



Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey

Graduate School of International Policy & Management

COURSE SYLLABUS – FALL 2021

NPTG 8639

Seminar: Detering and Influencing Terrorism and WMD

4 Credits

Version 1.0 – August 26, 2021

Date/Time: Monday, 2:00 – 3:50pm Pacific time

Instructor: Jeff Knopf

Office: McGowan 200-D

Room: V499 Seminar Room

Tel. 831-647-7174

Email: jknopf@middlebury.edu

Office Hours: Wednesdays 1:30 – 3:00pm or by appointment

For online students: class and office hours will be in instructor's Zoom meeting room:

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This seminar examines deterrence and other strategies for responding to security threats, with a focus on how those strategies might be adapted to deal with the dangers posed by terrorism and WMD proliferation. The course will survey existing research on deterrence and alternative policy tools such as coercive diplomacy, assurance, and positive incentives. It will introduce some of the latest thinking about whether these tools are useful for influencing actors away from support for terrorism or WMD acquisition or use. The course will be conducted as a graduate seminar. There will be very little use of lectures; instead, most class time will be devoted to student discussion. It is thus essential for students to complete the assigned readings for each week prior to the seminar meeting.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

Students successfully completing this course will be able to:

- Define deterrence and identify different variants of deterrence.
- Identify and define a range of other influence strategies besides deterrence, both coercive and non-coercive.
- Identify and analyze factors that affect the likelihood of the success or failure of deterrence and other influence strategies, both in general and in specific cases.
- Discuss the prospects and limitations of deterrence and alternative approaches in dealing with terrorism and WMD proliferation.
- Recognize the strengths and weaknesses of alternative methodologies and theoretical frameworks used in the analysis of influence strategies.

TEXTBOOKS AND OTHER MATERIALS

Required Text: Students should purchase the following text:

- Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004)

Other Readings: All readings that are not from the required Freedman text will be posted in the class Canvas site.

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, all readings on the syllabus are required readings. Students should complete the readings prior to the seminar date and come to class prepared to discuss them.

ASSIGNMENTS AND POLICIES

The course will meet synchronously, and class sessions will be devoted to student participation in class discussions. Hence, it is important for students to read the assigned materials and be prepared to discuss them in class. Class participation will count significantly toward the final grade. If there are students for whom time zone differences or other factors make synchronous participation difficult, please discuss with the instructor the possibility of making a different arrangement; these will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

In addition, there are two written assignments: a short, annotated bibliography and a 12- to 15-page research paper focused on a single case study. Instructions and lists of possible topics will be provided separately. If students wish to write a paper about a topic that is not on the list, they should contact the instructor to get approval.

The annotated bibliography is due Friday, Oct. 15. Final papers are due Tuesday, December 21, by 5 p.m. Late papers received up to 48 hours late will be marked down one-third letter grade (e.g., from A to A-); late papers received more than 48 hours late will be marked down by two-thirds of a letter grade. Students who wish to request an extension should contact the instructor well before the due date and should be prepared to document whatever situation is leading to the request. It is at the instructor's discretion to decide whether to grant an extension. Please email papers to jknopf@middlebury.edu. Submit papers as a Word document if possible; otherwise submit them as a PDF.

ACADEMIC CONDUCT

All students will be held to all policies and procedures listed in the most current Policies and Standards Manual (PSM). This includes but is not limited to our Student Honor Code and regulations on plagiarism. A complete copy of the Policies and Standards Manual (PSM) can be found here: (<http://www.middlebury.edu/about/handbook/iv.-policies-for-the-institute/a.-academic-policies>).

Self-Plagiarism: Re-use of a student's work, in part or in its entirety, for another course without the express permission of the course instructor may be considered a form of plagiarism. If you want to use the same work to fulfill assignments in two different courses, you must get permission in advance from both instructors.

POLICY FOR STUDENT DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS

Students with documented disabilities who believe that they may need accommodations in class are encouraged to contact Assistant Dean of Student Services, Ashley Arrocha, as early in the semester as possible to ensure that such accommodations are implemented in a timely manner. Assistance is available to eligible students through the Office of Student Services. Please contact aarrocha@miis.edu or 831-647-4654 for more information. All discussions will remain confidential.

GRADING

- Your grade will be based on the following performance criteria:

Attendance and Participation	25%
Annotated Bibliography	25%
Final Paper	<u>50%</u>
TOTAL	100%

SCHEDULE AND WEEKLY ASSIGNMENTS

PART I: CLASSIC DETERRENCE THEORY

- Week 1 (possible pre-meeting Wed. Sept. 8): Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence – A Review

NOTE: For students who have not previously studied nuclear strategy, these readings review and summarize some of the main ideas and debates from the Cold War and after. Students should read these as background before the first formal class meeting on 13 September.

Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)

Francis J. Gavin, “Beyond Deterrence: U.S. Nuclear Statecraft since 1945,” in *Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: U.S. and Russian Nuclear Concepts, Past and Present* (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Feb. 2018)

- Week 2 (Mon., Sept. 13): Intro to Deterrence Theory

Thomas C. Schelling, “The Retarded Science of International Strategy,” reprinted in his *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 1

Freedman, *Deterrence*, chaps. 1, 2, and 7 [textbook; not in Canvas]

Robert Jervis et al., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), ch. 1

- Week 3 (Mon., Sept. 20): Deterrence vs. the Spiral Model – Putting Deterrence Theory in Context

Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary,” *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), ch. 3

Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Models of Adversaries,” *Comparative Strategy* 22 (Dec. 2003)

Recommended, Not Required:

Russell J. Leng, "Escalation: Competing Perspectives and Empirical Evidence," *International Studies Review* 6 (Dec. 2004)

- Week 4 (Mon., Sept. 27): Research on Deterrence – Reviews of the Literature

Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 2 (1999)

Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare, "Deterrence and Crisis Bargaining," in *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia: International Studies* [aka, The International Studies Association (ISA) Compendium] (Oxford University Press and ISA, 2017 update)

Michael J. Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2018), Summary, ch. 2, and ch. 5

- Week 5 (Mon., Oct. 4): Critiques and Defenses of Rational Deterrence Theory

R. Ned Lebow, "Brinkmanship," *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), ch. 4

Freedman, *Deterrence*, ch. 3

Elli Lieberman, "Author's Response to H-Diplo/ISSF Review Essay No. 20," *International Security Studies Forum*, Feb. 13, 2014, <https://issforum.org/essays/20-response-lieberman>

Recommended, Not Required:

Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 8-31 ONLY (the second half of the chapter is assigned later)

Frank C. Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence," *World Politics* 42, No. 2 (Jan. 1990)

PART II: OTHER INFLUENCE STRATEGIES

- Week 6 (Mon., Oct. 11): Coercive Diplomacy – **CLASS MAY NEED TO BE RE-SCHEDULED (to Wed. Oct. 13?) DUE TO INSTRUCTOR TRAVEL**

Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, "Coercion: An Analytical Overview," in Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds., *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018)

Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), Introduction

Roundtable on Phil Haun *Coercion, Survival, and War*, H-Diplo/ISSF 9, no. 16 (2017), <https://issforum.org/roundtables/9-16-coercion>

Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security* 30 (winter 2005/06)

REMINDER: Annotated bibliography due by Friday, October 15

- Week 7: Assurance (**NO MEETING MONDAY OCTOBER 18, FALL BREAK – WILL CONSIDER WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 20 MEETING INSTEAD, OR ELSE PUSH DOWN ONE WEEK**)

Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 31-72 ONLY

Deborah Welch Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization* 41 (winter 1987)

Recommended, Not Required:

Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Introduction" and "Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses," in Knopf, ed., *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), chaps. 1-2
James J. Wirtz, "Conclusions," in Knopf, ed., *Security Assurances*, ch. 12

- Week 8 (Mon., Oct. 25): Positive Incentives

Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, *The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 1-34, 157-169

Miroslav Nincic, "Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations," *International Security* 35 (summer 2010)

Rupal N. Mehta, *Delaying Doomsday: The Politics of Nuclear Reversal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chaps. 1 and 8

PART III: THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS

- Week 9 (Mon., Nov. 1): Strategic Culture

Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett, "Strategic Culture," in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, eds., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2019)

Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19 (spring 1995)

Alan Bloomfield, "Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 3 (Dec. 2012)

Michael C. Desch, "Culture versus Structure in Post-9/11 Security Studies," *Strategic Insights* 4 (Oct. 2005)

- Week 10 (Mon., Nov. 8): Psychology

Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 1988)

Jeffrey D. Berejikian, "A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence," *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (Oct. 2002)

Samuel Zilincik and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "Deterrence: A Continuation of Emotional Life with the Admixture of Violent Means," in Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijts, Editors, *NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice*

Recommended, Not Required:

Rose McDermott, Anthony C. Lopez, and Peter K. Hatemi, "Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence," *Texas National Security Review*, 1, no. 1 (Dec. 2017)

Anne I. Harrington and Jeffrey W. Knopf, *Behavioral Economics and Nuclear Weapons* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2019), Introduction

- Week 11 (Mon., Nov. 15): Norms and Domestic Politics

Freedman, *Deterrence*, Intro, pp. 29-32 (these pages are review), and ch. 4

Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory: Toward a New Research Agenda," *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (Sept. 2010)

Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 510-24

Jack Snyder, "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," *World Politics* 42 (Oct. 1989)

Recommended, Not Required:

Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Rationality, Culture, and Deterrence," Report to the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), PASCC Report No. 2013-009, September 2013

PART IV: DETERRENCE TODAY – DETERRING TERRORISM AND WMD

- Week 12 (Mon., Nov. 22): Deterring Terrorism – Theory

Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Terrorism and the Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," in Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner, eds., *Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012)

Elli Lieberman, *Deterring Terrorism: A Model for Strategic Deterrence* (London: Routledge, 2019), ch. 1

Janice Gross Stein and Ron Levi, "The Social Psychology of Denial: Deterring Terrorism," *Journal of International Law and Politics* 47 (2015)

John Sawyer, "Dissuasion by Denial in Counterterrorism," in Alex S. Wilner and Andreas Wegner, eds., *Deterrence by Denial: Theory and Practice* (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2021)

- Week 13 (Mon., Nov. 29): Deterring Terrorism – Evidence from Cases

Shmuel Bar, "Deterrence of Palestinian Terrorism: The Israeli Experience," in Wenger and Wilner, *Deterring Terrorism*, ch. 9

Laura Dugan and Erica Chenoweth, "Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism," *American Sociological Review* 77 (2012)

Boaz Atzili and Wendy Pearlman, "Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength, Beaten by Weakness," *Security Studies* 21 (April-June 2012)

Keren E. Fraiman, "Underestimating Weak States and State Sponsors: The Case for Base State Coercion," in Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds., *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018)

- Week 14 (Mon., Dec. 6): Deterring WMD-Armed Rogue States and the Utility of Tailored Deterrence

Freedman, *Deterrence*, chaps. 5, 6, 8

Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy after 9/11" *Contemporary Security Policy* 29 (Aug. 2008), pp. 243-256 ONLY

Patrick M. Morgan, "Evaluating Tailored Deterrence," in Karl-Heinz Kamp and David S. Yost, eds., *NATO and 21st Century Deterrence*, NDC Forum Paper 8 (Rome: NATO Defense College, May 2009)

Wyn Bowen, Jeffrey W. Knopf, and Matthew Moran, "The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the 'Resolve Plus Bombs' Formula," *Security Studies* 29, no. 5 (2020).

Recommended, Not Required:

Dmitry Adamsky, "From Israel with Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Intra-War Coercion, and Brute Force," *Security Studies* 26, no. 1 (Jan.-Oct. 2017)

- Week 15 (Mon., Dec. 13): TBD

This session is currently left open in case we need to push down or re-schedule an earlier week. If we do not have to move down any of the earlier sessions, we can either cancel the final class meeting or add a topic. Possible options include (but are not limited to):

- Cyberdeterrence (and/or space deterrence)
- Cross-domain deterrence
- Deterring gray zone conflict and hybrid warfare
- Debates about the importance of reputation and credibility
- Sanctions as a nonproliferation tool
- Security guarantees as a nonproliferation tool
- Soft power
- One or more specific country case studies (North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, etc.)
- Contemporary debates about nuclear strategy
- Research on the value or lack thereof of nuclear superiority
- Student presentations of research papers in progress
- Cancel the last week of classes and schedule individual meetings with instructor instead

REMINDER: Papers are due Tuesday, Dec. 21, no later than 5 p.m. Please email a copy to jknopf@middelbury.edu. Attach paper as a Word document if possible; otherwise send as a PDF.