Interview with Marc Finaud

Marc Finaud is a Senior Programme Advisor for the Emerging Security Challenges Programme and the Arms Proliferation Cluster Leader at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). During his 30-year career as a French Diplomat, he served in several bilateral postings (in the Soviet Union, Poland, Israel and Australia) as well as in multilateral missions (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations).

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) has the primary purpose of promoting peace, security and international cooperation through executive education and training, applied policy analysis and dialogue. What are your main activities in the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament?

At the GCSP, we try to promote rules-based and cooperative responses to arms proliferation while developing awareness of the inter-relationship between that phenomenon and other challenges such as regional conflict, globalization, new technologies, terrorism, organized crime, etc. We cover the whole spectrum of instruments and regimes for the three categories of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, nuclear) and for conventional weapons (including international trade and legal restrictions on use). We also cover dual-use and emerging technologies. Apart from executive education courses (e.g. on arms control in the Middle East and North Africa - MENA - region or Arms Trade Treaty implementation), we conduct research and organise workshops and side events, in particular on the occasion of large meetings of the main treaties (such as, for instance, the Non-Proliferation Treaty - NPT -, the Biological Weapons Convention, or the Arms Trade Treaty).

Your research currently focuses on missile non-proliferation. The topic is highly controversial in the Middle East whose security environment appears increasingly precarious. How can the problem of missile proliferation in the region be tackled and what can be done to engage the key actors?

This is indeed a crucial issue in the Middle East but it cannot be disconnected from the global framework, be it only because of the role of external suppliers or international sanctions that may encourage domestic production (as in the case of Iran). The scarcity of international instruments (apart from the Hague Code of Conduct, the Missile Technology Control Regime - MTCR -, and rules of international humanitarian law restricting the use of missiles in armed conflict) is a major obstacle to any serious effort in tackling missile proliferation in the Middle East. Jointly with the Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East (APOME), the GCSP has made proposals to overcome the current crisis resulting from both the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the pressure on the Iranian ballistic missile programme. Such proposal includes win-win incremental confidence and security-building measures involving the key actors: Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia. In any case, no progress will be achieved by further arms build-ups and sanctions.

Do you think it is still possible to expect progress on the plan to create a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ME-NWFZ)? What initiatives can be undertaken to revitalize a discussion on such a goal which is an essential part of the arms control agenda of both the UN and the EU?

The major challenge is to bridge the gap between the Israeli position supported by the United States (which can be summarized in “Peace, First!”) and the Egyptian position supported by the Arab League and Iran (“Disarmament, First!”). In this direction, Russia has made interesting proposals, such as parallel tracks on regional security and on disarmament. The recent adoption of a resolution of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in favour of a UN-led process may help overcome this challenge and remove the obstacle from the NPT framework, opposed by Israel, but in order for the process to be successful, it will need to take the security interests and concerns all regional states’ into account.

How can extra-regional actors, and specifically the European Union, contribute to this effort?

The previous rounds of consultations were conducted by the Finnish Facilitator, Amb. Juukko Laajava, who benefited from the support of the EU. Similar efforts will need to be pursued either within the UN or the NPT - where the EU has the capacity to assist in crafting compromising solutions. The other external actors, such as the US, Russia and the UK, as the three “co-convenors” (and now the UN Secretary-General, as a result of the last resolution), will also need to be actively engaged to facilitate a smooth launch of the process.

Achieving the possible: Towards a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East

The idea of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ), a still unfulfilled plan that would ban nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the region, represents a major challenge in every NPT review cycle. 2020 is no exception. Finding NPT optimists today is like searching for survivors at ground zero following a nuclear blast. As nuclear states modernise their arsenals and Middle East conflicts rage, the two biggest obstacles to progress appear unsurmountable. But pessimism itself has become its own significant block, driven by our collective failure to imagine shifts in the perception that nuclear weapons have powerful military and political utility, or to negotiate nudges to the nuclear diplomatic supertanker to move it in a more constructive direction.

The zone and the NPT, like Siamese twins, both depend on each other for survival and yet each stunts the development of the other. Can they be separated so that each may flourish, or would such separation be fatal? The US proposed such surgery this May and caused an outcry, even from allies. My cheeky proposal at the same meeting was that such a separation would require a full unwinding of the 1995 bargain, with a decision in 2025 (25 years afterwards) to extend the NPT for a further 25 years. This would be a chance to think more creatively about the bargain and demonstrate that it is a temporary one.

More realistically but equally radical, to stimulate an optimistic, inclusive exploration of the issues, a group of people under the umbrella of British American Security Information Council (BASIC) have put together a draft treaty text for the zone. To stimulate renewed discussion around deterrence and disarmament, BASIC is coordinating a reframing discussion focused upon the responsibilities of states when nuclear weapons are present concerning issues such as signalling, security, command and control and disarmament diplomacy.

Paul Ingram
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EU institutional news

EU statement on the convention on certain conventional weapons

On 21 November 2018, during the 20th meeting of the high contracting parties to the convention on certain conventional weapons (CCW), the European Union delivered a general statement renewing its full support to the convention and its protocols.

The convention on certain conventional weapons, formally “the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects” also known as the “inhuman weapons convention,” was adopted on 10 October 1980 and entered into force on 2 December 1983. The convention aims to ban or limit the use of specific types of weapons, which are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. With a flexible structure and a text composed only by general provisions, the CCW leaves to annexed Protocols the identification of specific weapons or weapon systems to be prohibited or restricted. Currently, the CCW has five protocols annexed to it, which prohibit or restrict the following items: non-detectable fragments (protocol I); mines, booby traps, and other devices (Protocol II - amended in 1996); incendiary weapons (Protocol III); blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV) and explosive remnants of war (Protocol V). The scope of the convention, originally applicable only to situations of international armed conflict, was broadened - and its text amended - in 2001 to cover situations of non-international armed conflict, as it was acknowledged that conflicts also occur within the borders of a State.

The statement of the European Union underscored the importance of the CCW, described as a pillar of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The EU also expressed concerns over the slowing pace of ratifications to the CCW and its Protocols, the non-compliance with financial obligations by some high contracting parties, as well as over the growing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), of mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) and the situation in Syria. The EU called on all parties to armed conflicts to fully comply with IHL principles and rules, and condemned the alleged use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against civilians or military targets in Syria. The EU also reminded that IHL applies also to emerging weapons systems and that States remain accountable for their usage, reaffirming that human control is essential to ensure compliance with IHL, and welcoming the agreed guiding principles by the 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Finally, the statement confirmed support to gender mainstreaming, welcoming the increased consideration of gender issues in addressing the conventional weapons cluster.

EU general statement: Meeting of the high contracting parties to the convention on certain conventional weapons (CCW)

Network News

The EU non-proliferation and disarmament consortium holds a seminar on mine action

On 28 November 2018, the EU non-proliferation and disarmament consortium organized an ad-hoc seminar on “mine action donor strategies – lessons for the revision of the EU guidelines for mine action”, held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on the margins of the 17th meeting of the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention (the Ottawa Convention). The event brought together nearly 60 participants from States Parties to the Convention, the UN (UNMAS), the EU (EEAS, Commission) and the main NGOs in the field of mine action. The objective of the ad-hoc Seminar was to collect lessons learned, views and inputs regarding mine action donor strategies, with a view to feed the revision of the EU guidelines for mine action.

The EU is one of the world’s top donors. EU’s assistance is still led by the “guidelines for mine action” adopted in 2008 and since revised. As a result, seven main donor countries explained their mine action strategies (the UK, Germany, the USA, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, Norway) along with key donors at regional (the EU) and global (the UNMAS) levels. Thanks to Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Colombia, the participants were provided with accurate lessons learned from the ground. Significant messages were sent to donor countries and operators. Exchanges with some of the more relevant operators helped European officials feel the reflection about the revision of the EU guidelines. As part of the debate, it was interestingly mentioned that mine action is based on the needs of affected countries and on foreign policy objectives for donor countries. Burden sharing amongst partners was also raised. Donor coordination was discussed and the necessity for transparency in the policies of affected countries was stressed. Mine action is a paramount activity because it stands at the crossroads of sustainable development, disarmament, humanitarian assistance approaches, post-conflict reconstruction and peace promotion. As such, it has on the one hand been a strategic objective and on the other a challenge for coordination and effectiveness.

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