

## EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium

Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

E-newsletter of the European Network of Independent Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Think Tanks

### EXPORTS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS TO PREVENT THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: AN INTERVIEW WITH MONICA CHINCHILLA – UNIVERSITY OF NAVARRA



Mónica Chinchilla, Ph. D. is an International Law Professor and Researcher at the University of Navarra (Pamplona, Spain). She participates as an Associate Researcher in the CBWNet project for a comprehensive reinforcement of norms against chemical and biological weapons. Mónica was a visiting researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) in 2023 and the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2019. Her research focuses on the relationship between hard and soft law in the non-proliferation realm and the role of export control mechanisms for chemical and biological non-proliferation purposes.

#### The University of Navarra recently joined the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. What activities does the University carry out in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament and what are its main research topics?

The University of Navarra is progressively including non-proliferation and disarmament topics into its Law and International Relations courses. The faculty's think tank, *Global Affairs and Strategic Studies*, promotes research on different fields of knowledge, including arms control. A diverse group of students analyse WMD issues to analyse and publish articles, essays, commentaries and reviews on latest events and pressing matters. Also, nuclear weapons proliferation was the main topic addressed in the Arab League Committee as part of our Model United Nations this academic year (*UNMUN 2025*). María Bassols, Spanish Ambassador to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, was invited to deliver the opening speech of that event. On a personal note, I invite a few intern students each year to collaborate on my WMD research topics and gain experience in the field.

The members of our academic research group focus on different but interconnected topics: Professor Eugenia López-Jacoiste is an International and EU Law expert dealing with cybersecurity, emerging technologies and autonomous weapons systems; Professor Salvador Sánchez Tapia, a former Brigadier General, is Professor of International Security and Conflict Analysis specialized on NATO and nuclear weapons; Professor Shahana Thankachan is an Indian International Relations scholar working on arms control in the Asia-Pacific region; and my personal expertise is on International Law and biological and chemical weapons.

#### Given your expertise, what is your assessment of the role of export control arrangements in the efforts to prevent chemical and biological weapons proliferation?

In the current international security landscape strengthening export controls, especially over dual-use goods and technology is imperative. On-going wars and conflict dynamics stemming from great power competition require stricter controls over security standards of international trade.

In particular, biological and chemical goods and technology are of dual-use to a large extent, so export, import, transit, transshipment and brokering activities, among others, must be carefully monitored. Despite their quasi-universal scope, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are far from perfect treaties, especially in terms of (export) controls. The UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) obliges Member States to adopt national measures against illicit WMD trafficking, while multilateral export control regimes establish some (non-legally binding) common standards. However, enforcement and verification measures hardly guarantee an adequate control over transfers of biological and chemical goods. National implementation should be also supported through cooperation and assistance.

#### In your view, what can the EU and its member states do to make the Union's role more effective in export control to prevent the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons?

The EU seems to be doing a good job in terms of WMD export controls. Regulation (EU) 821/2021, which sets up a regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items is constantly updated and has had a notable impact along the years. But, of course, work must continue. While interstate relations are important, stakeholders in member states should also be part of the equation, since industrial companies or custom officers, for instance, have also a role to play. Also, the EU P2P (partner-to-partner) Export Control Programme cooperates with third countries and provides capacity building to strengthen export controls worldwide. While personal and economic resources are essential, the EU and its Member States should work on raising awareness and engagement. The EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium is the perfect instrument to advance towards this goal. However, I believe that universities can also play a key role in promoting research in this field and engage the future generations of researchers and policy makers.

### THE ROLE OF THE CTBT AHEAD OF THE 2026 NPT RevCon

Despite not entering into force 28 years after its signing, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains a cornerstone of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, with a vital and complementary role alongside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In fact, the call to ban nuclear testing predates the NPT, with the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) marking the first international legal constraint on nuclear weapons - by restricting nuclear testing underground - and serving as a stepping stone to the NPT.

The CTBT is closely intertwined with the NPT, as reflected in the preambles of both treaties, and has been a fundamental component of every forward-looking output in the NPT review process. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the commitment to conclude CTBT negotiations by 1996 was key to extending the NPT indefinitely. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, two of the 13 practical steps were directly connected to the CTBT. Likewise, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, as many as five action items in the NPT Action Plan were dedicated to the CTBT and nuclear testing. Additionally, the CTBT is fundamental for advancing the NPT's first two pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation and disarmament. Nuclear testing plays a crucial role in building nuclear weapons capabilities. By prohibiting such tests, the CTBT effectively limits nuclear weapons proliferation, whether it involves new countries acquiring nuclear arms, nuclear states upgrading their arsenals, or the development of advanced nuclear weapon technologies—thus supporting non-proliferation both vertically and horizontally. The CTBT is essential to nuclear disarmament as it fosters confidence that any nuclear test would be detected.

Following the failure of the last two NPT Review Conferences to adopt a final document, the upcoming 2026 NPT RevCon faces pressure to deliver a successful outcome. However, the challenges facing the NPT have grown increasingly complex, aggravated by wars in Ukraine and Gaza, rising defense budgets, the looming expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026, and heightened concerns about the potential resumption of nuclear testing.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) serves as a mechanism for engaging both NPT States Parties and Non-NPT States in constructive dialogue on disarmament issues. For example, Israel—a Non-Party to the NPT—is a Signatory State to the CTBT and hosts 3 certified IMS facilities. Similarly, despite announcing its de-ratification of the CTBT, the Russian Federation also declared the completion of its 32nd and final IMS station within its territory soon after. Notably, Russia has remained a signatory to the Treaty and has expressed its intent to uphold the nuclear testing moratorium unless the US tests first while continuing to operate IMS stations on its territory. Particularly during a time of heightened concern over the potential resumption of nuclear testing, the IMS plays a necessary role in encouraging other Annex II States, like China and the United States, to remain actively engaged in efforts to enhance monitoring and detection of potential nuclear test activity in the region.

In sum, the CTBT stands as a fundamental multilateral measure with near-universal support, advancing the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. As we approach the 2026 NPT Review Conference, it is essential to elevate the CTBT's profile to support and reinforce the NPT regime.

Eleonora Neri, Project & Research Coordinator, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

## Latest Publications

What Ukraine can teach Europe and the world about innovation in modern warfare. Joyce Hakmeh. Chatham House. March 2025.

The Security Implications of Developments in Biotechnology. Nariyoshi Shinomiya, Kiwako Tanaka, IISS Research paper. February 2025.

Blurring conventional–nuclear boundaries: Nordic developments, global implications. Wilfred Wan and Gitte du Plessis. SIPRI Commentary/Essays. January 2025.

Perceptions of Emerging & Disruptive Technologies on Crisis Prevention & Management in South Asia. Eva-Nour Repoussard. BASIC Report. January 2025.

## Network Calls

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the Institute of Global Affairs at The American College of Greece (ACG) announce the 5th ELIAMEP-ACG Summer Academy: *Empowering the Next Generation of Mediterranean Leaders*. The Academy will take place from the 14th – 19th of July 2025 in Ancient Olympia, Greece.

More info: [Here](#)

The Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute - SIPRI is recruiting one intern for its Military Expenditure and Arms Production (MILAP) programme from 1st of May 2025. The intern will assist the team in all aspects of the programme's work and activities (qualitative and quantitative research, desk research and publications; design, planning and implementation of activities; liaison with partner organisations; programme's visibility).

More info: [Here](#)

## EU NEWS

### EU STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR SECURITY AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS

In its statement at the IAEA Board of Governors on 3 March, the EU reiterated the commitment to maintaining and strengthening effective and comprehensive nuclear security, recalling the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The EU expressed deep concern regarding Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and commended the IAEA for its support and assistance missions in Ukraine.

Read the full statement [here](#).

## NETWORK NEWS

### CEI-ISCTE WILL HOST THE 23RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC STUDIES ASSOCIATION

CEI-Iscte, the Center for International Studies at ISCTE-University Institute of Lisbon, will host the 23rd Annual Conference of the Transatlantic Studies Association. The Conference will take place between 14 and 16 July 2025. The call for papers is now open: proposals cover topics such as: US and European foreign policy and its impact on Southern European transitions, the role of NATO and other international organisations, Latin American solidarity with democratic movements and the influence of Cold War geopolitics.

More info: [Here](#)

### JOIN IAI AT “THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY” BOOK LAUNCH EVENT

The Istituto Affari Internazionali is pleased to invite you on March 18th, 2025 at 5 p.m. CET to the upcoming webinar dedicated to the launch event of The European Union's Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy, the third book in the Trends and Perspectives in International Politics series, edited by IAI for Routledge. The event aims to give selected speakers and the public a fruitful occasion to understand the development and performance of the EU's nuclear governance policies as crucial for assessing its role as a Normative Power. The author Manuel Herrera, along with Professor Clara Portela will provide an analysis of the intricacy of its evolving non-proliferation policy, shedding light on the complexities of European nuclear diplomacy.

Click [here](#) to register.

### SIPRI AND THE ALVA MYRDAL CENTRE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT INVITE APPLICATIONS FOR THE 2025 ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT SUMMER SCHOOL

The Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute - SIPRI and the Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament at Uppsala University, in cooperation with the Odesa Center for Nonproliferation, are now inviting applications to the 2025 Armament and Disarmament Summer School, to be held in Stockholm and Uppsala on 25–29 August. The Summer School consists of a five-day programme of in-person lectures, seminars and training workshops on armament and disarmament matters that endeavours to develop knowledge and skills and to motivate and empower emerging specialists to further expand their expertise in these critical issues and beyond.

More info: [Here](#)