Under the current Council Decision, FRS will publish a series of Research Papers on the various aspects of the Code, as well as short Issue Briefs to highlight specific thematic and regional issues, and a major technical study. To find out more, go to our Project Activities
This article evaluates the opportunities associated with The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) for India. HCoC is a stand-alone agreement against ballistic missile proliferation. Since the 1974 Pokharan nuclear tests it has been tricky for India to get into the non-proliferation mainstream.
Concerns about the harm caused upon orbiting space objects – whether intentional or accidental – have increased in recent years, as well as the emerging awareness that the security and safety of national satellites – of vital importance for modern societies but at the same time so vulnerable – relies on a collective effort. In December 2008 the EU responded to these concerns by adopting a Draft Code of Conduct (EU Draft CoC) for outer space activities.
The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles has been adopted in November 2002, in order to bolster the international effort to reduce and prevent the proliferation of delivery systems which can carry weapons of mass destruction.
This issue of Disarmament Forum assesses the current situation concerning missiles and investigates future prospects for control. Existing devices, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), UN Security Council resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative, are all attempts at ameliorating some aspects of missile-related problems, as are the various bilateral confidence-building measures already in operation.
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, launched in November 2002, established itself as the first political and truly multilateral initiative on non-proliferation in the field of missiles. He succeeded in laying down principles of universal scope in a field which was totally lacking in them and in establishing confidence-building measures which could serve as a model for countries not yet signatories.
With a view to liberalizing access to missile technologies, the MTCR would therefore remain a central instrument, since it would continue to regulate sensitive exports. Admittedly, its final binding effects could, in the short term, be further attenuated, turning the regime into a forum for harmonization.