I. INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) first introduced explicit strategies for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2003. These strategies and other measures to reinforce and strengthen them have firmly established the EU’s objective to counter WMD proliferation. Over the past decade, an internal process of institutional development, most recently through the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, has—together with enhanced financial and technical capabilities—increasingly provided the EU with the resources to cope with its expanded non-proliferation policies. The establishment of a new external policy architecture in 2010—the European External Action Service (EEAS)—introduced an institutional framework intended for greater coordination and coherency in the EU’s external policies, potentially enabling the EU to have a more prominent role in multilateral arms control. Nonetheless, institutional cooperation between the EU’s external and internal policies mainly functions on an ad hoc basis, and questions remain on how EU institutions will coordinate non-proliferation efforts in order to maximize outcomes. This paper explores how ‘external’ EU WMD non-proliferation policy under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and later the EEAS, has evolved in parallel within ‘internal’ EU domestic policy, leading to an increase in the number of actors involved with implementing non-proliferation policy and possible implications for the EU’s external WMD non-proliferation efforts.

SUMMARY

This paper identifies the key European Union (EU) institutional actors and programmes involved in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. In doing so, it outlines WMD non-proliferation as a horizontal policy issue that cuts across a number of disciplines, involving multiple actors, budget instruments and programmes. While external non-proliferation policies have gained a prominent role in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy since the launching of the EU Non-Proliferation Strategy in 2003, several internal policies relating to non-proliferation have also developed out of the strategic framework as an attempt to address the threat posed by the spread of WMD.

This paper explores how the innovations in the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission and the European External Action Service, work to bring greater coherence to the implementation of EU non-proliferation policy. The paper finds that, although WMD non-proliferation has distinct support in the new foreign policy architecture of the EU, the coordination structures and mechanisms do not fully take into account the increased external ambitions of the institutional actors outside of the post-Lisbon security structure. The paper further highlights the need for enhanced internal–external coordination of the EU’s assistance programmes to strengthen the overall outcome of its WMD non-proliferation efforts.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lina Grip (Sweden) is SIPRI’s Project Coordinator and Research Assistant for the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium. She has a Master’s Degree in International Relations from Stockholm University and has previously worked at the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Unit at Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and with CFSP/CSDP issues in the European Parliament.
II. WMD NON-PROLIFERATION: A HORIZONTAL ISSUE

Since 2003 the strategies guiding EU non-proliferation policy have made WMD threats a core issue within the CFSP framework. Although the strategies framed WMD non-proliferation as a horizontal issue within the CFSP and sought to integrate non-proliferation policy with external relations (namely trade and development cooperation), few links were made between the new external non-proliferation policy and existing internal policies on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threat mitigation. Hence, the strategies effectively made the non-proliferation of WMD an intergovernmental policy—an area under which the Commission’s mandate was limited. One exception to the limited linking of external–internal policy was the request in the 2003 Non-Proliferation Strategy for cooperation between non-proliferation and the internal public health structures. In 2008 the Council of the EU’s ‘New Lines for Action’ noted that ‘while non-proliferation activities form an essential part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, certain types of measures may be implemented within the framework of other EU policies and instruments which may contribute towards the same objective’. However, New Lines fell short of providing further guidelines for how to best avoid potential overlaps, other than stating that ‘the powers and authority of the European institutions and Member States will of course be respected’ and providing a general recommendation about ‘endeavouring to achieve greater coordination of all the policies and instruments’. The EU’s 2010 Internal Security Strategy—which sought to coordinate different actors and sectors within and outside of the EU and to serve as an ‘indispensable complement to the EU Security Strategy’—made no reference to WMD or non-proliferation.

While few political requests for greater external–internal policy coordination have been put forward in the area of non-proliferation in the CFSP, the topic of proliferation threats has continuously spilled-over into EU internal policy areas such as health, counterterrorism and energy policy. During the past decade the European Commission (Commission) services involved in addressing CBRN threats, often in the form of industrial hazards or natural breakout falls, have increasingly framed these threats as the malevolent activities of terrorism and proliferation. The transboundary nature of the CBRN threats has enabled the Commission to address threats outside of the EU. As a result, the programmes and actors within the EU involved in external non-proliferation assistance programmes have multiplied in the recent years without a subsequent institutional mechanism for internal and external coordination and cooperation. While the EU has underlined the importance of making the EU a unique and leading actor within the area of WMD non-proliferation, the risk of ‘institutional overlap’ within and between the EU institutions and its member states is rarely discussed. Surprisingly little attention has been given to identifying the competing competences of the EU actors in the area of WMD non-proliferation.

III. EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS: ROLES AND CAPACITIES

The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009, amending the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1991 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). The EU’s foreign policy architecture set out in the Lisbon Treaty was developed in parallel to the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), including its WMD non-proliferation policy framework. Like the CFSP and CSDP, the new architecture links to the external relations of trade and development, but it does not produce a single holistic foreign policy or institutional structure.


3 Council of the European Union, 15708/03 (note 2), p. 11.

4 Council of the European Union, 17172/08 (note 2), pp. 6, 24.


Although the Lisbon Treaty does not mention the terms ‘arms control’ or ‘non-proliferation’, it does refer to strengthening international security, joint disarmament operations and the promotion of ‘an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’.\(^7\)

In addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduced institutional reforms potentially important for EU WMD non-proliferation policy and its implementation.\(^8\) Rather than maintaining a distinction between ‘external relations’ (i.e. trade and development) and ‘foreign and security policy’ (i.e. CFSP/CSDP), the Lisbon Treaty focuses on EU ‘external action’.\(^9\) It also introduced the potential for a more comprehensive approach to EU foreign and security policy by ending the pillar structure, which had been divisive between the Council of the EU and the Commission. This was done by establishing the double-hatted post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (High Representative; HR/VP). As the title indicates, the post conducts the CFSP and serves as vice-president of the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty mandates the High Representative to ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of EU action not only in EU external policies, but between these and EU’s internal policies with external ambitions.\(^10\) In this sense the Lisbon Treaty provides the opportunity to bring together the intergovernmental CFSP and Union’s external relations polices in the pursuit of more coordinated EU strategic objectives and interests. On 19 November 2009 Catherine Ashton was appointed to the post High Representative. She was made responsible for defining and implementing the CFSP, since notably the Commission will no longer be able to make proposals concerning the CFSP. The High Representative is assisted by the newly established EEAS. The integration of the Commission, the Council and member state staff into the EEAS will play an important part in forging a joined up foreign and security policy.

Another institutional change brought on by the treaty was the formal introduction of the European Council as one of the EU’s constituent institutions and the establishment of its president as a permanent position, thus introducing another new foreign policy actor. On 19 November 2009 Herman Van Rompuy was appointed to the post of European Council president. The president of the Council chairs the meetings of European Heads of State in the European Council. A cabinet of 30 members, of which one is dedicated to CSDP, including non-proliferation issues, supports the president. The High Representative and the president of the European Council share the role of representing the EU’s external non-proliferation policies in international organizations and conferences (e.g. Ashton represented the EU in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 2010 and Van Rompuy represented the EU at the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010).\(^11\)

### The Council of the European Union

The Council of the EU continues to adopt the EU’s non-proliferation strategies, policies and related decisions and conclusions. In the past it has successfully adopted a number of Joint Actions, Common Positions and Council Decisions related to WMD non-proliferation. Since the Lisbon Treaty, these instruments are now all called Council Decisions. The majority of these allocate funding from the CFSP budget to support multilateral treaties and bodies, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540’s Secretariat, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Some decisions have introduced new legislation at the EU level, such as the enhanced EU regulation on the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, while other decisions have introduced restrictive measures.

---

\(^7\) Treaty of Lisbon (note 1), articles 42.1, 43 and 21.


\(^10\) Treaty of Lisbon (note 1), articles 26.2 and 21.3.

against individual states. The Council is responsible for defining negotiation mandates for political dialogue with third countries (i.e. a country that is not a member of the EU), which, since 2003, in the area of non-proliferation takes the form of a non-proliferation clause in contractual relations.

The main body in which EU member states coordinate their positions on non-proliferation was formerly called the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAREC) and was chaired by the six-monthly rotating Council president. GAREC is now divided into a General Affairs Council (GAC) and a Foreign Affairs Council (FAC); the High Representative is the permanent chair of the FAC and the rotating Council Presidency continues to chair the GAC. Combining the roles of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), vice-president of the European Commission (VP) and the chair of the FAC effectively means that the HR/VP replaces the former three-person ‘troika’ formation.

Due to the horizontal nature of the WMD threat level—in that its relevance cuts across several different policy areas (e.g. health, energy, trade)—non-proliferation issues may also possibly be discussed as an internal security matter, for example, within the Justice and Home Affairs Council (i.e. the Ministers for Justice and of the Interior). Weekly meetings take place between national permanent representatives in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) to prepare the work of the Council. The Working Party on Non-Proliferation (CONOP) and the Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control (CODUN), which are made up of officials from member states, are the main working groups assisting COREPER regarding WMD non-proliferation. However, dual-use export controls issues are covered by the Working Party on Dual-Use Goods (WPDU), and WMD-related issues have been discussed in a variety of fields. The establishment of the EEAS involved a transfer of 411 posts from the Council to the EEAS in 2011, including the entire Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Unit of the Council Secretariat and a budget reduction of about €80 million. The Secretariat to the Council Working Groups, including those related to non-proliferation and disarmament (i.e. CONOP, CODUN and COARM—the Working Party on Conventional Weapons’ Export Control), remains within the Council.

The European Parliament

The European Parliament is involved in EU non-proliferation efforts, among other things, through its political oversight, budgetary authority and legislative capacities. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the involvement of the European Parliament in the development of security policies has greatly increased, which means that effective consultation with the European Parliament by the High Representative at all stages is essential. According to the Lisbon Treaty,

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. She shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration... The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security policy.

The European Parliament and the Council must approve the annual EU budget as well as the multi-annual financial perspectives. The European Parliament has the power to reject the annual draft budget put forward by the Commission. The European

---


13 Council of the European Union, ‘Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the EU’s wider relations with third countries’, 14997/03, 19 Nov. 2003.


16 Treaty of Lisbon (note 1).
Parliament has the final say regarding non-compulsory expenditure and can influence the substance of non-proliferation policies by allocating or withholding resources, or blocking or delaying the allocation of resources in order to have an effect on the allocation of resources to different policy areas. Furthermore, it can put money into so-called reserves for which the Council or Commission needs the approval of the European Parliament for every allocation. The Parliament has the right of scrutiny over the EEAS operational budget but also, to some extent, over the EEAS administrative budget proper.17 The European Parliament also has a right of scrutiny over the Commission’s implementing acts. Article 290 of the Lisbon Treaty empowers the European Parliament to object to or even to revoke certain decisions proposed by the Commission regarding where and how money is spent.

The European Parliament can adopt legislative resolutions, which are considered legislative proposals that cannot be easily ignored by the Commission or the Council.18 The European Parliament has been active in adopting resolutions in support for non-proliferation, including support to the non-proliferation regimes.19 The Parliament’s Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (DG EXPO) is responsible for organizing the work of all parliamentary bodies in the field of external policies.20 Within this, WMD non-proliferation issues are handled by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and its subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). Export control issues, including the regular update of the list of controlled items under EU dual-use regulation, are covered by the Standing Committee on International Trade (INTA).21 Other committees will take the lead on other aspects as relevant to their jurisdiction. For example, the Standing Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) will take the lead on the CBRN Action Plan, which raises questions of coordination on the European Parliament side. The Policy Departments in the European Parliament provide research and expertise to the committees. In addition, inter-parliamentarian delegations (i.e. between the European Parliament and the parliaments of third countries) offer the opportunity of raising political matters, including that of non-proliferation, with parliaments around the world.

The European Commission

The European Commission is responsible for drawing up legislative proposals that it forwards to the Council and the European Parliament. It is also responsible for managing and carrying out the budget and implementing the policies and programmes adopted by the Council and the European Parliament. The Commission manages a sizeable Union budget and adopts regulations on the financial instruments. The European Commission’s different directorate-generals (DGs) have a direct role in managing non-proliferation assistance outside the EU. The Commission is increasingly active in various non-proliferation related matters, including relations with third countries.22 The European Commission is, for example, responsible for producing Annual Work Programmes for the specific programmes addressing CBRN threats, and it extensively funds research on WMD non-proliferation.

Under the authority of the High Representative, in the position’s capacity as vice-president of the Commission, the Commission is responsible for the financial implementation of the CFSP budget and the Instrument for Stability (IFS).23 The Commission department responsible for this implementation is the Foreign Policy Instruments Service (SFPI). The SFPI was introduced in October 2010 and is what remains of the former European Commission’s foreign assistance outside the EU. The Commission is responsible for producing Annual Work Programmes for the specific programmes addressing CBRN threats, and it extensively funds research on WMD non-proliferation.

affairs department (DG for External Relations, DG RELEX). After the Lisbon Treaty it was found that some RELEX services, such as administrative staff, could not easily be transferred to the EEAS or merged with existing Commission structures, hence former DG RELEX funding and personnel created SFPI. Within this framework, SFPI staff continue to work on non-proliferation issues from a CFSP point of view. Although part of the Commission, SFPI is housed alongside the EEAS.

The EU’s IFS was created in 2007 to address conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building and is the main budget instrument to fund WMD non-proliferation programmes. An Expert Support Facility (ESF) was established in 2007 to mobilize expertise to support the Commission in maximizing the impact of the IFS—including through the identification of key areas of intervention, risk assessment and consistency with other programmes. The ESF is managed by the Commission, but it could be used and co-financed by other EU actors. The long-term component of the IFS under budget headings 19.0603 (for support to the ESF) and 19.0602 (for risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, nuclear and biological materials or agents) are the main sources of funding for WMD non-proliferation projects. The combined IFS budget for 2007–13 is €2062 million, of which €266 million has been dedicated to WMD non-proliferation efforts.

The IFS Indicative Programme on WMD issues for 2009–11 focuses on establishing regional centres of excellence on CBRN; support to fighting illicit CBRN trafficking and deceptive financial practices; assistance and cooperation on export controls on dual-use goods; support for the retraining of former weapons scientists; and support for multilateral nuclear assurance (MNA) initiatives. The IFS is mandated to fund assistance project in third countries with a WMD non-proliferation conditionality clause.

The Lisbon Treaty made the EU a single legal entity able to conclude international agreements and to become a member of international organizations, replacing the European Community. While the Commission already had a legal identity before, it maintains its observer status post-Lisbon in the important multilateral export control regimes Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, the Zangger Committee as well as in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Commission is a de facto participant in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a full member of the Global Health Security Initiative and represents the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) as observer at the meetings of the IAEA Governing Bodies.

### The European External Action Service

The EEAS is a support service under the authority of the High Representative, working to prepare policies for decisions by the Council and Commission and assisting the Council and the Commission in ensuring consistency between different policy areas. The EEAS support the triple-hatted High Representative in fulfilling the position’s mandate to conduct the CFSP of the Union. It is responsible for the preparation and implementation of decisions adopted by the Council regarding CFSP (including those on non-proliferation) and for supporting the Commission in the preparation of decisions regarding the financial instruments. The central administration of the EEAS is divided into administrative, geographic and thematic units. WMD non-proliferation issues mainly fall under the Managing Director for Global and Multilateral Issues, in particular under two of its directorates: the Directorate for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (Director Annalisa Giannella, former Personal Representative on Non-proliferation and Disarmament) and the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy under (Director Richard Wright, former Director for Crisis Platform and Co-ordination of CFSP, DG RELEX, European Commission).

Importantly, the Lisbon Treaty introduced permanent chairs of the Council working groups to the assistance in the area of non-proliferation would be financed from the IFS.

---


26 IFS articles 4.1 and 4.2.


28 The EU negotiators assured their African, Caribbean and Pacific Islands (ACP) counterparts that any future EU technical or financial
High Representative’s staff in the EEAS. A permanent chair is presumed to facilitate consistency in the working groups over time, with the ability to take on long-term discussions and maintain a high level of expertise. The Directorate for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament provides staff to chair the working parties CONOP, CODUN and COARM. Chairs of the working groups are tasked with promoting legislative and political decisions, coordinating member states’ positions and leading negotiations. By acting as the permanent chair for several Council working groups, the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Directorate is closely tied to member states; in comparison the Conflict Prevention and Security Policy Directorate, which does not chair any working group—although any decisions prepared by it will have to go through the relevant working group or the Political Security Committee (PSC).

Another important feature of the EEAS is its contributions to the strategic phases of programming of the external relations instruments, such as the strategic and indicative programming of the IFS and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). This will require close cooperation between the Security Policy Unit under the Conflict Prevention and Security Policy Directorate and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Directorate. The EEAS is responsible for supporting the Commission in the preparation of decisions on the strategic, multi-annual steps within the programming cycle of the budget instruments, including with regards to country allocations to determine the global budget for each region, national and regional strategic papers and indicative programmes. Throughout the cycle of programming, planning and implementation of the instruments, the High Representative and the EEAS work with the relevant members and services of the Commission. All proposals for decisions will be prepared by following the Commission’s procedures and will be submitted to the Commission for adoption.

The Directorate for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation further provides expertise to the programming of other financial instruments, to ensure consistency between EU external actions and its non-proliferation commitments. The directorate is also responsible for assessing the implementation of the EU’s non-proliferation strategies, including updates on the adoption of the non-proliferation clause and its impact on reform in third countries, in the form of six-monthly progress reports (previously a shared responsibility between the Council Secretariat and DG RELEX). It is unclear where dual-use issues, which fall between trade (outside of the EEAS) and non-proliferation (within EEAS) and managed in the WPDU will be placed in the new architecture. Given that thematic, rather than geographic, EEAS units manage non-proliferation issues, it may be problematic to fully integrate non-proliferation into geographical programmes. This will require close cooperation with the relevant geographical desks in the EEAS and units in the Commission’s Development Cooperation DG (see section IV) as well as careful attention in the review of the financial instruments, where an absence of thematic issues in geographic instruments will need to be reflected in changes in the thematic instruments like the IFS or CFSP budget. However, the EEAS provides the necessary framework to integrate non-proliferation policy more closely with regional policy as part of other security and development initiatives. Therefore, it is possible that funding for non-proliferation capacity-building in third countries will take place in a broader package of EU assistance to that country. Critics within the development community have, however, argued that ‘the conscious injection of security concepts as part of the broader policy package dealing with the perceived security risks inherent in underdevelopment’ effectively means a securitization of development cooperation. Hence, the new EU institutional set up may still conceal differences of opinion in terms of integrating non-proliferation assistance with development cooperation.

The CFSP budget is the instrument used by the Council Secretariat to implement EU foreign and security policy. This budget now falls under the

---


32 The Council conclusions on the insertion of a WMD clause in 2003 introduce conditionality for non-proliferation as a standard element in EU contractual relations with third countries. The so-called WMD clause, followed by the SALW clause in 2008, is the main arms control mechanism at the EU’s disposal in bilateral relations. Despite a rather impressive adoption record, the clause’s role in promoting non-proliferation reforms in third countries has yet to be proven.

responsibility of the High Representative and EEAS. The Commission via SFIP is responsible for the financial implementation of the CFSP budget under the authority of the High Representative in her capacity as vice-president of the Commission. Between 2000 and 2009 the CFSP budget was increased from €47 million to €243 million. It is projected to reach more than €400 million in 2013. The majority of the funds are allocated to operations and actions related to civilian crisis management, with almost half of the 2009 budget (€116 million) allocated to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo alone. In 2010 the combined support for WMD non-proliferation efforts in the CFSP budget totalled to €17.5 million, funding work by the IAEA, CTBTO and the EU network of non-proliferation think tanks. The EU’s financial contributions from the CFSP budget to the international non-proliferation regimes constitute a small part of what EU member states provide bilaterally, but the support remains high relative to other voluntary contributions.

Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Delegations, formally a part of the European Commission, became the Delegations of the EU, and the network of 136 EU Delegations became an integrated part of the EEAS. In terms of non-proliferation, the role of the Delegations includes advising the central administration of the EEAS on potential challenges or threats, and they have previously, at the insistence of the Council Secretariat, reported regularly on proliferation of WMD issues. Although the Delegations fall under the EEAS, they may also support the European Parliament in their contacts with the international organizations or third countries to which the delegations are accredited. Delegations may also, upon request from an EU member state, support the member states in their diplomatic relations.

The Delegations are the eyes and ears of the EEAS as well as being its representative body out. The permanent representations to international organizations in Geneva and Vienna have become the representative of the EU and its member states in Geneva- and Vienna-based international organizations, specialized agencies and bodies, including several working with non-proliferation issues. In order to ensure consistency between the external relations of the EU and EURATOM, Delegations also undertake the representation of EURATOM in third countries and at international organizations such as the IAEA. The Delegations monitor all IFS programmes in the beneficiary countries. In many cases, the delegations are providing project proposals to the EEAS Secretariat and are directly responsible for the implementation of adopted assistance programmes. This allows not only negotiation and conclusion of contracts with local counterparts, but also the monitoring of project implementation in the field. The Head of Delegation is responsible for ensuring that trade representatives in the mission, while receiving instructions from DG TRADE, are acting in pursuit of the overall EU’s objectives for a country. The EEAS could expand the use of the Delegations on the implementation of WMD non-proliferation policy—for example, in the area of risk assessment, control of end-user certificates and on-the-ground coordination between donors. These additional tasks would require a serious upgrading in the number and quality of political staff to carry out the new tasks.

Agencies

The EEAS is supported by several EU agencies which the High Representative is authorized to manage, namely the EU Satellite Centre, the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the European Defence


\[36\] Council of the European Union, 2009 Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP (Council of the European Union: Brussels, June 2010), p. 44.


\[40\] Council of the European Union (note 23). See also European Commission, External Relations, Taking Europe to the World: 50 Years of the European Commission’s External Service (European Communities: Italy, 2004).

\[41\] Duke and Ojanen (note 22), p. 491.

\[42\] Council of the European Union (note 23), p. 32, para. 18.

Agency (EDA) and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). The Council established these agencies, but their roles have previously been described as competing with the competences of the Commission. EU ISSS is a think tank that provides analysis and recommendations on the CFSP to the EEAS and other stakeholders in the form of reports, working papers and a regular newsletter; their research includes assessments of EU non-proliferation policy. The EDA is the common agency of EU’s national defence ministries. It runs several research projects relevant for CBRN issues, including biodefence capabilities and dual-use technologies. EDA harmonizes CBRN research activities with the Commission under the EDA and European Space Agency (ESA) frameworks. A European Framework Cooperation Joint Investment Programme on CBRN is currently under preparation by EDA. The ESDC is the CSDP’s educational instrument, providing training to civilian and military personnel working on CSDP issues within EU member states and EU institutions.

It is a ‘virtual’ college made up by national educational institutions within the member states, but its courses are also available to participants outside the EU. In this sense, the EU can be claimed to attempt to export its security-related knowledge to third countries.

Originally a part of the Council Secretariat, another EEAS agency is the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), an intelligence gathering body that ‘monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide on a 24-hour basis with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD proliferation’. Its staff is comprised of both EU civil servants and includes seconded staff from national intelligence services. SitCen prepares analyses for EU decision makers rather than for authorities in member states (unlike e.g. the European Police Office, Europol). It uses predominately open sources, but retains the option of member states providing additional information. While under the Council Secretariat, SitCen completed a geographical study of general WMD priorities and provided analysis of key countries of concern. The agency set up a special early warning system in the EU health sector in collaboration with the Commission, EU member states and the EU agency the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC). Proliferation finance is a potential area where the SitCen may contribute to assessing global risks, trends and threats.

IV. EXTERNAL POLICY ACTORS OUTSIDE THE EEAS

Major strands of the EU’s external relations remain under the Commission’s jurisdiction. Rather than falling under the EEAS, the EU’s Development, Enlargement, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, and Trade policies still fall under the relevant the directorate-generals of the European Commission and their Commissioners. These directorate-generals are important for the implementation of the EU’s WMD non-proliferation strategies. Some steps have been taken to integrate WMD non-proliferation policy with trade and development policies, most notably through the adoption of the non-proliferation clause in 2003. The EU institutional set up under the Lisbon Treaty aims to strengthen the coherency between external

---

44 Council of the European Union (note 23), p. 31, para. 7.
46 DeWilde, G., ‘European Framework Cooperation on CBRN research’, Presentation at workshop on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Research, University Foundation, Brussels, 9 Nov. 2010.
47 Smith (note 9), p. 18.
49 Davis Cross (note 48), p. 4.
50 Council of the European Union, Six-monthly Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2010/II), 17080/10, Brussels, 16 Dec. 2010, p. 7. The term ‘proliferation finance’ is a relatively new in the non-proliferation lexicon. Although there is no universally accepted definition, the working definition proposed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is currently the most authoritative: ‘the act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations’. The FATF definition covers the full spectrum of WMD proliferation, from development to use, and it reflects the relatively new practice of exploring the financing of proliferation as an issue separate from export controls. Bauer, S., Dunne, A. and Micic, L., ‘Strategic trade controls: countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’, SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011), pp. 441–45.
relations and the CFSP—areas of competence that were previously split between the Commission and the Council Secretariat. This section sets out how the four external policy directorate-generals in the Commission are linked to the EEAS and gives examples of their external non-proliferation projects.

The Directorate-General for EuropeAid Development and Cooperation

The DG for EuropeAid Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) formally began its work in January 2011, but its full structure came into place in mid-April 2011. This new DG was created by the merging of DG Development (responsible for initiating development policy) and DG EuropeAid (responsible for implementing external aid programmes and projects), following the transfer of around 100 administrators working in the country desks of the DG Development to the EEAS. DEVCO is the main implementer of external EU non-proliferation assistance projects and acts as the single contact point for stakeholders both inside and outside the EU—including the EEAS and all relevant DGs (e.g. trade, humanitarian aid) of the Commission. DEVCO currently finances training and other forms of capacity building related to non-proliferation, including export controls, to non-EU member states. The regional directorates within DEVCO fund assistance to third countries with the Union external budget instruments. For example, the Nuclear Safety Unit, placed under DEVCO’s Europe, Southern Mediterranean, Middle East and Neighbourhood Policy Directorate manages nuclear safety assistance—which includes safeguards projects in Eastern Europe (e.g. Russia and Armenia) and are funded by the INSC—and CBRN risk mitigation, which is funded by the long-term component of the IFS. The unit is responsible for the CBRN regional centres of excellence in the Middle East and any future centre in the regions under its mandate.

In 2007 the INSC replaced the TACIS programme, which worked on nuclear safety in states of the former Soviet Union. Although the Commission initially proposed the inclusion of nuclear safety cooperation in the IFS, this element was cut out in the course of negotiations and a new proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a separate financial instrument for nuclear safety was approved. Support measures in the INSC Financial Perspective 2007–13 include the promotion of nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries. The total INSC support amounts to €217 million for 2007–2009, with about €20 million for nuclear safeguards. Taking into account the lessons learned through the TACIS programme, the EU began to move from an ad hoc approach (2007–10) to a more coherent and integrated regional networking strategy in the Middle East, South and South East Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and parts of Africa. The INSC is supported by the Regulatory Assistance Management Group (RAMG), which brings together EU regulatory bodies, including members of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), to assist the Commission in defining regulatory components of the nuclear and radiation safety needs of potential beneficiary countries. DEVCO is responsible for drafting the thematic and geographical Annual Action Programmes and implementing their associated policies. DEVCO further provides technical and legal assistance and training to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540—for example, through the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) on the region’s borders with China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. BOMCA, which is implemented by the United Nations Development Programme, is one of the largest Commission assistance programmes in Central Asia, allocated with €27.7 million for the period 2003–10, out of which €25.7 million is provided by the Commission.

DEVCO and EEAS prepare proposals under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Development Fund (EDF). As one of the new instruments launched in January 2007, DCI supports cooperation with 47 developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Central Asia, the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq and Yemen) and South Africa. DCI has been

52 The export controls capacity-building programme is implemented by the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA).
53 The term TACIS comes from the programme’s title ‘Technical assistance programme stimulating partnerships between the EU and the Community of Independent States’.
used to fund EU assistance projects in third countries in the field of biosafety and biosecurity.\textsuperscript{58} Within the DCI framework, WMD non-proliferation has been included as a topic in bilateral dialog between EU and India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{59} With a budget of €22.7 billion for the period 2008–13, the EDF is the main budget instrument for EU development cooperation. The EDF is outside of the Union budget and, therefore, not under the scrutiny of the European Parliament. It is, however, still managed by DG DEVCO. It has been difficult to use the EDF to fund non-proliferation projects in partner countries as WMD proliferation is often a low security priority for the receiving states, who determine how money will be allocated. For example, in the 2005 Cotonou Agreement, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Islands (ACP) group of states required the EU to fund export control and non-proliferation efforts in ACP countries using money from the IFS instead of the EDF.\textsuperscript{60} When drafting administrative expenditure estimates for the EEAS, the High Representative holds consultations with the DEVCO Commissioner regarding the commissioner’s responsibilities.\textsuperscript{61} The EEAS contributes to the Union’s external cooperation programmes and seeks to ensure that the external programmes fulfil the objectives for external action as set out in the Lisbon Treaty and that they respect the objectives of the Union’s development policy. In this context, the EEAS also promotes the fulfilment of the objectives of the European Consensus on Development and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.\textsuperscript{62}

**CBRN Centres of Excellence**

CBRN regional Centres of Excellence have been established by the Commission in the Middle East, South East Asia, Ukraine and the South Caucasus in cooperation with the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. CBRN Centres in other regions—including Central Asia, the Mediterranean basin region and Africa—will follow. The main purpose of the centres is to assist countries in building institutional capacity and in implementing a coherent and coordinated strategy for CBRN risk mitigation, as required by their international commitments, while developing coherent national assistance packages tailored to a regional context. The Centres of Excellence aim to build on local ownership and long-term sustainability.\textsuperscript{63} CBRN Centres of Excellence management falls under the mandate of DG DEVCO and will be a core support structure for the Commission in its implementation of WMD non-proliferation assistance under the IFS. The CBRN Centres of Excellence rely on a central CBRN hub at the Joint Research Centre (JRC; see below) as well as regional centres, national teams and international collaboration to develop tools and methods to support the work of the centres. To avoid duplication, coordination takes place between JRC, DG DEVCO, FP7/EEAS, UNICRI, the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and parties of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).\textsuperscript{64}

**The Directorate-General for Enlargement**

The DG for Enlargement (DG ENLARG) manages the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which aims to help candidate and potential candidate countries for EU accession to implement the domestic reforms needed to fulfill EU requirements for integration. Beneficiaries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. The IPA has funded some projects related to nuclear safety and security, such as repatriating irradiated fuel elements from the Vinca nuclear research reactor in Serbia to the Russian Federation,\textsuperscript{63}

---


\textsuperscript{59} Council of the European Union (note 36), pp. 51–52.


\textsuperscript{61} Council of the European Union (note 23), p. 36, article 8.3.


at a cost of about €4.5 million, and the conditioning and safe storage of disused, sealed radioactive sources in Serbia, at a cost of about €0.6 million. The IPA is the only geographic financial instrument in the external relations field not managed by the EEAS. EU accession is often thought of as a powerful incentive for domestic reforms in candidate countries. The DG ENLARG can play a role in implementing the reform-focused goals of the EU’s non-proliferation strategy regarding, among other things, setting up (or maintaining) effective export control systems in neighbouring countries.

The Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

The DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) administers the Civil Protection Financial Instrument. The budget instrument under the EURATOM Treaty provides funding to ‘support and complement the efforts of the Member States for the protection, primarily of people but also of the environment and property, including cultural heritage, in the event of natural and man-made disasters, acts of terrorism and technological, radiological or environmental accidents and to facilitate reinforced cooperation between the Member States in the field of civil protection’. The budget allocated to the instrument under the EU’s 2007–13 financial framework amounts to €189.8 million, of which €56 million is allocated for actions in third countries. In 2011 the budget article for civil protection interventions in third countries amounted to €4 million; it covered the dispatching of expertise for missions outside of the EU and the transport and associated logistics. The Commission is involved in providing logistical support for the assessment and coordination of the experts it deploys; facilitating the pooling of member states’ transport and equipment resources; assisting the member states to identify and facilitate their access to transport resources and equipment which may be available from other sources; and financing any additional transport necessary to ensure the timely and effective delivery of the civil protection response.

The Directorate-General for Trade

Trade issues remain fully outside of the EEAS structure, even if some institutional efforts have been made to facilitate dialogue between the Commissioner for the DG for Trade (DG TRADE) and the High Representative and their support staff. Thus, the non-proliferation and trade sectors will continue to have overlapping competences, not least within the area of dual-use items. The 2011 Management Plan for DG TRADE identified dual-use export controls as a specific area of focus, citing the number of available EU General Export Authorizations for dual-use items as one indicator for an effective EU export control system. Based on this indicator, DG TRADE set a mid-term target to July 2011 to increase the availability of the general licences by third countries from the current seven beneficiaries.

General licences are exceptions to the standard individual licences issued for export of sensitive products and their increase spread have natural proliferation concerns. DG TRADE’s Dual-Use Unit is responsible for the internal side of export controls as part of the EU Common Commercial Policy by ensuring the proper functioning of the export control system and that the system increases harmonization between EU exporters. The Dual-Use Unit is currently preparing a training programme on export controls focused on EU licensing and customs officials, but progress on this project depends on funding. DG TRADE also provides some input to capacity-building projects financed by the Commission through DG DEVCO, with the political priorities for this work set by the EEAS.

V. INTERNAL POLICY ACTORS AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

In addition to the external policy actors, various other Commission DGs have developed substantial competences on internal policies related to WMD.

66 Council of the European Union (note 34).
non-proliferation. This section presents the actors that manage non-proliferation projects with an external dimension. Importantly, a number of additional internal policy areas are likely to include aspects of external WMD non-proliferation in the near future. One such area is visa policy, which will need to implement EU member states’ commitments under various EU and UN Security Council resolutions related to intangible transfer of technologies (as well as objective 2 in the New Lines for Action of 2008). Another area of concern is maritime security and the implementation of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. The Commission services assist the Council Secretariat, the EEAS and the High Representative through ‘service-level arrangements’ drawn up on the initiation of the Council Secretariat, the EEAS or relevant Commission DG. However, no clear institutional arrangement exists on how to bring together the internal programmes, and more importantly what role these programmes have in implementing EU’s external non-proliferation policy.

The Directorate-General for Home Affairs

The DG for Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JFS) was divided into two directorate-generals in July 2010: DG Home Affairs (DG HOME) and DG Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship (DG JUST). Prior to its division, DG JFS had completed policy work on several areas related to non-proliferation, including a Green Paper on biopreparedness in 2007 and support to an initiative to develop international biosafety and biosecurity laboratory standards. The division of JFS saw the department for international affairs move to DG HOME. The Crisis Management and Fight Against Terrorism Unit within DG HOME is responsible for assisting the authorities of the member states in their implementation of the EU strategy to combat terrorism. The strategy includes several references to the ‘proliferation–terrorism nexus’ outlined in the non-proliferation strategy and provides objectives to cut off terrorists’ access to attack materials, specifically WMD, delivery systems and dual-use products while depriving terrorists of the opportunities to ‘spread technical expertise related to terrorism’, thus addressing intangible knowledge transfers related to WMD proliferation.

Internationally, the strategy identified that the EU ‘must work with partners and international organizations on transport security, and non-proliferation of CBRN materials and small arms/light weapons, as well as provide technical assistance on protective security to priority third countries as a component of our wider technical assistance programmes’. DG HOME’s Crisis Management and Fight Against Terrorism Unit is also responsible for the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan, adopted by the Council in November 2009. Although it is mainly aimed at providing a framework for increased collaboration and coordination of security policies within the EU, the Action Plan also contains international ambitions. Through technical support and funding by the IFS (now an EEAS role), the INSC and Council Decisions, the Action Plan sets out to enhance regional and international collaboration regarding CBRN security. One of the core recommendations of the action plan was to strengthen the EU’s effort to present a coordinated view in multilateral arms control arenas such as the IAEA, the OPCW, the BTWC Conference, Interpol and the GHSI. In this context, DG HOME has had regular contacts with colleagues working in the WMD centre (formerly in the Council Secretariat) and colleagues in DG RELEX working on CBRN issues—which has now been transformed into regular contacts with the responsible services in the EEAS. DG HOME further connects the Commission’s DG JFS and DG HOME with member states law enforcement and security services and Justice and Home Affairs agencies, such

72 Council of the European Union (note 23), p. 33, article 4, para. 5.
76 Council of the European Union 14469/4/05 (note 75), p. 11.
as Europol, the European Police College (Cepol) and Eurojust (a judicial cooperation body created by the Council to help provide safety within an area of freedom, security and justice).\footnote{Krassnig, C., ‘Research focus in the EU CBRN action plan’, Presentation at workshop on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Research, University Foundation, Brussels, 10 Nov. 2010.} Since 2008 Europol manages a CBRN database of CBRN terrorism-related events and CBRN products and materials.

A Technical Expert Service consisting of a consortium of research institutes and law enforcement agencies supports DG HOME and provides it with technical expertise for the implementation of the CBRN Action Plan.\footnote{Council of the European Union (note 50), p. 6.} The main financial tools available to the Commission to support the implementation of the CBRN Action Plan are the specific programmes ‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and Other Security Related Risks’ and ‘Prevention of and Fight against Crime’, both of which DG HOME manages.\footnote{Council Decision of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007–2013, as part of the General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific Programme ‘Prevention of and Fight against Crime’, both of which DG HOME manages.} The Commission made €100 million available for support of the implementation of the CBRN action plan over the period 2010–13.\footnote{Council Decision of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007–2013, as part of the General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific Programme ‘Prevention of and Fight against Crime’, Official Journal of the European Union, L58, vol. 50 (24 Feb. 2007), pp. 7–12.} For 2010 the ‘Prevention Of and Fight Against Crime’ programme spent €12 million on measures concerning the threats posed by the possible use by terrorists of CBRN materials—including measures related to raising awareness, developing safety standards, improving information exchange mechanisms, conducting exercises and training, increasing security capacity, networking and others. In addition, another €7.5 million was made available for projects under Framework Partnerships.\footnote{European Commission (note 77), pp. 8–9.}

### The Directorate-General Health and Consumers

The Health Threat Unit of the Commission’s DG for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO) covers CBRN issues. Addressing the threat of CBRN agents was a core objective in the EU Health Strategy, in which bioterrorism was identified as one of four major potential threats to health. The EU response to CBRN threats was launched to coordinate and ‘respond rapidly to health threats globally and to enhance the EC’s and third countries’ capacities to do so’.\footnote{European Commission, ‘Together for health: a strategic approach for the EU 2008–2013’, White Paper, COM(2007) 630 final, Brussels, 23 Oct. 2007, p. 3.} Union-level action included scientific risk assessment, preparedness and response to bioterrorism as well as Union-level cooperation and coordination between member states and international actors.\footnote{European Commission, COM(2007) 630 final p. 3.} During 2001–2008 DG SANCO funded several international projects on preparedness, including a laboratory cooperation project with Russia and a network for communicable disease control in southern Europe and the Mediterranean countries.\footnote{Kuhlau (note 73), p. 35.} The DG SANCO continues to finance non-proliferation projects in third countries, including ‘EpiSouth Plus’, jointly with DEVCO, and the health monitoring system ‘Alerting System and Development of a Health Surveillance System for the Deliberate Release of Chemicals by Terrorists’. EpiSouth Plus is a network for the control of public health threats and other biosecurity risks in the Mediterranean Region and Balkans, which includes 9 EU member states and 18 non-EU member states. The Alerting System involves developing mechanisms for analysis and reporting information and consulting with EU member states and stakeholders on health issues at community, national and international levels.\footnote{European Commission, COM(2007) 630 final p. 3; and European Commission, Kuhlau (note 73), p. 35.}

The Commission coordinates health security measures in the EU through its Health Security Committee (HSC). The HSC is an informal cooperation and coordination body chaired by DG SANCO that meets twice a year and includes representatives from all EU member states as well as from other relevant Commission departments and agencies (e.g. the ECDC). It addresses CBRN threats by concentrating on health-related threats from terrorism or any deliberate release of biological or other agents. It also seeks to raise levels of preparedness for cross-border threats. The EU Health Programme 2008–13 provides financial support for the work of the HSC and actions on preparedness and response to CBRN threats to
public health. Projects promoting health development can receive EU funding from the health programme as a means of implementing the EU Health Strategy. Since 2005 the EU agency Executive Agency for Health and Consumers, in close cooperation with DG SANCO, manages calls for proposals for projects and organizes grants, conferences and relations with the beneficiaries of health programme funding. Currently four projects covering biological risk threats are funded by the EU Health Programme 2008–13, and another three are under negotiation; the estimated budget for the seven projects totals €8.8 million. In addition, DG SANCO is currently involved in two projects concerning chemical, radiological and nuclear threats, with a combined funding from the Health Programme of half a million euro.

The Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry

The DG for Enterprise and Industry (DG ENTR) manages an end-user oriented security research and development programme with currently 80 projects on security research, including research on (a) CBRN protection and CBRN response, (b) security of infrastructures and utilities (e.g. urban areas, energy, transport, communication grids, surveillance, supply chain and cyber crime), (c) intelligent surveillance and border security, and (d) security research coordination and structuring. The specific objectives for DG ENTR include the promotion of ‘favourable framework conditions for European industry’ and ‘access for European business to third country markets’. Hence, DG ENTR supports European industry through development of technologies and through an enhanced ‘research to market’ dimension. In this context, DG ENTR is integrated with some of the topics from the EU CBRN action plan (e.g. Goal 6: strengthen and structuring.

The DG for Internal Market and Services

The DG for Internal Market and Services (DG MARKT) follows the topic of proliferation finance together with DG TRADE and SFPI. For the time being, work is mainly carried out in the context of the UN and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In 2010, to raise awareness of issues related to proliferation financing, the FATF has published a status report on its policy work and consultations. The FATF has 36 members, which besides the Commission also includes 15 EU member states. The former EU Representative on Non-proliferation and Disarmament defined increasing EU member states’ participation in FATF as a priority. However, membership criteria includes ‘strategic importance’ and ‘geographic balance’, factors which might hinder more EU member states from joining FATF. DG MARKT will presumably expand its work against proliferation finance, as part of the broader threat finances arena, particularly when EU member states’ national policies in the area are harmonized at the EU level.

The Directorate-General for Energy

The DG for Energy (ENER) was split from the DG for Transport and Energy in February 2010. The new DG includes the EURATOM Safeguards Office (ESO). In the communication ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, the Commission identified the promotion of non-proliferation, nuclear safety and security. It specifically identified reinforced cooperation with the IAEA as one of the key priorities to be pursued by an effective external EU energy policy. In a similar

---

89 European Commission (note 87).
90 Health Threat Unit, Directorate C Public Health and Risk assessment, DG SANCO, Information provided to the author, Apr. 2011.
96 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: an energy policy for Europe,
manner, ‘EU Energy Policy 2020’ included a set of actions for the promotion of legally binding non-proliferation standards worldwide. Within its mandate, the Commission ‘will develop initiatives aiming at encouraging partner States to make international non-proliferation standards and procedures legally binding and effectively implemented, in particular through reinforced cooperation with the IAEA’.97 The ‘Nuclear Safety Directive’, adopted by the Council in 2009 and developed in cooperation with IAEA, reaffirmed the importance of non-proliferation in EU nuclear regulations. Furthermore, as the first regional legal framework on nuclear safety, the Commission envisioned that the Nuclear Safety Directive could initiate legally binding safety standards in other regions of the world as well as to help to create a level playing field in the context of the negotiations of international agreements in the nuclear field with third parties.98

The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)

The Lisbon Treaty had minimal impact on the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) Treaty which remains in force.99 EURATOM has not merged with the EU and, therefore, remains a separate legal entity, while sharing the same institutions as the EU. EURATOM continues to fund nuclear research and promote the peaceful use of nuclear materials and energy, both inside and outside of the EU. The EURATOM Treaty provides a framework for nuclear non-proliferation through safeguards concerning the prevention of the diversion of fissile materials, radiation protection, physical protection and export controls. Many provisions of the treaty cover activities and institutions that contribute to nuclear non-proliferation, including at international level, where EURATOM may negotiate and enter into agreements with third states and international organizations.100

The Joint Research Centre

The Commission’s JRC provides technical and scientific support on non-proliferation-related security under the Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7).101 Established by Article 8 of the EURATOM Treaty, the JRC has developed methodologies and technologies for the implementation of nuclear safeguards, the training of Commission and IAEA inspectors and the implementation of the European support programme to the IAEA. The JRC was the technical implementing unit of the TACIS Programme on nuclear security and assisted in the transfer of the EU acquis communauté to new member states by training their authorities and experts during the enlargement process.102 In 2009 an EU Security Training Centre was set up at JRC. The centre focuses on nuclear security training, including training on dual-use export control. The JRC programmes draw on member states’ expertise and are open to beneficiary countries of TACIS and IFS programmes. Examples of international JRC projects include the implementation of measures to combat illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear material in former Soviet states under INSC and border management in Mediterranean Basin countries and in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Region under the IFS. For the period 2007–13 the EU general research budget funds non-proliferation research managed by the JRC. Within the FP7 the EU has allocated €1.4 billion to security research. As of November 2010, the FP7 had initiated 21 CBRN Research projects (18 projects signed, 3 under negotiation) with €83 million contributed by the Commission.103 The research

---

programme provides significant funding opportunities for the areas of research prioritized through the EU CBRN action plan. Further security research priorities will be informed by the work of the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), the report of which will include indications on the future threats of CBRN materials and the research and innovation efforts deemed necessary to counter them.\footnote{European Commission (note 77), p. 9.}

VI. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has shown how WMD non-proliferation over the past decade has become embedded into the institutional structures and the budget instruments of the EU. EU WMD non-proliferation policy remains divided along external and internal lines—with the Commission addressing internal aspects and the EEAS taking responsibility for its external dimension. The Commission continues to manage external policy areas of importance for non-proliferation and, in recent years, the scope of the Commission's internal non-proliferation-related policies have been expanded to include external ambitions, primarily as a response to the transnational nature of the WMD threat. These developments have added to an understanding of WMD non-proliferation as a horizontal issue rather than purely a CFSP issue, while at the same time have multiplied the institutional actors involved in the programming.

The horizontal nature of WMD non-proliferation means that references to it can be found in a number of strategic documents covering a wide variety of issues. On the one hand, this has opened up more Union resources to be used for external actions on WMD non-proliferation, increased the expertise available for their implementation and enhanced harmonization of member states' position on specific topics. On the other hand, as the number of implementing actors and active programmes within the field rapidly multiply, it makes oversight and coherency in EU non-proliferation efforts more difficult to maintain. The EU's external WMD non-proliferation policy as part of the CFSP has not adopted a holistic approach to integration between internal and external policies. On the contrary, the New Lines for Action in 2008 sought less of an integration between internal and external non-proliferation structures than did the Non-Proliferation Strategy of 2003.

Real coherency demands more synergy between EU external action and EU domestic efforts on non-proliferation. All EU efforts on WMD non-proliferation listed above have an international dimension to their programmes. However, their underlying approaches are not unique but rather share one strategic objective: to work within multilateral non-proliferation structures. EU assistance proposals are often directed towards major international regimes, such as the IAEA, and assistance to third countries in non-proliferation capacity-building is often implemented through the international organizations tied to a specific treaty or by EU member states' agencies. From a policy perspective, the objectives set out from the different institutional actors do not clash. Indeed, the various actors often share a common mix of strategies building on both reform in and assistance to third countries. The potential difficulties instead lie in coordinating these actors, defining a clear division of labour and, more importantly, learning how to draw on the significant EU non-proliferation competences that have already been developed. Tighter coordination will become even more urgent as non-proliferation issues are absorbed by new actors and policy areas—often as a response to the implementation of the EU's continuously expanding multilateral commitments on non-proliferation, such as counterproliferation finance and cooperation in terms of consular vigilance.

The findings of this paper suggest that the institutional architecture for monitoring coherency in the EU's many non-proliferation programmes is falling behind due to the distinction between external policy actor and internal policy actor in the field of non-proliferation. The responsibility to coordinate the EU's non-proliferation policies falls under the mandate of the High Representative. The creation of the EEAS and its mandate to coordinate EU external action with that of internal policies suggests that there is recognition within EU institutions of the tensions over competences in this area. However, the High Representative's, and the EEAS's, extensive duty of cooperation with the different EU institutional actors has so far not been supported by any practical work arrangements combining all actors involved in non-proliferation. Furthermore, the reciprocate information exchange arrangement between EU institutions under the Lisbon Treaty currently lacks support in EU non-proliferation policy, and the
strategic documents guiding the EU’s WMD non-proliferation policy do not set out greater cooperation and coordination of internal and external policies as a priority. The difficulties involved in obtaining an overview in order to fully comprehend the extent of EU’s non-proliferation initiatives and expertise could be the basis for some of the critique towards the EU’s seeming ‘inaction’ within the field of WMD non-proliferation. The growing number of programmes funded by a large variety of budget instruments makes clear oversight of EU non-proliferation projects difficult. Although the six-monthly progress reports have greatly improved over the past couple of years and now include a more detailed list of projects under EU funding, the reports have a clear CFSP focus and, in the past, seldom covered non-proliferation projects funded by Commission DGs other than DG RELEX. Furthermore, the monitoring reports fall short of providing the public with any real impact assessment on current and past WMD non-proliferation projects funded by the EU. EU institutions and other stakeholders would benefit from further analysis on where, and in what capacity, the EU can have an added value for WMD non-proliferation—and especially whether EU non-proliferation strategy should be reform-focused or assistance-focused. Finally, to fully coordinate the non-proliferation efforts of various EU actors, EU institutions must, in more detail, take into consideration the bilateral assistance made by EU member states as well as draw from their national expertise, in order to identify the political will and the technical competences appropriate to EU’s WMD non-proliferation actions.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Islands Group of States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFET</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOMCA</td>
<td>Border Management Programme in Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cepol</td>
<td>European Police College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COARM</td>
<td>Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Export Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODUN</td>
<td>Council Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOP</td>
<td>Council Working Party on Non-Proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBTO</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ENLARG</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Enlargement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ENTR</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG EXPO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG HOME</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG JFS</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG Justice</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG MARKT</td>
<td>Internal Market and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG RELEX</td>
<td>Directorate-General for External Relations in the Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG SANCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Health and Consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG TRADE</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDG</td>
<td>European Centre for Disease Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENSREG</td>
<td>European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA</td>
<td>European Space Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDC</td>
<td>European Security and Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Expert Support Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESO</td>
<td>EURATOM Safeguards Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRIF</td>
<td>European Security Research and Innovation Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euratom</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHSI</td>
<td>Global Health Security Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSC</td>
<td>Health Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTA</td>
<td>International Trade committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpol</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBE</td>
<td>(Civil) Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Multilateral Nuclear Assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMG</td>
<td>Regulatory Assistance Management Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDE</td>
<td>Security and Defence Subcommittee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFPI</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Instrument Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SitCen</td>
<td>Joint Situation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical assistance programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A EUROPEAN NETWORK

In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to create a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centres from across the EU to encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.

STRUCTURE

The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is managed jointly by four institutes entrusted with the project, in close cooperation with the representative of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The four institutes are the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) in Paris, the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Consortium began its work in January 2011 and forms the core of a wider network of European non-proliferation think tanks and research centres which will be closely associated with the activities of the Consortium.

MISSION

The main aim of the network of independent non-proliferation think tanks is to encourage discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, particularly among experts, researchers and academics. The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to conventional weapons. The fruits of the network discussions can be submitted in the form of reports and recommendations to the responsible officials within the European Union.

It is expected that this network will support EU action to counter proliferation. To that end, the network can also establish cooperation with specialized institutions and research centres in third countries, in particular in those with which the EU is conducting specific non-proliferation dialogues.

http://www.nonproliferation.eu