Awareness-building session on HCoC in Prague

4 June 2014

On 4 June 2014, the FRS organised, on behalf of the European Union, an awareness-building session in Prague about dual-use technology and knowledge transfer issues in order to prevent them in the field of ballistic missiles. The session allowed considering both trends in the technology transfer for ballistic missiles and what could be promoted to prevent it at an early stage. This workshop gathered experts from scientific, space and industry communities of HCoC subscribing and non-subscribing States.

AGENDA

WELCOMING REMARKS

  • Alexandre HOUDAYER, Secretary General, Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS)

 

I/ HCoC & TECHNOLOGY ISSUES 

  • Dr. Xavier PASCO, Senior Research Fellow, Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS)
  • Dr. Serge PLATTARD, Resident Fellow, European Space Policy Institute (ESPI)

 

II/ PERSPECTIVES ON PROLIFERATION CONTROLES OF HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS IN TE LAUNCHER & MISSILES FIELS 

  • H.E. Carlo TREZZA, Chairman, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
  • Dominique GUILLAUME, Chief Export Control Officer, Airbus Defence and Space

 

III/ ISSUES AND INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NON-PROLIFERATION & THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIMES

  • Dr. Jan WOUTERS, Director, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies
  • Roger ROBINSON, Chairman and Co-founder, Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI)

 

WRAP-UP SESSION: HCoC & NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS

Issue Briefs

The HCoC and South Asia

India’s and Pakistan’s ballistic missiles are mostly designed as delivery vehicles for their nuclear weapons. While intrinsically linked to their national security, ballistic missiles also have regional security implications for South Asia. Non-proliferation and arms control efforts have so far been aimed at the bilateral level. Subscription to other instruments including the HCoC remains low in the region, although India joined the HCoC in 2016.

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Research Papers

Origins and Development of the Hague Code of Conduct  

This paper recalls the state of ballistic missile proliferation at the time of the adoption of the Code, before delving into the genesis of the Code and especially the various reports and meetings that promoted the adoption of a supply-side multilateral instrument. It describes the conferences and diplomatic efforts that led to the Code in 2002. It also explains why the Code ended up the way it is today with modest ambitions but concrete outcomes.

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