Under the current Council Decision, FRS will publish a series of Research Papers on the various aspects of the Code, as well as short Issue Briefs to highlight specific thematic and regional issues, and a major technical study. To find out more, go to our Project Activities
Only three out of ten Southeast Asian states have joined the HCoC to date (the Philippines, Cambodia and Singapore). This limited rate is noteworthy as Southeast Asia is increasingly concerned by the ongoing ballistic missile competition in broader Asia. Moreover, the region is actively investing to benefit from space technologies.
China is currently the main ballistic missile possessor and spacefaring nation which remains outside the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). This can be explained by China’s traditional opacity regarding its deployment of strategic missiles, but also its exports of ballistic systems or technologies abroad. This absence is nonetheless problematic for a regime based on voluntary transparency and confidence-building which aims at universality.
The New Space trend – an ongoing innovative transformation of the space sector – has led to a rise of investment in small launch systems. While an increasing number of nations are gaining access to space, the number of private sector entities investing in this domain is also rising. Meanwhile, small space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles rely on increasingly similar technologies.
The proliferation of WMD and of conventional weapons are, in many ways, separate threats with different levels of impact and proliferation dynamics. However, there are linkages between WMD and conventional weapons proliferation. Notably, the same factors increase the risk of both threats, including geographic vulnerabilities.
Four of the five most recent subscribing states to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) are African. Adopted in November 2002 in The Hague, the HCoC’s chief objective is to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, as well as related technology.
Caribbean states have regularly joined the HCoC since its adoption in 2002, showing a steady interest in the Code. But despite this, the current level of subscription remains low, with half of the 16 Caribbean states having signed it.
Latin America is one of the regions with the highest level of support for the HCoC. This support reflects the historic commitment of the region in favour of disarmament and non-proliferation. The remaining four non-subscribing states – Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba and Mexico – have voiced concerns about the adoption of the Code outside the United Nations framework and its limited scope.
The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) was adopted in 2002 with a view to reducing the proliferation of ballistic missiles that can be used to carry weapons of mass destruction (WMD). From its inception, it took into account not only ballistic missiles – then the main vectors of ADM – but also space launchers, the two technologies sharing many characteristics.
India’s and Pakistan’s ballistic missiles are mostly designed as delivery vehicles for their nuclear weapons. While intrinsically linked to their national security, ballistic missiles also have regional security implications for South Asia. Non-proliferation and arms control efforts have so far been aimed at the bilateral level. Subscription to other instruments including the HCoC remains low in the region, although India joined the HCoC in 2016.
While both ballistic programmes and the risk posed by these systems remain very limited on the African continent, ballistic missiles inherently constitute a global risk – due to their range and destructive potential. Instruments such as the HCoC, which seek to limit the proliferation of such systems, are therefore relevant for African countries.
The Hague Code of Conduct focuses on ballistic missiles as they remain the preferred delivery vehicle for WMDs. The HCoC therefore regulates one of the most dangerous types of weapons in existence.
The HCoC was adopted in 2002, at a time where the international community pushed strongly for the adoption of norms to promote non-proliferation and disarmament. It was initially designed as a first step which would lead to further regulations in the field. However, rising international tensions have prevented states from engaging beyond the 2002 compromise.
Around 30 states hold ballistic missiles today. All current nuclear-weapon possessor states have acquired missile production capacities to enhance their nuclear deterrence.
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Missile Technology Control Regime and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 each contribute to the international regime for the nonproliferation of ballistic missiles. The three instruments aim at controlling both horizontal and vertical proliferation.
This note identifies the various proposals for arms control in a post-INF world, with a focus on missiles. It seeks to offer an analysis of diplomatic suggestions and non-State expert reports, putting the ins and outs of the various proposals into perspective and reflecting on their feasibility and prospects in the current context.
The Hague Code of Conduct aims at curbing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. Today, with an important increase in ranges, these weapons are more and more used for a conventional mission, by a variety of states. This dissemination illustrates the fact that many stakeholders master the technologies necessary to build and sustain these weapons. But it also raises questions on the possible destabilising effects of these arsenals, even when they are not linked to WMDs.
The issue of extending the scope of the Hague Code of Conduct to cruise missiles is regularly raised in academic and political discussions about the Code. Some non-subscribing States justify their refusal to join the instrument because of this exclusion, perceived as a major flaw. Indeed, cruise missiles have characteristics that can make them very effective in carrying weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore clearly of interest to consider extending the HCoC scope to these weapons.
On 15 January 2019, the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka (INSSSL) and the FRS held a South Asia Regional Seminar “Dealing with the missile threat in South Asia” with the support of the European Union. This explainer on ballistic missile proliferation explains a few key aspects of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) in relation to small states with special reference to Sri Lanka.
This contribution written within the specific framework of improving the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, recalls the respective roles of governments and private players as well as the universal general principles of export control.
Taken as a wide-ranging notion, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have not produced significant instruments in international security over time, UNSCR1540 being an exception. As such, there are no existing WMD free zones (WMDFZ) which can be used as examples and as potential frameworks for further initiatives banning ballistic missiles.