{"id":7416,"date":"2023-05-17T08:53:12","date_gmt":"2023-05-17T06:53:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/?p=7416"},"modified":"2023-06-06T11:23:19","modified_gmt":"2023-06-06T09:23:19","slug":"the-hcoc-and-strategic-risk-reduction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nonproliferation.eu\/hcoc\/the-hcoc-and-strategic-risk-reduction\/","title":{"rendered":"The HCoC and Strategic Risk Reduction"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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The HCoC and Strategic Risk Reduction<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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HCoC Issue Brief – May 2023<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Reducing strategic risks: a pragmatic and necessary approach<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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In non-proliferation and disarmament forums, the reduction of strategic risks <\/strong>has received considerable attention in recent years. Indeed, while current geopolitical conflicts may be perceived as blocking points in progressing on disarmament, they call for increased efforts to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. No agreed definition of strategic risks reduction exists. Some states focus on the risks related to the possession of nuclear weapons and raise issues such as the alert level, the security of arsenals or the improvement of launch procedures. Others feel that it may be more important to focus on various pathways to nuclear use<\/strong> and to work on measures that may prevent the escalation of tensions<\/strong> between possessors of nuclear weapons. In both cases, providing transparency on doctrines and forces<\/strong> is generally seen as a positive element.1<\/strong><\/a> Some ballistic<\/strong> missiles are strategic weapons<\/strong> that can carry the threat posed by nuclear warheads to thousands of kilometres in a few minutes. Providing transparency on these systems may therefore limit instability.<\/p>

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Figure 1. Typology of risk reduction measures. Credits: UNIDIR<\/figcaption><\/figure>

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In brief<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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In a context of strong geopolitical tensions, confidence-building measures (CBM) are of particular importance<\/strong> in order to limit the risks of escalation.\u00a0The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), is a case in point, providing greater transparency on ballistic missiles<\/strong>.<\/p>

As a multilateral instrument, the HCoC holds a particular place in a global architecture of measures that attempts to reduce the destabilising nature of ballistic missiles<\/strong>. By promoting transparency about policies and launches, it aims to limit the risk of misunderstanding, misinterpretation<\/strong>, and worst-case assessments.<\/p>

As such, the Code, is a key instrument of strategic risk reduction<\/strong>. This function comes in addition to its obvious purpose of curbing the proliferation of ballistic missiles.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Author: Emmanuelle Maitre<\/h4>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Download in English<\/a><\/p>

Download in French<\/a><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Missile testing: a potential source of misunderstanding and escalation<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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Figure 2. US early warning systems, composed of space assets (left) and ground-based radars (right), can detect when missiles or rockets are ignited on the launch pad. Credits: Lockheed Martin and MDA.<\/figcaption>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/figure>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Transparency on missiles can take different forms. It can involve sharing information on the types of systems deployed, their main characteristics, zones of deployment and concepts of use. It can also focus on missile testing<\/strong>. States deploying space-based sensors and radars, such as the United States (Figure 2) and Russia, can detect missile launches on the launch pad and follow their trajectory until the impact. But it can be difficult to distinguish between a missile fired for testing, a civilian rocket launch or an incoming ballistic missile attack<\/strong>.<\/p>

Transparency on missiles can take different forms. It can involve sharing information on the types of systems deployed, their main characteristics, zones of deployment and concepts of use. It can also focus on\u00a0missile testing<\/strong>.\u00a0<\/p>

States deploying space-based sensors and radars, such as the United States (Figure 2) and Russia, can detect missile launches on the launch pad and follow their trajectory until the impact. But it can be difficult to distinguish between a missile fired for testing, a civilian rocket launch or an incoming ballistic missile attack<\/strong><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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On 25 January 1995, Russian radar operators reportedly detected an incoming rocket heading towards Moscow that they identified as a submarine-launched American ballistic missile. This led to the automatic alert of allRussian forces and the nuclear briefcase of then President Yeltsin was readied for launch. Although it was assessed very quickly that the object was in fact a Norwegian scientific-sounding rocket, the incident showed the risk of escalation<\/strong> that could result from misinterpretation of a launch<\/strong> and hence the necessity to communicate on these activities.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Comparisons of transparency mechanisms related to missile launches<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t
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iven the potential risk of misunderstanding linked to missile and space launcher activities, it is no surprise that states have sought to inform each other about them. In 2002, the Hague Code of Conduct was adopted and included, inter alia<\/em> (see below), a provision that invites its subscribing states to pre-notify any ballistic missile test or space launch<\/strong>.<\/p>

While the Code\u2019s main objective is to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles, this multilateral instrument considers in a comprehensive manner how confidence and transparency can reduce the risks posed by deployed nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. But it is not the only international agreement that has created a notification regime for missile launches. During the Cold war, the<\/strong> United States and the USSR first considered the problem in 1971<\/strong> through the \u2018Accident Measures Agreement\u2019, which required both countries to notify missile tests \u2018if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party<\/em>\u2019 (Article 4). <\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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The HCoC: information that may be included in a pre-launch notification<\/strong><\/p>