

## EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium

### Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

E-newsletter of the European Network of Independent Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Think Tanks

#### The G7 and the Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, an interview with Fumihiko Yoshida



Fumihiko Yoshida is director of Nagasaki University's Research Centre for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (RECNA) and editor-in-chief of the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (J-PAND). Previously, he was Deputy Editor of the Editorial Board of the Asahi Shimbun and served on the Expert Advisory Group on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He holds a PhD in International Public Policy from Osaka University (2007).

At the Hiroshima Summit the G7 leaders placed unprecedented emphasis on disarmament and non-proliferation challenges. How do you assess this development? Do you think that the G7 can play a significant role in reviving the global arms control agenda?

The member states of the G7 are nuclear weapon states or nuclear umbrella states; all of them rely on nuclear deterrence for their security policies. It was very significant that the leaders of the seven countries visited Hiroshima at the same time and heard directly from an A-bomb survivor about her experiences. The basic line of dependence on nuclear deterrence will not change anytime soon, but hopefully this experience will have some influence on the attitudes of the G7 leaders on the nuclear disarmament agenda.

Autocratic nations such as Russia, Belarus, China, and North Korea are pushing nuclear deterrence more forcefully to the forefront. Indeed, it seems that they have no reservations about embracing the logic of nuclear deterrence. While also dependent on nuclear deterrence the G7 members tend to have, as democratic states more articulated positions. In this sense, placing too much emphasis on nuclear deterrence may play in the hands of autocratic nations. Shouldn't we reconsider security policies from such a perspective as well?

The statement from the G20 summit meeting in Bali sent the following strong message. "The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible. The peaceful resolution of conflicts, efforts to address crises, as well as diplomacy and dialogue, are vital. Today's era must not be of war". It is time for us to reflect on these implications.

The G7 leaders approved in particular a document entitled "Vision on Nuclear Disarmament". In your view, what are its most important points?

The G7 leaders recognized "the need for concrete steps by nuclear-weapon States to reduce strategic risks". And they call on China and Russia to "engage substantively in relevant multilateral and bilateral forums,

*in line with their obligations under the NPT, including Article VI" which compels all state parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control")*

In order to translate this call into policy, the G7 should propose and prepare "relevant multilateral and bilateral forums", and map out pathways for dialogue and negotiations. The reduction of strategic risks, i.e., the reduction of the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, can be achieved through nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament negotiations (plus agreements). It should be a common understanding that nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament constitute an integral part of security policy.

**How should the Group approach the modernisation and expansion of Russia's and China's nuclear arsenals? Is there space, realistically, for a renewed dialogue on nuclear disarmament between the major powers?**

The Hiroshima Vision drew attention to the inclusion of "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" in the Joint Statement issued in January 2022 by the leaders of the five nuclear weapon states. This key phrase was one of the engines for advancing nuclear disarmament during the Reagan-Gorbachev era. Nuclear deterrence cannot exist without the threat of nuclear use. But once nuclear war breaks out, there is no guarantee that the use of nuclear weapons will be limited and that escalation to a large-scale nuclear attack will be prevented. We should face up to this incontrovertible reality and engage in reducing the role of nuclear weapons and in creating a framework for conflict resolution through diplomacy. In this process, nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations will become an important policy tool for fostering confidence and expanding transparency

#### The European Union and the 5th CWC Review Conference

The 5th Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Review Conference that took place in May 2023 provided an opportunity for CWC States Parties to review its operationalisation and implementation. Ahead of the meeting, the Council of the European Union issued a number of conclusions to inform the work of the Conference and to outline the Union's position.

The Review Conference met in a challenging international climate. Similarly to other recent international non-proliferation and disarmament treaty review conferences, States Parties struggled to agree on a number of issues and ultimately consensus could not be reached on an outcome document. In her statement under Agenda item "AoB", H.E. Ambassador Marjolijn Van Deelen Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation European External Action Service indicated that the EU would have supported an outcome document on the basis of the provisional document formulated by the Open-Ended Working Group for the Preparations of the Fifth Review Conference and expressed disappointment in the result of the Conference, but pledged the Union's continued support to find a path forward.

Nevertheless, the week provided an opportunity for the EU and its Member States to show their support for the Convention and to promote issues that are of particular importance to the Union. Indeed, delegates highlighted that the EU together and its Member States are the biggest voluntary contributors in support of the OPCW activities. One such example is the financial assistance provided for the creation of the new OPCW laboratory, the ChemTech Centre, which opened in 2023. Ongoing support will be key to allow the Centre to serve its purpose as a force-multiplier for the OPCW. The EU's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) Initiative is another mechanism through which the EU supports the Convention, with regional projects aimed at strengthening CBRN security, including chemical security. The EU and its Member States also have long supported civil society participation in Convention related matters, acknowledging the role that they can play in furthering the implementation of the CWC. To demonstrate support for civil society, the Permanent Representations of Canada, Germany, Norway, the USA and EU hosted an evening reception for NGOs during the Conference and provided messages of support during official statements.

With 99% of the chemical weapons stockpiles declared by possessor States verifiably destroyed, the emphasis of the CWC regime will turn to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. Despite this notable success, significant challenges remain, for example in relation to implementation. Statistics from the OPCW demonstrate that seventy-one States Parties have not yet adopted the minimum legislative measures to implement the CWC. With the growth of chemical industry worldwide, this represents a worrying gap in the CWC regime. As the priorities shift from elimination to prevention, furthering implementation of the Convention at the national level will be key and the EU can play a leading role in this matter, in line with the Union's position, by supporting States Parties through engagements and initiatives to further implementation of the Convention.

Thomas Brown, Legal Officer for VERTIC's National Implementation Measures Programme

## Latest Publications

[Changing Patterns of Warfare between India and Pakistan: Navigating the Impact of New and Disruptive Technologies.](#) Rizwana Abbasi and Muhammad Saeed Uzzaman. Routledge. May 2023

[A New Approach to Arms Control. How to Safeguard Nuclear Weapons in an Era of Great-Power Politics.](#) Ulrich Kühn and Heather Williams. Foreign Affairs. June 2023

[The Role of Umbrella States in the Global Nuclear Order.](#) Tytti Erästö. Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI). 1 June 2023

## Network Calls

The Flemish Peace Institute offers internships to students and graduates in the domains of: violence and conflicts in society, in arms trade and use, communication and outreach. Deadline for the October-December vacancy is on July 1

More info: [Here](#)

The European Space Agency is looking for an Internal Research Fellow in Advanced Mission Analysis located in Noordwijk, Netherlands, for PhD graduates in related technical or scientific fields. Deadline for application is July 3.

More info: [Here](#)

The Center for International Studies announces a job opening for a research manager associated with the ERC Starting Grant Project "The Afterlives of Development Interventions in Eastern Africa"

More info: [Here](#)

## EU NEWS

### **TWELFTH CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE EU NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT CONSORTIUM**

THE TWELFTH CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE EU NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT CONSORTIUM TOOK PLACE ON THE 12TH AND 15TH JUNE 2023.

AS CUSTOMARY, THE MEETING EMPHASIZED THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON CURRENT SECURITY DEBATES, THE IMPLICATIONS OF RISKS AND THREATS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS, AND SHARED POLICIES. FURTHERMORE, THE MEETING SOUGHT TO DELVE INTO THE TECHNICAL, OPERATIONAL, AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO THE RAISED ISSUES, AIMING TO TRANSCEND ONGOING DEBATES AND PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS.

REGARDING NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT, THE MEETING ON 12 JUNE ADDRESSED NUCLEAR, BALLISTIC, AND SPACE-RELATED CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY TECHNOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES. THESE INCLUDED HYPERSONICS AND THE INCREASING CAPABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, DUAL SYSTEMS, THE INTEGRATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, AND MULTI-DOMAIN APPROACHES. SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES WERE EXAMINED TO BETTER COMPREHEND THESE CHALLENGES, NAMELY STRATEGIC INSTABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA, THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC ISSUE, AND THE DYNAMICS OF ACTION AND REACTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION FOLLOWING THE AUKUS PARTNERSHIP.

BUILDING UPON THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ELEVENTH CONSULTATIVE MEETING THAT TOOK PLACE ON THE 14TH AND 15TH SEPTEMBER 2022, WHICH PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON REVIEWING MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES, THE MEETING ON 15 JUNE EXPANDED UPON THIS EXAMINATION BY CONCENTRATING ON EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO FIND CONVERGENCES WITH THE EU'S POLICY OBJECTIVES. IT ALSO EXPLORED THE PRIMARY EXISTING MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING THE DIVERSION AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, THE REGULATION OF TRANSFERS INVOLVING DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES, AS WELL AS EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.

## NETWORK NEWS

### **CALL FOR PAPERS - JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS (JOSTC)**

THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS (JOSTC) IS CO-EDITING A SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE FOLLOWING TOPIC: "TRAINING PROGRAMMES TO COUNTER CURRENT AND EMERGING BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL PROLIFERATION RISKS: THEMES, PRACTICES, AND LESSONS LEARNT". THIS CALL FOR PAPERS AIMS TO FACILITATE INTER-DISCIPLINARY EXCHANGE REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRAINING TO COUNTER EMERGING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES. IN PARTICULAR, THE CALL WELCOMES CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE FORM OF JOSTC ARTICLES ON THE PROCESSES, MECHANISMS, AND TOOLS FOR CREATING AWARENESS OF THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

- CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT (E.G. TRANSPORT, SHIPMENT) OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT.
- CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS (GMOS).
- TRADE IN SENSITIVE AND DUAL-USE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT.
- STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL REGIMES OF RELEVANCE TO DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION.
- INFORMATION SECURITY, DATA SHARING, AND CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES TO CBRN NONPROLIFERATION.
- DUE DILIGENCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES TO SAFEGUARD GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS AGAINST MISUSE AND DIVERSION.

MORE INFO: [HERE](#)

### **INTENSIVE COURSE ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT POLICY**

THE VCDNP WILL OFFER AN INTENSIVE COURSE ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT POLICY ISSUES FROM 2 TO 6 OCTOBER 2023 IN VIENNA. THE ONE-WEEK PROGRAMME WILL INCLUDE AN EXTENDED ANALYSIS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME; AN OVERVIEW OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ITS ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT CHALLENGES TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR SECURITY.

DEADLINE TO APPLY IS JULY 28

MORE INFO: [HERE](#)