Recommended Readings

In our recommended readings section, we suggest a collection of readings which can form the foundation for university instructors who would like to
arrange their own courses on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. These recommended readings are not limited to timeless arms control
classics, but also include more recent and critical literature.

Arms Control and Disarmament in general

  • Altmann, Jürgen /Liebert, Wolfgang /Neuneck, Götz/Scheffran, Jürgen (1998): Preventive Arms Control as a Prerequisite for Conversion of Military-Related R&D. In: Judith Reppy, Joseph Rotblat, John Holdren, and Vsevolod Avduyevsky (Eds.), Conversion of Military R&D, London/New York, 1998, 255-271.

The authors argue that traditional arms control, which has focused primarily on quantitative limits, has failed to prevent continuous qualitative advancements in military technology. They introduce the concept of preventive arms control, which aims to restrict military-related research and development (R&D) before destabilizing weapons emerge. The paper contends that limiting military R&D is essential for sustainable disarmament and conversion to civilian use. A key contribution of the work is its emphasis on the need for early intervention in the weapons innovation cycle, proposing technology assessment tools and verification mechanisms as means to enforce such restrictions. The authors stress that a comprehensive approach, integrating preventive arms control with non-proliferation efforts, is necessary to avoid future arms races. From today’s perspective, the text is particularly exciting because accelerating technological developments, especially in the field of emerging disruptive technologies, pose ever greater challenges to arms control and a preventive approach would often be appropriate in view of the emerging dangers. At the same time, there has been practically no preventive arms control to date – an exciting and tragic finding.
Due to its conceptual depth and policy-oriented analysis, the text is best suited for graduate or postgraduate students in security studies, international relations, or science and technology policy who are interested in why certain good ideas have not succeeded and are interested in counter factuals.

  • Bolton, M. B., & Mitchell, C. C. (2020). When scientists become activists: The international committee for robot arms control and the politics of killer robots. In: Breay Bolton, M/ Njeri, S./Benjamin-Britton, T. (Eds): Global activism and humanitarian disarmament, Springer: Cham, pp. 27-58.

The article investigates the role of academics/scientists in arms control. By focusing on the international committee for robot arms control’s (ICRAC) involvement in the “killer robots” debate of the 2010s and 2020s, the article offers an interesting account of how academics become issue advocates, influencing/framing the discourse on AWS. Bolton and Mitchel argue that their case illustrates how the boundaries between science and politics, and activism are shifting and sometimes even blurry, challenging a Weberian notion of the politically detached scientists.

The article uses the “epistemic community” concept which has evolved quite a lot since Adler’s seminal article in 1990s. It should thereby be placed in the constructivist tradition. However, it is also relevant – although implicitly – to the diverse literature about transnational actors and interest groups in IR.

The text is a (challenging) text for enthusiastic undergraduates, as the empirical part is very accessible and not too abstract, given the sometimes very technical and abstract debate in the international fora. However, the text is best suited for master’s students if it is meant to spark a meaningful debate about theoretical concepts which requires some knowledge about IR theories (constructivism, epistemic community) and arms control. It raises important questions. To give a few examples: How political should scientists be? What other “roles” or “functions” can scientists take on in arms control and more broadly (“pure scientists”, observers, technocrats, advisors, quasi-decisionmakers, etc. etc.)? What about other arms control areas—is this a unique case or can we observe an “activist turn” in other areas? Is there even an “activist turn”?

  • Cohn, Carol. “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Signs: 12: 4, 1987, 687–718

The text by Carol Cohn is an anthropological study of the community of US nuclear strategists in the 1980s. Cohn finds a prevalence of gendered and patriarchal imagery and explores how this language functions and what its political effects are. Cohn finds language that is illustrative of the “awe-some”, sexual attractiveness of this type of weaponry (“vertical erector launchers”, “deep penetration” etc.) but also euphemistic metaphors and narratives of domesticity. One example given is how non-proliferation is talked about in frames of “fatherhood”: younger, immature countries cannot be trusted with dangerous weapons. The effect of this language lies in its sanitising and trivialising function: it allows defence intellectuals to plan and discuss the possible destruction of millions of people for a living while suggesting control over these destructive forces.

This article is one of the classic texts in feminist and critical security studies. It shows in a very accessible way how specialised and gendered language renders the strategy around these weapons of mass destruction as “rational”. Further, this type of “technostrategic” language delegitimising values and ideas from outside of the professional in-group of nuclear strategists as too emotional and unrealistic (such as disarmament).

Cohn’s text is suited for students from all levels, from the undergraduate to the postgraduate studies. A basic understanding of nuclear deterrence is helpful, however.

The text, authored by Oliver Meier and Michael Staack, explores China’s evolving role in multilateral arms control. It highlights China’s transition from a passive participant to an active shaper within global security frameworks, reflecting its ambition to mold international norms to its strategic interests. Meier and Staack emphasize the importance of China’s involvement for the stability of global arms control architecture, despite the challenges posed by its simultaneous military expansion.
Their scholarly contribution focuses on how China’s participation could foster cooperative security dialogues, especially with Europe. They suggest that areas such as regional confidence-building and verification present viable starting points for Germany and the EU to engage China in constructive arms control discussions.

This text is best suited for advanced International Relations students (mainly Master’s level), as it requires understanding of arms control frameworks, multilateralism, and Sino-European relations, but can be read in undergraduate courses as well, as long as appropriate support is provided. The analysis aligns with Constructivist IR theory, as it examines how China’s normative shifts impact multilateral governance and reshape global security norms.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

The article by Hoffmann et al. explores advancements in synthetic biology, specifically the potential and risks associated with synthetic genomes. While these technologies hold great promise for improving human health, agriculture, and industrial processes, they also introduce concerns regarding biosecurity. The authors emphasize that the ability to engineer and construct new genomes, including those of potential human pathogens, lowers the barrier of access to harmful biological agents. As synthetic genomics becomes more accessible, the risk of accidental or intentional misuse increases, necessitating effective risk mitigation strategies.

One of the key points discussed in the article is the role of sequence screening as a safeguard against the unauthorized synthesis of hazardous genetic material. The authors discuss risk mitigation strategies both on the digital and the biological level. Firstly, sequence screening, while already widely implemented by many synthetic DNA providers, is not a universal standard and comes with considerable costs. Additionally, since screening systems rely on algorithms, they are vulnerable to potential manipulation or circumvention. The other possible risk mitigation point is on the organism level through biocontainment systems. As the authors point out, genetic containment systems depend on the compliance of the actors, since these systems would be embedded in the genome and could be activated when needed.

The article provides a comprehensive overview of the promises and challenges of synthetic genomics, offering insights into the current state of risk mitigation strategies and their future directions. It serves as a valuable resource for students and researchers with some background in biology and synthetic biology, helping them understand both the opportunities and the ethical, technical, and security considerations of these advances.

  • Harald John, Marcel J. van der Schans, Marianne Koller, Helma E. T. Spruit, Franz Worek, Horst Thiermann, Daan Noort (2018): Fatal sarin poisoning in Syria 2013: forensic verification within an international laboratory network. In: Forensic Toxicol 36, 61–71

This article describes a real case of forensic verification of chemical weapons using analytical chemistry techniques. In August 2013, one of the most horrific chemical attacks was perpetrated in Syria. After this event, the OPCW authorized two designated laboratories for forensic analysis of numerous tissues from a deceased female victim. Both laboratories found irrefutable evidence confirming that the victim was poisoned with Sarin. In this journal article, Harald John and co-workers, from the designated laboratory of the Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology, reported their analyses using CG-MS (gas chromatography-mass spectrometry) and LC-MS (liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry) to demonstrate the presence of Sarin in the biological tissues of the victim through five methods. Both analytical techniques (CG-MS and LC-MS) are commonly used by the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) designated laboratories to analyse environmental and biological samples constituting chemical weapons (CW). This text is primarily aimed at chemistry students who wish to deepen their knowledge in the field of chemical weapons verification. The information in the article is therefore intended for an audience with prior knowledge of chemistry.

  • Alexander Ghionis and Alexander Kelle. The Chemical Weapons Convention After its Fifth Review Conference: Key Issues for the European Union. EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper No. 87, February 2024

Alexander Ghionis and Alexander Kelle examine the key challenges and opportunities for the European Union (EU) regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) following the Fifth Review Conference (RevCon5) held in 2023. The authors outline five priority areas for EU engagement: upholding the norm against chemical weapons use, adapting verification mechanisms, strengthening capacity-building efforts, improving organizational governance, and enhancing external engagement. The paper highlights the EU’s diplomatic and financial contributions to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and discusses how geopolitical tensions, particularly Russian obstructionism, have complicated consensus-building efforts. The authors argue that the EU must adopt a proactive approach to strengthen CWC implementation and maintain global chemical weapons norms. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of institutional challenges and policy recommendations. Due to its focus on policy analysis, international law, and multilateral diplomacy, the text is best suited for graduate or postgraduate students in security studies, international relations, or disarmament policy.

  • Ralf Trapp, The Chemical Weapons Convention – Past Successes, Current Challenges. In: Crowley, Michael; Dando, Malcolm; Shang, Lijun (eds.), Preventing Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Disarmament as the Sciences Converge, London: Royal Society of Chemistry 2018, pp. 27-68.

The text provides a detailed overview and analysis of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its control regime. It first gives a brief overview of the historical and political context of the CWC negotiations, before presenting the “key concepts and provisions” of the CWC in detail and thematically arranged. The third section describes achievements in the implementation of the CWC, such as chemical weapons destruction, and covers current and future challenges. Special attention is drawn to scientific and technological developments in the context of chemical weapons control. The text is suitable for readers with a basic knowledge of multilateral arms control and with an interest in the details and complexities of chemical weapons disarmament and the prevention of their re-emergence.

Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

  • Jeremy Littlewood, The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In: Crowley, Michael; Dando, Malcolm; Shang, Lijun (eds.), Preventing Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Disarmament as the Sciences Converge, London: Royal Society of Chemistry 2018, pp. 69-100.

In this text, readers get a concise overview of the history of the biological weapons prohibitions, including negotiations of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and of past biological weapons use. It then analyses the evolution of the BWC regime chronologically in three phases. The last section is dedicated to the implications of scientific and technological developments on the BWC regime. The text is useful for readers with an interest in norm and regime evolution. Prior knowledge of the main provisions of the BWC is not essential, but may help to fully appreciate the analysis presented in the text.

Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

  • Alexander Kelle, Prohibiting Chemical and Biological Weapons: Multilateral Regimes and Their Evolution, London: Lynne Rienner 2014.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the chemical and biological prohibition regimes from an institutionalist and regime theoretical perspective. It gives detailed overviews of all elements of both regimes and pays special attention to scientific and technological developments, export controls and the problem of non-state actors in their context. Having been published in 2014, it does not include the more recent developments, such as the repeated use of chemical weapons in the Syrian war and in assassinations. It is nevertheless a useful source for readers who wish to study either one of the two regimes, or both, holistically and with a theoretically informed perspective. 

Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

This paper provides an analysis of the problem of chemical weapons use in Syria. It briefly explains the background of the chemical weapons prohibition and control mechanism in general, before describing the investigation mechanisms and activities that have been applied in Syria since 2012, and also the related political dynamics. While the text does not cover the more recent activities of the Identification and Investigation Team (IIT) since 2018, it still informs readers about the situation in Syria up to then and also presents ideas for additional steps to deal with cases of non-compliance with the CWC. 

Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

Conventional Weapons

  • William E. Lippert (2024) How conventional arms control failures caused the Russo-Ukraine War, Defense & Security Analysis, 40:1, 138-160

William E. Lippert analyzes how failures in conventional arms control contributed to the Russo-Ukraine war. He examines Russian strategic policies, the breakdown of past arms control agreements, and their impact on regional security. Lippert focuses on the erosion of treaties such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, highlighting how weak enforcement mechanisms and growing geopolitical tensions fostered instability. By providing historical context and policy analysis, the article offers valuable insights for a university course on arms control, particularly in discussions of regional security and conflict prevention. Lippert’s work is best suited for graduate students, particularly those studying international relations, security policy, or European studies, as it assumes familiarity with Cold War-era arms control agreements and broader international security dynamics. 

  • Oelrich, I. (1990) Conventional arms control: the limits and their verification. [Cambridge, Mass.] : Lanham, Md: Center for Science and International Affairs ; University Press of America (CSIA occasional paper, no. 8).

To say that conventional arms control is not very popular now would be a gross understatement. With the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) almost irrelevant, it is hard to see the benefits once being associated with conventional arms control in Europe. In this vintage article, Oelrich lays out the fundamental goals of conventional arms control from a military perspective, and focuses on how issues like the reduction in force readiness or constraints on maneuvers can lead to an increase in stability. He also points to the problems of verifying conventional arms control treaties. Altough many current debates on arms control and disarmament are heavily influenced by normative aspects, Oelrich’s analysis is soberly grounded in a strategic analysis of how incentives for a military strike can be reduced. While students might feel that the text is out of time, it is a good start to understand the basic rationalist logic behind conventional arms control – in Europe and elsewhere. 

Suitable for: Undergraduates

Counter-Proliferation

  • Braut-Hegghammer, M. (2011) ‘Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks’, International Security, 36(1), pp. 101–132. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00046.

In this article, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer assesses the success of preventive, military counter-proliferation efforts by revisiting the1981 Israeli airstrike against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. By providing a new historical account of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, she argues that the Israeli attack not only intensified Iraq’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons, but also lead to a clandestine nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist. Integrating realist and liberal/domestic perspectives, Braut-Hegghammer also reveals that the delays in the Iraqi nuclear program were primarily caused by highly inept management. Therefore, the airstrike eventually proved counterproductive, even though it forced Iraq to adopt a more challenging technical route to make the bomb.

Suitable for: Advanced Undergraduates / Postgraduates

Cybersecurity

  • Jürgen Altmann (2019): Confidence and Security Building Measures for Cyber Forces. In: Christian Reuter (Ed.), Information Technology for Peace and Security, Springer, 2019, 203-219 (updated version coming)

Jürgen Altmann explores how confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) can be adapted to cyber forces to reduce risks and prevent cyber conflicts. He argues that, unlike traditional arms control, which struggles with enforceability in cyberspace, CSBMs offer a practical alternative by promoting transparency, cooperation, and predictability among cyber actors. Altmann emphasizes the need for mutual information exchange, doctrine-sharing, and voluntary cyber capability declarations to prevent escalation. A key contribution of this chapter is its insistence that CSBMs must involve both state and non-state actors, given the decentralized nature of cyber operations. The chapter is relevant within an arms control course as it expands the discussion beyond conventional weapons to the digital battlefield. While the text provides a comprehensive theoretical framework, it assumes familiarity with both arms control and cybersecurity concepts, making it most suitable for graduate students specializing in international security, cyber policy, or strategic studies. 

  • Altmann, J. (2019) ‘Confidence and Security Building Measures for Cyber Forces’, in Reuter, C. (ed.) Information Technology for Peace and Security: IT Applications and Infrastructures in Conflicts, Crises, War, and Peace. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, pp. 185–203. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-25652-4_9

The question whether or in how far classical instruments of arms control are applicable to the cyber realm has preoccupied arms control experts for years. Many would agree that “hard” controls and verification are difficult to implement when it comes to cyber weapons. Another classical instrument, developed by the UN and implemented in Europe by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)  are so-called Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), aiming at creating transparency and trust between actors. In this chapter from an edited volume completely devoted to cyber war and cyber peace, Jürgen Altmann debates the difficulties which arise when trying to apply classical arms control concepts such as verification. He concludes that as long as cyber arms control is not available, one has to settle for confidence and security building measures as a prior step. Two exciting topics are discussed with the text: It not only debates the problems of applying arms control to “cyber” in a reader-friendly way but is also suitable as an introduction to the topic of CSBMs. 

Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

Dual-Use/Export Controls

  • Vaynman, J., & Volpe, T. A. (2023). Dual Use Deception: How Technology Shapes Cooperation in International Relations. International Organization, 77: 3, 599–632. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818323000140

Jane Vaynman and Tristan Volpe (2023) develop in their paper a theoretical framework to assess the impact of technological dual-use characteristics on arms control agreements. By positioning dual-use items along two dimensions, their framework allows the translation of these technological characteristics into political possibilities or constraints. The two dimensions proposed and tested throughout the paper are the technologies’ degree of distinguishability (degree to which an item can be classified as for military of civilian use) and integration (into military use cases). Underlying this scheme is the information disclosure problem, arms controllers are confronted with for the verification of assets – a problem that is either intensified or mitigated depending on the technologies positioning within the two dimensions, according to the authors (p. 601). The result is four zones/hypothesis, situated along low to high degrees of distinguishability and integration (p. 611):

1. Permissive zone: distinguishable and niche (best prospects for arms control agreements)

      2. Detection constraints: indistinguishable and niche (modest prospects)

      3. Disclosure constraints: distinguishable and ubiquitous (modest prospects)

      4. Dead zone: indistinguishable and ubiquitous (worst prospects)

      Following, the article tests for these zones using previous arms control agreements and finds the assumptions majorly supported. Through the analysis of technologies characteristics, Vaynman and Volpe revitalize the discussion on verification and its importance for the likelihood of drafting an arms control agreement. Especially with new emerging technologies, a sound technical assessment framework to judge a technologies impact on the information disclosure problem, allows for an interesting perspective on arms control. As often discussed elsewhere as well, emerging technologies offer opportunities for verification regimes and this article took the first step to analyse them systematically.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates/ Postgraduates

      In their report, Nils Duquet and Dennis Vanden Auweele look at a relatively rarely studied phenomenon: gun violence throughout Europe. The main argument presented by the authors is that firearm trafficking significantly impacts gun violence in Europe, particularly in criminal contexts. The study highlights that while criminal gun violence is often perceived as the dominant form of gun-related crime, non-lethal firearm threats are far more prevalent than lethal incidents. It emphasizes that policies to combat gun violence are often reactive and event-driven, whereas a structural, intelligence-based approach is necessary. The text fits into the broader context of arms control by advocating for stricter legislative harmonization across Europe, improved law enforcement cooperation, and enhanced intelligence gathering to prevent firearms trafficking and misuse. However, the report is quite long and should only be used in excerpts in a seminar. In terms of content, however, there are no hurdles, so that excerpts can also be read by undergraduate students.

      The main argument presented by Diederik Cops is that the diversion of components of conventional weapons (CWC) is an increasingly recognized issue that requires targeted technological solutions. While full weapon systems have long been the focus of arms control efforts, the trade and misuse of individual components have received far less attention. The report assesses 14 emerging technologies, such as big data analysis, chemical encoding, and distributed ledger technology, as potential tools to prevent, detect, and identify diversion risks at different stages of the weapons supply chain. The advocates for improved monitoring, regulation, and cooperation between public and private stakeholders to curb illicit proliferation. The text is suitable as a counter to more conventional approaches where the full product is in the focus. It is easy to read and suitable for undergraduate and graduate students alike.

      European Union Policies

      In the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, the EU has become an extremely important player over the last couple of years. This is especially true in the areas of weapons of mass destruction, cyber, and small arms and light weapons (SALW). However, articles summarizing the EU’s efforts are surprisingly rare. In this text, Nils Duquet presents the 2018 EU strategy on illicit firearms. He puts the strategy into an historical context and presents earlier relevant initiatives on which the strategy rests. While the author hails the many positive elements the 2018 adds to already existing instruments, he also points towards the need to  upgrade member state’s arms export policies.  While the text does not feature any theoretical perspective in particular, it is a very helpful start to get to know the EU’s initiatives to combat illicit trade of small arms and light weapons.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      Export Controls 

      In this SIPRI research paper, SIPRI’s expert for arms export controls Kolja Brockmann describes how current export control efforts can be undermined by additive manufacturing (AM), better known as 3D printing. The text first summarizes the state of the art in 3D printing technologies and then describes how these technologies lead to proliferation risks in the fields of Small and Light Weapons or missiles technologies. Brockmann shows that 3D printing is or will become highly problematic even in the nuclear realm, for example when building centrifuges for enrichment or even “printing” a nuclear device. Finally, Brockmann debates how multilateral export control regimes can control AM itself. A general background on arms export regulations is helpful to follow the text, but not essential, and no theoretical knowledge is needed to follow the argument.

      Suitable for: Advanced Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems/AI 

      • Rosert, E., & Sauer, F. (2021). How (not) to stop the killer robots: A comparative analysis of humanitarian disarmament campaign strategies. Contemporary Security Policy, 42: 1, 4-29. 

      Using the example of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), this article deals with the question of how certain issues get onto the international arms control agenda and what role civil society or NGO campaigns can play and where the limits lie. Building on the observation that civil society criticism primarily relates to the (presumed) humanitarian problems of LAWS, this tendency to frame virtually every topic in humanitarian terms is subjected to critical scrutiny. The authors argue that such strategies are sometimes misguided, totalising and ‘consequentialist’ – as in the case of the LAWS. Rosert and Sauer conclude that the strategy of the ‘Campaign to Stop Killer Robots’, which aims at a legally binding ban on autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), will not be successful within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Instead, they argue in favour of focusing on the definition of ‘meaningful human control’ over critical functions in the target selection process in order to effectively regulate the development and use of such weapon systems.

      The text casts a critical light on campaigns without questioning the success of the campaign against killer robots as such and joins the growing number of articles that subject activist involvement in arms control to critical scrutiny. It can be seen as both a contribution to the actual debate, as well as to a more broader discourse on the role of civil society.

      Even if not everyone will like the authors’ arguments, it is likely to provoke debates in the classroom. On a theoretical level, the text is rooted in the broader norms literature, and therefore also uses a constructivist lens as analytical framework. It is best suited master’s students who are familiar with the topic of LAWS and arms control negotiations in general.

      The text discusses the current trend of militaries worldwide, that are increasingly interested in incorporating machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) into their operations to enhance effectiveness. It provides a brief but good overview on different aspects of this development and examples of the integration, from administrative tasks like recruiting and promotion to critical areas such as surveillance, early warning systems, and direct engagement on the battlefield. Based on that, it presents the challenges and risks of this AI driven military systems for international security. The text argues, that AI in military contexts introduce uncertainties and unintended consequences and analyses especially the limitations inherent in machine learning methods that could escalate the chances of inadvertent conflicts. To address these concerns and promote global stability, the text argues for the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as strategies designed to reduce the likelihood of accidental war by enhancing transparency and communication among nations. Given the rapid development of AI and its limitations, the text presents starting points to standards CBM measures for AI-enabled systems.
      The text “AI and International Stability Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” provides technical newcomers a useful start into the technology of AI, the current trends of its military application and the strategic background of this development. It also hightlights the special features of AI technology in terms of a potential regulation that provide a helpful basic set to understand the risks and challenges of this technology but also the fact, that security stabilizing measures are possible.

      Artificial intelligence is revolutionizing military operations, and with it comes a host of challenges for arms control. Paul Scharre and Megan Lamberth argue that AI-driven systems could speed up decision-making in warfare, increase the risk of unintended escalation, and make traditional verification mechanisms obsolete. At the same time, they explore how AI could be harnessed to enhance transparency and compliance monitoring. Their analysis fits into the broader arms control debate by emphasizing the need for adaptive governance structures that account for AI’s unique risks. Taking into account Paul Scharres and Megan Lamberth’s intensive knowledge and extremely long involvement with questions of the military use of AI, this text is a must-read for all those who deal with this topic. This paper is highly relevant to any modern arms control seminar. However, the text has many prerequisites and features a mix of policy and technical analysis and should therefore primarily be read by graduate students.

      Can the lessons of nuclear arms control help regulate artificial intelligence in warfare? Mauricio Baker believes so. He examines past verification mechanisms—such as intrusive inspections, cooperative transparency measures, and treaty monitoring—and explores how these could be applied to AI-based military technologies. A key issue he raises is that AI, unlike nuclear stockpiles, is intangible and difficult to track, making compliance assessments more complex. This paper contributes to the broader arms control discussion by bridging traditional verification methods with emerging technology governance. It aligns with regime theory, which studies how international agreements shape state behavior. Engaging and deeply analytical, this work is a strong fit for an arms control seminar, especially in discussions on treaty verification. Given its in-depth examination of compliance mechanisms, it is best suited for graduate and postgraduate students.

      • Thomas Reinhold (2022): Hard Arms Control for AI? In: Reinhold,T./ Schörnig, N. (Eds.), Armament, Arms Control and Artificial Intelligence. Springer: Cham, 2022, 151-162. 

      Thomas Reinhold challenges the assumption that AI cannot be regulated through traditional arms control measures. He proposes a novel component-based approach, suggesting that AI systems be broken down into training data, models, and effectors, allowing for selective and specific verification mechanisms. This argument counters the prevailing belief that AI’s intangibility makes it unsuitable for arms control. Reinhold acknowledges the theoretical nature of his approach, emphasizing that more research is needed before implementation. This chapter is highly relevant to arms control studies as it directly addresses the feasibility of AI regulation within existing frameworks. Given its conceptual complexity and policy implications, the text is best suited for postgraduate students in arms control, AI policy, and international law.

      • Niklas Schörnig (2022): Artificial Intelligence as an Arms Control Tool: Opportunities and Challenges. In: Reinhold, T/ Schörnig, N. (Eds.), Armament, Arms Control and Artificial Intelligence. Springer: Cham, 2022, 69-88.

      Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly discussed as a tool for enhancing arms control verification and compliance monitoring. Niklas Schörnig explores its potential applications, categorizing AI’s potential role into several key functions, including the translation and analysis of arms control documents, the examination of graphical and sensory data, and the integration of multimodal data sources. Based on existing studies, he shows the state of the art (as of 2022) and identifies future potential where AI can support verification measures. In the end he argues that while AI cannot replace human inspectors, it significantly enhances their capabilities by improving efficiency, accuracy, and data processing speed.

      This chapter is particularly relevant within an arms control course as it addresses one of the most pressing challenges in contemporary verification regimes—how to modernize and improve compliance mechanisms using AI-driven tools. Schörnig also cautions that AI’s reliance on vast datasets raises concerns about transparency and trust, as states may be reluctant to base policy decisions on AI-generated findings. The paper provides an overview and invites students to explore for themselves where new developments have taken place since publication. Given its balance between theoretical and technical discussions, this chapter is suitable for graduate students specializing in arms control, security policy, and emerging technologies. Its insights into AI-driven verification could also be valuable for postgraduate researchers in international law and disarmament studies.

      Means of Delivery

      • Wilkening, D. (2019) ‘Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Stability’, Survival, 61(5), pp. 129–148. doi:10.1080/00396338.2019.1662125.

      This article by Dean Wilkening offers a neorealist analysis on hypersonic weapons and their effects on strategic stability. After explaining the three different types of hypersonic weapons and the concept of strategic stability, Wilkening examines how these systems could affect crisis stability and arms race stability. In his analysis, he argues that the substantial maneuverability and high speed of hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles could contribute to inadvertent escalation. Similarly, Wilkening claims that hypersonic weapons are hard to defend against and will foster an intense offense-defense competition. Finally, the author explores several approaches which could ameliorate the destabilizing effects of hypersonic weapons, but finds none of them promising.

      Suitable for: Advanced Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      • Tracy, C.L. and Wright, D. (2020) ‘Modeling the Performance of Hypersonic Boost-Glide Missiles’, Science & Global Security, 28(3), pp. 135–170. doi:10.1080/08929882.2020.1864945.

      In this article, Cameron L. Tracy and David Wright model the performance of hypersonic boost-glide vehicles using a new computational model and a notional glide vehicle based on a real-world experimental glider tested by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Their calculations challenge the widespread assumptions that hypersonic boost-glide vehicles would be faster than traditional ballistic missiles and that they could evade existing early warning systems. In order to explain this mismatch between perceived and actual technical capabilities, Tracy and Wright draw on the sociology of technology and argue that erroneous facts about hypersonic weapons have been socially constructed by the organizations developing these systems.

      Suitable for: Postgraduates

      Miscellaneous: Autonomous Weapons

      • Altmann, J. and Sauer, F. (2017) ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability’, Survival, 59(5), pp. 117–142. doi:10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263.

      Since 2014, there has been a debate within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva whether (lethal) autonomous weapon system (LAWS) should be banned. The main arguments brought forward by proponents of a ban or at least a regulation of these emerging weapon systems have focused on ethical and legal aspects, e.g. the assumption that LAWS will violate International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In their text, Altmann and Sauer approach autonomous weapons from a classical state-security-oriented perspective. They ask how automated and autonomous weapons would impact on stability – both crisis as well as strategic stability – and whether (and if so: how) classical arms control concepts like verification can be applied to the new technology. The authors conclude that the acceleration of warfare will have a tremendous negative impact on stability, thus supporting the call for regulation or even a ban with classic security-related arguments.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      Miscellaneous: Drones

      • Horowitz, M., Schwartz, J.A. and Fuhrmann, M. (2022) ‘Who’s prone to drone? A global time-series analysis of armed uninhabited aerial vehicle proliferation’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 39(2), pp. 119–142. doi:10.1177/0738894220966572.

      Almost no emerging military technology has been discussed as intensively as the armed drone. Surprisingly, there are nevertheless relatively few empirical studies that underpin the often emotional debate with facts. In their article, Horowitz, Schwartz and Fuhrmann build on earlier work based on their original time-series dataset on drone proliferation, looking for the driving forces behind the current increase in drone proliferation. Based on a comprehensive statistical analysis, they conclude that former theories arguing that democracies are more prone to drones have to be rejected. In fact, the opposite is the fact: After the 2010s, non-democracies have been more likely to acquire armed drones due to China entering the world marked. While security threats are a non-surprising factor for drone procurement, the authors also show that status seeking – a constructivist perspective – is also a relevant factor explaining drone proliferation. 

      Suitable for: Postgraduates

      Miscellaneous: Emerging Technologies

      • Vaynman, J., & Volpe, T. A. (2023). Dual Use Deception: How Technology Shapes Cooperation in International Relations. International Organization, 77(3), 599–632. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818323000140.

      In their paper, Jane Vaynman and Tristan Volpe (2023) develop a theoretical framework to assess the impact of technological dual-use characteristics on arms control agreements. By positioning dual-use items along two dimensions, their framework allows the translation of these technological characteristics into political possibilities or constraints. The two dimensions proposed and tested throughout the paper are the technologies’ degree of distinguishability (degree to which an item can be classified as for military of civilian use) and integration (into military use cases). Underlying this scheme is the information disclosure problem (transparency for monitoring risks to disclose other capabilities) which arms controllers are confronted with for the verification of assets – a problem that is either intensified or mitigated depending on the technologies positioning within the two dimensions, according to the authors (p. 601). The result is four zones/hypothesis, situated along low to high degrees of distinguishability and integration (p. 611):

      1. Permissive zone: distinguishable and niche (best prospects for arms control agreements)
      2. Detection constraints: indistinguishable and niche (modest prospects)
      3. Disclosure constraints: distinguishable and ubiquitous (modest prospects)
      4. Dead zone: indistinguishable and ubiquitous (worst prospects)

      Following, the article tests for these zones using previous arms control agreements and finds the assumptions majorly supported.  

      Through the analysis of technologies’ characteristics, Vaynman and Volpe revitalize the discussion on verification and its importance for the likelihood of drafting an arms control agreement. Especially with emerging technologies, a sound technical assessment framework to judge a technology’s impact on the information disclosure problem, allows for an updated perspective on arms control.

      Suitable for: Postgraduates

      • Vaynman, J. (2021). Better Monitoring and Better Spying: The Implications of Emerging Technology for Arms Control (Fall 2021). Texas National Security Review:, 4(4). https://doi.org/10.26153/TSW/17498

      In her article, Jane Vaynman (2021) challenges policy makers to refocus on the importance of verification in the design of arms control regimes. The proposed theoretical framework utilises three indicators to evaluate the effect of emerging technologies on the likelihood successful of arms control agreements based on the security-transparency trade-off.

      The first part of the article introduces the reader to the security-transparency trade-off in the nexus of arms control: to be transparent for monitoring and verification purposes, comes with cost for national security. This means, that, through monitoring measures, capabilities outside the agreement – both in the security and economical realm – could be monitored by the verifying party. Hence, she cautions against the fallacy of assuming that technological advantage to gather more information often ascribed to emerging technologies strengthens verification. Rather, the technical assessment should consider three implications when it comes to the evaluation of technology

      1. Unilateral monitoring

      Improved capabilities to monitor capabilities non-intrusively make agreements more likely, because transparency does not come at cost of security.

      • Demonstratable control

      For more intrusive monitoring forms, the extent to which the quality and quantity of data collection can be demonstrated decides on the states willingness to accept such intrusion.

      • Concealment

      Technological advantage can improve capabilities to conceal agreement violations or deceive the verifier. Hence more transparency is needed to verify which comes at higher security cost.

      After this methodological introduction, the article applies this framework to small satellites, drones, additive manufacturing and artificial intelligence. Considering that “Technological change has the potential to significantly alter how states parties to an agreement get compliance information.” (p. 54), Vaynman concludes that more research has to be conducted to refine the proposed model as well as adding further analytical dimensions.

      Overall, the article offers a good introduction into the security-transparency trade-off in arms control monitoring and verification. Even though, the concept itself is not new and the evaluation scheme presented here is to some degree subjective, Vaynman’s approach of pinning down the three factors for a technological assessment, makes the latter more accessible and offers an interesting starting point in the debate surrounding emerging technologies and arms control verification.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      Missile Defense

      • Lewis, G. and von Hippel, F. (2018) ‘Limitations on ballistic missile defense—Past and possibly future’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74(4), pp. 199–209. doi:10.1080/00963402.2018.1486575.

      This article by George Lewis and Frank von Hippel describes the past, present, and future of United States missile defense programs, including the rise and fall of the 1972 US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and Ronald Reagan’s vision of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). From a realist point of view, the authors highlight the adverse consequences of deploying strategic-capable ballistic missile defense systems and the potential of a renewed offense-defense competition between the United States and other nuclear powers, especially Russia and China. Finally, Lewis and von Hippel discuss six approaches – technical fixes, arms control agreements, cooperation on missile defense, transparency, restraint, and diplomacy – to limit the impact ballistic missile defense deployments.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      • Arbatov, A. (2018) ‘The vicissitudes of Russian missile defense’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74(4), pp. 227–237. doi:10.1080/00963402.2018.1486595.

      In this article from the same issue, Alexey Arbatov explains the history of Russian missile defense programs, as well as Russian perceptions of US missile defense systems. Rather than limiting his analysis to strategic considerations derived from the realist paradigm, Arbatov argues that Russia’s vision of missile defense – including its steadfast opposition against US ballistic missile defense systems – should be attributed at least partly to other political factors, personal grievances, and the peculiarities of Soviet/Russian decision-making procedures on matters of military and defense. Moreover, the author evaluates the likelihood of a new agreement on missile defense between Russia and the United States, and outlines how such a deal could look like.

      Suitable for: Advanced Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      • Tsypkin, M. (2009) ‘Russian Politics, Policy-Making and American Missile Defence’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 85(4), pp. 781–799.

      This article by Michael Tsypkin addresses Russia’s response to US missile defense deployments in Central Europe. Tsypkin uses a liberal perspective and argues that the domestic political context in Putin’s Russia is crucial for understanding the forceful Russian reaction. In doing so, he demonstrates how a combination of anxieties that Russia could loose its nuclear weapons, domestic popularity of the great power status, worst-case threat assessments by the intelligence services, Putin’s reluctance to consult experts, and the Russian elite’s worldview have shaped Russian politics and policy-making. In addition, Tsypkin argues that US-Russian strategic miscommunication has exacerbated Russian worst-case thinking, and that the prospects for an agreement about missile defense in Europe look dim.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      Nuclear Arms Control

      • Adler, E. (1992) ‘The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control’, International Organization, 46(1), pp. 101–145.

      In this social-constructivist study, Emanuel Adler explains that nuclear strategy and arms control theory are not based on rigorous scientific principles, but on a set of unproven, nonscientific suppositions. In the remainder of the article, he analyzes how the core ideas of arms control – devised by a small number of national intellectuals affiliated with the RAND Corporation in the United States – were diffused into US government circles, the Soviet Union, and eventually became the foundation for arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Adler concludes by arguing that the beliefs established by the arms control epistemic community were a necessary condition for creating the arms control architecture during the Cold War.

      Suitable for: Postgraduates

      • Schelling, T.C. (1985) ‘What Went Wrong with Arms Control?’, Foreign Affairs, 64(2), pp. 219–233. doi:10.2307/20042570.

      This remarkably timely classic by Thomas Schelling explores why arms control has gone awry following the implementation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 1972. In his essentially realist essay, he argues that arms control has become an end in itself, rather than a set of measures to achieve strategic objectives. Among other things, Schelling identifies a lack of coherent theory about what arms control is meant to accomplish, a fixation on formal negotiations and treaties, as well as an unduly focus on numbers and categories of weapons – instead of their character – as some of the main culprits. In the last section, Schelling also reaffirms his belief in the principles of mutual deterrence.

      Suitable for: Advanced Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      • Tannenwald, N. (2020) ‘Life beyond Arms Control: Moving toward a Global Regime of Nuclear Restraint & Responsibility’, Daedalus, 149(2), pp. 205–221. doi:10.1162/daed_a_01798.

      As formal arms control treaties come out of fashion, this article by Nina Tannenwald explores alternative measures to formal, legally binding binding international agreements. Tannenwald does not endorse a particular theoretical perspective, but she calls for a global regime of restraint and responsibility that would aim to reduce the risk of nuclear use and strengthen the norms of nuclear restraint. In doing so, Tannenwald outlines three principles on which the regime would rest on, and she proposes 12 specific measures that governments could implement. Finally, she makes the case that pressure from civil society will be crucial for fostering nuclear restraint and making her proposed agenda feasible.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      Nuclear Weapons

      • Talmadge, Caitlin, Lisa Michelini, and Vipin Narang. 2024. “When Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Adversary Perceptions of Nuclear No-First-Use Pledges.” International Security 48: 4, 7–46. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00482.

      This paper examines the credibility of nuclear no-first-use (NFU) pledges from the perspective of adversaries. It argues that such pledges are deemed credible only under two conditions: (1) when the political relationship between the pledging state and its adversary is relatively benign, or (2) when the pledging state’s military lacks the capability to execute a nuclear first strike. The authors analyze historical NFU declarations by the Soviet Union, China, and India, finding that these favorable conditions are rare. Consequently, they suggest that changes in declaratory policy alone are insufficient to convince adversaries to discount the possibility of nuclear first use without concurrent shifts in political relations or military capabilities. This paper is particularly relevant for Master’s students in International Relations, especially those focusing on security studies and nuclear policy. It draws on the literature of signalling, emphasizing the importance of perceptions, credibility, and the interplay between declaratory policies and material capabilities in international security dynamics.

      • Evangelista, Matthew (2024): A “Nuclear Umbrella” for Ukraine? Precedents and Possibilities for Postwar European Security. In: International Security, 48:3, 7-50.

      The text by Matthew Evangelista discusses alternatives to nuclear deterrence for Ukraine’s post-war security, emphasizing historical perspectives and contemporary implications. Evangelista challenges the assumption that nuclear deterrence alone can maintain peace, referencing Cold War instances where deterrence almost led to catastrophe (e.g., the Berlin crisis). Instead, he suggests a “non-offensive defense” model, combining civilian-based resistance and limited, non-provocative military capabilities. This approach, rooted in peace research during the Cold War, proposes maintaining security without exacerbating the security dilemma that often fuels conflicts.

      The article’s new contribution is the application of Cold War “common security” concepts, like non-offensive defense, to Ukraine’s situation. By prioritizing defensive strategies and transparency, this model could reduce dependency on nuclear deterrence, thus offering a potential roadmap for stable, nuclear-free European security.

      Evangelista’s text is best suited for students in advanced studies (mainly Master’s level), as it assumes familiarity with Cold War history, nuclear deterrence theory, and the security dilemma concept. Basic knowledge of NATO’s role and Cold War crises, such as the Berlin crisis, would be advantageous for understanding the arguments fully.

      • Onderco, Michal/Smetana, Michal/ Etienne, Tom W. (2023): “Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weapons post-Ukraine,” in: Global Policy, 14:2, 305–317

      The study by Michal Onderco, Michal Smetana, and Tom W. Etienne explores shifts in European public opinion on nuclear weapons post-Russian invasion of Ukraine. Surveying German and Dutch populations in 2020 and again in 2022, the authors find a marked increase in support for nuclear deterrence and a reduced inclination to withdraw US nuclear weapons from Europe. The invasion has fostered “hawkish” attitudes, making nuclear deterrence more acceptable, while support for disarmament measures has diminished. This suggests a shift toward alignment with NATO’s nuclear strategy, especially concerning the deterrence provided by US nuclear presence in Europe. What makes the text particularly interesting is its comparative longitudinal approach, which illustrates how significant geopolitical events can alter public opinion, challenging the narrative that Europeans are uniformly opposed to nuclear deterrence.
      This text, which is based on a constructivist perspective of international relations, is more suitable for advanced studies (Master’s level) in International Relations due to its theoretical depth and assumption of familiarity with nuclear policy and deterrence theories. Knowledge of public opinion theory and NATO’s nuclear strategy would enhance understanding.

      The text by Tytti Erästö’s critically examines the reliance of non-nuclear-armed allied states—or “umbrella states”—on nuclear deterrence provided by nuclear-armed patrons. This reliance is integral to the defense strategies of NATO members, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Belarus, aiming to enhance deterrence credibility against adversaries. The central argument challenges the security benefits of forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons and doctrines permitting their first use. Erästö points out that umbrella states scarcely spell out how nuclear deterrence contributes to their security. Instead, she argues for conventional deterrence strategies and no first use or sole purpose postures. Erästö highlights the growing dependence on nuclear deterrence due to global tensions, nuclear investments by armed states, and declining arms control. Examples include Poland and South Korea’s openness to hosting U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons and a review of the reserved attitude of NATO-members towards changes in the US nuclear doctrine. The text critiques nuclear deterrence assumptions and advocates for defense strategies reducing nuclear reliance, offering alternative measures for long-term security and stability. The text offers a critical perspective on contemporary discussions of nuclear weapons in military alliances and deterrence policies. The benefit of nuclear weapons for a state’s security is challenged without denying that (conventional) deterrence strategies can contribute to the security of an actor under the perception of being threatened by another state. The paper offers practical policy recommendations for reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons for states participating in nuclear-sharing agreements and those who have an interest in it. The text is targeted at master students, as basic knowledge of the role of nuclear weapons in the global order, several regional conflicts and nuclear policies is required.

      • Cohn, C. (1987) ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’, Signs, 12(4), pp. 687–718.

      This classic by Carol Cohn examines the language used by defense intellectuals through a feminist lens. In her article, Cohn claims that the sanitized, “technostrategic” language about nuclear weapons and nuclear war so prevalent in think tank, government, and universities allows both speakers and listeners to ignore the horrors and human suffering which any nuclear exchange would entail. Moreover, Cohn discusses the plethora of sexual connotations used in professional discourse on nuclear strategy, such as “deep penetration” or “thrust-to-weight ratios.” She further contends that technostrategic language severely limits what is considered a politically relevant opinion, and that it effectively portrays critics who do not speak this language as irrational.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      • Sagan, S.D. (1997) ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, 21(3), pp. 54–86. doi:10.1162/isec.21.3.54.

      In this seminal article on nuclear proliferation, Scott Sagan challenges the realist notion that states acquire nuclear weapons to enhance their national security. Drawing on the liberal and constructivist traditions in international relations theory, he develops two alternative models: the domestic politics and the norms model. Sagan argues that states acquire or abandon nuclear weapons not merely because of narrow security considerations, but also due to domestic parochial and bureaucratic interests, and due to the symbolic function of the atomic bomb. This argument is supported by case studies on India, South Africa, France, and Ukraine. In addition, Sagan outlines how the three models should affect US nonproliferation policy.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      • Sagan, S.D. and Weiner, A.S. (2021) ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine’, International Security, 45(4), pp. 126–166. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00407.

      This article by Scott Sagan and Allen Weiner analyzes how the law of armed conflict applies to US nuclear doctrine and war planning. By applying the key principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution to nuclear strategy, the authors argue that the law of armed conflict would allow for some, but certainly not all, counterforce strikes against legitimate military targets. Any attack on civilians, on the other hand, would be illegal. Sagan and Weiner also discuss the legal concept of belligerent reprisals and conclude that they are prohibited under customary international law. Finally, the authors explore the implications of their analysis and call for changes in US nuclear doctrine and decision-making procedures.

      Suitable for: Advanced Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      • Tannenwald, N. (1999) ‘The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use’, International Organization, 53(3), pp. 433–468. doi:10.1162/002081899550959.

      In this article, Nina Tannenwald suggests that deterrence and other realist arguments cannot explain why nuclear weapons have never been used again after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, she introduces a social-constructivist account into the study of nuclear non-use and argues that a normative element – the nuclear taboo – is necessary to explain this phenomenon. After introducing her idea of the nuclear taboo, Tannenwald discusses three types of normative effects and compares her explanation to more prevalent, materialist accounts. Finally, she analyzes the role of the taboo in four empirical cases: Japan in 1945, the Korean War in the 1950s, the Vietnam War during the 60s, and the 1991 Gulf War.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      NWFZs

      • Mendenhall, Elizabeth (2020): “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Contemporary Arms Control,” in: Strategic Studies Quarterly, 14:4, 122-151.

      Elizabeth Mendenhall’s article assesses the role of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in the contemporary nuclear landscape, termed the “second nuclear age.” While nuclear modernization trends have intensified, NWFZs continue to offer a nonproliferation and disarmament mechanism by prohibiting nuclear activities within specific regions. Mendenhall’s primary contribution is her exploration of three new potential NWFZs in the Middle East, Arctic, and Northeast Asia, highlighting these as incremental arms control measures. Unlike traditional NWFZs, these would need tailored frameworks to address regional challenges, such as strategic security concerns, complex verification needs, and the nuclear powers’ participation.

      The study argues that new or modified NWFZs could foster regional security by creating gradual restraints on nuclear activities, even in sensitive zones like the Arctic. Mendenhall emphasizes that success depends on adaptability within the NWFZ model, allowing each zone’s design to align with unique regional dynamics, potentially accommodating limited nuclear presences to support broader disarmament.

      This text is suited for advanced International Relations students, especially at the Master’s level, due to its theoretical depth and familiarity with nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, and regional security structures. The article draws on Constructivist theories, addressing how norms and regional alliances influence nuclear disarmament efforts and affect global security dynamics.

      Proliferation Crises

      • Kim, M. (2021) ‘Why Nuclear? Explaining North Korea’s Strategic Choice of Going Nuclear and Its Implications for East Asian Security’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 56(7), pp. 1488–1502. doi:10.1177/0021909620971338.

      In this article, Min-hyung Kim explains why North Korea has decided to go nuclear. By drawing on various theoretical perspectives, he argues that North Korea pursues nuclear weapons to safeguard its independence from external powers and to ensure regime security. In contrast to many realist accounts, however, Kim conceptualizes regime security not just as “national security” – he factors in internal security, too. With that in mind, the article makes the case that nuclear weapons do not only protect North Korea from foreign aggression, but also enhance the Supreme Leader’s domestic power and legitimacy. After exploring the implications of a nuclear North Korea for East Asian security, Kim argues that Pyongyang is highly unlikely to renounce its nuclear arsenal.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Graduates

      Regional Security

      • Kühn, U. (2019) ‘Between a rock and a hard place: Europe in a post-INF world’, The Nonproliferation Review, 26(1–2), pp. 155–166. doi:10.1080/10736700.2019.1593677.

      When it comes to conventional European arms control, the Russian invasion in Ukraine has rendered almost all texts written before 2022 outdated. While all articles acknowledge the deep crisis in arms control between the West and Russia, almost all focus on the remaining potential to somehow find working arms control anyway. This text by Ulrich Kühn is no exception. However, it is still a worthwhile read. Based on the concepts of strategic stability and crisis stability, Kühn debates the European options after the end of the INF treaty. He predicts that the US will develop INF-missiles to counter Russia and China, which will lead to a debate within NATO about a new round of missile deployment. Kühn believes that this debate has the potential to significantly weaken NATO. While not in favor of missile deployment, Kühn nevertheless points towards a “number of different military options … below the level of deploying new INF missiles in Europe,” thereby arguing for a stronger military position of Europe vis-à-vis Russia years before the war in Ukraine.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      Space

      • Grossfeld, Elena. 2024. “Russia’s Declining Satellite Reconnaissance Capabilities and Its Implications for Security and International Stability.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 38: 1, 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2024.2330848.

      The article examines the decline in Russia’s satellite reconnaissance capabilities and its implications for arms control and international stability. It argues that systemic issues in Russia—corruption, brain drain, and reliance on outdated infrastructure—have stalled its ability to recover from the Cold War-era parity in satellite intelligence with the United States. Despite increased investments in its space program, persistent failures, economic sanctions, and the war in Ukraine have exacerbated these issues. For arms control, the consequences are significant. Russia’s reduced satellite capabilities undermine its ability to verify compliance with arms-control treaties, a critical function historically enabled by reconnaissance satellites. Verification mechanisms relying on satellite imagery played a pivotal role in enabling trust and compliance during the Cold War. Russia’s decline in this area raises uncertainties about the feasibility of verifying future nuclear agreements, particularly as the New START treaty is set to expire in 2026. The lack of reliable verification systems diminishes prospects for new agreements and increases the risk of mistrust and arms races. Moreover, Russia’s technological limitations and inability to match Western satellite capabilities drive its focus toward anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons development. These efforts threaten the peaceful use of space and further complicate arms control discussions, as reliance on space-based systems for treaty verification is a cornerstone of strategic stability. Russia’s declining satellite capabilities, coupled with its ASAT advancements, destabilize the framework for future nuclear arms agreements and undermine global efforts to maintain stability. This article is particularly relevant for Master’s students in International Relations and security studies. It adopts a realist perspective, focusing on the interplay between technological asymmetry and strategic stability, highlighting the critical role of space-based intelligence in arms control and global security.

      The article by James Clay Moltz is located in the field of Strategic Studies and provides the necessary foundation for anyone who wants to approach 21st Century Space Security. The focus of this research are the power dynamics in space between the three dominant space actors United States, Russia and China. This text mainly focuses on the concept of power and how power in space is shaped by state actors, but also addresses how recent trends in the commercial sector feed into the space power question.

      The first half of the text is taking a historical approach to late Cold War power determinants in the space domain and the early post-Cold War period, characterized by US dominance.  In the second part, Moltz focusses on “Russia’s Resurgence” and “China’s Rise” (73), and explains how the concept of space power has been reshaped in the 21st century. His main argument states that, while Cold War Era and early 2000s space determinants were based on a “technocratic” model, which was characterized by a high military involvement and slow top-down innovations, the 21st Century Space Power model is a “netocratic” one that is networked, commercially led and bottom-up innovative. He then proceeds to analyze current trends of the now-established main space powers, those being USA, Russia and China, in regard of commercialization, technological innovation and space-based capabilities.

      Moltz concludes that while the vibrant commercial trend towards space favors the US and argues that the tight state control over private initiatives in Russia or China is a “less effective organization principle” and concludes that “state-led strategies are more likely to fail” (89). However, he cautions that the “vibrant, emerging commercial space start-up sector” of the US “does not mean it can assume future US power relative to its adversaries” (88) if policy makers do not “develop and follow through on initiatives aimed at institutionalizing strong US public-private and allied links in space” and continue to move ”from Cold War ‘technocracy’ to twenty-first-century ‘netocracy.’” (89) – a wake-up call to all Western countries engaged in space.

      In sum, this article provides an interesting historically orientated classification of Space Security and its power dynamics at play, addressing recent questions regarding the role of private firms in the current space race.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates/ Postgraduates

      • Mutschler, M.M. (2013) ‘Space Weapons and Arms Control’, in Mutschler, M.M. (ed.) Arms Control in Space: Exploring Conditions for Preventive Arms Control. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK (Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series), pp. 104–148. doi:10.1057/9781137320643_5.

      This book chapter by Max Mutschler offers an excellent insight into the militarization of space, starting with the Sputnik-shock in 1957. Mutschler debates what kind of weapons can be stationed in space, e.g. Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT), and points to the difficulties defining a space weapon. He then shifts to arms control in space, i.e. the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. Mutschler shows himself to be an excellent expert on national space programs. While this chapter 5 from his broader book on “Arms Control in Space” does not refer to any particular theory but features a very thick empirical description, the overall book is guided by “Preventive Arms Control”-theory and tries to identify conditions for preventive arms control theory to work. So, other chapters might be of interest as well, for example the chapter on regime theory and preventive arms control (chapter 3). Sometimes the text is very fact-heavy and a bit tough to read, but this is made up for by the wealth of information conveyed in a short space.

      Suitable for: Postgraduates

      Traffics

      In this report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the authors debate the two contradictory perspectives with which arms deliveries to the security forces of fragile states can be viewed. On the one hand, equipping security forces in fragile states can be seen as a precondition for stability and the execution of statehood. On the other hand, arms exports to fragile states might lead to more violence and instability rather than less. Based on empirical case studies, the authors focus on the question how the former effect can be achieved while limiting potential negative countering effects. Here, up-to-date information is key and multilateral measures on the supply side are recommended. In the heated debate about arms exports, this sober analysis is a very helpful contribution. Showing that a sheer black or white position might turn out counterproductive, the text calls for a nuanced debate.  

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates

      United Nations

      Since the end of World War II, the UN has become one of the most active and important player when it comes to international disarmament. In her online learning unit on the UN Disarmament Machinery, which is accessible free of charge and without registration, Dall’Arche offers a comprehensive overview of the history of the UN’s efforts, as well as an insight into the UN Disarmament Machinery’s architecture — including the Conference on Disarmament, the UN Secretary General’s Agenda for Disarmament or the Security Council. Dall’Arche also describes the UN bodies supporting the machinery in detail, e.g. UNIDIR, UNODA or the Regional Centers for Peace and Disarmament. Finally, the unit describes major accomplishments within the framework of the machinery as well as shortcomings and improvements. Without any theoretical bias, the unit is an excellent introduction to the UN Disarmament Machinery for everyone who needs a quick yet comprehensive introduction. 

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Postgraduates without prior knowledge

      WMD Terrorism

      • Danzig, R. et al. (2012) Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons. Center for a New American Security. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06323 (Accessed: 11 March 2022).

      This extensive case study explores the biological and chemical weapons programs by Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese apocalyptic cult which killed 13 people in the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack. Based on interviews with former Aum members, the authors describe the genesis of the cult as well as its WMD program. From these insights, they derive lessons for understanding attempts by other terrorist groups to acquire chemical and biological weapons. Among other things, it is thought that chemical weapons are more accessible than biological weapons, and that dissemination of the agents is likely to burden terrorist groups. Nevertheless, the authors argue that non-state actors may eventually achieve their goals despite many operational failures in the process.

      Suitable for: Undergraduates / Graduates

      • McIntosh, C. and Storey, I. (2018) ‘Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism’, International Studies Quarterly, 62(2), pp. 289–300. doi:10.1093/isq/sqx087.

      In this article, Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey challenge the conventional wisdom and claim that terrorist groups would be unlikely to detonate a nuclear weapon in an attack even if they could acquire one. The authors provide three main reasons for their realist argument. Firstly, a nuclear attack would involve significant opportunity costs because it may preclude other effective strategies such as the use of chemical weapons or conventional explosives. Secondly, terrorist groups are risk-averse and would likely face the risk of complete elimination if they were to use a nuclear weapon. Thirdly, victory for a terrorist group may not necessarily translate into the end of hostilities with a state actor.

      Suitable for: Postgraduates

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