{"id":3678,"date":"2021-06-29T17:36:00","date_gmt":"2021-06-29T15:36:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/?p=3678"},"modified":"2022-12-16T16:22:52","modified_gmt":"2022-12-16T15:22:52","slug":"the-hague-code-of-conduct-and-the-caribbean","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/the-hague-code-of-conduct-and-the-caribbean\/","title":{"rendered":"The Hague Code of Conduct and the Caribbean"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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About the HCoC<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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<\/p>\n

Adopted in 2002, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is a politically binding instrument aiming to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery vehicles. Composed of a set of transparency and confidence-building measures, the HCoC is the only existing multilateral instrument to focus on WMD delivery vehicles. The HCoC has reached 143 subscribing states (December 2022) vs <\/em>93 at its inception.<\/p>\n

When subscribing to the HCoC, states commit to abide by a set of UN treaties and international conventions on space security<\/strong>; to produce an annual declaration<\/strong> regarding ballistic missile capacities and national policy on non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and instruments; and to deliver pre-launch notifications<\/strong> prior to any missile or space launch. Documents are uploaded onto a dedicated online platform managed by Austria, which acts as the HCoC Immediate Central Contact (Executive Secretariat). Subscription to the HCoC is free of charge.<\/p>\n

While subscribing states are asked to exercise \u2018maximum restraint\u2019 in the development of ballistic capacities, they are proscribed neither from possessing ballistic missiles nor from pursuing space launch activities. <\/strong>In return, subscribing to the HCoC enables states to gain access to information<\/strong> shared by other subscribing states, and to display their political commitment<\/strong> to non-proliferation and disarmament.<\/p>\n

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In brief<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Caribbean states have regularly joined the HCoC since its adoption in 2002, showing a steady interest in the Code<\/strong>. But despite this, the current level of subscription remains low, with half of the 16 Caribbean states having signed it.<\/p>

The low subscription rate is partly explained by concerns about possible<\/strong> administrative costs<\/strong> and a low priority granted to missile proliferation issues<\/strong>. However, the Caribbean\u00a0\u2013 as an important transit <\/strong>and financial hub<\/strong>, that has difficulties curbing illegal trafficking of arms and assets<\/strong>, and given the importance of a secure access to space data<\/strong> \u2013 would benefit from an enhanced focus on the HCoC.<\/p>

The limited commitments of the Code can be attractive for states with limited resources but a political will to show their support to global non-proliferation efforts<\/strong>.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Authors: Lauriane H\u00e9au and Emmanuelle Maitre<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Download in English<\/a><\/p>\n

Download in French<\/a><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Regional interest in the HCoC<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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The<\/strong> threat posed by ballistic systems in the Caribbean<\/strong>1<\/strong><\/a> today is very low<\/strong>, as no regional actor possesses a missile arsenal. These circumstances may explain the limited level of subscription to the HCoC (8 out of 16 states as of December 2022). But while a number of states have yet to formally subscribe to the Code, overall support by the region for this instrument can be observed<\/strong>.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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Figure 1. The HCoC in the Caribbean: date of subscription and HCoC status of Caribbean states<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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Firstly, it should be noted that the<\/strong> rate of HCoC subscription<\/strong> \u00a0by Caribbean states has steadily increa-sed since its inception<\/strong>, with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines joining in 2020 and Saint Kitts and Nevis in 2014.<\/p>\n

Secondly, Caribbean states have consistently supported the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions in support of the HCoC<\/strong>. Thus, seven non-subscribing states have voted in favour of all ten resolutions adopted since 2004. Cuba remains the only state to consistently abstain and to voice its scepticism vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> the Code.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Figure 2. Caribbean states\u2019 support to the HCoC and to UNGA resolutions on the Code (*: Non-subscribing states)<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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Regional attention paid to disarmament and the non-proliferation of WMD<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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While the question of WMD proliferation may appear remote to countries that have no capabilities and are not directly threatened by these systems, Caribbean states are relatively well involved in the implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation norms. The priority for the region has historically been the fight against nuclear weapons<\/strong>, having witnessed the risk of nuclear war since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, in the midst of the Cold War. The rejection of nuclear weapons was set in stone with the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967<\/strong>; as well as a general rejection of nuclear deterrence as a way to address conflicts in the international system. This position is demonstrated by the support provided by many Caribbean states to the recently adopted Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW).<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Figure 3. Ratification of disarmament and non-proliferation agreements by Caribbean states<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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Caribbean states also largely participate in international efforts to stem proliferation<\/strong>, with a quasi-universal participation to the chemical (CWC) and biological (BWC) weapons conventions as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Eight Caribbean states support the Proliferation Security Initiative and all states have submitted at least an initial report to the 1540 Committee. Efforts could be pursued by nominating points of contact systematically as part of the implementation of Resolution 1540 or by drafting national action plans. CARICOM is especially active in assisting states in implementing their non-proliferation obligations<\/strong>.2<\/strong><\/a> Taking up these international commitments has been done while recognising the specific proliferation challenges the region is facing (see box). Most states of the region therefore perceive non-proliferation agreements as matching their national interests and their ambitious disarmament policies. But they are also aware of the potential problems they may face on the ground in implementing their commitments. Thus, subscription to the HCoC is appreciated according to the specific WMD proliferation challenges in the region.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Specific WMD proliferation challenges in the Caribbean<\/strong><\/h3>