

Foreign, security and defense policies in Europe: Interview with Gustav Lindstrom



Gustav Lindstrom is the Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Previously, Dr Lindstrom worked at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the RAND Corporation and the World Bank. His areas of focus include the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, cybersecurity, EU-NATO relations and emerging security challenges. Dr Lindstrom holds a doctorate in Policy Analysis from the RAND Graduate School and an MA in International Policy Studies from Stanford University.

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the European Union's agency dealing with foreign, security and defense policies. What are the Institute's main research activities in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament?

The Institute's principal research focus in this area is to analyse developments concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) – especially in light of geopolitical changes and/or technological advances. We are also keen to examine developments in related fields, be it discussions held within the Convention on Certain Weapons (CCW) concerning lethal autonomous weapons systems, trends in missile proliferation, or challenges to arms exports regimes. As an EU agency, we also contribute to the work of EU Member States in these areas as well as the efforts spearheaded by the European External Action Service.

Autonomous weapons and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are two topics of increasing concern that EUISS has recently examined. What are the links between the two?

Within this area, our focus is mainly on the security implications of artificial intelligence. While recognising that AI results in multiple beneficial outcomes across different fields, there are others in which it may cause disruption. We try to identify these as early on as possible to gauge unintended consequences and inform about possible implications. We also examine developments in associated areas, be it the Internet of Things, cloud computing, quantum computing, and mobile networks. As AI advances, so does our ability to field autonomous systems. This places a premium on understanding related issues such

as responsibility/accountability (if something goes wrong), impacts on privacy, the possible weaponisation of AI and links to human dignity.

We have witnessed deepening transatlantic divergences over a number of arms control and disarmament issues. How do you assess those divergences?

These divergences are not wholly new. What is different is the manner in which they are being framed and communicated. So while there may be different tools or views on how to forward the arms control and disarmament agenda, the key is to maintain a shared end-state vision across the Atlantic. We should remember that even within the United States and within Europe there are diverging views on how to advance these agendas, adding further complexity to the debate. With the 2020 NPT Review Conference rapidly approaching, we will have a better sense of the state of this divergence.

What do you think the EU should do to enhance its role in preserving the existing multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and promoting their consolidation and universalisation?

The EU is already very active in this field -- probably as much as it can be, given the important role played by member states. Besides leveraging numerous financial instruments/programmes to consolidate and strengthen international agreements, it is a key supporter of multilateralism and the primacy of a rules-based order. By maintaining a proactive voice, the EU also shines a light on outstanding issues - such as the promotion, universalisation and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). What may be less well-known are the EU's efforts in other important areas, such as countering illicit flows of conventional weapons (e.g. Small Arms and Light Weapons – SALW).

The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has spurred a fierce international debate. This Editorial discusses the Treaty's political significance. The next issue will host an alternative view on the matter.

The NPT may not be well – but the TPNW will help

Fears of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) collapse are as old as the treaty itself. The latest iteration contends that prohibiting nuclear weapons would somehow challenge non-proliferation. In fact, the stigma against banned weapons makes them less desirable, so a ban is not just a measure intended to help long-stalled disarmament steps, but also bolsters non-proliferation.

This becomes even more evident in view of the NPT's ailments. While it has been effective in limiting proliferation, its disarmament pillar is nowhere near implemented. This may lead some to conclude that if disarmament is not forthcoming, then further proliferation must surely follow. In reality, the 2015 NPT Review did not fail due to an excessive disarmament verve. Consensus was blocked by two nuclear-armed states, in the interest of a third nuclear weapon state that is not even a party to the NPT – this is how you undermine a treaty.

Meanwhile, the majority of NPT-Parties were busy strengthening the taboo on nuclear weapons. In 2017, they adopted the [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons \(TPNW\)](#), complementing the NPT just like the CTBT and FMCT are to complement its non-proliferation pillar.

It is unfortunate, then, that nuclear-armed states and their mostly European allies, who portray nuclear weapons as desirable by subscribing to a policy of "extended nuclear deterrence", simultaneously accuse the majority of NPT-Parties of undermining non-proliferation by adopting a treaty that unequivocally declares nuclear weapons illegal. Let's be clear: TPNW supporters such as Austria and Ireland are, and have always been, among the most faithful adherents to the NPT.

The NPT is not collapsing. But this does not mean the 2020 Review is safe. A good first step would be if those states that are challenging the NPT by failing to reduce the role of weapons of mass destruction in their security doctrines, recognise the TPNW as a good-faith contribution to both non-proliferation and disarmament. Seventy states have so far signed the TPNW, which may enter into force before the 2020 Review. Prohibiting these weapons is a first step, and a catalyst, to implement a step by step process towards the shared goal of a nuclear-weapon free world.

Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm
EU-Liaison - International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)



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EU News

[Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini in Munich: The European way to security](#)

Latest Network Publications

[Is There a Threat of a Repeated Deployment of Nuclear "Eurorockets" from the Cold War period in Europe?](#) Miroslav Tůma, Institute of International Relations Prague, 2018

[Cyberspace: Asymmetric Warfare and Cyber-Heists](#), Matthias Schulze, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 2018

[The Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Dark Web](#), Giacomo Persi Paoli, UNODA Occasional Papers, Number 32

Network Calls

RESEARCH ANALYST

The Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House is seeking a Research Analyst to support the execution of International Security Department's research projects on CBRN policy
Location: London
Salary: £28,000 - £30,000 pro rota
Application deadline: 11th March 2019 at 9:00am

CARNEGIE EUROPE SUMMER INTERNSHIP - PROGRAM AND RESEARCH

Carnegie Europe is looking for an intern to support the center's activities in research, communications, and development.
Location: Brussels
Application deadline: 22 March 2019

EU INSTITUTIONAL NEWS

The Council of the European Union continues to support the JCPOA

On 4 February 2019, recalling the [November 2016 Council Conclusions](#), the Council of the European Union adopted new Conclusions reaffirming its resolute commitment to and continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal. The conclusions came just few days after [the statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini](#) on the creation of [INSTEX - Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges](#), a new financial instrument aimed at facilitating legitimate trade between Iran and three piloting European countries: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Affirming that "the JCPOA is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and an achievement of multilateral diplomacy", the Council emphasized its support for the development of EU-Iran relations in areas of common interest, including - but not limited to - political dialogue, human rights, economic cooperation, trade and investment, energy and climate change and civilian nuclear cooperation.

While welcoming Iran's progress on the adoption of necessary reforms as provided by the JCPOA, the Conclusions also expressed grave concerns over Iran's ballistic missile activity, calling on Iran to refrain from such activities as they "deepen mistrust and contribute to regional instability". The Council reminded that ballistic missile launches are inconsistent with [UN Security Council Resolution 2231](#), and urged the country to take all the necessary measures to fully respect all relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to the transfer of missiles and relevant material and technology to state and non-state actors in the region.

The document additionally reported serious concerns regarding Iran's internal human rights situation, and regarding the country's military involvement and presence in Syria. The Council encouraged Iran to fully support the UN-led process on Syria in line with UNSCR 2254 and to use its leverage with the Syrian government to this end.

For more information:

[Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on the JCPOA](#)

[Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the creation of INSTEX France, Germany, United Kingdom: joint statement on the creation of INSTEX](#)

NETWORK NEWS

"2019: Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control" Conference

On 15 March 2019, the German Federal Foreign Office will host the International Conference "2019: Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control" on arms control and technology. Four members of the *Network of Independent Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Think Tanks* will be thematic partners.

The aim of the Conference is to promote a well-informed international dialogue on the nature and implications of current technological trends and discuss whether new solutions are needed to ensure that the global arms control architecture can effectively capture new technologies.

The Conference will cover four technology themes:

- new developments in relation to biotechnologies, led by SIPRI
- missile technologies, led by FRS
- cyber-instruments, led by IISS
- lethal autonomous weapons systems, led by SWP

The Conference, which will be held in Berlin, is open to the participation of international political, diplomatic and military representatives. International expert scientists from the fields of arms control and new technologies are also encouraged to participate.

For further information please visit <https://rethinkingarmscontrol.de/> or contact the German Federal Foreign Office at rethinkingarmscontrol@diplo.de