what this change of strategy may lead to, in military terms, and in political terms, on the Korean peninsula."}