

**PERSPECTIVES ON
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION**

[PW-BA-P2; POWI-P2; advanced BA]

Wednesday, 10:00-12:00, 14.04.2021 to 14.07.2021

While 'for most peoples "arms control" has meant having a good control of their arms in order to effectively wage war, and "disarmament" something imposed by victors upon the vanquished' (Daniel Deudney), during the Cold War for many arms control almost acquired the status of a "cure all", variously credited for preventing military escalation, accidental nuclear war and hastening the political conclusion of the block confrontation.

More recently, dual and divergent trends are putting pressure on existing theoretical assumptions and concrete regimes alike: on the one hand, the rollback of long-standing arms control regimes like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Open Skies treaties or the apparent failure of nonproliferation initiatives such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, US and EU during the tenure of the Trump administration seem to signal a real crisis in arms control. On the other hand, demands for more comprehensive nuclear disarmament by both the "nuclear have-nots" and transnational civil society as well as multilateral initiatives to preemptively control emerging technologies – such as autonomous weapon systems, artificial intelligence or hypersonic glide vehicles – point towards both an enduring belief in the importance and feasibility of arms control approaches as well as dissatisfaction with existing regimes.

This proseminar will introduce students to fundamental issues and enduring controversies of arms control, with a special focus on nuclear weapons as the paradigmatic case of arms control. It will explore cross connections between the development of arms control and International Relations theory as well as recent challenges posed by technological and political developments, including controversies over "nuclear justice" or the geopolitical implications of arms control negotiations. At the end of the proseminar students should have a solid base of knowledge about key arms control regimes, both historical and current, in addition to insights into the practical activities of arms control professionals and the debates surrounding arms control within IR.

Prerequisites:

- A fundamental grasp of Cold War history, especially concerning the role of nuclear weapons
- Ideally some exposure to International Relations theory, especially Realist and Liberal approaches
- As the course will be held in English working knowledge of English is required!

OLAT

Registration in the OLAT course is mandatory and absolutely essential for course participation! Communication, preparation and seminar materials will be handled entirely through OLAT and registration there is the deciding factor in determining enrolment (not QIS/LSF registration alone).

<https://olat-ce.server.uni-frankfurt.de/olat/auth/RepositoryEntry/11403558921>

Certificate Requirements

A. Requirements for Students seeking Participation Certificates (“Teilnahmescheine”)

1. Reading and Active Participation via Zoom: As zoom meetings cannot fully replace interaction and discussion normally expected in a seminar context, individual study forms an even more important part of the course and students should be ready for a considerable amount of reading: expect between 50 and 75 pages of readings per week! Unless otherwise indicated students should read *all* required readings.

Due to legal and technical reasons there will be no attendance check for online seminars, but participation is nonetheless required!

2. Wiki article: Students are required to contribute to at least two short “Wiki”-style articles of between 500 and 800 words, working in small groups of no more than 3 students each. Registration for these groups will be possible after the first session on 14. April through OLAT, closing on April 21st after the second session – per session of the seminar up to three groups can submit Wiki articles.

These articles should introduce and explain key concepts on the basis the respective week’s required and supplemental texts, enabling even students who have not read these specific texts to participate in the discussion. Wiki articles can cover an important treaty, a theoretical concept, an historical case or an international organization – some topic suggestions are listed in the syllabus but feel free to find your own topics! Wiki articles are to be posted in the respective section on OLAT no later than Tuesday 12:00 am to give everyone ample time to read and prepare for Wednesday’s seminar. During the seminar groups should be prepared to deliver a *short* (max. 5 minutes) presentation of “their” concept at opportune moments (ideally, groups should designate one or two members for this task beforehand).

3. Essays: Additionally, students are required to submit an essay/thesis paper of 800 to 1200 words on a topic of their choosing. Unlike the wiki entries these will have to be written individually. These short essays should raise questions, problematize, challenge or support narratives and theories from the readings and serve as impulses for discussion (for general tips for writing thesis papers see https://www.fb03.uni-frankfurt.de/55406663/WA_Thesenpapier.pdf [German only]).

Even though wiki entries and thesis papers are shorter than usual end-of-term papers, both will be held to the usual standards of academic writing regarding citation, formatting or style and these factors will impact grading for students seeking “Leistungsscheine”. A sample Wiki entry will be available through OLAT.

B. Requirements for students seeking grades („Leistungsschein“ / „Modulabschlussprüfung“)

In addition to the points listed under A.), students seeking graded certificates of course participation are required to turn in additional writings, with a choice between:

1.) A **term paper** of at least 4500 words (roughly 12-15 pages) on a topic of your own choosing. Students planning on writing term papers will have to hand in a short abstract (~200 words) of their planned paper by Friday, July 9th, for discussion during the final session. In addition, everyone interested in writing a paper is strongly encouraged to contact me via mail so we can talk about the planned paper via Zoom. Term papers will have to be turned in on September 30th.

OR

2.) A **take-home exam**, equivalent to a term paper in length and required work. Exams consist of a number of essay questions which you will have to answer (or rather: discuss) over the course of one week. The resulting essay should be around 4500 – 5000 words. Questions for the take-home exam will be released on Monday, July 19th and you will have until the end of Sunday, July

25th to upload your exam. Take-home exams have to be worked on individually; utilizing all tools and materials permissible in a regular term paper is not only encouraged but required and answers should include meaningful references to course readings (and, ideally, additional literature).

The final grade will consist of the grades for wiki entries (17,5%, with equal grades for all group members), thesis paper/essay (17,5%) and either term paper or take-home exam (65%).

PART I – BASICS OF ARMS CONTROL

14. April Organizational matters & Introduction

21. April What is Arms Control? – and why it is not Disarmament

Required Readings:

- Morgan, P. 2012. “Elements of a General Theory of Arms Control” in: Williams, R.E. and P.R. Viotti (eds) *Arms Control: History, Theory, and Policy*, Santa, pp 15-39.
- Mutschler, M.M. 2013. “Arms Control: Concepts and Debates” in: Mutschler, M.M. *Arms Control in Space*, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 16-32.

Wiki entry suggestions: Arms Control, Disarmament, Preventive Arms Control

28. April Organizing Arms Control: Unilateral Disarmament, Bilateral Treaties, Multilateral Regimes

Required Readings:

- Mutschler, M.M. 2013. “Regime Theory and Preventive Arms Control” in: *Arms Control in Space*, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 39-61.
- Kühn, U. 2020. *The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe*, pp 155-169.
- Poucet, A. 2006. “Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Treaties: An Ontology of Concepts and Characteristics”, in: Avenhaus et al. *Verifying Treaty Compliance: Limiting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions*, Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer, pp 41-59.

Supplemental Readings:

- Mueller, J. 2009. “Arms Races: Positive and Negative”, in Mueller, J. *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda*, Oxford University Press: pp 73 – 87.
Read this for: a counterpoint on how institutionalized arms control and treaties can also hinder efforts at arms reduction and crisis prevention and a case for unilateral action and organically developing “negative arms races” – “arms reduction will happen best if arms negotiators keep out of the way.”

Wiki entry suggestions: Multilateralism, Regime Theory, Verification, International Institutions

05. May **The Problem of Nuclear Weapons**

Required Readings:

- Fetter, A. 2021. “What are Nuclear Weapons and why are they so powerful?” in: *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 17–32.
- Fetter, A. 2021. “The Nuclear Revolution, Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear War” in: *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 87 – 110.
- Schelling, T. 1967. “The Diplomacy of Violence” in: *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, pp. 1-34.

Supplemental Readings:

- Morgan, P. 2003. “The Essence of Deterrence Theory” in: Morgan, P. *Deterrence Now, Cambridge*: Cambridge University Press, pp 8 – 25
Read this for: a more detailed overview of the central tenants of deterrence theory and how it envisioned nuclear usage and non-usage.
- Mueller, J. 2009. “Deterring WWII: Essential Irrelevance”, in Mueller, J. *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda*, Oxford University Press: pp 29 – 42.
Read this for: a thorough rejection of the central role of nuclear weapons in international politics and the claim that deterrence was crucial for preventing a “hot” Cold War.
- Cohn, C. 1987. “Sex and Death in the Rational World of the Defence Intellectual” *Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 12 (4): 687-718.
Read this for: A highly interesting account of “nukespeak”, the “private language” used in nuclear strategizing and deterrence theory – equal parts amusing and terrifying!
- <https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap>
Visit this for: vivid visualizations of the effects of nuclear weapons and the global reach of ballistic missiles.

Wiki entry suggestions: Strategic Balance & Mutually Assured Destruction, Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Age, Types of Nuclear Weapons

12. May **The Nuclear Arms Control Regime**

Required Readings:

- Fetter, A. 2021. “Managing Nuclear Threats: Structures of Global Nuclear Governance” in: *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, Palgrave Macmillan: 171-89.
- Biswas, S. 2014. *Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp 27-74.

Supplemental Readings:

- Feiveson, H.A., Glaser, A., Mian, Z., von Hippel, F. 2014. *Unmaking the Bomb*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 1 -19 & 173- 85.
Read this for: technical & political background on the chances & difficulties of achieving disarmament and nonproliferation by limiting countries’ access to plutonium & enriched uranium.

Wiki entry suggestions: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Test Ban Treaties, SALT & START, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, Fissile Material & Enrichment, IAEA

19. May Conventional Arms Control & Confidence Building

Required Readings:

- Koivula, T. 2017. “Conventional Arms Control in Europe and Its Current Challenges” in: Koivula, T. and K. Simonen (eds) *Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats*, Helsinki: National Defence University Press, pp 113 – 129.

AND at least one of the following:

- Prezelj, I and D. Harangozo. 2018 “The Vienna Document CSBM Mechanisms and Related Brief History” in Prezelj and Harangozo, *Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Europe at a Crossroads*, Baden-Baden: Nomos: 22-38.
- Dunay, P. and H. Spitzer, 2005, “The Open Skies Negotiations And the Open Skies Treaty”, in: Dunay et al. *Open Skies: A Cooperative Approach to Military Transparency and Confidence Building*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, pp. 17-52.
- Zwillig, M. 2006. “Treaty on Conventional Force in Europe”, in: Avenhaus et al. *Verifying Treaty Compliance: Limiting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions*, Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer, pp 153-169.

Supplemental readings:

- Fatton, L.P. 2016. “The impotence of conventional arms control: why do international regimes fail when they are most needed?” *Contemporary Security Policy* 37 (2): 200-222.

Read this for: a critical perspective highlighting the importance of domestic politics as opposed to international regimes, based on the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

Wiki entry suggestions: Conventional Arms Control, Helsinki Conference & Confidence Building, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Vienna Document, Open Skies Treaty

Supplemental: Other Non-Nuclear Arms Control Regimes

Wisotzki, S. 2013. “Humanitarian Arms Control [...]” in Müller, H and Wunderlich, C. *Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice*, University of Georgia Press, pp 82-103.

Read this for: an overview of arms control efforts aimed primarily at preventing human suffering, not outbreak of conflicts, including the treaties banning anti-person mines and cluster ammunitions.

Cirincione, J., Wolfsthal, J.B. and Rajkumar, M. 2015. “Biological and Chemical Weapons, Agents and Proliferation” in Cirincione/Wolfsthal/Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenal: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats*, pp 57-67.

Read this for: a short overview of the history of biological and chemical weapons as well as the efforts to control and ban both, introducing the most important treaties and regimes; appendix includes examples of chemical and biological agents and their effects.

PART II – PERSPECTIVES ON ARMS CONTROL

26. May Nuclear Nonproliferation – why bother?

Required Readings:

- Waltz, Kenneth (2003) “More may be Better”, in: Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2003. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp 3 – 45.
- Sagan, Scott (2003) “More will be Worse”, in: Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2003. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp 46 – 82.

Read both texts on the spread of nuclear weapons and decide with which author’s position you identify more; formulate a short argument (~ 1 min.) in support for why you think “more” or “less” will be “better” and be prepared to present it during the seminar.

Supplemental readings:

- Mueller, J. 2009. “Proliferation: Slow and Substantially Inconsequential”, in Mueller, J. *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda*, Oxford University Press: pp 89–102.
Read this for: account of proliferation as, while not “better”, not “a big deal” as a problem in international politics, questioning & criticizing mainstream views.

Wiki entry suggestions: Strategic Balance, Stability-Instability-Paradox, Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, Nuclear Accidents, “Proliferation Optimism & Pessimism”

02. June Arms Control & International Relations Theory

Required Reading:

- Bull, H. 1976. „Arms Control and World Order”, *International Security* 1: 3-16.
- Buzan, B., Hansen, L. 2009, “The Cold War challenge to national security: peace research and arms control”, in: *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-118.
- Wright, S. 2009. “Feminist Theory and Arms Control”, pp 191-213.

Supplemental Reading:

- Krieger, Z. and A.I. Roth 2005. “Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory” *International Studies Review* 9(3): 369-384.
Read this for: A detailed account how prominent neo-realist thinkers Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer tackled the problem of nuclear weapons over time.
- Adler, E. 1992. “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control”. *International Organization* 46(1): 101-145.
Read this for: further elaboration of the role of national and transnational actors such as scientists in developing norms and pushing for arms control and disarmament.

Wiki entry suggestions: Realism, Feminist International Relations Theory

09. June Arms Control & Global Justice

Required Readings:

- Biswas, S. 2014. *Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp 75-108.
- Tannenwald, N. 2013. "Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" *Ethics & International Affairs* 27(3): 299-317.

Supplemental Readings:

- Knopf, J. 2012. "NGOs, Social Movements and Arms Control" in: Williams, R.E. and P.R. Viotti (eds) *Arms Control: History, Theory, and Policy*, Santa, pp 169-192.

Read this for: an overview of how civil society has impacted and contributed to arms control efforts, from the earliest peace movements in the 19th century up to modern regimes resulting from (among other things) public pressure, such as the Ottawa treaty banning land mines.

Wiki entry suggestions: Postcolonial Theory, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

16. June Arms Control vs. Disarmament?

Required Reading:

- Freedman, Lawrence. 2019. "Is 'Old School' Nuclear Disarmament Dead?", in Njølstad, Olav and Steen, B.N.V. (eds) *Nuclear Disarmament – A Critical Assessment*, New York: Routledge, pp. 9 – 24
- Glaser, Charles L. 2019. "Was Nuclear Disarmament ever alive?", in Njølstad, Olav and Steen, B.N.V. (eds) *Nuclear Disarmament – A Critical Assessment*, New York: Routledge, pp. 25 – 42
- Craig, Champel. 2020. "Can the Danger of Nuclear War be Eliminated by Disarmament?", in Sauer, T. et al (eds) *Non-Nuclear Peace*, PalgraveMacmillan, pp 167 – 180.

Supplemental Readings:

- Johnson, R. 2019. "The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats" in: *Nuclear Disarmament – A Critical Assessment*, New York: Routledge, pp. 75 – 91.

Read this for: an argument in favor of the nuclear ban treaty by one of the co-founders of the International Campaign to abolish Nuclear Weapons.

Wiki entry suggestions: International Campaign to abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), Global Zero

PART III – CASE STUDIES & OUTLOOK

23. June Case Study I: Iran and the “Nuclear Deal”

Required Readings:

- Sagan S. and Waltz, K. 2007. “Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?” *Journal of International Affairs* 60(2): 135 – 150
- Samore, G. et al. 2015. *The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide*. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, pp 4 – 15.
- Rezaei, F. 2019. “Iran and the United States: The Rise and Fall of the Brief Détente” in: *Iran’s Foreign Policy after the Nuclear Agreement*, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 21-44.

Supplemental Readings:

- Rezaei, F. 2019. “The Negotiated Political Order and the Making of Iran’s Foreign Policy” in: *Iran’s Foreign Policy after the Nuclear Agreement*, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1-19.
Read this for: background on the Iranian political System, including internal factionalism and differing perspectives on the JCPOA.
- <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-04/features/arduous-path-restoring-iran-nuclear-deal>
Visit this for: an up to date (April ’21) perspective on the challenges of reviving the nuclear deal.

Wiki entry suggestions: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, Regional Arms Races

30. June Case Study II: A Crisis of Arms Control in Europe?

Required Readings:

- Zellner, W., Oliker, O., Pifer, S. 2020 „A Little of the Old, a Little of the New: A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe“, *Deep Cuts Issue Brief* #11, pp 1-13.
- Kulesa, L. 2019 “The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe” *Survival* 60 (4): 75–90.
- Anderson, J.V. and A.J. Nelson. 2019. “The INF Treaty: A Spectacular, Inflexible, Time-Bound Success”, *Strategic Studies Quarterly* Summer 2019: 90-117.
- Kühn, U. 2019. “Between a rock and a hard place Europe in a post INF world” *The Nonproliferation Review*, 26 (1-2): 155-166.

Wiki entry suggestions: American Justifications for Withdrawing from INF Treaty, Russian Justifications for Suspension of CFE Treaty

07. July Hypersonic Killer Robots in Cyberspace? New Frontiers for Arms Control

Required Reading:

- O'Connell, M.-E. 2015. "21st Century Arms Control Challenges: Drones, Cyber Weapons, Killer Robots, and WMDs", *Wash. Univ. Global Studies L. Rev* 13: 515-533.

and TWO of the following:

- Altmann, J and Sauer, F. 2017 "Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability", *Survival*, 59 (5): 117-142.
- Tikkanen, E. 2017 "Cyber: Arms Control without Arms?", in: Koivula, T. and K. Simonen (eds) *Arms Control in Europe: Regimes, Trends and Threats*, Helsinki: National Defence University Press, pp 151-168.
- Tannenwald, N. 2020 "Life beyond Arms Control? Moving towards a Global Regime of Nuclear Restraint and Responsibility", *Dædalus* (Spring 2020): 205 – 221.
- Schütz, T. 2019 "Hypersonic Weapon Systems Will Decrease Global Strategic Stability – and Current Control Systems Won't Do" *DGAPkompakt* 4: 1-6.

Supplemental Reading:

- Mutschler, M.M. 2013. "Space Weapons and Arms Control" in: Mutschler, M.M. *Arms Control in Space*, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 104-148.
Read this for: a detailed account of space weapon programs during the Cold War, other military uses of space for surveillance and communication and (failed) attempts at space arms control.
- Deudney, D. 2020. *Dark Skies. Space Expansionism, Planetary Geopolitics & the Ends of Humanity*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 145-181.
Read this for: a larger perspective on the dangers of space militarization and the importance of arms control for the survival of humanity in the long run.

Wiki entry suggestions: Outer Space Treaty, Stuxnet & Cyber Warfare, Hypersonic Weapon Systems & Missile Defence

14. July Open Discussion, Closing Remarks and Term Paper Discussion
