

THE EU AS A KEY PLAYER IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS ON SPACE SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE OEWG 2025–28

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I. INTRODUCTION

In December 2024, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 79/22 on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours.¹ In parallel, the General Assembly created an open-ended working group (OEWG) on the ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its Aspects’, which was scheduled to commence substantive discussions in April 2025 and will conclude its work in 2028.²

This OEWG was the result of a decision to merge two previous groups created by the General Assembly in 2022–23, which resulted in separate processes seeking to resolve similar issues. One was created to address space security through the angle of responsible behaviours and political commitments.³ The other would have elaborated recommendations on a legally binding document.⁴ Both topics will now be considered by the new OEWG. However, at the first organizational meeting in February 2025, and the substantive meeting in April 2025, states were unable to reach consensus on the agenda and programme of work for the OEWG. States aim to address these procedural issues and move to substantive discussions in the coming months. This paper accordingly explores how the European Union (EU) can play a key role and contribute to shaping space security governance in the upcoming sessions.

¹ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours’, A/RES/79/22, 9 Dec. 2024.

² United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Open-ended working group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its Aspects’, A/DEC/79/512, 2024.

³ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours’, A/RES/78/20, 4 Dec. 2023.

⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space’, A/RES/78/238, 22 Dec. 2023.

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the positions of the European Space Policy Institute or the European Space Agency.

SUMMARY

There has been increased engagement at the multilateral level on the topic of space security in recent years. An open-ended working group (OEWG) on reducing space threats was organized in 2022–23 and a Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was convened in 2023–24. Unfortunately, consensus has been difficult to achieve due to worsening tensions on the global stage and longstanding disagreements on space matters. In this context, the role of the European Union (EU) as a community of states and a spacefaring actor in its own right needs to be elaborated. This report examines the recent evolution of EU space activities and the growing connection established by EU stakeholders between space, security and defence. It reflects on how these developments informed EU participation in the earlier OEWG in 2022–23 and should be leveraged to contribute to the new one in 2025–28.

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The new OEWG will continue work undertaken in recent years, in particular by the earlier OEWG on Reducing Space Threats that was active in 2022–23, and a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that convened in 2023–24 to address ‘Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’. While the former group was open to all interested representatives and received inputs from both state and civil society representatives, the latter forum only convened experts from 24 UN member states.

The EU has enhanced observer status at the UN, which allows it to ‘join in debates, submit proposals, take part in negotiations and participate in the general debate each September’.⁵ EU representatives are also allowed to present the positions of the EU and its member states. For these reasons, but also due to the open nature of OEWGs, the EU is expected to play a role in the upcoming group, as it did in the earlier one. Active participation is also likely as the EU has become increasingly willing to strengthen its involvement and play a decisive role in both space and security and defence, alongside the activities already conducted by its member states in their individual capacities. In this context, the OEWG is an opportunity for the EU to do more, in concert with its member states, to advance European interests and become a key contributor to space security on the global stage.

To explore how the EU could contribute to the upcoming OEWG in 2025–28, this report first recounts the history and conclusions of the first OEWG, explains how the EU has developed its footprint in the space and security and defence areas in the past decade, and describes the initiatives launched by the EU institutions to closely link the two domains. The report then analyses the contributions and ideas put forward by the EU in the first OEWG and reflects on the ways in which these inputs might be leveraged and expanded in the new OEWG. Finally, it makes recommendations on the options the EU has to promote in the forum.

II. THE FIRST OEWG: A NEW APPROACH TO A LONGSTANDING ISSUE

The 2022–23 OEWG and its upcoming follow-up are part of a long history of attempts to advance multilateral discussions on space security and defuse tensions in this area. The question of space security,

or ensuring that space assets do not become the target of hostile actions, is crucial due to the increasing economic and strategic benefits that these systems have been providing in recent decades. The use of satellites to monitor observance of arms control treaties during the cold war made the issue even more pressing. Thus, the issue is not new and has been tackled by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) since the 1980s under the agenda of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Nonetheless, progress on this issue area has encountered various obstacles. In 1981, two rival resolutions submitted to the General Assembly illustrated that states disagreed on which weapons to regulate. While some favoured a prohibition on placing any weapons in space, including those that could target the Earth,⁶ others sought to focus on anti-satellite systems aimed at disrupting assets in orbit.⁷ These different perspectives persist and advocates on each side usually favour different solutions to implementation of the PAROS agenda. The former prefer a legally binding approach while the latter promote voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) within the existing legal framework.⁸

Despite these differences, various initiatives were launched. China and Russia prepared a draft treaty in 2008, which was revised in 2014.⁹ However, this was ultimately rejected by the United States and its allies, not least due to the complexity of verifying that states would abide by its provisions. The EU proposed a draft International Code of Conduct focused on TCBMs, but this failed to gather momentum. A GGE on TCBMs was established in 2012–13, which adopted a report by consensus that invited states to improve information sharing. Another GGE that convened in 2018–19 focused on devising a legally binding instrument for implementing PAROS, but failed to reach a consensus.¹⁰

⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space’, A/RES/36/99, 15 Jan. 1982.

⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Prevention of an arms race in outer space’, A/RES/36/97C, 9 Dec. 1981.

⁸ Silverstein, B., Porras D. and Borrie, J., *Alternative Approaches and Indicators for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space*, Space Dossier 5 (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: Geneva, 2020).

⁹ Draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT).

¹⁰ For more information on the history of PAROS see West, J. and Azcárate Ortega, A., *Norms for Outer Space: A Small Step or a Giant Leap for Policymaking?* Space Dossier 7 (UNIDIR: Geneva, 2022).

⁵ Council of the European Union, ‘EU cooperation with the United Nations’, Updated 27 Jan. 2025.

Following limited substantive progress, a new approach to addressing space security was proposed in 2020, which eventually led to the establishment of the first OEWG. The objective was to shift the emphasis from capabilities and technologies—or what should be considered a space weapon—to identifying responsible behaviours in space, or the type of actions that are or are not acceptable. The focus on technologies and definitions of weapons in space had polarized states and there seemed to be limited scope to bridge these divides. A focus on a behavioural approach therefore appeared to its proponents to have greater promise. In addition, the dual-use aspects of space systems had become more apparent in recent years, in particular due to the growing role of commercial actors, which had made the focus on technologies and a clear definition of weapons in or directed from space increasingly difficult. This in turn had consequences, for instance, for the possibility of verifying an arms control agreement. Instead, it appeared more feasible to reflect on the use of systems and the operations conducted with them. Thus, states can consider imposing conditions or restrictions on use, and establish criteria for deciding whether specific types of operations should be considered threatening.

Promotion of this new approach to space security began in 2020 in a General Assembly resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom.¹¹ In the following year, and pursuant to this resolution, the UN Secretary-General compiled a report summarizing positions on the topic, based on inputs received from member states.¹² In the same year, the General Assembly created the first OEWG to address the issue in more detail.¹³

The criteria that characterize such mechanisms are not precisely defined in UN documents. Overall, OEWGs aim to be more inclusive than other types of mechanisms such as GGEs by making it possible for all UN member states to participate and by providing an opportunity for civil society representatives and private sector organizations, as well as other international organizations to express their views. These entities bring substantial added value to

discussions, due to their expertise or specific interests in preserving the space environment. Organizations such as the EU can be more active in such forums, while they cannot participate directly in GGEs, which are limited to government experts nominated by member states—although they do not need to be state representatives. The 2023–24 GGE, for instance, heard from representatives from 24 different states. The major added value of OEWGs is thus to gather all the relevant actors around the same table and allow them to contribute to the debate, with the objective of broadening the horizons of participants and making them aware of the diversity of interests and perspectives. However, the outcome of an OEWG, which is usually a consensus report, can only be adopted by states' representatives.

The first OEWG was held in Geneva over four one-week sessions—two in 2022 and two in 2023. Member state representatives were mostly diplomats dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation affairs at the CD. The mandate of the group on the areas to be explored established clear tasks: (a) 'to take stock of the existing international legal and other normative frameworks concerning threats arising from State behaviours with respect to outer space'; (b) 'to consider current and future threats by States to space systems, and actions, activities and omissions that could be considered irresponsible'; (c) 'to make recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours relating to threats by States to space systems, including, as appropriate, how they would contribute to the negotiation of legally binding instruments, including on the prevention of an arms race in outer space'; and (d) 'to submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session'.¹⁴

State and non-governmental entities were given an opportunity to express their views on these points, both orally and through written inputs. Although both types of actors addressed similar areas, the angles from which they did so varied. Thus, state representatives reflected on the proper balance between legally binding and non-legally binding measures, and emphasized the importance of discussing measures to build trust, including through enhanced information exchange, the provision of assistance and training, the transfer of technology and improved sharing of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) data. States also called for greater transparency, for instance through

¹¹ United Nations, General Assembly, 'Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours', A/RES/75/36, 7 Dec. 2020.

¹² United Nations, General Assembly, 'Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours', A/76/77, 13 July 2021.

¹³ United Nations, General Assembly, 'Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours', A/RES/76/231, 30 Dec. 2021.

¹⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/76/231 (note 13).

the publication of space policies and doctrines, notably on activities that could be perceived as threatening. This was particularly recommended for rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs), that is, actions where spacecraft manoeuvre close to one another and potentially even dock.¹⁵

Non-governmental stakeholders by contrast shared their concerns about the lack of common threat perceptions, the lack of trust between states—coupled with the difficulty of assessing intentions when conducting space operations—and the false belief that the behaviour of satellites is always predictable. They therefore mostly made recommendations that rely on improved cooperation among states, such as the conduct of joint exercises on debris removal and the need to find solutions to address potential violations of non-legally binding commitments, as well as stronger academic cooperation.

Despite their different focus, it is interesting to note that both types of actors agreed on a few topics, such as the requirement to establish terminology and definitions that are shared by all actors, the need to address both kinetic and non-kinetic interference, as long as it is harmful, and the urgency of limiting the deliberate creation of space debris.¹⁶

In spite of the various discussions that took place in the four sessions, participants in the OEWG did not reach a consensus on an outcome report. In addition to the different perspectives on the issue at hand, this was also partly linked to broader dynamics caused by geopolitical divisions and worsening relations, in particular as a result of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These have aggravated deadlocks in multilateral forums and made consensus harder to reach, although the 2023–24 GGE did manage to achieve consensus on its final report.

Nonetheless, the Chair of the OEWG decided to release a report summarizing its own understanding of the conclusions, without prejudice to any member state's position. A non-exhaustive set of nine elements was identified for 'Member States to give further consideration to the examination or elaboration of proposals for possible measures to reduce space threats': (a) 'damage and destruction of space objects or use of space objects as weapons'; (b) 'development

and deployment of space objects for hostile purposes'; (c) 'interference with the normal and safe operation of space objects'; (d) 'protection of critical space-based services'; (e) 'assistance and encouragement in certain acts'; (f) 'military space policies, doctrines and strategies'; (g) 'implementation of international obligations, commitments and measures'; (h) 'notifications of defence and security exercises'; and (i) 'consultative mechanisms'.¹⁷ These areas can inform future efforts on space security, in particular for those who adhere to the responsible behaviours approach.

In parallel, the international community has taken steps to pursue dialogue on this issue area. A GGE was set up following the work of the first OEWG, although its establishment, sponsored by Russia, had been voted on the year before. It held two sessions—one in 2023 and another in 2024—that addressed 'substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space'.¹⁸ The mandate of the GGE did not include responsible behaviours but instead focused on legally binding initiatives. However, this did not prevent proponents of the responsible behaviours approach from discussing it on this occasion.

The GGE reached consensus on its report which, among other things, underlined that legally binding and non-legally binding instruments can be interlinked, and that clear definitions and verification measures are essential. It also emphasized that the principles and obligations established in international law, such as the Outer Space Treaty or the Charter of the UN, should be considered in any future elaboration of a legally binding instrument. Finally, it discussed some of the areas that will be addressed by the 2025–28 OEWG, such as the threat or use of force and the protection of space-based services to civilians, thereby making the GGE one of the building blocks that will inform exchanges in the next OEWG.

¹⁵ See UNIDIR, Space Security Lexicon, 'Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO): Definition' [n.d.].

¹⁶ For more on the diverse positions of the OEWG participants see Azcarate Ortega, A. and Erickson, S., *OEWG on Reducing Space Threats: Recap Report* (UNIDIR: Geneva, 15 Mar. 2024).

¹⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 'Draft report of the open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours', A/AC.294/2023/CRP.1/Rev.1, 31 Aug. 2023.

¹⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, 'Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space', A/RES/77/250, 30 Dec. 2022.

III. THE EU AS AN INCREASINGLY RELEVANT ACTOR IN SPACE, SECURITY AND DEFENCE

As illustrated above, space security is addressed at the international level, as ensuring stability in orbit is in the interests of all spacefaring nations as well as all nations that benefit from space-based data. Therefore, a plurality of stakeholders can be involved in discussions on the matter.

In the EU, space is a competence that is shared between the EU institutions and member states. However, in contrast to other shared competences, even if the EU decides to activate its prerogatives in this domain, member states retain the ability to conduct their own activities. In addition, policy issues related to security and defence, as well as diplomacy, remain primarily the responsibility of member states although the EU also has a diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The EU is a spacefaring entity, as it owns space assets under the Galileo and Copernicus programmes. The former provides positioning, navigation and timing services, while the latter relies on EU assets and contributing missions for Earth observation. The EU is also continuing to develop its activities in this field, such as with the upcoming IRIS2 constellation, which will be used to deliver secure communications to European institutions and citizens. These assets provide essential services for the EU economy, supporting sectors such as finance, energy and transport, but also for its security, in particular environmental security (monitoring climate change and water management) and emergency management. These benefits make the protection of EU space assets a priority. This is reinforced by recent actions that have highlighted existing threats, especially in the electromagnetic and cyber realms. At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, for instance, a commercial satellite owned by Viasat suffered a cyberattack (since attributed to Russia), which affected several European states not party to the war. For instance, thousands of wind turbines were knocked offline in Germany.¹⁹ Such incidents have multiplied in the years since the start of the conflict, raising concerns in European decision-making circles. Thus, the EU has an increasing stake in participating in discussions about space security.

These developments have led to a gradual change in the EU narrative. While they previously emphasized

the socio-economic or environmental benefits of the EU Space Programme, its representatives now increasingly insist on the dual-use nature of space. Expanding on this narrative would be a way for the EU to incentivize its member states to better use EU space assets to meet their security and defence needs, even though they were initially developed for civilian purposes. Leveraging dual use is probably seen as a solution to reduce costs and save public money in times of constrained budgets, by avoiding duplication that would be caused by the development of specific systems for civilian needs, on the one hand, and military activities, on the other. Moreover, for several years, the EU has been willing to increase its footprint in both the space and the security and defence domains, while also deepening the connection between these two domains at the EU level. To this end, it has been acting in three different dimensions.

Policy dimension

At the policy level, EU representatives have made several statements and published various policy documents that actively link space with security and defence concerns. The two most notable are the Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries, published in 2021, and the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence (EU SSSD), launched in 2023.²⁰ The Action Plan aims to ensure that progress and innovation in one sector can be leveraged by the others. The EU SSSD is a landmark document arising from the Strategic Compass published in 2022, and the first EU document fully dedicated to the security dimension of space. It aims to create a common threat assessment for the space domain across EU member states, and lists actions to be taken by the EU and its member states to better protect their space assets, exploit space data more efficiently for security and defence purposes, and engage internationally to enhance space security, in particular by furthering cooperation with the United States and NATO, but also with non-traditional partners. Specific measures include the creation of an EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre, extension of the

¹⁹ Poirier, C., *The War in Ukraine from a Space Cybersecurity Perspective* (European Space Policy Institute, ESPI: Vienna, 2022).

²⁰ European Commission, 'Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries', COM(2021) 70, 15 Feb. 2021; and European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 'European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence', JOIN(2023) 9, 10 Mar. 2023.

‘protection scheme’ for Galileo to all components of the EU Space Programme, and calls to implement or draft regulatory acts. A primary objective of the EU SSSD is to make the EU autonomous and resilient in space. The rapid changes in the geopolitical environment make concretizing this strategy even more urgent and an important complement to other EU defence-related efforts. Its full implementation would also help to strengthen the position of the EU in international forums on space security.

Finally, on the regulatory side, an EU Space Law is expected in 2025, which will address the three pillars of safety, sustainability and resilience, in particular but not only in relation to cyber threats. This is another way for the EU to connect issues in the space sector primarily managed by civilian entities (safety and sustainability) with other concerns where the military has the leading role (security and resilience).²¹ This connection is necessary due to the close interweaving of the three concepts: there is no security without safety and sustainability, and vice versa.²² It also allows the EU to expand its boundaries, using areas where its role is not (or less) disputed to deepen its involvement in ‘hard security’ topics and address topics from which it has traditionally been excluded.

Organizational dimension

EU entities have also tried to better connect space with security and defence by reorganizing their administrative structures, in particular at the European Commission. In 2019, a Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space was set up within the Commission for the first time, under the direction of the European Commissioner for Internal Market. This demonstrated the new importance given by the executive body of the EU to space and security and defence, and signalled the intent of European authorities to exploit the synergies between them.

²¹ The management of these issues is also distinct at the international level. Safety and sustainability (and, more generally, peaceful uses of outer space) are addressed by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) while space security matters are discussed in the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission.

²² Indeed, to perform their missions, military assets in orbit would benefit from an environment with little debris and where ‘rules of the road’ are clearly established. Conversely, more transparency on military spacecraft (e.g. on their orbital trajectories) and restrictions on military activities that create debris would be beneficial for the safety of all actors operating in space and for the long-term sustainability of the domain.

In 2024, this intent was further consolidated by the appointment of a Commissioner for Defence and Space, adding direct political backing to the development of these areas at the EU level. Interestingly, the EEAS, which represents the EU in multilateral forums, has also evolved its structure to better integrate space. The team in charge of addressing space matters was transformed from a Task Force into a unit (Unit SECDEFPOL.5) in the department for Security and Defence Policy.

Putting the two areas under the same authority creates risks, however, in particular for the space sector. Even if space is an integral part of defence, it does not represent all of it. Thus, in a context where war has reappeared on Europe’s doorstep and European financial means are restricted, wider defence priorities might divert resources from narrower space security concerns and space might have to compete with other defence areas. However, such risks might be offset by the opportunities that it creates, such as ensuring proper mutual support between the two areas, raising awareness about the criticality of space as an instrument of hard power—and, therefore, the need to properly fund it—and fostering synergies between the two domains.

Capability development dimension

Finally, the EU has been particularly willing to exploit the synergies between space and security and defence through its initiatives in support of capability development.

First, while the EU Space Programme was originally created primarily to serve civilian purposes, such as monitoring the environment and supporting various economic sectors, it has also included elements related to security and defence, notably the Public Regulated Service of Galileo and the Copernicus Security Service. In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on meeting these specific needs, as demonstrated by ongoing or expected initiatives, such as IRIS² or the future Earth Observation Governmental Service, which will provide Earth Observation services for security and defence purposes.²³ This trend will continue, as the EU SSSD calls for better integration of military needs into the preparation of the next EU Space Programme, which is likely to be aligned with the next

²³ European Commission, ‘Developing reconnaissance capabilities at an EU level’, 23 Jan. 2024.

Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–34, to ensure that the technical specifications for future EU space infrastructure serve these needs. Moreover, one of the focal points of the European Commission in the coming years will be developing the strategic capability to act in space through In-Space Operations and Services (ISOS). A joint declaration by five EU member states (France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) and the European Commission on the development of a pilot mission, ISOS4I, was signed in January 2025.²⁴ While activities in this area aim to support the competitiveness of European industry through the creation of a new market and the sustainability of space activities, they also take account of the security and defence aspects that such technologies entail, for instance, to ensure the protection of European assets in orbit. The EU is therefore rapidly launching new projects. Although funding remains limited and this might lead to a dispersion of efforts, these initiatives are likely eventually to result in an increase in the number of European capabilities in orbit. This will contribute to move space security as a topic higher up the EU agenda. This also explains why the EU is concerned with better regulating operations that are fundamentally dual use, such as RPOs.

Second, space is also significantly embedded in EU programmes related to defence. For instance, space is expected to benefit from 10 per cent of the European Defence Fund's budget (approximately €800 million between 2021 and 2027), which will financially support research and development projects to enhance EU defence capabilities. The Fund is based on annual calls, in which space is a constant theme. Similarly, several space projects are taking place under Permanent Structured Cooperation, an initiative led by EU member states. These projects address areas such as SSA, imagery and radio-navigation.²⁵ All these initiatives are designed to be complementary, as some focus on joint capability development while others support R&D performed by the industry. Space is likely to continue to be central as the documents that make up the baseline for defence capability development in Europe—the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the Capability Development Priorities, both prepared by the European Defence Agency—have identified it as a strategic domain. In this regard, it will

be interesting to see how recent announcements made in the defence realm, such as measures announced in the European Defence Industrial Strategy or new mechanisms created by the European Defence Industry Programme, might be leveraged to develop space capabilities for security and defence.²⁶ For instance, a European Defence Project of Common Interest is likely to be set up for Space Domain Awareness (SDA).²⁷ Similarly, questions arise regarding how measures to support the joint procurement of armaments, such as the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act and the Structure for European Armament Programme, could be applied to the space domain.

IV. EU PARTICIPATION IN THE FIRST OEWG

Linking space with security and defence is thus a key dimension of EU involvement in this field. As a result, and to protect its broader security interests, the EU actively participated in the first OEWG. This section explores EU engagement with that OEWG, explains the rationales of the EU and its member states in supporting a behaviours-based approach, and analyses the proposals made by the EU during the exchanges.

How did the EU contribute?

During the OEWG, the EU advanced its positions through five written inputs and two oral statements, through which it recalled the benefits provided by space assets and the need to ensure their delivery, the risks created by the dual-use nature of space technologies, the diversity of threats, the relevance of

²⁴ European Commission, 'Signature of a Joint Declaration for the deployment of the In-space Operations and Services Pilot Mission', 29 Jan. 2025.

²⁵ See the list of space-related projects on the PESCO website.

²⁶ European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 'A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry', JOIN(2024) 10, 2024; and European Commission, 'Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products ('EDIP')', COM(2024) 150, 2024.

²⁷ European Defence Projects of Common Interest are mechanisms proposed by the European Defence Industry Programme, but which do not exist yet. Based on European Projects of Common Interest, they aim to incentivize states to work together on production and joint procurement by providing additional financial resources. See Pugnet, A., 'The eight defence projects that could become first-ever EU projects of common interest', Euractiv, 21 Oct. 2024; and European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 'A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry', JOIN(2024) 10, 2024, p. 9.

TCBMs and the importance of finding an agreement to guarantee space security, especially through non-legally binding measures.²⁸ EU member states also contributed on their own behalf, reinforcing the messages shared by European partners. The EU was also active beforehand, during the preparatory stages for the OEWG. For instance, it was the only international organization apart from NGOs to contribute to the report by the UN Secretary-General.²⁹

Why does the EU support the responsible behaviours approach?

The EU participates in the OEWG and promotes an approach based on the identification of principles of responsible behaviours for several reasons. First, the EU sees overall benefits in this approach, as it helps to ‘contribute to increased international cooperation in space, commit to mutual non-interference in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, facilitate an equitable access to outer space and increase transparency and confidence in the conduct of space activities’.³⁰ In a context of tensions at the international level, in particular between major spacefaring nations, and of a loss of commitment to multilateralism, defining principles of responsible behaviours is seen by the EU as the most relevant and pragmatic approach to ensuring security in outer space. Space activities currently face two major challenges that could be circumvented by a behaviours-based approach: the dual-use nature of space systems, and the difficulty of attributing threats or attacks and verifying respect for disarmament agreements. The EU clarified the latter point in a contribution to the GGE in 2023–24, explaining that the complexity of distinguishing space weapons from other technologies, and their dual use, means that the intent of an actor must be deciphered in order to recognize a threat. In this context, behaviour can be considered a key identification criterion.³¹

²⁸ UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Open-ended working group on reducing space threats, ‘Documents’; and UNODA, Open-ended working group on reducing space threats, ‘Statements’.

²⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, A/76/77 (note 12).

³⁰ Delegation of the European Union to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva, ‘Open Ended Working Group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours: EU statement’, 31 Jan. 2023.

³¹ Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, ‘Verification of legally binding measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)’, GE-PAROS/2023/WP.15, 6 Dec. 2023.

In line with the evolution of its own narrative, the dual-use nature of space systems has become a major concern for the EU, and even the main justification for its involvement in the OEWG and its willingness to act quickly. The EU and its member states consider that an approach based on behaviours, together with monitoring capabilities, will ‘help reduce the risks of misunderstanding, misperception and miscalculation, and it will therefore help decrease the risk of conflicts and escalation in outer space’.³² To back its claims on the risks created by dual-use systems and the need to mitigate them, the EU made multiple mentions of spacecraft performing RPOs, which might be used to either repair or disrupt systems. For this reason, the EU recommended the establishment of rules of consent between client and servicer when conducting RPOs, which, if applied, will also have an impact on future EU ISOS activities.

A final set of rationales goes beyond the mere strategic usefulness of space. These additional motivations include preservation of the delivery of essential services to citizens, to maintain their well-being thanks to the socio-economic benefits provided by space-based applications, as well as the need to ensure the safety and sustainability of outer space. Regarding this latter element, the EU remains willing to respect the limits of action of each UN body, as it states that ‘the development of norms of responsible behaviours related to threats should be distinct but complementary to the same exercise relating to safety risks, which is being considered in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’.³³ However, justifying action in the space security and defence realm by the need to ensure the safety and sustainability of this domain might lead to calls for further interaction between the CD and COPUOS in the future.

What did the EU propose?

Finally, the EU made concrete proposals on helping to ensure security and stability in orbit. The EU and its

³² See the EU contribution to United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, A/76/77, 13 July 2021.

³³ United Nations, General Assembly, European Union joint contribution on the works of the open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, Fourth part: Recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour relating to threats by States to space systems, A/AC.294/2023/WP.18, 19 June 2023.

member states clearly stated that they consider tests of destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite systems (DA-ASAT) to be irresponsible, due to the concerns and mistrust that such tests create, the changes they trigger in the threat assessments of all space actors and the risk of escalation that they produce, as well as their actual consequences for the space environment.³⁴ Broadly speaking, the EU and its member states called on states to refrain from creating space debris intentionally, but they also highlighted that non-kinetic threats should be perceived as irresponsible behaviours. To mitigate these risks, they recalled the usefulness of past mechanisms such as the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC),³⁵ as well as the TCBMs identified in the consensus report adopted by the GGE in 2012–13.³⁶

In its oral statements, and in line with its concerns related to the activities of dual-use systems, the EU called for the establishment of norms to address RPOs.³⁷ Similarly, in line with its focus on the added value of space as a provider of essential services to civilians, EU representatives demanded that norms be established to prevent states from conducting activities that ‘impair the provision of space-based services critical to the public and severely affect or even harm civilians’.³⁸

Finally, the topics of the diverse contributions provided by the EU and its member states at the different sessions of the OEWG were consolidated in a single document. This identified a number of areas of convergence on which states could work together to achieve space security: ‘(a) Norms addressing the use and/or testing of destructive, direct ascent anti-satellite missiles; (b) Norms addressing intentional and destructive acts that result in the creation of space debris, in particular long-lived debris; (c) Norms addressing in-orbit rendezvous (physical contact)

operations that affect another State’s space systems; (d) Norms addressing proximity orbital operations that affect other State’s space systems; (e) Norms addressing activities that impair the provision of space-based/enabled services critical to the public; (f) Further discussions to shape a common understanding of the concepts of “due regard”, “harmful interference” (Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty), and of their practical implementation by States’.³⁹

These areas are particularly important because they can form the baseline for action by the EU and its member states in the new OEWG. This would underline the consistency of the EU in defending its views and interests at the multilateral level, and therefore enhance its credibility and reinforce its positions. Moreover, by aggregating 27 member states, the EU has the capacity to shape and build norms as, even if they are only unilaterally adopted by the EU, the number of countries respecting them would already have reached a critical mass. It could then seek to persuade more countries to adopt them, especially if this became a requirement to be able to cooperate with the EU in space.

V. KEY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EU ACTION

Having contributed to the first OEWG, the EU must now devise its positions for the new one. While relying on its previous suggestions, the EU also needs to take account of the rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape and its impact. Alliances are shifting and the EU is speeding up its efforts to achieve strategic autonomy, in particular in space, thus raising further the stakes on space security. First, it is useful to recall how, while not a UN member state, the EU can still positively impact the results of the OEWG, in particular for European states. To grasp this added value, one step is to specify the ideas the EU can bring to support the various agenda items of the new OEWG, particularly in the light of the areas of convergence that it highlighted in 2023. The EU could also make suggestions on new approaches to adopt in future multilateral forums.

³⁴ Destructive DA-ASATs are systems launched from Earth, typically a missile, able to destroy a satellite by colliding with it using kinetic energy. European Union, EU joint contribution to the Open Ended Working Group on reducing space threats ‘Third part: Current and future threats by States to space systems, and actions, activities and omissions that could be considered irresponsible’, Sep. 2022.

³⁵ The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) is a multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument aimed at mitigating the spread of ballistic missiles.

³⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, A/68/189, 2013.

³⁷ Delegation of the European Union to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva (note 30).

³⁸ Delegation of the European Union to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva (note 30).

³⁹ United Nations, General Assembly, A/AC.294/2023/WP.18 (note 33).

Table 1. Overlap between the areas of convergence identified by the EU and topics for discussion by the new OEWG

	<i>Topics of discussion of the new open-ended working group</i>			
	Intentional damage to and destruction of space systems	Threats to the safe operation of space objects	Rendezvous operations and proximity operations that could increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation	Protecting critical space-based services to civilians as well as services that support humanitarian operations
<i>Areas of convergence identified by the European Union</i>				
Norms addressing the use and/or testing of destructive, direct ascent anti-satellite missiles	✓			
Norms addressing intentional and destructive acts that result in the creation of space debris, in particular long-lived debris	✓	✓		
Norms addressing in-orbit rendezvous (physical contact) operations that affect another State's space systems			✓	
Norms addressing proximity orbital operations that affect other State's space systems			✓	
Norms addressing activities that impair the provision of space-based/ enabled services critical to the public				✓
Further discussions to shape a common understanding of the concepts of 'due regard', 'harmful interference' (Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty), and of their practical implementation by State	✓	✓		

The EU can demonstrate its 'legitimacy' and added value

Continued participation by the EU can be expected, in line with the EU SSSD, which calls on the EU to further engage on the international stage in a section suitably titled 'Partnering for responsible behaviours in outer space'. This emphasis illustrates the importance of this approach to the EU agenda. Interestingly, the EU SSSD also invites the EU to explore opportunities for establishing dialogues with non-like-minded partners. Forums such as the OEWG can serve as a first step for gauging the views of these countries and assessing opportunities for further interaction with them, and could serve as a platform for showcasing the capacity of the EU to be a major contributor to a more secure space environment, for instance by overcoming political

divides and acting as a bridge between proponents of different perspectives.

In defence of European interests, the EU should continue to strive to coordinate the positions of its member states and ensure that they promote similar perspectives, or at least do not disagree in public. Ensuring that EU member states adopt the same positions in a consistent manner can help get these points heard by the international community and advance European preferences on space security. The importance of this role needs to be reasserted and become evident to all EU member states.

The EU can make a specific contribution to each OEWG issue area

The EU can make a substantial contribution to the work of the new OEWG. The resolution accompanying the decision to create the OEWG identifies specific areas of work on norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, but also further practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.⁴⁰ These areas are: (a) ‘intentional damage to and destruction of space systems’; (b) ‘threats to the safe operation of space objects’; (c) ‘rendezvous operations and proximity operations that could increase the risk of misunderstandings and miscalculation’; (d) ‘protecting critical space-based services to civilians as well as services that support humanitarian operations’; and (e) ‘associated measures on capacity-building, space situational awareness and inter-State coordination and consultation that could contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space’.

The EU had previously identified potential areas of convergence in the first OEWG.⁴¹ This should be the starting point of its contribution to the OEWG in 2025–28. Interestingly, several of these areas fall under the areas of work identified in the resolution establishing the second OEWG on responsible behaviours, prior to the decision to merge and replace the OEWGs.⁴² However, this decision recognizes this resolution as one of its pillars, together with the one creating the OEWG on legally binding instruments.⁴³ Thus, the EU already has inputs that it can bring to several of the elements that will be discussed, and should pursue its efforts to address these and find agreement among the OEWG participants. Table 1 illustrates the extent to which the areas of convergence identified by the EU match the topics that will be addressed in the new OEWG.

A panoply of topics can therefore be drawn up for the EU to address. Due to its own expertise, its current and expected activities in space and its background in contributing to discussions on space security on the international stage, the EU can raise specific points on each of the areas identified as subjects for the upcoming OEWG.

Intentional damage to and destruction of space systems

In order to encourage its interlocutors not to intentionally destroy space systems, the EU could build on the widespread agreement among all participants in the first OEWG—both state and non-state actors—that the voluntary creation of space debris is a major issue faced by all operators of space assets, and a risk for all nations that benefit from space data.

More specifically, it could leverage the commitment that the EU and its member states made to the US-led ban on the testing of destructive DA-ASAT.⁴⁴ The EU could unilaterally decide to extend this ban to other types of ASAT systems, such as non-destructive ones (e.g. electronic, cyber and directed energy ASATs), and establish restraint on their operational use (e.g. favouring reversible measures over non-reversible ones), with the objective of incentivizing other actors to follow suit. Safeguards would nonetheless have to be put in place to ensure that the EU and its member states are not left vulnerable to the actions of other states.

Threats to the safe operation of space objects

As a way of mitigating the threats to spacecraft in orbit, the EU could rely on its experience of sharing data among its member states through the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking Partnership (EU SST) to promote a type of information-sharing mechanism that could be adapted to current challenges. Such a framework would result in the pooling and sharing of data from various institutional sources, thereby implicitly recognizing their validity. Moreover, it could gradually integrate commercial actors, although the whole system would remain under the control of participating states. A state-led initiative that encourages mutual recognition of the data of other participants would be beneficial and provide broad acceptance of the alerts provided. The EU could make bilateral agreements based on this model as a showcase to attract more countries.

This area of work should also be seen as an opportunity for the EU to continue to connect security, safety and sustainability, which would have positive effects on the broader conduct of space operations.

⁴⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/79/22 (note 1).

⁴¹ United Nations, General Assembly, A/AC.294/2023/WP.18 (note 33).

⁴² United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/78/20 (note 3).

⁴³ United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/78/238 (note 4).

⁴⁴ Erwin, S., ‘US declares ban on anti-satellite missile tests, calls for other nations to join’, SpaceNews, 18 Apr. 2022; and United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing’ A/RES/77/41, 7 Dec. 2022.

Rendezvous operations and proximity operations that could increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation

As mentioned above, the EU is currently seeking to develop its ISOS activities to support the emergence of a fully-fledged ecosystem. This initiative could be an opportunity for the EU to become an early mover in this relatively new domain, and thus open avenues to establish practices that enable the ‘ethical’ conduct of ISOS. This would help to reduce misunderstandings and misinterpretation of the dual use that can be made of these technologies. Best practices could include transparency about the type of activity that can be conducted by an ISOS system at launch and during its lifetime, clear warning before any RPO involving spacecraft of the same nationality or different nationalities, and limiting such activities to spacecraft where there has been prior agreement among the owners. The latter point could eventually lead to the creation of ‘safety zones’ around satellites, in which a spacecraft could only approach another up to a certain distance, after which approval would be required. That distance would have to be agreed among all spacefaring nations.

Protecting critical space-based services to civilians as well as services that support humanitarian operations

With regard to preventing negative impacts on civilians, the EU is likely to continue to highlight that international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to space, and should continue to do so. This question has become a battle of narratives. Some countries, in particular Russia, have expressed opposition to discussing this, arguing that it makes hostilities in space both conceivable and tolerable.⁴⁵ From an EU perspective, remaining consistent could help to make the applicability of IHL to space acceptable to the international community. Stating this point repeatedly could trigger an ‘acculturation process’ for those states that have no clear position on the issue, and would demonstrate the fundamental importance it has for the EU and its member states, which would have to be considered when dealing with them. At the very least it would highlight the clearly diverging views on this

question and compel countries that do not share this vision to provide further justification.

If the application of IHL becomes too polarizing and therefore counterproductive, the EU could encourage states to find consensus on the legal protections that spacecraft serving humanitarian purposes could enjoy in either wartime or peacetime, without mentioning IHL in itself. As a minimum, the EU could raise awareness among states of the need to cooperate to ensure the resilience of satellite services that support humanitarian relief and emergency response, in particular through knowledge exchange and capacity-building, as the International Committee of the Red Cross recommended to the first OEWG.⁴⁶

However, the EU should recognize that characterizing a spacecraft according to whether it provides humanitarian services is extremely difficult, due to the multiple payloads and customers that can be associated with a single satellite, as well as the difficulty of knowing with any certainty how a service is used.

Associated measures on capacity-building, space situational awareness and interstate coordination and consultation, which could contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space

One central element of these associated measures, repeatedly mentioned by the EU and other participants in the OEWG, is the need to be able to verify and monitor the measures that are taken to promote responsible behaviours. To this end, SSA and/or SDA will be required.⁴⁷ The EU pushed for more cooperation in this domain during the first OEWG. It can position itself in this area by leveraging the EU SST Partnership and its Front Desk as the focal point for collaboration with international partners. In the longer term, beyond the upcoming OEWG, the EU could strive to become a driving force behind the definition of standards for SSA data at the international level. This would allow claims related to the conduct of irresponsible behaviours to be double checked, making it possible for other states to verify the observations used to advance such claims,

⁴⁵ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Considerations concerning the counterproductivity of considering the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to space activities: Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation’, A/AC.294/2023/WP.11, 2 Feb. 2023.

⁴⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Preliminary recommendations on possible norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours relating to threats by States to space systems, submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross’, A/AC.294/2023/WP.7, 31 Jan. 2023.

⁴⁷ SSA refers to the detection and tracking of a spacecraft in orbit while SDA adds an intelligence component, as it seeks to determine the purpose of a space object.

which would eventually help to increase trust between states.

Finally, another way to prevent an arms race in outer space would be to better leverage the Hague Code of Conduct. The EU regularly mentions the HCOC in its statements and written inputs, and it is recognized that states comply with it to a large extent by providing pre-launch notifications of space launch vehicles to the HCOC Secretariat (while the UN registry of space objects often experiences delays).⁴⁸ Besides its contribution to the non-proliferation of missile technology, the HCOC could therefore be seen as a tool for transparency in the context of space security. While more emphasis has been put on the space dimension of the HCOC in its recent annual meetings, the EU could push for more engagement between the policy and expert communities addressing space and missile proliferation, or even organize dedicated side events on the HCOC during the new OEWSG. This would help raise awareness and educate a space audience on how the HCOC can contribute to enhancing space security.

The EU can prepare its future positions and involvement in multilateral forums

Despite its support for the responsible behaviours approach, the EU remains open to other types of agreement that could help to ensure space security. The EU has reiterated several times in its written contributions and oral statements that political commitments might be a first step towards a legally binding agreement and that, based on historical precedents, these norms, rules and principles might be used to negotiate a legally binding agreement at a later date.⁴⁹

The EU should continue to repeat this argument, with two objectives. First, to convince states that are proponents of a legally binding approach to demonstrate goodwill towards the responsible behaviours approach, as this might incentivize western countries to be more constructive in mechanisms dedicated to a legally binding approach. Second, a legally binding approach would make everyone more secure, or at least legitimize the ban on some practices. However, this enhanced security can only be guaranteed if there is the capacity to verify the

application of legally binding instruments, which requires capability development.

Moreover, the link made by the EU between safety and security is both a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, both are connected and need to be tackled together, which also justifies the integration of more actors in forums that address the two topics. On the other hand, connecting both might make the capacity to reach consensus more difficult as it calls for a holistic approach that takes account of all dimensions, some of which might be more contested than others. This could therefore be detrimental to questions that are more related to safety and sustainability, and affect the whole space community beyond security-related actors, such as space traffic management. Although this approach should lead to calls for more and better cooperation between COPUOS and the CD, as well as the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, it is noteworthy that the EU has not yet gone too far in this direction, but has rather highlighted that processes that address safety and security should be distinct but complementary and avoid duplication.⁵⁰

Overall, the EU should push for its positions in upcoming UN forums. It should actively engage with partners from other regions, in particular through the preparation of cross-regional inputs. This would achieve a first step of coordination before the formal debates begin. However, if difficulties persist, the EU could also diversify its approach beyond a purely multilateral focus. For instance, on some measures for which consensus is hard to find, a mini-lateral approach with like-minded countries outside Europe could help to operationalize certain norms and principles to see them incrementally adopted by the international community. In this regard, the model initiated by the US DA-ASAT test ban could be replicated for other space security issues. The EU and its member states could commit to some practices of their own choosing, and then incentivize other states, including non-like-minded ones, as recommended in the EU SSSD, to join them. Once sufficient momentum has been achieved, these topics could be brought back to the UN to formalize them, either through the adoption of a consensus report by the new OEWSG or in a General Assembly resolution.

⁴⁸ This information is taken from a closed-door workshop organized by SIPRI in Nov. 2024.

⁴⁹ Delegation of the European Union to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva (note 30).

⁵⁰ United Nations, General Assembly, A/AC.294/2023/WP.18 (note 33).

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Space security is a burning topic that will continue to be addressed by the international community in the coming years, in particular by the upcoming sessions of the OEWG in 2025–28. Despite procedural challenges regarding agenda and modalities, there is scope for constructive exchanges on substance, as this OEWG will address the norms, rules and practices required for responsible behaviours in space, as well as practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, including discussions on prospective legally binding instruments. There are opportunities for the EU to be an active contributor in this process.

While the EU Space Programme was initially developed mostly for civilian purposes, EU officials have more recently been increasingly connecting activities in this domain with security and defence concerns, not only in their narratives, but also at the policy, organizational and capability development levels. This trend is expected to continue and to be reinforced by developments within EU member states, which are also deepening their involvement in space, including in the military space realm. As a consequence, the EU has a stake in participating in international forums that seek to tackle space security issues.

In this context, the EU should play an active role in the next OEWG. It has the legitimacy to contribute not only as a coordinator of the positions of its member states, but also as a spacefaring actor in its own right. By leveraging its participation in the first OEWG, the EU could provide substance to the discussions, including as a forerunner in some emerging domains. It could for instance suggest a moratorium on non-kinetic ASATs, lead the way to ‘ethical’ RPOs, persistently emphasize that IHL applies to any potential conflict in outer space, provide concrete examples of better sharing of SSA or SDA data, and promote alternative tools for building transparency and trust, such as the HCOC. However, the EU should also keep open the possibility of advancing space security through other channels, should the current deadlock in the multilateral environment create insurmountable obstacles.

ABBREVIATIONS

CD	Conference on Disarmament
DA-ASAT	Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite systems
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EU SSSD	EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence
EU SST	EU Space Surveillance and Tracking Partnership
GGE	Group of Governmental Experts
HCOC	Hague Code of Conduct
IHL	International humanitarian law
ISOS	In-Space Operations and Services
OEWG	Open-ended working group
PAROS	Prevention of an arms race in outer space
RPO	Rendezvous and proximity operations
SDA	Space Domain Awareness
SSA	Space Situational Awareness
TCBM	Transparency and confidence-building measure



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A EUROPEAN NETWORK

In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to support the creation of a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centers from across the EU to encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The Council of the European Union entrusted the technical implementation of this Decision to the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium. In 2018, in line with the recommendations formulated by the European Parliament the names and the mandate of the network and the Consortium have been adjusted to include the word 'disarmament'.

STRUCTURE

The EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium is managed jointly by six institutes: La Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/ PRIF), the International Affairs Institute in Rome (IAI), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS–Europe), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). The Consortium, originally comprised of four institutes, began its work in January 2011 and forms the core of a wider network of European non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks and research centers which are closely associated with the activities of the Consortium.

MISSION

The main aim of the network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks is to encourage discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, particularly among experts, researchers and academics in the EU and third countries. The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons (SALW).

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