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HCoC.at

Supporting the Hague Code of Conduct

an FRS project funded by the European Union

Side event on HCoC in the margins of the UNGA in New York

9 October 2019

On 9 October 2019, FRS organised a side event on the Hague Code of Conduct and Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation in the margins of the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, and on behalf of the European Union.

AGENDA

INTRODUCTION & WELCOMING REMARKS 

  • Amb. Jacek BYLICA, Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, European External Action Service (EEAS)

 

EXISTING & POSSIBLE RISK REDUCTION INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD OF MISSILES 

MODERATOR:

  • Emmanuelle MAITRE, Research Fellow, FRS

PRESENTERS:

  • Amb. Kjersti Ertresvaag ANDERSEN, Ambassador of Norway to Austria, HCoC Chair, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

  • Mr Mark FITZPATRICK, Associate Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

  • Dr Nikolai SOKOV, Senior Fellow, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation (VCDNP)

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October
2021
Research Papers

The HCoC and China

China is currently the main ballistic missile possessor and spacefaring nation which remains outside the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). This can be explained by China’s traditional opacity regarding its deployment of strategic missiles, but also its exports of ballistic systems or technologies abroad. This absence is nonetheless problematic for a regime based on voluntary transparency and confidence-building which aims at universality.

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January
2023
Other publications

North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25

This study focuses on the new systems introduced, and assesses their potential impact as conventional weapons and as non-conventional weapons. Through an analysis of the possible capacities of these systems, this study examines their consequences on North Korean strategy. It concludes by exploring what this change of strategy may lead to, in military terms, and in political terms, on the Korean peninsula.

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