{"id":203,"date":"2020-10-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2020-10-22T22:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/?p=203"},"modified":"2026-02-06T10:19:31","modified_gmt":"2026-02-06T09:19:31","slug":"the-hcoc-asmall-yet-key-tool-against-ballistic-missile-proliferation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/the-hcoc-asmall-yet-key-tool-against-ballistic-missile-proliferation\/","title":{"rendered":"The HCoC: A Small Yet Key Tool Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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The golden decade of non-proliferation<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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With <\/span>the <\/span>end <\/span>of <\/span>the <\/span>Cold <\/span>War, <\/span>a <\/span>number <\/span>of <\/span>treaties <\/span>and <\/span>agreements <\/span>were <\/span>adopted <\/span>to <\/span>diminish <\/span>the <\/span>threat <\/span>posed <\/span>by <\/span>nuclear weapons and drastically reduce the number of weapons <\/span>deployed <\/span>by <\/span>the <\/span>United <\/span>States <\/span>and <\/span>Russia. <\/span>This <\/span>period <\/span>of <\/span>improved cooperation and optimism also coincided with the <\/span>possibility <\/span>of <\/span>negotiat<\/span>ing<\/span> new non<\/span>–<\/span>proliferation measures an<\/span>d <\/span>reinforc<\/span>ing<\/span> existing <\/span>ones<\/span><\/strong>. <\/span>In <\/span>particular, <\/span>the <\/span>international <\/span>community adopted a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, <\/span>extended <\/span>the <\/span>Non<\/span>–<\/span>P<\/span>roliferation <\/span>Treaty <\/span>(NPT) <\/span>indefinitely <\/span>and <\/span>negotiated the <\/span> much anticipated<\/span> Comprehensive Nuclear<\/span>–<\/span>Test<\/span>–<\/span>Ban Treaty<\/span> (C<\/span>TBT)<\/span>. <\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/span> problem<\/span> of delivery vehicles and ballistic missiles <\/span> had<\/span> been <\/span>partially <\/span>addressed <\/span>in <\/span>1987 <\/span>with <\/span>the <\/span>creation <\/span>of <\/span>the <\/span>Missile <\/span>Technology <\/span>Control <\/span>Regime <\/span>(MTCR). <\/span>However, <\/span>several <\/span>proliferating programmes continued to emerge <\/span> in the 1990s<\/span>,<\/span> raising<\/span> major concerns. In particular, the <\/span>development of a long<\/span>–<\/span>range <\/span>ballisti<\/span>c <\/span>missile <\/span>programme <\/span>in <\/span>North <\/span>Korea<\/span><\/strong>, <\/span>demonstrated during an overflight of Japan in 1998, <\/span> compelled <\/span>the international <\/span>community<\/span> to <\/span> confront<\/span> ballistic proliferation <\/span>more actively<\/span>. As early as 1999, the MTCR partners <\/span> collectively <\/span>sought<\/span> to <\/span> establish <\/span> a universal norm <\/span> curbing<\/span> the proliferation of <\/span>ballistic systems. <\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Adopted in 2002, the<\/span> HCoC was therefore a logical follow<\/strong><\/span>–<\/span>up <\/span>to the post<\/span>–<\/span><\/strong>Cold War efforts<\/strong> <\/span> to develop <\/span> an<\/span> international legal <\/span>framework <\/span>to <\/span>fight <\/span>the <\/span>proliferation <\/span>of <\/span>weapons <\/span>of <\/span>mass <\/span>destruction<\/span> (<\/span>WMD<\/span>s)<\/span> systems. One<\/span> year <\/span>after <\/span>the 9\/11 <\/span>terror <\/span>attacks and in <\/span> the<\/span> context of deep suspicion <\/span> surrounding <\/span> the <\/span>proliferation activities of states such as North Korea, Libya, Iran, <\/span>Syria and Iraq, <\/span> the HCoC was followed by other <\/span> cooperative <\/span>efforts <\/span>to <\/span>stem <\/span>the<\/span> trafficking <\/span>of <\/span>sensitive <\/span>materials<\/span><\/strong> (Proliferation <\/span>Security <\/span>Initiative, <\/span>Global <\/span>Initiative <\/span>to <\/span>Combat <\/span>Nuclear Terrorism) but also<\/span> legally<\/span> binding instruments to limit <\/span>the risks of WMD<\/span>s<\/span> falling into the<\/span> hands of non<\/span>–<\/span>state actors<\/span><\/strong> (<\/span>1540<\/span> United Nations Security Council (UNSC) <\/span>Resolution<\/span>).<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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In brief<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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The HCoC was adopted in 2002, at a time where the international community pushed strongly for the adoption of norms to promote non-proliferation and disarmament<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

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It was initially designed as a first step<\/strong> which would lead to further regulations in the field. However, rising international tensions <\/strong>have prevented states from engaging beyond the 2002 compromise.<\/p>\n

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Despite its limited scope, the HCoC has been lauded as the only universal instrument regulating ballistic missiles<\/strong> \u2013 an essential role given the association of ballistic systems with WMD programmes.<\/p>\n

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By focusing on confidence-building measures, the HCoC complements other regimes and norms dealing with missiles<\/strong> and is therefore a small yet key tool against missile proliferation.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Authors: Lauriane H\u00e9au and Emmanuelle Maitre<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Download in English <\/a><\/p>\n

Download in French<\/a><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Creating a norm against the proliferation of WMD delivery vehicles<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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The <\/span>HCoC<\/span> has <\/span>successfully <\/span>created <\/span>a <\/span>norm <\/span>which <\/span>underpins the MTCR and aims at reducing the risk <\/span>posed <\/span>by <\/span>ballistic <\/span>missiles<\/span>. <\/span>Inspired <\/span>by<\/span> the <\/span>then<\/span> bilateral US<\/span>–<\/span>Soviet (and <\/span> later <\/span> US<\/span>–<\/span>Russian) launch pre<\/span>–<\/span>notification <\/span>agreements<\/span>, <\/span>it <\/span>has <\/span>created<\/span> a <\/span>near<\/span>–<\/span>universal mechani<\/span>sm<\/span> to<\/span> avoid the <\/span>misinterpretation <\/span>between <\/span>space <\/span>launch <\/span>vehicle <\/span>(<\/span>SLV<\/span>)<\/span> launches, <\/span>missile tests <\/span> and <\/span> strikes<\/span><\/strong>. At a minimum, the HCoC <\/span>has <\/span>imposed <\/span>on <\/span>missile <\/span>possessors <\/span>a <\/span>set <\/span>of <\/span>requirements <\/span>in <\/span>terms <\/span>of <\/span>behaviour <\/span>and <\/span>transparency to offset the destabilising natu<\/span>re of <\/span>these weapons<\/span><\/strong>. On the non<\/span>–<\/span>proliferation front, the <\/span>HCoC <\/span>also <\/span>represents <\/span>a <\/span>major <\/span>achievement, <\/span>even <\/span>though <\/span> it remains<\/span> a <\/span> non<\/span>–<\/span>legally<\/span> binding agreement<\/span>. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

With <\/span>the <\/span>adoption <\/span>of <\/span>the HCoC, <\/span>the <\/span>international <\/span>community officially stated that the <\/span>dissemination of <\/span>ballistic missiles coupled with WMD<\/span>s<\/span> is <\/span> a threat <\/span> to<\/span> international security and as such should be curbed. <\/span> <\/span>The necessity <\/span>for<\/span> such a norm against delivery vehicles <\/span>is<\/span> demonstrated <\/span>by <\/span>the <\/span>almost <\/span>systematic <\/span>co<\/span>–<\/span>development <\/span>by <\/span>states <\/span>of <\/span>WMD<\/span>s<\/span> and <\/span>ballistic <\/span>missiles<\/span><\/strong>. <\/span>That <\/span>is<\/span>, <\/span>all <\/span>countries <\/span>that <\/span>have <\/span>acquired <\/span>nuclear, chemical or biological weapons since <\/span>the end of the Cold War<\/span> have <\/span>al<\/span>so procured or produced <\/span>ballistic systems<\/span>, and some coupled their balli<\/span>stic missiles with WMD<\/span>s<\/span> (Figure 1<\/span>)<\/span>. For all except India, <\/span>missile technologies and parts have been traded and transfers have occurred <\/span> unimpeded <\/span> by the <\/span>international regimes<\/span> in place<\/span>. <\/span>Finally,<\/span> none of the<\/span>se states<\/span> are <\/span>members <\/span>of the MTCR<\/span>, except for India, <\/span>which joined the regime in 2016<\/span>.<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

While WMD development remains the major source of concern and in most cases <\/span> constitutes <\/span> a <\/span>violation of international commitments, the threat of these <\/span> programmes <\/span> is <\/span> mostly theoretical without <\/span>an adequate vehicle to deliver them. <\/span> Preventing the spread of <\/span> ballistic <\/span> missiles is therefore a <\/span>practical necessity <\/span><\/strong>to limit the consequences of WMD programmes<\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Figure 2. Nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missile programmes since 1991 (initiated and actually deployed). Source: NTI.<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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A majority of states currently agree on the desirability of curbing the dissemination of ballistic systems, even though there is no legal ban to produce or export them apart from to non-state actors and states targeted by United Nations sanctions. As such, the HCoC establishes a norm which increases the legitimacy of other initiatives aimed at curbing the dissemination of missiles capable of carrying WMDs<\/strong>, their technology or components. This legitimisation is emphasised by the fact that a majority of states have subscribed to the HCoC (143 in 2020), and an even greater number have voted in favour of the biennial United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution in support of the HCoC (171 in 2018).<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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The HCoC: a first step and a compromise<\/h3>\n

Given its limited scope, the HCoC may appear as a modest instrument to address ballistic missile proliferation. Initially designed as a first step which would then lead to more ambitious regulations<\/strong>, its wording reflects the political compromise made at the time of drafting the instrument:<\/p>\n

\u27a2 Ballistic missiles could not be simply prohibited as they were and remain used by major powers in the implementation of their nuclear deterrence strategies.
\u27a2 A two-status treaty such as the NPT, with \u2018haves\u2019 and \u2018have-nots\u2019, was unacceptable for a majority of states.
\u27a2 A legally binding text would have been opposed by states possessing missiles due to security concerns. As it is, some states refuse to display the level of transparency required by the HCoC.
\u27a2 Cruise missiles or other systems used regularly on the battlefield are not included as many states would have refused to share information on their deployment or testing.<\/p>\n

Several propositions were later made to conceive further regulations aimed at limiting ballistic missile proliferation<\/strong>, including additional CBM or regional measures.1<\/strong><\/a> However, these hopes have not been fulfilled. The international context makes it increasingly difficult to engage states beyond the initial compromise of 2002. Complementary measures to the HCoC are somewhat unlikely to emerge in the coming years due to several challenges, including that states are increasingly relying on ballistic missiles as conventional deterrence weapons,2<\/strong><\/a> that disarmament worldwide is blocked and non-proliferation objectives are challenged.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Complementarity with other instruments \nfocusing on missiles<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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The adoption of the HCoC brought \u2013 for the first time \u2013 a universal focus to the problem of missiles, though other norms had previously been created to regulate these weapons to some degree. For example, bilateral arms ontrol treaties between the United States and Russia have limited the deployment of ballistic missiles and even prohibited certain categories of systems. At the national level, some states were or remain prohibited from developing ballistic capabilities because of violations of their non-proliferation commitments. For example, North Korea\u2019s ballistic developments are prohibited by UNSC Resolution 2407.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Figure 3. HCoC subscribing states and MTCR partners<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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Since it was established in 1987, the MTCR has also been an essential tool to limit the dissemination of ballistic missile technologies<\/strong>, parts and dual-use items. It has played a notable role in curbing the proliferation of weapon systems and roduction lines.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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However, due to its nature as a voluntary export control mechanism, it remains ill-equipped to prevent the development of indigenous ballistic programmes. In 2004, UNSC Resolution 1540<\/strong> brought a new dimension to WMD and delivery vehicles proliferation by focusing on non-state actors. The resolution, which addresses nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological weapons and their means of delivery, clearly underscores the destabilising effects of ballistic missiles coupled with WMD capabilities in the hands of non-state actors.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Figure 3. Comparisons between the three international agreements dealing with ballistic missiles<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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The HCoC is complementary to these efforts.3<\/strong><\/a> It recalls the generally agreed principle of non-proliferation of ballistic systems and the desirability of a progressive elimination of these weapons. But in the short term, it recognises the existence of these weapons and attempts to limit their danger by defining accepted rules for those that possess them<\/strong>. It is underpinned by the assumption that even if eradicating an entire class of weapon systems is, for the time being, not feasible, thinking about risk reduction measures in order to lower the likelihood of such weapons being used is nonetheless worthwhile. The main tool in this regard is transparency..<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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About the Hague Code of Conduct<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Adopted in 2002, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is a politically>binding instrument aiming to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) delivery vehicles.Composed of a set of transparency and confidence-building measures, the HCoC is the only existing multilateral instrument to focus on WMD delivery vehicles. Signed by 93 states at its inception, the HCoC hasnow reached 143 subscribing states (as of December 2020).<\/p>\n

When subscribing to the HCoC, states commit to abide by a set of UN treaties and international conventions on space security<\/strong>; to submit an annual declaration<\/strong> regarding ballistic missile capabilities and national policy on non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and instruments; and to send pre-launch notifications<\/strong> prior to any missile or space launch. Documents are uploaded onto a dedicated online platform (available for subscribing states only) managed by Austria, which acts as the HCoC Immediate Central Contact. Subscription to the HCoC is free of charge.<\/p>\n

While subscribing states are asked to exercise \u2018maximum restraint\u2019 in the development of ballistic capabilities, it should be stressed that they are not proscribed from possessing ballistic missiles nor from pursuing space launch activities<\/strong>. Subscribing to the HCoC also enables states to gain access to information<\/strong> shared by other subscribing states, and to demonstrate their political commitment<\/strong> to non-proliferation and disarmament.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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1<\/strong> David Bertolotti<\/span>, <\/span>\u2019Le Code de Conduite de la Haye contre la <\/span>p<\/span>rolif\u00e9ration des <\/span>m<\/span>issiles <\/span>b<\/span>alistiques<\/span>. L<\/span>e r\u00e9gime qui n\u2019existait pas?\u2019<\/span> Annuaire Fran\u00e7ais de Relations Internationales<\/span><\/em>, volume VII, 2006.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

2<\/span><\/strong> St\u00e9phane Delory, \u2018Ballistic missiles and conventional strike weapons: Adapting the HCoC<\/span> to address the dissemination of <\/span>conventional ballistic missiles,\u2019 <\/span>HCoC Research Paper n\u00b06<\/span><\/em>, <\/span>Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS)<\/span>, January 2020.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

3<\/span> <\/span><\/strong>Kolja Brockmann, \u2018Controlling ballistic missile proliferation<\/span>:<\/span> Assessing complementarity between the HCoC<\/span>, MTCR and UNSCR <\/span>1540<\/span>,<\/span>\u2019 <\/span>HCoC <\/span>Research <\/span><\/em>Paper<\/em> n\u00b07<\/span>, FRS, June 2020.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The HCoC was adopted in 2002, at a time where the international community pushed strongly for the adoption of norms to promote non-proliferation and disarmament. It was initially designed as a first step which would lead to further regulations in the field. 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